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ABS TRACT
The general purpose of this study is to look at the post-
war economic reconstruction of Lebanon. More specifically, our
primary aim is to examine, within the context of development
theory, the institutional arrangement for implementing the
various reconstruction programmes. In order to address these
points, we will need to examine several important issues: How
the economic leadership of post-war Lebanon has developed; what
the institutions providing economic leadership have been; what
plans have been developed for Lebanon's reconstruction; what
groups have participated in the reconstruction; and what the
principal obstacles to the economic reconstruction of the
country have been.
We will argue that the institutional arrangement is
inappropriate for implementing the recovery programme. In part,
because of the institutional arrangement, the recovery programme
has suffered, and it is conceivable that the programme may fail
to strengthen the Lebanese economy.
The information collected for this study originated from
three main sources including: material obtained from library
research in the U.K.,; material collected in Lebanon from
organisations, institutions, and individuals involved in the
recovery programme; and material acquired from a series of
unstructured interviews conducted in Lebanon in the winter of
1997 with individuals intimately associated with the
reconstruction, prominent opponents of the system, and general
observers of the Lebanese scene.
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1Chapter One: Introduction
1. Objective of Study
In the aftermath of Lebanon's sixteen year "civil war"
(from 1975 to 1990), the current Lebanese government is pursuing
an ambitious programme to revitalise the Lebanese economy with
the ultimate aim, as Rafiq Hariri, the current Lebanese Prime
Minister and the public face of the reconstruction initiative,
put it, "to make Lebanon the centre of financial and business
activity in the region."1
The mere implementation of such a programme, let alone its
success, would be an impressive feat. Dr. Nasser Saidi, First
Vice Governor of Lebanon's Central Bank, has argued that: "The
economic, social, and organisational structures inherited from
the pre-war period are, in many cases, either inadequate or
inappropriate as a foundation for the rebuilding of the
Lebanon." 2
 Whether or not this is strictly true, reforms will
certainly prove difficult to implement. Thus, ihe task the
Hariri government has set for itself is very daunting. In fact,
in 1995, Dr. Saidi estimated that the reconstruction would take
at least one generation to complete.3
The general purpose of this study is to look at the post-
1 Quoted in MEED (4 February 1994), 20.
2 Nasser Saidi, "Financing Reconstruction: Issues &
Opportunities", unpublished paper delivered at the Financial
Times sponsored Conference Lebanon Toward 2000: Opportunities
for Finance and Investment in a Re-emerging Market, (Beit Men,
Lebanon: 8-9 June, 1995), 2.
3Ibid,2.
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In the aftermath of Lebanon's sixteen year "civil war"
(from 1975 to 1990), the current Lebanese government is pursuing
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at least one generation to complete.3
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2war economic reconstruction of Lebanon. More specifically, our
primary aim is to examine, within the context development
theory, the institutional arrangement for implementing the
various reconstruction programmes. In order to address these
points, we will need to examine several important issues: How
the economic leadership of post-war Lebanon has developed; what
the organisations providing economic leadership have been; what
plans have been developed for Lebanon's reconstruction; what
groups have participated in the reconstruction; and what the
principal obstacles to the economic reconstruction of the
country have been. We will argue that the institutional
arrangement is inappropriate for implementing the recovery
programme. In part, as a consequence of the institutional
arrangement, the recovery programme has suffered, and it is
conceivable that the programme may even fail to strengthen the
Lebanese economy, let alone fail to help Beirut regain its
status as a regional financial and commercial centre.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the post-war economic
reconstruction, it will be useful to review briefly political
and economic conditions in Lebanon from 1943 to 1990 in order to
place the reconstruction in its historical context.
2. The Historical Context
An extensive body of literature pertaining to Lebanon is
available in the West. Before 1975, the tone of this literature
was generally optimistic. 4 Much praise was directed toward the
' In particular, see Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in
Lebanon, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966); and Elie Adib
Salem, Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience
(London: Indiana University Press, 1973). A notable exception to
3genius of Lebanon's political and economic systems, which
provided the religiously divided country with relative stability
in a region fraught with political and econonic upheaval. So
impressed were the experts that the Lebanese political system
was hailed as a potential model for other heterogeneous
societies such as Northern Ireland and Cyprus.5
2.1 The Lebanese Political System: 1943-1975
The political system which existed in Lebanon from the
l940s to the early 1970s essentially conforms to the political
model of "consociational democracy" which was developed in the
1960s through the political scientist Arend Lijphart's research
into how societies deeply divided along communal lines managed
their latent conflicts. Consociational democracy can be defined
as: "government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy
with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy."6
According to Lijphart, several important conditions of social
structure, and of mass political culture, are prerequisites for
a successful consociational democracy. First, there must be
clear boundaries between subcultures, as limited contacts
between groups tend to lessen the chance of hostility.
	 As
this is Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political
Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968).
For more information regarding this point, see Myron
Weiner's chapter on political change in the developing world.
Myron Weiner, "Political Change: Asia, Africa and the Middle
East", in Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (eds.),
Understanding Political Development (Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Foresman/Little, Brown Higher Education, 1987), 36.
6 Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", World Politics
21, no.2 (1969), 216.
4Quincy Wright explained, ideologies accepted by different groups
within a society may be inconsistent without creating tension.
The chance of greater tension arises only when the groups are in
close contact. 7
 A second condition, however, stresses the
necessity for elites within each group to work closely together,
while at the same time maintaining the loyalty of their
followers. A major threat to the system may occur if elites lose
control over their followers. 8 A third condition is the
existence of a multiple balance of power among subcultures. For
instance, in a dual culture society, the tendency is for the
majority culture to attempt to dominate the other culture.
However, in societies with several subcultures, none of which
holds a clear majority, the likelihood is greater that the elite
groups will be willing to cooperate with each other. 9 A fourth
condition is a relatively low total load on the system. The
stability of the system can be weighed in terms of its capacity
to handle increased demands. Writing in 1968, Lijphart contended
that the loads on the Lebanese system were not great and that
this helped to explain its stability.10
Lebanese society has been deeply divided for centuries
along vertical lines: clans, villages, tribes, sects, and ethnic
groups. The most prominent division, at least for purposes of
political analysis, is sectarian, and an important feature of
Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems",
Comparative Politics 1, no.1 (April, 1968), 25.
8 Ibid, 26.
Ibid, 27.
10 Ibid, 30.
5Lebanese society is the relationship among the various religious
sects who make up the population. 11 As Helena Cobban explained:12
For about a millennium now, the major
present-day sects have been living in the
Lebanese Mountain, each with its quite rich
and varied inner life. The idea of the
interaction of a number of these sects,
which lies at the heart of the concept of
'Lebanon', persisted from the late sixteenth
century down to the 1980s. Even after the
emergence of a 'Lebanese' polity, however,
the sects continued to live out their own
inner lives.
Further emphasising the vast importance of parochial loyalties
in Lebanon, Michael Hudson wrote:'3
Parochial divisions are uncommonly important
because they are the traditional primary
social organisation in terms of family,
community and security. They serve as semi-
autonomous communities, institutionalised
during Ottoman domination, maintaining, their
own personal status laws and effective
internal systems for conflict resolution.
There are seventeen official religious communities in
Lebanon, the two most prominent of which, historically, have
been the Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim sects. The Maronite
Christian community was the most politically and militarily
aggressive of the religious sects. They were the first to
" For a very succinct examination of this, see David
McDowell, Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities (London: Minority
Rights Groups, 1986). Also, see Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties
and Politics in Lebanon", Middle Eastern Studies 4, no.2 (April,
1968)
12 Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (London:
Hutchinson, 1985), 11.
13 Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political
Modernization in Lebanon, 21.
6espouse a distinct Lebanese identity, and they played a major
role in the creation of present day Lebanon.' 4 In 1918, France
secured a mandate over Lebanon, and it was under French tutelage
that the Maronites became the dominant sect in the country. The
central ideology of the community, which certainly predated
these developments, was incisively remarked upon by the Maronite
historian Isfan al Duwayhi (1629-1704): "the Maronite
community's history is a continuous struggle to maintain
national and religious identity in a dominant Muslim
environment." 5
 In sharp contrast to the Maronites stood
Lebanon's Sunni community, the leading Muslim community in the
country, whose ideology had long been pan-Arab. Accordingly,
they were opposed to the creation of an independent Lebanese
state, preferring that Lebanon should belong to a larger
Arab/Muslim entity, or failing that, that it should at least be
aligned with the Arab/Muslim world.
Within each of Lebanon T s religious sects there was a core
group of elites, known as zu'ama (political bosses), who wielded
extensive political power within their respective sects and were
the main players in the Lebanese government. There were at least
three different types of zu'ama. 	 First, there was the semi-
feudal variety, possessing large estates and traditional
' For a history of the Maronite role in the creation of
modern day Lebanon, see Neir Zamir, The Formation of Modern
Lebanon (London: Croon Helm, 1985).
' Quoted in Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett,
"Aspects of the Changing Nature of Lebanese Confessional
Politics: al-Murabitan, 1958-1979", in Ernest Geliner (ed.),
Islamic Dilemmas: Reformers, Nationalists and Industrialization
(Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1985), 269.
7lordships. Their power rested on their positions as landowners,
their use of strong-arm men, and their ability to give
protection and patronage. This type of za'im (singular form) was
particularly prominent within the Druse community, within the
Shiite community, and in the Sunni community of the rural Akkar
region, and included, among others, Kamal As'ad, and Kamal
Jumblatt. A second type of za T im was the 'populist' variety,
found in the predominantly Christian regions of Mount Lebanon,
and included such noteworthy figures as Camille Chamoun and
Pierre Gemayel. Their leadership was derived from the use of
powers of protection and patronage and/or some kind of
ideological appeal. The third type of za'im was the urban boss,
found primarily in Sunni communities in Beirut, Tripoli, and
Sidon. This included Riad Solh and Rashid Karami among others.
Their power rested on the manipulation of the urban masses,
through patronage, ideological appeal, and the use of strong-arm
men.'6
The extreme importance of the zu'ama was commented upon by
Elie Salem:'7
in the moment of truth local leaders and
established families held greater control of
their followers than did the central
government. Each religious and ethnic group
had its own pyramid of power and its own
internal source of strength, and it is with
these pyramids that the cabinet must deal
16 Albert Hourani, "Ideologies of the Mountain and the City",
in Roger Owen (ed.), The Crisis in Lebanon (London: Ithaca,
1976), 35-36.
17 Quoted in Halim Barakat, "The Social Context", in Edward
Haley and Lewis Snider (eds.), Lebanon in Crisis: Participants
and Issues (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 12.
8and at times even negotiate.
In 1943, a compromise agreement, known as the National
Pact, was reached between the elites of the Maronite and Sunni
communities. This led ultimately to Lebanon's independence from
France. Essentially, the agreement upgraded Lebanon's 1926
constitution, and established the basic parameters of both
domestic and foreign relations. At the domestic level it
installed a confessional democracy where political power was
divided among the religious communities in such a way that,
those communities which were numerically the largest at the time
were guaranteed the most political power. Based on a 1932
census, the Lebanese population was as follows:
ColtutLuni ty	 Population
Christian
Maronite	 226,378	 28.8
Greek Orthodox	 76, 522
	
9.7
Greek Catholic	 45, 999	 5.9
Armenians	 31, 156	 4.0
Others	 22,308
	
2.8
Total Christian	 402,363
	
51.2
Muslim
Sunni	 175, 925	 22.4
Shi it e	 154,208
	
19.6
Druse	 53, 047
	
6.8
Total Muslim	 383, 180
	
48.8
Total Population	 785, 543
	
100%
Lebanon's Christian population was accordingly guaranteed a
ratio of 6 seats in parliament for every 5 Muslim seats. At the
external level, the National Pact stipulated that Lebanon would
pursue a neutral foreign policy in which the Maronites would
renounce their reliance on, and support for, the West, while the
9Sunnis would accept that the Lebanese state was to be
independent from, and neutral towards, the Arab world.
Seemingly, the Sunni elite accepted the National Pact, and the
Maronite hegemony which accompanied it, primarily because it
gave them access to state patronage which they subsequently used
to strengthen their own positions within their community. The
elites of the other religious communities generally followed
suit. As Roger Owen remarked:18
Once it was decided to reward the leaders of
some of the religious communities with
access to high office, and to attempt to
incorporate others into the system on the
same basis, ... a powerful group [was
created which was] committed to the defence
of the existing status quo.
2.2 The Lebanese Economic System: 1943-1975
As we have noted previously, Lebanon's capitalist economic
system was generally looked upon favourably in Western circles.
This was particularly true where the Lebanese economy was
compared to the command economies of other Arab countries. As
of 1974, there seems to have been a reasonable consensus that
Lebanon was a relatively prosperous country.' 9 The dominant
economic group in Lebanon was the commercial bourgeoisie, which
emerged in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, when
the rapid expansion of usurious capital, controlled primarily by
the Lebanese merchant and commercial classes, combined with
18 Roger Owen, "The Political Economy of Grand Liban 1920-
197O', in Roger Owen (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, 24.
19 See Iliya Hank, "The Economic and Social Factors in the
Lebanese Crisis", Journal of Arab Affairs 1, no.2 (April, 1982),
209-244.
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other effects of European trade to lead to the collapse of the
feudal economy. While the financial and commercial industries
expanded dramatically, the development of the agricultural and
manufacturing spheres was somewhat limited, to the extent that,
by the time the French mandate was established after the First
World War, Beirut's financial and commercial class had assumed a
dominant role in the Lebanese economy.2°
The dominance of the commercial bourgeoisie assumed even
greater importance during Lebanon's independence period, when
the laissez faire nature of the Lebanese economy was solidified.
The Lebanese economy was dominated by the tertiary sector -
trade, banking and services - which accounted for three-quarters
of its national product. The importance of this sector, and its
continued growth during Lebanon's independence period is
illustrated by the fact that, by the late 1950s and the 1960s,
Lebanon was the banking centre of the Arab world. 2'	 The
commercial bourgeoisie included representatives from all of the
religious communities, but most importantly from the Sunni,
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Maronite communities.
Individual members of the Greek Orthodox conirnunity, for example,
owned much of the wealth of Beirut, although the community as a
whole only played a minor part in the political life of the
20 Paul Saba, "The Creation of the Lebanese Economy -
Economic Growth in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", in
Roger Owen (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, 1-20.
21 Whereas in 1951 there were only five banks in the
country, in 1966, there were ninety-three. Michael Hudson, The
Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon, 95.
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country.22
The coimnercial bourgeoisie's alliance with the zu'ama
ensured the stability of Lebanon's economic system. Admittedly,
there was some overlap between these two groups, but for the
most part their respective memberships were distinct. Their
cooperation was based on their common interest in keeping the
Lebanese state weak, and in maintaining the status quo. For the
commercial bourgeoisie, this meant ensuring that the government
pursued policies that would guarantee private sector dominance
over the economy. This included keeping taxes and tariffs low,
as well as ensuring the overvaluation of the Lebanese pound. The
zu'ama had other reasons for wishing to see the Lebanese state
remain weak, primarily the maintenance of their control over the
patronage system.23
The fundamental features of the Lebanese political and
economic systems were summed up by Owen:24
[The] main characteristic of a system which
by virtue of its confessional political
arrangements, its commercially oriented
economy and its underdeveloped government
services gave great power to a small class
of men, both Christian and Muslim, whose
positions as landlords, merchants or bankers
was reinforced by the leadership of their
respective religious communities.
22	 Albert Hourani, "Ideologies of the Mountain and the
City", 34.
23 Ibid, 34-35.
24 Roger Owen, "The Political Economy of Grand Liban 1920-
1970", 26.
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2.3 The Collapse of the Lebanese Political System
There has been many debates concerning the collapse of
Lebanon's political system in 1975. Hudson's description of the
demise of Lebanon's consociational system is apt: "the
difficulty in applying the consociational model to developing
countries is that the system is too static to accommodate
changes unleashed by social mobilisation." 25
 Hudson argued that
by 1975, the Lebanese political system was unable to adjust to a
broad range of political, economic and social developments. In
effect, all of the theoretical prerequisites for the stability
of the consociational democracy had ceased to exist.
While it is generally acknowledged that several factors
contributed to the outbreak of the war, some authors would argue
that certain ones were more crucial than others. Essentially,
there are five schools of thought.
The first school of thought (including both Marxist and
non-Marxist scholars) suggests that problems in the Lebanese
economy were the major cause for the outbreak of the civil war.
The argument is based on class conflict. 26 Authors subscribing
to this school point out that Lebanon's wealth was significantly
concentrated along two axes. The first of these was class. There
was a dominant economic class, a weak middle class, and a large
proletariat. The wealthiest four percent of the population
25 Michael Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of
Consociational Democracy", Journal of Palestine Studies, no.344
(Spring-Summer, 1976), 113.
26 Such an argument has been put forth in such scholarly
journals as the MERIP reports and Arab Studies Quarterly, the
French daily, Le Monde, and in such studies as B.J. Odeh,
Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict (London: Zed Press, 1983)
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received 32 percent of the total gross national product, and 82
percent of the population received only 40 percent. 27 The second
was geographic. The heart of the economy was centred around
Beirut, which in 1957 accounted for nearly a third of the GNP,
while Lebanon's heavily neglected agricultural sector, which
employed nearly half the labour force, contributed only 15% of
the GNP in that same year. 28 The members of this school of
thought proceed to argue that these economic inequalities led to
the breakdown of the traditional patron-client system. The
government attempted to offset problems created by the
concentration of wealth around Beirut by assisting the poorer
rural areas with development projects. These projects were met
with great resistance by the rural zu'ama, who feared that
government aid would undercut their own control over the
patronage system. This somewhat shortsighted perspective led to
their undoing, however, as continuing poverty in the rural areas
initiated a tendency towards urbanisation (in the form of
migration to Beirut), which actually served to place much of
their traditional client base beyond their influence. The urban
zu'ama also suffered from the change in population distribution
as they were unable or unwilling to provide patronage for the
great numbers of people entering their sphere of influence. As
the government was also unable or unwilling to assist them, the
new urban poor, facing extreme hardship, turned to an
increasingly radical and aggressive Leftist movement. As
27 Halim Barakat, "The Social Context", 10.
28 Roger Owen, "The Political Economy of Grand Liban, 1920-
70", 28.
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Lebanon's poorer classes, under Leftist leadership, challenged
the privileges of the rich, the Right resorted to coercive
measures to disrupt the challenge, and a civil war ensued.
A second major school of thought, which includes some of
the most prominent observers of the Lebanese scene, including
Kamal Salibi and the late Albert Hourani, do not accept the
first school of thought as a sufficient explanation, arguing
that it fails to account for the fact that Lebanon's population
split primarily along sectarian, rather than class lines. As an
alternative explanation, they put forth the thesis that, above
all else, the Lebanese political system collapsed because of a
lack of political community. As we noted previously, Lebanon had
a divided political community - those, predominantly Muslim, who
supported pan-Arabism, and those, predominantly Christian, who
supported a pro-Western Lebanon. The National Pact was based, to
a great extent, on a compromise between the major sects which
ostensibly neutralLised Lebanon's foreign policy orientation.
Changes in the Arab world (namely, the popularity of Arab
nationalist and Arab socialist ideas) undermined public
confidence in the workability of this compromise, and sectarian
mistrust superseded class interest as a reason for conflict. As
Arab socialism and Arab nationalism tended to be strongly
linked, the Lebanese Left was perceived by many of the
Christians (perhaps with some justice) as being too much in line
with the Arab nationalist and pro-Palestinian agendas of pan-
Arabism. Therefore, rather than seeing the Left primarily as a
group opposed to the privileges of the wealthy, the Christian
masses saw it as a disguise for a Muslim challenge to the basic
15
Western nature of Lebanon and the traditional position of the
Christian community. As the Leftists manifested increasingly
aggressive tendencies, and solidified their alliance with the
Palestinians in Lebanon, the Christian masses flocked to and
encouraged the Christian Right.
A third school of thought suggests that a major cause of
the civil war involved increasingly ardent demands for the
redistribution of political power by groups which perceived
themselves as under-represented in the context of the existing
decision making process. In short, groups on the fringes of the
Lebanese political system challenged proportional representation
on both demographic and ideological grounds. Demographically,
it was contended by many in the other sects that the Maronites
were no longer numerically the largest group and, therefore, had
no legitimate claim to political dominance. The Shiites
particularly began to lay claim to their share of political
power. Ideologically, the Leftist movements were opposed to the
status-quo, calling for the deconfessionalisation of the
political system, and a change in Lebanon's foreign policy
orientation in favour of support for pan-Arab issues, such as
the Palestinian cause. Naturally, many, both within the existing
elites and among the masses, with particular reference to
Christian elements, were opposed to such radical changes in the
status quo. Hence, demands for change were resisted, and society
became increasingly polarised, to such an extent that when
additional stresses arose to challenge the existing system, a
major conflict ensued.
A fourth school emphasises the breakdown of elite-mass
16
relations.	 In short, the elites were increasingly unable to
control their followers. 	 Their respective attempts to solve
this problem led to a general breakdown in good relations
between the elites themselves. In his 1986 study of Sunni
patron-client relations, Michael Johnson argued that the Sunni
zu'ama were unable to control their own 'street', as their
clients found alternative patrons including pan-Arab and
Palestinian groups. In an attempt to retain the support of
their clients, Sunni elites paid lip service to popular pan-Arab
causes, most particularly the armed Palestinian presence in
Lebanon. This position, however, served to put them at odds with
other elites, particularly within the Maronite sect, whose own
community fervently opposed the Palestinian presence. 29 Tewfik
Khalaf argued that the Maronite elite, like their Sunni
counterparts, were prisoners of their own 'street'. Popular
Maronite attitudes hardened as a result of the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon and of the increased demands of the Muslim
communities. 3° As a consequence, it was difficult for Lebanon's
elites to find common solutions to the problems facing the
country. The increasingly poor intra-elite relations paralysed
the government.
A fifth school, of which Iliya Hank and Georges Corm are
leading advocates, argues that it was primarily the pressures
originating from external factors, such as the Palestinian-
29 Michael Johnson, Class & Client in Beirut: The Sunni
Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840-1985 (London:
Ithaca, 1986)
30 Tewfik Khalaf, "The Phalange and the Maronite Community",
in Roger Owen (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, 43-56.
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Israeli conflict, which caused the civil war. 3' The position of
this school was summed up by Corm:32
Lebanese society was not genetically flawed;
{this is} not to say that Lebanon was a
country without problems, but only that
there was little time to adjust to and
assimilate the tensions, irribalances and
shortcomings which are also coimnon to other
societies before the regional conditions
that destabilised the country appeared in
1967.
The Arab-Israeli dispute and the armed Palestinian presence
was, according to this school of thought, the major external
load on the Lebanese system, greatly polarising Lebanese
domestic politics. In addition to drawing the Lebanese
completely into the Arab-Israeli conflict, with all the problems
which that entails, the Palestinians actively offered their
support to Lebanon's Left, reinforcing Maronite fears that the
Palestinian presence would upset the political balance.
Following Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli conflict,
Maronite fears that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon would
become permanent increased. With the Lebanese government
politically powerless to use coercive measures due to the
aforementioned intra-elite conflict, the Maronites reacted
aggressively by arming themselves, and in 1975, began a military
31 In addition, see Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in
Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978); Kamal Salibi,
Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (London: Ithaca
press, 1976)
32 Georges Corn, "Myths and Realities of the Lebanese
Conflict", in Nadim Shehadi & Dana Haf far Mills (eds.), Lebanon:
A History of Conflict and Consensus (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988),
240-259.
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conflict with the Palestinians that ignited the war.	 The
regional loads on the Lebanese political system were commented
upon by Walid Khalidi:33
When a deeply divided society like Lebanon
belongs to a regional system characterised
by the level of turbulence prevailing in the
Arab world, and when the Pan-doctrine is
actively espoused within this system, the
centrifugal tendencies within this member
society are likely to be maximised.
2.4 The Lebanese Civil War: 1975-1990
For most people, the Lebanon of the late 1970s and the
1980s became synonymous with anarchy, ranging from incidents of
random violence, car bombings and kidnappings to major military
conflicts such as the 1982 Israeli invasion. The antagonists in
the many conflicts which made up the war included both domestic
and external actors, and battles were fought over a diverse
range of issues. Conflicts over political change in Lebanon and
the territorial ambitions of rival militias coexisted with major
regional wars which had little to do with internal Lebanese
politics but which were fought, nevertheless, on Lebanese
territory. A detailed discussion of Lebanon's civil war is
beyond the scope of this study, but it will be important, for
our purposes, to examine briefly the political and economic
changes which have taken place since the outbreak of the
conflict
Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon:
Confrontation in the Middle East, 101.
Numerous studies on the Lebanese war were published. In
particular, see Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon
1958-1976; Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon:
Confrontation in the Middle East; Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation:
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2.4.1 The Political System 1975-1988
From a technical standpoint, at least, the Lebanese
political system continued to function from 1975 to 1988.
Although the security situation prevented the election of a new
parliament, resulting in the extension of the 1972 parliament's
mandate, new presidents were elected in 1976 and 1982. The
Lebanese bureaucracy also continued to function. Moreover, none
of the major players involved in the war called for the
disintegration of the Lebanese state structure, although their
actions did much to undermine it.
Looking at the situation from a broader perspective,
however, the government was effectively powerless. With the
disintegration of the Lebanese army in early 1976, the Lebanese
government lost its coercive capability, thereby becoming, for
the most part, a peripheral player for the remainder of the war
years. In effect, the Lebanese state was forced both to compete
against, and to negotiate with, other more powerful actors in
Lebanon, including various Lebanese militias, Palestinian
groups, and the Syrian and Israeli governments, all of which
were in de facto control over certain territories in the
country.	 In short, it was the policies and actions of these
Lebanon at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Roger
Owen (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon; Michael Hudson,
"The Lebanese Crisis: the Limits of Consociational Democracy";
David McDowell, Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities; Salim Nasr,
"Lebanon's War. Is the End in Sight?" Middle East Report
(January-February, 1990), 5-8.
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groups, and of their international supporters, which dictated
the pace of developments in Lebanon during the war years.
At the end of the first phase of fighting in 1976, the
Maronite militias were in control of East Beirut and the
Christian parts of Mount Lebanon; the leftist Lebanese National
Movement and its ally the PLO were in control over West Beirut
and much of South Lebanon; the Lebanese government, with the
backing of the Syrian- army-dominated Arab Deterrent Force, was
in control of North Lebanon and the Biqa Valley; and Israeli
backed militias controlled a strip of land straddling the
Israeli border. Further divisions were to occur during the war.
For example, after 1982, and during much of the remainder of
the war, the Shiite militias, .mal and Hizb Allah came to
dominate West Beirut and the South. The Lebanese government was
unable to reinstate its authority after the initial phase of
fighting, or in any other period during the war, because of
opposition from these domestic and external actors.
The territorial integrity of Lebanon was further undermined
by the growth of various administrative centres within the
enclaves, which very much came to resemble autonomous "states"
within a state. Some of these enclaves, particularly the
Maronite and PLO dominated ones, developed highly sophisticated
administrative units. For example, the Maronite militias
developed a public service department which operated through
civilian popular committees in villages and towns, and provided
such services as a public transportation system, water,
electricity, telephone services, a police force, and the
regulation of consumer prices. In addition, the militias
21
collected taxes, and made military service compulsory. They even
had a foreign affairs department with representatives in
important world capitals.35
In addition to the much weakened role of the Lebanese
government, and the establisbment of rival "governmental
structures", elite turnover occurred. For example, some of the
zu'ama, particularly in the Shiite and to a lesser extent in the
Maronite communities, lost control over their clients and were
supplanted largely by sectarian based militias. Within the
Shiite community, Pmal and Hizb Allah became new "zu'ama" able
to represent the community through their control over coercive
power and patronage. Hizb Allah, for instance, built hospitals
and other community projects. Within the Maronite community the
Lebanese Forces militia became the new dominant force.
2.4.2 The Economic Situation 1975-1990
Ironically, the Lebanese economy performed relatively well
from 1975 to 1982. 	 As Salim Nasr put it: "civil strife and
continuous confrontation coexisted with economic prosperity.
During these seven years of strife the standard of living of
most Lebanese remained stable or even improved." 36 For example,
per capita income rose from $1,415 in 1974 to $2,011 in 1982,
while the monthly minimum wage during the same period rose from
Raymond Helmick, "Internal Lebanese Politics: The Lebanese
Front and Forces", in Halim Barakat (ed.), Toward a Viable
Lebanon, 311.
36 Saliin Nasr, "Lebanon's War: Is the End in Sight?" 5.
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$135 to $195. Certain sectors of the Lebanese economy
including banking, construction, public works, engineering,
consulting, and printing and publishing showed substantial
growth.
Nasr attributes this	 surprisingly strong economic
performance to five main factors. First, Lebanon had a strong
economic reserve. In 1975 Lebanon had a -balance of payments
surplus of more than $4 billion, with large reserves of gold and
hard currencies. In addition, the wealthy Lebanese held
considerable private reserves and savings. This situation helped
offset the economic disruptions which occurred because of the
conflict. Second, an economic boom in the Gulf states created
many opportunities for Lebanese workers and businesses,
particularly those in the sectors noted above. Lebanese migrant
workers in the Gulf increased from 98,000 in 1975 to 210,000 in
1979. As a consequence, transfers and remittances rose
dramatically, from $910 million in 1975 to $2,254 million in
1980, representing more than a third of Lebanon's national
income. A third factor was the presence of a "Palestinian
economy". In 1981, for example, it was estimated that the
Palestinian economy represented more than 15% of Lebanon's GNP.
The PLO, which was headquartered in Beirut, and which,
according to Nasr, had a budget larger than that of the Lebanese
government, created tens of thousands of jobs both directly and
indirectly. In addition, Palestinian salaries and other sources
of income were, to a great extent, either spent in Lebanon or
Ibid, 6.
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deposited in Lebanese banks. 38 A fourth factor was the presence
of "political money": grants and transfers given to the militias
from their external backers. In the early 1980s, the influx of
political money was estimated at $300 million a year. This
political money underwrote the costs of the various conflicts in
Lebanon, lessening pressure on specifically Lebanese sources. A
fifth factor was the social and spatial redistribution which
occurred because of the fighting. This included the creation
both of new elites, such as the militia leaders, and of new
regional centres, such as the Christian port city of Jounieh,
which created an increasing demand for construction of housing
and schools, and the increase of durable goods.39
The Lebanese economy during this period did, however,
suffer some negative effects from the conflict, including
physical destruction to infrastructure (factories, hotels, and
other facilities) and the reduction of certain sectors including
industry, tourism, transit, the re-export business and
educational and health services to non-residents.4°
Beginning with the Shiite militia takeover of Beirut in
1984, and continuing until the advent of the prime ministership
of Rafiq Hariri, the Lebanese economy went into serious
decline. 4' For example, GDP dropped to less than one-third its
38 Ibid, 5.
Ibid, 6.
40 Ibid, 7.
41 In addition to the Nasr article, see Yusif al Khalil,
"Economic Developments in Lebanon Since 1982", The Beirut Review
no.3	 (Spring,	 1992),	 83-94; and Saade Chami, 	 "Economic
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early 1980s level, the exchange rate dropped from 3.4 pounds to
the dollar in 1980 to 450 pounds to the dollar in 1989, and the
unemployment rate increased from 12% in 1980 to 35% in 1989.42
The collapse of the economy can be accounted for by a number of
factors including the effective disappearance of many of the
elements that helped propel the economy in the late 1970s.
Economic problems in the Gulf countries closed that economic
alternative. By 1987 there were only 65,000 Lebanese working in
the Gulf States.
	
Remittances fell off from a peak of $2,254
million in 1980 to only $300 million in 1987. In addition, the
return of thousands of Lebanese from the Gulf increased
pressures on the Lebanese job market. 43 Second, as a result of
the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in 1982, the Palestinian
economy was lost. Third, the richer Arab states greatly reduced
their contributions of political money to the various factions
in Lebanon. Fourth, the Lebanese state's finances collapsed.
On the one hand, expenditures, especially military spending and
public subsidies, increased, while, on the other hand, tax
collection and customs revenues fell off drastically. This can
be partially explained by the fact that a parallel economy had
developed in some of the enclaves, which included the illegal
collection of non-government taxes and the use of illegal ports.
The increased spending and reduced revenues resulted in growing
budget deficits, and led to massive inflation. In 1987, for
Performance in a War-Economy: The Case of Lebanon", Canadian
Journal of Development Studies 13, no.3 (1992), 325-336.
42 Salim Nasr, "Lebanon's War: Is the End in Sight?" 8.
Ibid, 6-7.
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example, inflation was 425%. The poorer economic conditions
and the continued escalation of violence (see below) led many
Lebanese, particularly the middle classes, to emigrate.45
2.4.3 A Violent Prelude to the 1989 Ta'if Accord
In addition to the economic crisis of the late 1980s,
Lebanon also experienced an increasingly severe political and
security crisis. As battles among the various militias and
foreign armies became both more frequent and more intense,
Lebanon, after 1984, became the focus of considerable negative
attention internationally due to the fact that Lebanese hostage-
takers began to target Westerners. The dominant players in
Lebanon were essentially external; or, to put it more precisely,
the Lebanese were no longer the masters of their own country.
Syria, with thousands of troops in the country, and a carefully
cultivated and maintained alliance with several Lebanese
clients, had become the dominant foreign power; 46 Iran played a
key role through its client Hizb Allah; 47 and Israel was still
active in the South. Only the Maronite enclave, dominated by the
Lebanese Forces militia, was reasonably independent of any
foreign control.
In 1988, a new political crisis occurred when the leaders
Ibid, 7.
mid, e.
46 See Marius Deeb, "The External Dimension of the Conflict
in Lebanon: The Role of Syria", Journal of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies Xli, no.3 (Spring, 1989), 37-52.
Jim Muir, "Teheran Calls the Tune", Middle East
International no.303 (25 July 1987), 6.
26
of the various militias and foreign powers failed to agree on
the election of a new president for Lebanon. 48 Instead, rival
governments, both claiming to be the legitimate government, were
set up. One was led by Salim Hoss and dominated by the Syrians,
and the other was led by the anti-Syrian Lebanese General Michel
Aoun. This dual government system remained in place until the
end of the war in the fall of l99O.
The crisis took on a new dimension when General Aoun's
government attempted to break the stalemate. First, he
successfully extended his government's control over Christian
dominated East Beirut by moving against the unpopular Christian
militia. This move was applauded in both Christian and Muslim
circles, as the Lebanese pi.thlic had long tired of militia rule
and relished the return of a strong central government. Second,
he attempted to take the rest of Beirut, an obvious challenge to
the Syrians, by moving against their equally unpopular militia
allies. The latter move failed, resulting in heavy fighting.
Aoun declared a "war of liberation" against the Syrians,
refusing to end the fighting until they withdrew from Lebanon.5°
The political crisis, combined with heavy fighting,
48 Jim Muir, "Lebanon Set to Plunge Over the Brink", Middle
East International no.334 (23 September 1988), 3-4; Jim Muir,
"Why Lebanon Stepped Over the Brink", Middle East International
no.335 (7 October 1988), 3-7.
On the popularity of Aoun, see Mansour Road, "Everyone
Misunderstood the Depth of the Movement Identifying with Aoun",
MERIP Reports no.162, vol 20 no.1 (January-February, 1990), 11-
4.
° Jim Muir, "Aoun's Bloody Challenge to Asad", Middle East
International no.347 (31 March 1989), 3-4; Jim Muir, "The
General Overplays His Hand", Middle East International no.346
(17 March 1989), 6-7.
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prompted the international community to seek an end to the
conflict. A series of Arab mediation efforts caine to fruition
in the autumn of 1989 in the form of the Ta'if Accord. The
accord, negotiated by Lebanese Parliamentarians in Ta'if, Saudi
Arabia, under the auspices of the Arab League, brought a formal
ending to the civil war. 5' In fact, the accord only called for
minor changes to the political system, and it was not greatly
different than two previous peace plans, the 1976 Constitutional
Document, and the 1985 Tripartite Agreement. The key aspect of
the agreement was that it established the principle of Muslim-
Christian political parity. 52 Beyond this change to the
confessional balance of power, the pre-civil war political and
economic systems were to remain intact. ObvIously, the system
was to remain a confessional one. Moreover, as Norton
explained:53
implicitly, the accord rejected the idea
that parliamentary seats needed to be
reallocated periodically to adjust for
disparate rates of population growth among
the major confessional groups. Instead, the
principle of parity provided the basis of an
historic compromise meant to underscore the
fact that Lebanon is a country shared by
Christians and Muslims.
No changes to the laissez faire nature of the Lebanese economy
51 The Ta'if Accord was an 2merican and Saudi idea.
52 The major communities were guaranteed the following number
of seats: Maronites 34, Sunnis 27, Shiites 27, Greek Orthodox
14, Greek Catholics 8, Druse 8. Sunni control over the powerful
office of prime minister would continue to ensure their
political supremacy over the Shiite community.
Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, "Swiss
Soldiers, Ta'if Clocks, and Early Elections: Toward a happy
Ending in Lebanon?" Middle East Insight 10, no.1 (November-
December, 1993), 46-47.
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were envisioned, even though, as we noted, Lebanon's economic
problems had worsened considerably since 1975.
Just as few authors had predicted the outbreak of the civil
war in 1975, very few would have predicted the conclusion of the
war in 1990. As noted, The Ta'if Accord was not substantially
different from previous peace plans. It had few supporters
amongst the Lebanese leaders and the fighting actually did
continue for another year after Ta'if. Indeed, in some cases the
fighting was every bit as ferocious as any which had been seen
since the beginning of the war.
This raises the question of just why the war did end in
1990. There is general agreement that the conflict ended only as
a result of external pressure. In other words, it seems that
the Ta'if Accord was imposed on the Lebanese. On the whole, the
international community was supportive of the deal. Its major
supporters included the United States and Saudi Arabia, both of
which sponsored the Ta'if process and, significantly, Syria,
whose pre-eminent position in Lebanon was not substantively
affected by the accord. On the domestic front, none of the
groups allied to, or dependent on, Syria could openly oppose the
deal, no matter how much they disliked it. The comments of
Druse leader Walid Jumblatt to the French daily Le Figaro are
most telling: "1 will be summoned to Damascus this week, and I
will be told to accept the agreement: I have no choice. I will
stupidly accept it." 54	Aoun openly opposed the agreement,
largely because it did not set a firm date for a Syrian
FEIS, NES-89-206 (26 October 1989), 49.
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withdrawal from Lebanon. His troops held out against various
Lebanese militias and the Syrians until 13 October 1990 when the
Syrian air force, with a green light from the U.S., successfully
ousted him. This effectively ended both the civil war and
resistance to the newly appointed president, Elias Hrawi. On 3
December, a rehabilitated, Syrian-backed Lebanese army under the
control of the government in West Beirut proceeded to take
control of all of Greater Beirut for the first time since the
eruption of the war in 1975. On 24 December, Prime Minister
Omar Karami formed a "government of national reconciliation"
which included 30 ministers, equally divided between Christians
and Muslims. By the Summer of 1992, the Lebanese government,
with the assistance of the Syrian army, had extended its control
over all of Lebanon except the Israeli occupied parts of South
Lebanon.
3. The Political Economy of Contemporary Lebanon in the
Context of Existing Literature and Theoretical Perspectives
The general purpose of this study is to fill a void in the
literature by examining the post-war economic reconstruction of
Lebanon. More specifically, our fundamental aim is to examine,
within the broader theoretical context of development economics,
the institutional arrangement for implementing the various
reconstruction programmes.
3.1 The Literature on Lebanon to Date
The war in Lebanon has been over since the autumn of 1990.
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Post-War Lebanese governments, including the two before Hariri's
regime, immediately began the task of attempting to rebuild
Lebanon's devastated economy. In sharp contrast to the wealth of
information available about the war years, scholars concerning
this period have written little. 55 The most plausible explanation
for this is that events are still unfolding, and it has,
therefore, been difficult for scholars to obtain reliable
information. What literature there has been on the topic of the
reconstruction has tended to be somewhat polemic. 56 One school of
thought, consisting essentially of the Hariri government and its
domestic and external supporters, has attempted to paint a rosy
In addition to the daily coverage given to the
reconstruction programme by the Beirut press, most of the
writing produced on this period has tended to consist of short
articles which have appeared in specialised journals such as
MEED, The Middle East, Middle East Executive Reports, The
Lebanon Report, and The Banque Audi Report, and in general
sources such as The Financial Times.
Furthermore, brief studies or assessments of the Lebanese
situation have been produced by such international institutions
as the I.M.F. and the World Bank, and by private companies such
as the British merchant bank, Robert Flemings.
The few book length studies to be produced included one by
the former Lebanese president, 1\mine Gemayel, Rebuilding Lebanon
(London: University Press of 1merica,1992); one by a former
architect who helped develop plans for the rejuvenation of the
Beirut Central District, Angus Gavin, Beirut Reborn: The
Restoration & Development of the Central District (London:
Academy Editions, 1996); one by two leading proponents of the
economic regime in the country, Nasser Saidi & Salim Nasr, The
Development of Lebanon's Capital Markets: Economic, Legal, and
Organisational Issues (Beirut: Centre for Economic Policy
Research and Analysis, 1995); and a book produced by critics of
the regime, Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salam, & Jad Tabet (eds.),
Beyrouth: Construire L'Avenir, Reconstruire Le Passe? (Paris:
L'Urban Research Institute, 1995).
56 The Beirut based journal, The Lebanon Report, has probably
produced the most balanced work on the reconstruction programme.
Through an effective public relations staff, the Hariri regime
has been able to air its views through some of the specialised
journals noted in footnote 52.
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picture of the reconstruction programme. They have tended to
overlook the serious social and economic reservations of a
number of groups, in favour of placing emphasis on the ultimate
goal of making Lebanon the regional and financial centre of the
Middle East. A second school, which consists, essentially, of
Hariri's political opponents, including Lebanon's Left and the
Christian opposition leaders, has argued thaW the reconstruction
of the country is for the benefit of the super-rich, and that,
moreover, Hariri is using the reconstruction to enhance his own
personal fortune. In between these two schools of thought, there
are a number of individuals who have been critical of certain
aspects of the reconstruction programme, but who have generally
refrained from commenting on the validity of the programme as a
whole. Some of the leading members of this school include Assem
Salam, Nabil Beyhum, Jad Tabet, and Paul Mourani, all of whom
have been particularly critical of the plans to rebuild the
Beirut Central District.57
Given the lack of academic work on the reconstruction
process, therefore, we feel that a study of this nature is
significant, as it will provide an important addition to the
literature on post-civil war Lebanon.
Assem Salam is the President of the Order of Engineers in
Lebanon; Nabil Beyhum is an academic; and Paul Mourani is an
independent economist. This group has organised conferences,
produced a book (see footnote 55), and written articles
outlining their major concerns.
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3.2 Development Economics and the Importance of Institutions:
Theoretical Considerations
As noted, the fundamental aim of this study is to examine
the institutional arrangement for implementing the various
reconstruction programmes. A consideration of the effect of the
Lebanese institutional arrangement and political situation on
the recovery process raises interesting questions that have been
addressed in the wider context of theoretical literature. We
will undertake a brief review of this literature to locate the
Lebanese experience within the wider framework. In the following
sections, we will begin by briefly surveying some of the
dominant theories of development, before proceeding to focus on
those parts of the literature which are most relevant.
It should be emphasised at this point that development
studies is a vast field which spans the various disciplines
found in the social sciences including political science,
history, economics, and sociology. The areas of study, which
roughly fall under the development literature, are immense.
Obviously, we will deal with a very limited aspect of this
literature. As we have noted elsewhere, we are primarily
interested in the literature that deals with institutional
arrangements used to pursue various development programmes. In
the Lebanese case, we are interested in examining the
institutional arrangements used to pursue economic development
programmes planned primarily for an urban environment.
3.2.1 Dominate Theories in Development Economics
Development economics emerged as a discipline during the
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1950s and the 1960s when academics and economists, particularly
those working for such agencies as the World Bank and USAID,
were concerned with understanding the best way to achieve
economic growth in the developing world. Essentially, the
dominant view taken during this period advocated an activist
role for the state in the economy. Capital formation was
perceived as the best way to achieve growth, and policies such
as Import-Si.ibstitution-Industrialisation (ISI) were encouraged.58
However, for a number of reasons, this perspective lost
popularity toward the end of the 1960s and the 1970s, 59 and was
replaced by two broad and very different approaches to
development theory -- the neoclassical school and the dependency
school.
The neoclassical school, which is currently the dominant
view within such agencies as the World Bank and the IMF,6°
rejects the philosophy of capital formation, arguing that the
best way to achieve economic growth is through an efficient
allocation of resources. In order to generate effectively such
resources, proponents of this school championed the supremacy of
free	 market	 principles,	 including	 minimal	 government
58 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the
Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990), 8-9.
Several reasons were put forth for the change including:
ISI in some countries needed permanent government subsidisation;
government fiscal deficits required fiscal constraints; and
government corruption wasted resources, See ibid.
60 See Bella Balassa, et al. Development Strategies in Semi-
Industrial Economies. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1982)
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interference in the domestic market, 6' and full integration into
the international market. 1ST, for example, was discouraged in
favour of export-led growth. A country's strength was to lay in
its comparative advantage over others, whether this included
cheaper labour costs, better standards of education, advanced
technology, or the existence of abundant natural resources.62
However, while the general tendency within the neoclassical
school has been to stress these factors, and de-emphasise the
role of the state, some scholars within the school have argued
that some government interference in the market may be
advantageous. For example, they cite the positive roles that the
governments of some of the East Asian NICs, including Taiwan and
South Korea, have played toward protecting their respective
domestic markets, while at the same time encouraging exports.63
The other main paradigm in development literature, the
dependency school, sharply rejects the liberal neoclassical view
of economic development. Proponents of dependency theory, many
of whom were associated in the 1960s with the Economic
Coimnission on Latin Pmerica (ECLA) and the United Nations
61 This includes the following: providing macroeconomic
stability; providing physical infrastructure; supplying "public
goods" including defence and national security, education,
market information, and the legal system; contributing to the
development of institutions for improving the markets for such
things as labour, finance, and technology; offsetting price
distortions which arise in cases of market failure; and
redistributing income to the poorest members of society to meet
their basic needs.
62 See Robert Wade, Governing The Market: Economic Theory and
the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, 11.
63 Robert Wade referred to this as the simulated market
theory of development. For details of this concept, see ibid,
22-24.
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), attributed the
failure of economic development in the Less Developed Countries
to their integration in the world economy. To put it in simple
terms, dependency theorists argue that the international economy
is structured in such a manner that it benefits only a few
states at expense of the rest. This deterministic structuralist
approach leaves little room for manoeuvre by national
governments. Therefore, it is in the interests of the Less
Developed Countries to disentangle themselves from the world
capitalist economy.64
3.2.2 The Role of Domestic Institutional Arrangements
What is somewhat remarkable about both the neoclassical and
the dependency approaches is that they have generally ignored
the effect that domestic political institutional arrangements
have on a given country's economic development, 65 a fact which
Of course, the various theories which roughly fall under
the dependency approach range from the crude to the highly
sophisticated. Included in the latter group, for example, are
works by Peter Evans on the "triple alliance" of foreign firms,
local firms and state elites, the• concept of "dependent
development" by Fernando Cardoso, and linmanuel Wallerstein's
"word capitalist systems" approach of core, semi-periphery, and
periphery states.
See the following works on the dependency perspective.
Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of
Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979); Fernando Cardoso,
"Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical
Implications", in Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); lininanuel Wallerstein, The
Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979); Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and the Future Demise of
the World Capitalist System", Comparative Studies in Society and
History 16, no.4 (September 1974), 387-415.
65 In fact, the role of the state as an actor in the
political process has been generally ignored until recently.
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has not gone unnoticed by many political scientists, and
development economists. As political scientist Stephen Haggard
explained: 66
Both the neoclassical and the dependency
perspectives share a common disability: the
tendency to ignore how domestic political
forces constrain economic policy and shape
state responses to the external environment.
Economists have focused their attention
on the effect of policy on development but
generally have not examined the determinants
of particular policy choices; they treat
politics as exogenous. Sociologists,
political scientists, and historians working
in the dependency traditions, on the other
hand, have viewed external constraints as
determinative of national policies; the
result is a similar neglect of domestic
political forces and institutions.
There have, however, been several studies that have
attempted to address this problem. We will cite a few
significant examples. In his 1982 study on the rise and fall of
nations, Mancur Olsen argued that certain institutional
arrangements were necessary to ensure economic growth.
Essentially, he contended that some form of strong, or perhaps
even authoritarian, state was needed:67
Successful economic development requires
institutions that restrain, control, weaken,
or encapsulate the independent
organisational strength of social forces,
See Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Peter Evans,
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the
State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
66 Stephen Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics
of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (London:
Cornell University Press, 1990), 2 & 20.
67 mid, 44.
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thereby insulating decision-makers from
group pressures and expanding the range of
their directive powers.
In his 1990 study on the industrialisation of the East Asian and
Latin Pmerican I"TICs, Stephan Haggard concluded that specific
domestic institutional arrangements, especially in the East
Asian NICs, such as the relative autonomy of the state and the
powerful influence it had over industrial policy, were critical
to the direction and growth of the economy. Finally, in his
1990 study of the East Asian NICs, Robert Wade also concluded
that specific political arrangements, which gave the state
relative autonomy to formulate policy and direct the economy,
helped explain East Asian economic growth.
3.2.3 A Theoretical Understanding of Domestic Institutional
Arrangements
The growing body of literature on the role of domestic
institutional arrangements in influencing economic development
has added important new dimensions to the theoretical literature
on development economics. Haggard included the domestic
institutional arrangement as one of four major units of analysis
in determining the economic policies of the countries examined
in his study. 68 Wade, in his analysis of the economic development
of the East Asian NIC5, noted the importance of state
institutions both in directing and steering economic growth. He
called this arrangement the Governed Market Theory of
Development.
68 The other units of analysis included: the international
system; society as an explanation; and the transmission of
policy-relevant knowledge. See Ibid, 28-48.
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Perhaps one of the most significant attempts to
conceptualise the role of the state in the development process
emanated from the works of Chalmers Johnson. 69 Based on his
analysis of the institutional arrangements found in many of the
East Asian NICs, he developed a model called the "capitalist
developmental state" .o
Johnson's developmental state has several characteristics.
To begin with, the developmental state's top priority is
economic development. Second, it is committed to private
property and the market. Third, it guides the market with
instruments formulated by an elite economic bureaucracy, led by
a pilot agency or "economic general staff". 71 Fourth, it is
engaged in numerous institutions for consultation and
coordination with the private sector. Finally, it is relatively
autonomous from societal forces, thus allowing the economic
bureaucrats to formulate policy without being constrained by
private interests. 72 In short, the state is pre-eminent in its
69 See the following:
Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of
Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1982); Chalmers Johnson, "The Taiwan Model", in J.
Hsiung, et al. (eds.), Contemporary Republic of China: The
Tawain Experience (New York: Praeger, 1981); Chalmers Johnson,
"Political Institutions and Economic Performance: A Comparative
J'nalysis of the Government - Business Relationship in Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan", in F. Deyo (ed.), The Political
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (London: Cornell
University Press, 1987)
70 See Gordon White (ed.), Developmental State in East Asia.
(London: The MacMillan Press, 1988).
71 A classic example of such an agency would be Japan's
MITI.
72 For a summary of the approach, see Robert Wade, Governing
the Market: Economic Theor y and the Role of Government in East
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relations with societal forces. The regime would be inclined to
exhibit authoritarian or soft authoritarian corporatist
tendencies ..
3.2.4. The Economic Development of Lebanon: The Institutional
Arrangement
Given that recent theoretical literature has established a
link between successful economic development and certain kinds
of institutional arrangements, and given the fact that specific
domestic institutional arrangements were one of the key factors
identified with the impressive economic growth of the East Asian
NIC5, it seems appropriate to examine the domestic institutional
arrangement in post-Ta'if Lebanon with a view to determining its
potential impact on the prospects for Lebanon's economic
recovery.
The models that we briefly discussed, including those by
Olsen, Haggard, Wade, and Johnson, examined the linkages between
economic growth and specific institutional arrangements. All of
them shared a common central argument in their studies of East
Asian development; they argued that a strong government,
autonomous from societal actors, strategically intervened in the
economy to achieve impressive economic growth. Although all of
these models are similar, we will use Johnson's model to test
the Lebanese case since it is, perhaps, the only one of the
models to give a detailed description of a developmental state.
In particular, we will look at some of the key aspects of the
Asian Industrialization, 25-26.
Ibid, 27.
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model including the concept of strategic intervention in the
economy, and of the autonomy and power of the economic
bureaucracy.
A preliminary survey of the institutional arrangement used
to implement Lebanon's economic recovery program suggests that
several of the essential characteristics of successful
institutional arrangements, particularly of Johnson's
developmental state, may apply. For example, a relatively strong
Lebanese government, somewhat autonomous from domestic societal
forces, may have existed since 1992. Second, this government's
apparent raison d'être has been to rebuild the economy. Third, a
relatively autonomous economic bureaucracy (the C.D.R.) has been
given a generally free rein to implement the recovery programme.
Finally, the state has been consistent in its commitment to the
concept of private property.
In the course of the study, we wish to determine whether
the Lebanese state does actually possess the basic
characteristics Johnson establishes for the capitalist
developmental state. If it can be demonstrated that the Lebanese
state conforms to this model, which has been so successfully
used in some East Asian countries, the chances for a successful
recovery programme would be increased. If, however, the Lebanese
state does not possess the basic characteristics of the
developmental state, and if it can be demonstrated that the
Lebanese have not developed a comparable alternative, the
recovery programme may be jeopardised.
Although it may appear that the Lebanese government
possesses some of characteristics found in Johnson's
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developmental state, we will argue that this is not the case.
The Lebanese government lacks the necessary autonomy vis-à-vis
other political actors to successfully implement a recovery
programme; the economic bureaucracy suffers from extensive
political interference, which has weakened its ability to
properly implement recovery programmes; the government has not
really strategically intervened in the Lebanese economy to
ensure positive economic growth, certainly not to the extent
that some of the East Asian governments have; and finally, the
government's commitment to the entire economic development
process may be questioned. As we will argue in this study, the
lack of an appropriate institutional arrangement has had a
negative effect on the recovery programme in 'specific, and the
economy in general.
4. Methodology of the Study
The information collected for this study originated from
three main sources including: material obtained from library
research in the U.K.; material collected in Lebanon from
organisations, institutions, and individuals involved in the
recovery programme; and material acquired from a series of
unstructured interviews conducted in Lebanon in the winter of
1997 with individuals intimately associated with the
reconstruction, prominent opponents of the system, and general
observers of the Lebanese scene.
We obtained a wealth of information, particularly in the
form of raw data, about the reconstruction process from a number
of sources found in the Middle East Documentation Unit at the
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University of Durham and in the archives of the Centre for
Lebanese Studies, Oxford. These include, but are not limited to,
specialised journals such as the Middle East Economic Digest
(MEED) and The Lebanon Report, as well as some articles taken
from more general sources such as The Financial Times newspaper.
Progress Reports from the various institutions involved in the
reconstruction, particularly those published by the Council for
Development and Reconstruction (C.D.R.) have also been
invaluable. A wealth of information was obtained from various
unpublished sources including World Bank and IMF reports and
memorandums, consultancy reports (from which the actual
reconstruction plans originated), and from a series of papers
delivered at the Financial Times sponsored conference Lebanon
Toward 2000: Opportunities for Finance and Investment in a Re-
emerging Market held in Beirut (Beit Men) on June 8-9, 1995.
We have also found that material collected in Lebanon
during field research, which took place during the winter of
1997, was particularly valuable. Several organisations and
institutions, including the C.D.R., the property development
company called Solidere, and the Central Bank, as well as a
number of individuals including economists and academics,
provided us with information (much of which was unpublished)
which has greatly increased our knowledge of the reconstruction
process. In particular, our understanding of the institutions,
personalities, and other forces integral to the reconstruction
process was greatly strengthened, as well as our appreciation of
the major criticisms of the recovery programme.
Mi invaluable part of the material obtained for this study
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was derived from a series of unstructured interviews during the
winter of 1997 with leading individuals intimately associated
with the recovery programme, prominent opponents of the
programme, and observers of the Lebanese scene. 74 The interviews
not only helped us interpret much of the data that was available
through library research, but they also provided us with crucial
new information, much of which was otherwise unavailable,
concerning the dynamics of the recovery process. We interviewed
several people who worked in the main organisations managing and
implementing the recovery programme. For example, some of the
leading figures at the C.D.R and the I.D.A.L. interviewed
included: the Vice-President of the C.D.R., Boutros Labaki; Jim
McCredie, the senior Western consultant at the C.D.R., and an
advisor to the C.D.R. president on the recovery programme; and
Adib Salem, a senior economist at the I.D.A.L. We also
interviewed a number of opponents of the recovery programme.
Some of the leading opponents interviewed included: Salim Hoss,
head of an opposition bloc in parliament and a former prime
minister; Assem Salam, President of the Order of Engineers and
the brother of a former prime minister; and Paul Mourani, an
independent economist. Finally, we also interviewed a number of
academics and journalists who have followed the reconstruction
process closely. Some of the observers of the Lebanese scene
interviewed included: Nadim Shehadi, director for the Centre of
Lebanese Studies; Michael Young, editor of the journal, The
Lebanon Report; and Kamal Shehadi, research director at the
The interviews were conducted over a five week period.
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Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies in Beirut.
5. Outline of the Study
Including the present chapter, this study is divided into
eight chapters. Chapter two attempts to explain the
circumstances behind the rise of Prime Minister Hariri's
government. Chapter three deals with Hariri's economic plan for
the reconstruction of Lebanon. Chapter four examines the
various institutions which are managing the reconstruction
programme. Chapter five looks at the execution and results of
the plan. Chapter six examines private sector initiatives in the
Lebanese economy. Chapter seven looks at the political
constraints faced by the government with respect to the
implementation of the programme. Finally, chapter eight
concludes the paper with a review of the main players in the
post civil war political and economic scene in Lebanon, and, in
the context of looking at other kinds of constraints which
affect the ability of the government to implement the programme,
it raises a number of questions concerning the future stability
of the Lebanese political and economic systems.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE RISE OF RAFIQ HARIRI
In this chapter, we will attempt to explain the
circumstances behind the rise of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's
government, which has been instrumental in pushing through
Lebanon's reconstruction programme. In the course of examining
these circumstances, we will look at two crucial questions.
First, why did Syria feel compelled to accept the appointment of
an influential, independent minded, and, hence, potentially
troublesome, figure like Hariri as Lebanon's prime minister? And
second, what were Hariri's motives in accepting the position?
We will argue that Syria, for all intents and purposes the
main power broker in Lebanon, acquiesced, in spite of earlier
misgivings, to a constellation of interests inside and outside
Lebanon, and allowed Hariri to become Lebanon's prime minister.
We feel that the reasoning behind this acquiescence involved,
primarily, Syria's desire to ensure the stability of the
essentially pro-Syrian, post-Ta'if, political order in Lebanon,
which was threatened, perhaps to some considerable extent, by
three factors: first, a serious economic crisis; second, the
controversy surrounding the legislative elections; and, finally,
the possibility of international intervention if a more popular
and effective government was not appointed. In short, we will
argue that Hariri's appointment offered Syria a sort of "safety
valve". By giving the Lebanese effective control over their own
economic system, Syria may have hoped to silence, or at least
placate, many of its critics in the country, while allowing
Syrian dominance of the Lebanese political system to remain
largely intact. Furthermore, in the event that the economy did
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not improve, it would, at the very least, allow Syria to escape
the blame.
We will also argue that Hariri accepted the prime
ministership for two main reasons. First, we will argue that
Hariri was a politically ambitious man, who coveted the prime
ministership since at least the early l980s. Hence, when the
right circumstances arose, he eagerly accepted the position.1
Second, we will argue that Hariri accepted the prime
ministership because it offered him the chance to push through
his own economic plans for the country, in particular the plans
for the reconstruction of Beirut's city centre, which he
apparently felt were jeopardised by the treacherous political
quagmire of the post-Ta'if system in Lebanon.
This chapter is divided into two sections. In section one,
we will give a brief overview of the major problems with the
post-Ta'if political system, and explain in detail the failure
of the Omar Karami and Rashid Solh led governments in resolving
Lebanonts political and economic problems. In section two, we
will discuss the rise of Rafiq Hariri, the makeup of his
government, and the goals that it set for itself.
This argument is, of course, contrary to the two prevailing
views concerning Hariri. One school sees Hariri as a selfless
person who accepted a position in government simply to assist
Lebanon out of its economic crisis. A second school argues that
Hariri took over the prime ministership as a step to simply
increase his already ilmuense fortune.
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1. Problems With the Post-Ta'if Political System and the
Failures of the Karaxni and Solh Governments
1.1 Problems With the Post-Ta'if System
As we mentioned in chapter one, the Ta'if Accord was never
really a popular document with the Lebanese, with the possible
exception of the Sunni community. 2 Much of the discontent
centred around the accord's political reforms. For example,
although the Maronites were guaranteed more parliamentary seats
than any other community, their political power was curtailed by
the fact that the powers of the presidency were reduced
considerably, diminishing the significance of their traditional
prerogative and depriving them of their effective veto power
over the political system. 3 By contrast, the role of the prime
ministership, the traditional prerogative of the Sunni
community, was greatly strengthened. 4 The influence of the
Shiite community, probably the single largest community in
Lebanon at the time, was also significantly increased. Although
the Shiites were awarded only the same number of parliamentary
seats as the Sunni, the powers of its traditional prerogative,
2 For various analyses of the Ta'if Accord and its impact on
the situation in Lebanon, see Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon
After Ta'if: Is The Civil War Over?" Middle East Journal 45,
no.3 (Summer, 1991), 457-473; Augustus Richard Norton and
Jillian Schwedler, "Swiss Soldiers, Ta'if Clocks, and Early
Elections: Toward a Happy Ending in Lebanon?"; Ronald D.
McLaurin, "Lebanon: Into or Out of Oblivion?" Current History,
(1992), 29-33; Habib C. Malik, "Lebanon in the 1990s: Stability
Without Freedom?" Global Affairs part VII (Winter, 1992).
See Ronald McLaurin, "Lebanon: Into or Out of Oblivion?",
32.
' Executive power was transferred to the cabinet, which is
headed by the prime minister. See ibid, 31.
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the Speaker of the House, were greatly enhanced.5
While opposition, particularly from the Maronite community,
to these internal political reforms was real enough, a very
strong argument could be made that they were not the primary
reason for widespread opposition to the Ta'if Accord, or for
opposition to the post-Ta'if political system. These changes did
not really radically alter the pre-civil war political system.
After sixteen years of war, one could argue that the Maronite
community, who were the most vehement in their opposition to the
accord, might have been more accommodating to its political
aspects if their other concerns were addressed carefully. As we
shall attempt to demonstrate below, the opposite occurred. That
is to say, the Ta'if Accord, particularly in its more sensitive
aspects, was forced upon the community by Lebanese governments
which were popularly perceived as Syrian puppets.
The most fervent opposition to the Ta'if Accord,
particularly in Lebanon's Christian communities, seems to have
come chiefly as a result of the section dealing with Lebanese-
Syrian relations. In short, the Ta'if Accord legitimised the
dominant, yet very unpopular, Syrian presence in Lebanon. The
accord did not mention the withdrawal of Syrian troops, but only
called for their redeployment to the Biqa Valley two years after
the implementation of Ta'if. Even if the latter were to happen,
and it has yet to at the time of this writing, the Syrian army
We will give extensive treatment to the relationship among
the three leaders, which collectively have been referred to as
the "leadership troika", in chapter seven.
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would only be some twenty miles from Beirut. 6 Moreover, the
accord called on Syria to assist the Lebanese government in
implementing the Ta'if Accord. In fact, the Syrian government
was the dominant partner in the relationship. As Habib Malik
explained: "As the predominant power over most of Lebanese
territory, Syria was in an undisputed position to dictate both
the interpretation and the implementation of the accord." 7 As
one might expect, therefore, Syria would interpret and implement
the Ta'if Accord according to its own needs and goals, rather
than those of the various Lebanese communities. This is why,
for example, the post-Ta'if Syrian backed governments were
selective in their disarming of militias. Furthermore, Syria
was able to impose a series of bilateral agreements on Lebanon
which increased Syrian dominance of the Lebanese system. In
effect, Syria came to dominate most facets of Lebanese political
life. The extent of this dominance was bluntly commented on by
the Druse leader Walid Juxnblatt, who has served in all of the
post-war governments :8
we the government meet once every week,
but the agenda and the order of'business for
the day are usually set for us in advance
and communicated to us a day or two earlier.
All sensitive subjects have been examined
and resolved outside the confines of
government. Certain concerned parties are
sometimes made privy to the secret, but
generally we are the last to find out and
the decisions pass without anyone really
knowing how.
6 Ibid, 31.
Habib C. Malik, "Lebanon in the 1990s: Stability Without
Freedom?", 85.
8 Quoted in ibid, 93.
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As we will attempt to demonstrate in greater detail later
in this section, the failure of both Karami and Solh to bring
about political, and especially economic, stability, can only
really be understood within the context of Lebanese opposition
to an order thoroughly dominated by Syria, and its Lebanese
allies.
1.2 The Karami. Government
1.2.1 Developments in Post-Ta'if Lebanon
On 5 November 1989, the Lebanese Parliament met in the
Syrian controlled Biqa Valley to ratify the Ta'if Accord, and to
elect Rene Muawwad to the presidency. Following his
assassination seventeen days later, the parliament elected Elias
Hrawi. The prime ministership remained with Salim Hoss, who had
headed the rival government to General Aoun. As mentioned
previously, it took nearly a year before the Lebanese
government, with the support of the Syrian army, was able to
militarily defeat Aoun. Therefore, the process of implementing
the Ta'if Accord did not really begin until 21 August 1990, when
the Lebanese Parliament approved the constitutional reforms
stipulated in the accord. The following month, parliament
officially amended the constitution.9
1.2.2 "The Government of National Reconciliation"
On 24 December 1990, a new Lebanese government was formed,
Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the Civil
War Over?", 461.
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led by Prime Minister Omar Karami, and referred to as the
"government of national reconciliation". The cabinet, which was
the largest in Lebanon's history, included 30 ministers, divided
equally between Christians and Muslims. As one commentator
noted, the cabinet was "unwieldy and bitterly divided". As a
general rule, the ministers were either pro-Syrian and/or
militia leaders. In the case of the latter group, it was hoped
that including them in the system would make it easier to
convince them to disarm their militias.' 0 The position of
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea is one illustration of this.
In return for supporting the Ta'if Accord, and thus opposing
Aoun, Geagea was not only given a cabinet position, but he
understood that the new government would treat him as the most
important leader of the Maronite community.'1
The Syrian stamp on Karami's government was unmistakeable.
In fact, as Norton put it, "the designation of Karaiui as the
successor to Prime Minister Salim Hoss was announced in the
Syrian press two days prior to his formal nomination in December
1990, thereby mocking customary parliamentary consultations."2
The configuration of the government was decided in consultation
with Damascus. President Hrawi, Prime Minister Hoss, and other
prominent Lebanese figures made several trips to Damascus to
discuss the formation of the new government. The feelings of the
10 Ibid, 467.
' Drew Harrison, "A Manufactured Peace", The Middle East
(July, 1991), 18.
12 Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the
Civil War Over?", 457.
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Lebanese public about the extent of Syrian input in the makeup
of the new government, as well as in appointments to key
positions in the Lebanese army, security services, and
intelligence services, were commented upon by Ronald McLaurin:
"The sight of government ministers, businessmen, and political
figures running back and forth to Damascus to plead their cases
or receive their orders was the talk of Beirut and the
embarrassment of the country."3
1.2.3 The Return of State Control: The Dissolution of the
Militias
Two of the major objectives of the Karami government were
the essentially complementary aims of disarming the militias and
extending government control over Lebanese territory. On
balance, in the pursuit of these objectives the government was
quite successful. However, Syrian intervention in this process
became a focal point of public discontent with the government.
The government's first major success concerned the
extension of government control over the capital. In December of
1990, under the Greater Beirut Security Plan t the militias
withdrew from Beirut, leaving the city in government hands for
the first time since the start of the civil war.'4
' Ronald McLaurin, "Lebanon: Into or Out of Oblivion?", 32.
14 The process had begun under the Hoss administration. For
details of the Greater Beirut Security Plan, and a chronology of
the negotiations leading up to its implementation, see the
folowing copies of the Arab Press Service: Diplomat 18,
Recorder Covering (13/20 October 1990), SP 235; Diplomat 19,
Recorder Covering (20/27 October 1990), SP 251-2; Diplomat 20,
Recorder Covering (27/3 November 1990), SP 271; Diplomat 21,
Recorder Covering (3/10 November 1990), SP 290; Diplomat 25,
Recorder Covering (1/8 December 1990), SP 359.
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The disarming of the militias, and the subsequent extension
of government authority to their respective enclaves, was
considerably more difficult. The Ta'if Accord stipulated that
the militias were to be dissolved within six months following
its ratification by parliament. 15 Following intense negotiations
within the cabinet, in which a number of the militia leaders
either participated or were represented, all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias were given until 30 April 1991 to voluntarily
disarm. Their weapons were to be given to the Lebanese or Syrian
armies, or the weapons were to be transferred abroad.' 6 In
return, the militias were to be incorporated into the Lebanese
army, the police or the administration.' 7 Given the relative
balance of power, with the Syrian army backing a rejuvenated
Lebanese army, and with strong international support for the
dissolution of the militias, particularly from the U.S., few
militias were in any real position to resist. Pro-Syrian
militias were the first to disarm, followed by the Maronite led
militia, the Lebanese Forces. By the spring of 1991, the
Lebanese government had successfully extended its control over
This included the country's 10 religious and secular
militias. A four man ministerial committee drew up the plan to
disband the country's militias. The plan also included a
provision which called for the disbandment of "non-Lebanese
militias", referring to South Lebanese Army (S.L.A.) and the
various Palestinian groups. See Arab Press Service Diplomat 13,
Recorder Covering (16/23 March 1991), SP 252.
16 Arab Press Service Diplomat 14, Recorder Covering (23/30
March 1991), SP 266.
17 For the chronology of when the militias dissolved, see
Arab Press Service Diplomat 17, Recorder Covering (13/20 April
1991), SP 318; Arab Press Service Diplomat 18, Recorder
Covering (20/27 April 1991), SP 331.
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much of Lebanon.
The main difficulty with the issue of disarming the
militias, and a principal bone of contention with critics of the
government, especially within the Christian camp, was a
political rather than a technical one. That is to say, for
purely political reasons, a few of the militias were not
disarmed. The pro-Iranian Hizb Allah, was a particularly
important example of this.' 8 The official reason given was that
Hizb Allah had the right to continue to seek to liberate
Lebanese territory from Israeli control. Unofficially, however,
the Lebanese government was well aware of the fact that such
activities only invited Israeli reprisals against Lebanese
targets, and offered the Israelis a pretext to remain in South
Lebanon. The Lebanese government's failure to disarm Hizb Allah
stemmed, not from a technical inability of the government to do
so, but largely from Syria's support of the militia. In fact, it
was an agreement between Syria and Iran in April of 1991 that
allowed Hizb Allah to retain its arms. 19
 The advantages, for
Syria, of an armed Hizb Allah presence are obvious. Above all
else, Syria was able to continue to use it as a bargaining chip
in its relations with Israel, particularly with reference to the
peace process. Syria presented itself as the only actor capable
of disarming or reining in Hizb Allah, a view accepted by
Israel, and thus as the only actor capable of keeping Israel's
18 This also included several of the Palestinian groups based
in South Lebanon, and the Israeli backed South Lebanon Army.
19 Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the
Civil War Over?", 471.
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northern border quiet. Until a peace agreement with the Israelis
is signed, Syria will be quite content with the low level
conflict in South Lebanon. 2° In effect, the disarming of Hizb
Allah and the extension of Lebanese govermuent authority to
South Lebanon remained tied to a future peace agreement between
Israel and Syria.2'
1.2.4 The Increase in Syrian Dominance of the Lebanese
Political System
The Ta'if Accord called for further negotiations between
Lebanon and Syria on a whole spectrum of bilateral issues.
Several agreements were subsequently reached; the most prominent
of which was the "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and
Coordination" which was signed on 22 May 1991 in Damascus by the
Syrian and Lebanese heads of state. 22 The agreement called for
the two states to achieve the highest possible coordination in
all political, economic, security, and cultural domains. It also
established a "Supreme Council" chaired by the two heads of
state, and empowered this council to make "mandatory and
enforceable"23 decisions on regional policy or coordination in
20 As indeed are the Israelis.
21 For a succinct look at the dynamics of the situation in
South Lebanon, see Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After
Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over?", 469-472.
22 For the text of the treaty, see Arab Press Service
Diplomat 22, Recorder Covering (18/25 May 1991), SP 386.
23 Arab Press Service Diplomat 21, Recorder Covering (11/18
May 1991), SP 371.
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the fields noted above. 24 Several subordinate bodies were
created to facilitate the objective of the treaty, including:
the Foreign Affairs Committee, which includes the foreign
ministers of both countries, and is charged with coordinating
the two countries' foreign policies; and the Defence and
Security Affairs Committee, consisting of the respective defence
and interior ministers, which deals with the internal and
external security of both states.25
The treaty was widely and fiercely criticised in Lebanon,
but the opposition of the Christian community was particularly
strong. Some Christian members of the cabinet argued in favour
of delaying the treaty until the Lebanese government achieved.
full sovereignty over its territory with the departure of all
foreign forces from Lebanon. 26	The Maronite Patriarch, who
supported the Ta'if Accord, criticised the treaty saying that it
was unequal and imposed.27
At the international level, France and Israel protested
against the treaty. Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Arens,
24 The Supreme Council included:
On the Syrian side: the president, parliamentary president, the
prime minister, and the vice president of the republic.
On the Lebanese side: the president, speaker of the parliament,
the prime minister and the vice prime minister.
25 There is also an Economic and Social Relations Committee.
Arab Press Service Diplomat 22, Recorder Covering (18/25 May
1991), SP 387.
26 This included Georges Saadeh of the Kata'ib and Roger Dib
of the Lebanese Forces. Arab Press Service Diplomat 21, Recorder
Covering (11/18 May 1991), SP 371.
27 Jim Muir, "The Syrian-Lebanese Treaty: Grounds for Concern
or Hope?" Middle East International no.401 (31 May 1991), 34.
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referred to the Syrian-Lebanese treaty with the "loaded term
Anschluss, recalling the Nazi annexation of Austria in 1938.1,28
However, international reaction to the treaty generally tended
to be mute. The U.S. government was even somewhat optimistic,
arguing that the objectives of the treaty "were in the interests
of all states in the region, including Israel."29 In an effort
to placate critics of the deal, some State Department officials
privately stated that "such treaties should not be taken too
seriously or too literally."30
The overwhelming consensus in literature dealing with this
issue suggests that the provisions in the treaty have
institutionalised Syrian dominance of the Lebanese political
system. 31 In particular, it is argued that Syrian dominance is
most evident in the realms of foreign policy, security, and
defense. Further agreements between the two countries were
signed in the defense and security domains, leading to the
accusation that the agreements opened the "entire Lebanese
security structure, from firefighters to intelligence agencies,
to Syrian penetration." 32
 In addition, it is claimed that certain
28 Habib Nalik, "Lebanon in the 1990s: Stability Without
Freedom?", 93; Peretz Kidron and Donald Neff, "Euphoria and
Alarm", Middle East International no.401 (31 May 1991), 5.
29 Peretz Kidron and Donald Neff, "Euphoria and Alarm", 5.
30 Habib C. Malik, "Lebanon in the 1990s: Stability Without
Freedom?", 93.
31 For criticisms of the treaty, see Jim Muir, "The Syrian-
Lebanese Treaty: Grounds for Concern or Hope?", 3-4; Habib C.
Malik, "Lebanon in the 1990s: Stability Without Freedom?"; Drew
Harrison, "A Manufactured Peace", 17-18; Ronald D. McLaurin,
"Lebanon: Into or Out of Oblivion?".
32 Ronald McLaurin, "Lebanon: Into or Out of Oblivion?", 33.
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liberties in Lebanon, such as the free press, have been
curtailed for such things as criticising Syrian interests in the
country.33
1.2.5 The Economic Reconstruction of Lebanon
The sixteen years of war brought far-reaching devastation
to Lebanon, both in human suffering and in physical destruction.
The figures on the number of Lebanese who died as a result of
the conflict vary. The Lebanese daily al Nahar puts the final
death toll at 144,240 and the number of wounded at 184,05l.
Another source placed the death toll at 170,000 - some 5.6% of
the total population. 35
 Non-Lebanese casualties, including
Palestinian ones, are excluded from these figures. Estimates of
the number of displaced Lebanese, who were either evicted or
fled from their homes to the relative safety of areas dominated
by their own religious sect, ranged from 680,000 to 800,000
persons, accounting for some one-fifth of the population. The
problem of displaced Lebanese has yet to be resolved. 36
 And
The defense and security agreement between LebanorT and Syria was
signed on 17 August 1991. Other agreements were also signed
including one promising to combat the drug trade.
Ibid, 33.
"Lebanon Chronology TT , The Beirut Review no.4 (Fall, 1992),
221.
The figure was cited in Boutros Labaki, The Reconstruction
Program of Lebanon: Present and Prospects (Lebanon: Council For
Development and Reconstruction, 1993), 1.
36 See Giles Trendle, "The Problems of Lebanon's Displaced",
Middle East International no.423 (17 April 1992), 19-20. A
significantly lower number of displaced Lebanese, 355,000 was
quoted by the Lebanon Information Processing Service Bulletin
no.31 (July, 1992), 3.
	 For a brief analysis of government
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approximately 900,000 people, 30% of the population, a
significant number of which were from either the middle or upper
classes, emigrated. 37 The war caused enormous physical
destruction, especially to the country's infrastructure. In
dollar terms, the damage was estimated to be in the billions of
dollars. To cite a number of notable examples of conditions in
1992: less than half of the telephone lines in the country
worked, electricity was available for only a few hours a day,
80% of the potable water resources were polluted, and all the
sewerage treatment plants were out of order. 38 Of the 3,270 Jans
of roads in the country, only 1,000 km were classified as being
in good condition, 257 km were classified as being in fair
condition and the remaining 2,013 km ranged from bad to very
bad. 39 Beirut International Airport and Lebanon's ports,
particularly Beirut port, were also in need of extensive
repair. 4° The Housing Ministry estimated that 86,571 homes were
destroyed during the war. The cost of fixing destroyed homes was
measures for the return of the displaced, see "Government Agrees
Measures for the Return of the Displaced", Lebanon Information
Processing Service, 1.
The figure was cited in Boutros Labaki, The Reconstruction
Program of Lebanon: Present and Prospects, 1. For a detailed
examination of the population figures, internal displacement and
external migration, see the main consultancy report on the
reconstruction of Lebanon -- Bechtel & Dar al Handasah, Recovery
Planning for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon:
Phase One - Volume Two Priority Program (Beirut: Council for
Development and Reconstruction, December 1991), section 3, 15-
20.
38 Ibid, 2-3.
Ibid, 46.
40 Ibid, 3-57.
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estimated at $754 million, and $1.6 billion for the building of
new homes. 4' A detailed examination of the destruction to
Lebanon's infrastructure, and the estimated requirements for
repairing it, will be the subject of the next chapter. Suffice
it to say,
	
at this point,	 that,	 restoring Lebanon's
infrastructure must be considered an absolute necessity.
Shortly after taking office, the Karami government
attempted to begin the process of Lebanon's economic
reconstruction. In January of 1991, the government revamped the
Council for Development and Reconstruction (C.D.R.). This was a
public autonomous body linked to the Cabinet, which was
originally established by the Lebanese government in 1977, two
years after the beginning of the war, and entrusted with the
task of preparing and organising the economic reconstruction of
Lebanon. A new C.D.R. board was appointed by the government,
and the organisation was charged with basically the same task.
An extensive examination of the C.D.R., which is one of the most
crucial bodies involved in the present reconstruction, is
undertaken in chapter four. For the moment, it is important to
note that shortly after its new mandate in 1991, the C.D.R.
retained the services of a consortium of two world-renowned
consultants, the American Bechtel International and the Beirut-
based Dar al Handasah, to develop a rehabilitation plan for the
country. The Bechtel/Dar al Handasah plan, referred to as the
three year priority programme, included the rehabilitation of
41 50,000 of the homes were deliberately destroyed by the
militias to prevent the return of their inhabitants. Lebanon
Information Processinq Service Bulletin, 3.
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Lebanon's infrastructure in 15 sectors during the years 1993,
1994 and 1995. The objective was to restore the capacity of
Lebanon's infrastructure to its peak levels (i.e., the 1975
level for those which had fallen below standard, or the peak
post-1975 level for those sectors which had improved after the
beginning of the war.) 42 In December 1991, the plan was presented
to international donors at a meeting convened 'by the World Bank
in Paris. Following consultations with the members of a series
of World Bank missions to Lebanon during 1992, and further
damage assessment studies, which received financial support from
the Commission of the European Communities (C.E.C.), the plan
was updated and revised. This revised edition was called the
National Emergency Reconstruction Programme (N.E.R.P.), a three
year public investment program which also included programs for
strengthening institutions and technical assistance.43
The C.D.R. commissioned the same consultants to prepare a
master plan for the reconstruction of the Beirut Central
District (B.C.D.). The plan, which was presented in June 1991,
called on the private sector to assume priority for the
reconstruction of the B.C.D. It called for the establisbment of
a real estate company in which equity was to be held by the
present title holders of land in the B.C.D., the government, and
additional private investors.44
42 Boutros Labaki, The Reconstruction of Program of Lebanon:
Present and Prospects, 6.
' Council for Development and Reconstruction, The Horizon
2000 Plan (Beirut: Council for Development and Reconstruction,
1992), 18-19.
Bechtel & Dar al Handasah, Recovery Planning for the
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The C.D.R. also concluded several contracts with European
and Lebanese consultancy firms to assess war damage in the
infrastructure sectors. 45 In addition, it initiated contacts with
several organisations and countries in the hope of receiving
funds to finance the reconstruction.46
It was under the Karami government, therefore, that post-
civil war plans for Lebanon's economic reconstruction were
initiated. However, for a number of reasons, little progress was
made. Boutros Labaki, a key member of the C.D.R., has attributed
the failure to the lack of available financial resources, and to
the inability of the government "to act and implement
efficiently a large program after 15 years of wars." 47 The public
sector, which as one observer commented "was grossly over-
staffed and pathetically inefficient," 48 was severely criticised
by nearly every group in Lebanon from the private sector to
academics. In effect, the government, which was viewed as
Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One- Volume Two
Priority Program, section 3, 23.
Boutros Labaki, The Reconstruction of Program of Lebanon:
Present and Prospects, 6.
46 The following sources were contacted: the European
Economic Community (E.E.C.), the European Investment Bank
(E.I.B.), France, Italy, Japan, Germany, the Saudi Development
Fund, the Saudi government, the Islamic Development Bank, the
Arab Fund for Arab Economic and Social Development (A.F.E.S.D.),
the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic and Social Development
(K.F.A.E.S.D.), the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic and Social
Development, the United Nations Development Program (U.N.D.P.),
the World Bank, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Development
(I.F.A.D.), and the Lebanese private banks. Ibid, 10.
' Ibid, 16. See also, Gerald Butt, "The Dire Straits of
Lebanon's Economy", Middle East International no.423 (17 April
1992), 18-19.
48 Gerald Butt, "The Dire Straits of Lebanon's Economy", 18.
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offering little leadership in the economic sphere, was seen more
as an impediment to the economic reconstruction of the country
than as a key initiator. Much of the aid promised by
international donors was held up because of the governmentTs
failure to produce a coherent economic policy. 49 In the end, the
Karami government was unable to continue with the C.D.R.'s plans
for the economic reconstruction of the country for these
reasons, and because of a severe economic and political crisis.
As Nohad Baroudi, Secretary General of the C.D.R. explained,
"Domestic and external events unfortunately served to halt the
recovery dynamic initiated in 1991, to frustrate the economic
stabilisation programme and to retard the implementation of the
N.E.R.P."5° It is to these economic and political crises, which
eventually led to the downfall of the Karami and later Solh
governments, and to the eventual political rise of Rafiq Hariri
that we now turn our attention.
1.2.6 The Economic Crisis: 1990 - October 1992
As we noted in the first chapter, the Lebanese economy had
begun to deteriorate seriously during the mid-1980s. While a
measure of stability emerged during the Karami period with
respect to the security situation, there was no real improvement
in the sphere of Lebanon's faltering economy. 51 In fact, some
Middle East Mirror (17 April 1992).
° Mohad Baroudi, "Horizon 2000: A Synopsis", unpublished
paper presented at The Financial Times organised conference, 1.
51 As a result of the relatively stable security situation,
economic growth did occur within some sectors. In addition,
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economic indicators pointed to a continued decline in the
economy, reaching a crisis point during the controversial
parliamentary elections which were held in the late summer of
1992. A key indicator of the declining economic situation was
the fate of the Lebanese pound. The fluctuating pound declined
to its lowest levels ever vis-a-vis the lmerican dollar. In
February of 1992, the pound was valued at - 879 to one U.S.
dollar, in April it was valued at 1,500, and in May it dropped
to 2,100 to one TJ.S. dollar. 52 During the parliamentary
elections held in the late summer of 1992, the pound was valued
at close to 3,000 to one U.S. dollar. 53 The collapse of the
Lebanese pound, and the run away inflation rate, which, as one
source explained, "was meaningless to refer to when the pound
fluctuates so violently on a daily basis," 54 greatly increased
the hardship of Lebanon's growing number of poor. 55 For example,
a low income household could spend as much as 20% of its monthly
budget on bread alone.56
increased government revenues, mostly through customs receipts,
combined with very little spending on the reconstruction
programme, helped to lower the budget deficit. However, as we
will explain below, other economic indicators showed serious
problems with the Lebanese economy. See Said Hitti, "Budgetary
Politics in Lebanon: A Memorandum for Public Discussion",
Lebanese Economic Tribune Paper 3 (Beirut: Lebanese Center for
Policy Studies, 1997), 16.
52 Middle East Mirror (10 April 1992), (17 April 1992)
Adib Salem, "Elections Exacerbate Economic Crisis", The
Lebanon Report 3, no.9 (September, 1992), 12. 	 -
' Adib Salem, "Poor Grow Poorer", The Lebanon Report 3,
no.9, 14.
Ibid, 14.
56 Giles Trendle, "Lebanon: End of The Nightmare?" The Middle
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Criticism of the government's handling of the economy came
from a whole range of circles, and, in fact, there was
considerable criticism of economic policy even within the
government. For example, Minister Walid Jumblatt blamed the
government for the country's economic failure, stating that its
policies were "stupid and short-sighted". 57 Education Minister
Boutros Harb was even more critical, accusing the government of
corruption and of breaking the law.58
More criticism came from religious and business leaders.
Greek Orthodox Patriarch Hazim suggested that the replacement of
the Karami government would be a necessary step to improving the
economy, and Beirut Greek Orthodox Bishop, Ilyas Audi, implied
that the country was essentially in need of a hero to save it.
Central Bank Governor, Michel Khoury, threatened to resign if
the government did not reduce its spending, which was seen by
many as a major cause of the economic crisis.59
At the end of February of 1992, the Central Bank issued a
surprise announcement that it would no longer draw on its
reserves to prop up the value of the pound, a development which
made the pound's rapid decline virtually unavoidable. The
importance of the Central Bank's assistance is aptly
demonstrated by the fact that, in the previous month alone, it
East (September, 1991), 10.
----, "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.3
(Spring, 1992), 208.
58, "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.4, 223.
-----, "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.3, 216;
, "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.4, 223, 226.
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had spent approximately $400 million in supporting the pound.6°
Without this assistance, all the government could do was to
declare to the public that it no longer possessed the weapons
for checking the decline of the pound. 6' The move by the Central
Bank, and the government response, left "the people
overwhelmingly pessimistic", according to Dr. Elias Saba, an
economist and former finance minister.62
The most spirited criticism of the government's handling of
the economy came from Lebanon's trade union movement, which
organised general strikes and protests supported by tens of
thousands of Lebanese from all religious denominations. In many
instances, the protests turned violent. On 5 May 1992, the home
of Finance Minister Au al Khalil in Tyre was burned down, and
in Beirut, banks and expensive cars were attacked. 63 The strikes
were led by the Confederation of Trade Unions (C.T.U.), which
formed a bloc of approximately 60 Lebanese trade unions with a
total membership of 200,000.64 C.T.U. President Antoine Bishara
demanded the resignation of the government. Another union leader
stated: "We need a totally different cabinet. There's no longer
any room for 30 swindlers who are the direct cause of our
60 Gerald Butt, "The Dire Straits of Lebanon's Economy", 18.
61 "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.4, 223.
62 Arab Press Service Diplomat 20, Recorder Covering (2/9
March 1992), SP 272.
63 Middle East Mirror (15 May 1992); Arab Press Service
Diplomat 20, Recorder Covering (2/9 March 1992) SP 272.
64 Giles Trendle, "Playing Politics With the Vote", The
Middle East (September, 1992), 20.
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suffering." 65 On 6 May 1992, following several weeks of general
strikes and mass protests, Karami offered his resignation,66
following consultation with Damascus, and said he was doing so
in order to "save the country".67
There seems to be a reasonable consensus that the Karami
government was primarily to blame for the economic crisis. In
fact, this was the conclusion of a major report written by a
panel of leading economists, 68 which the Karaxrii government itself
commissioned, to study the causes of the economic crisis and to
recommend policies to improve the situation. The report was
released in April 1992.69 It stated that the government's fiscal
policies, particularly the large budget deficit, were a major
contributor to the declining economic situation. As the
economists explained in the report, "the persistence of a huge
65 Arab Press Service Diplomat 20, Recorder Covering (2/9
March 1992), SP 272.
66 The Confederation of Trade Unions (C.T.U.) organised
general strikes on 15 April and 22 April. On 15 April, some
10,000 people marched in Beirut. See "Lebanon Chronology", The
Beirut Review no.4, 225.
67 Arab Press Service Diplomat 20, Recorder Covering (2/9
March 1992), SP 272.
68 The panel included Samir al Maqdisi, Hisham al Bsat, Elie
Yashul, Kamal Hamdan, Elie Assaf, Hussain Awadha, and Marwan
Iskandar. Middle East Mirror (8 May 1992).
69 Many of the recommendations of the report were later
adopted by the Karami, Solh and Hariri governments. For a
summary and excerpts of the report, see --- "Report of Economic
Experts (Excerpts and Summary)", The Beirut Review no.4, 132-
136; Middle East Mirror (1 May and 8 May 1992);
,"Economists publish their plan for recovery", Lebanon
Information Processing Service, 2. For a brief analysis of the
causes of the economic crisis see, Gerald Butt "The Dire Straits
of Lebanon's Economy", 18-19; Giles Trendle "Only Dreams lmid
the Debris", The Middle East (August, 1992), 34-35.
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budget deficit implies that more money will be printed, putting
higher pressure on the economy and causing a larger fluctuation
in the value of the national currency." 7° The report recommended
a tougher fiscal policy, and stressed that reduced public
spending would be essential for a successful economic recovery.
The report also highlighted the importance of "scheduling the
reduction of the public deficit and its inflationary
consequences," as a key to curbing inflation and stabilizing the
exchange rate of the Lebanese pound. 71 Even more damning was the
report's harsh criticism of widespread corruption in the
government and the civil service, a criticism widely shared by
the Lebanese business community, and, for that matter, the'
public at large. 72 Under such conditions, the economists warned,
economic recovery or reconstruction would be difficult to
achieve. 73 Therefore, the report also called for the
restructuring of the public administration in order to eliminate
its "large scale and organised corruption", and to increase its
efficiency. 74 Certainly, such a climate was not conducive to
business confidence. As the Lebanese manager of an international
70 Quoted in -----, "Report of Economic Expert (Excerpts and
Summary)", Beirut Review, 132. See also Middle East Mirror (8
May 1992)
71 Ibid, 132.
72 For examples of widespread corruption, see Gerald Butt,
"The Dire Straits of Lebanon's Economy", 18-19.
Middle East Mirror (1 May 1992).
' See for example, the comments of Youssef al Khalil, an
economist at the Central Bank, in Gerald Butt, "The Dire Straits
of Lebanon's Economy", 18.
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bank in Beirut said, "Please tell the outside world one thing,
never give a single penny to the public sector. Our only hope
here is to minimise the role of the state and the public
sector." 75 On a more general level, the report strongly
emphasised that the key to Lebanon's economic recovery rested
with the political establisbment, "which must show the will,
ability and commitment to put the country back on its feet." 76 In
short, the report suggested that the Lebanese government under
Karami did not place a high enough priority on the goal of
achieving an economic recovery.
This raises the question of what the government's
priorities actually were. The government's words and actions, we
will argue, seem to indicate that they were prepared to let
Syria dictate their priorities to them, a possibility which may
have been every bit as exasperating to Lebanese at all levels of
society as the economic crisis itself. On 26 March 1992,
displaying a serious lack of understanding for the concerns of
the Lebanese public, President Hrawi declared that pushing
forward with the parliamentary elections, which most of the
Lebanese public favoured postponing, was the main concern of the
government. On 25 March 1992, Prime Minister Karami, upon
arriving from Damascus, and no doubt because of Damascus's
advice, declared that his cabinet would neither be changed nor
reshuf fled until general elections were held in the summer.77
Ibid, 19.
76 Middle East Mirror (8 May 1992)
, "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.4, 223.
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Furthermore, the government publicly absolved itself from
any blame for the economic crisis, and moreover, at times, did
not even acknowledge the seriousness of the crisis. For example,
on 27 February, Karami and the Speaker of the House, Husayn al
Husayni, insisted that the economy was not in any real crisis.78
When the government did publicly acknowledge the crisis, it
still refused to take any responsibility, preferring to place
the blame on various other elements. If the government did
activate economic policies to deal with the crisis, it usually
did so in response to public strikes or other forms of protest,
which, incidentally, were seen by many not just as a response to
poor economic management, but as a popular rebellion against the
government specifically and the Syrian dominated political order
in general.79
Even if the government was serious about dealing with the
economic crisis, it would have been hard pressed to come up with
a consistent plan because the cabinet was so bitterly divided.
As we noted earlier, the 30 man cabinet was a conglomeration of
pro-Syrians and militia leaders who had little in common, and
certainly did not share a national goal. We have already noted
the public criticism of government policies by members of the
78, "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.3, 217-
218.
Arab Press Service Diplomat 20,, Recorder Covering (2/9
March 1992) SP 272. On 5 March, in the midst of a general
strike, the cabinet announced measures to deal with the crisis,
including a freeze on the price of essential commodities such as
bread, and the punisbment of currency manipulators. See -----
"Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.4, 221-222.
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government. 80 Also, the three most powerful members of the
government, the president, the prime minister, and the speaker
of the house, were often at odds with each other over policy,
and frequently haggled over patronage appointments to the public
service. 8' Ronald McLaurin's comments as to the inability of the
Karami government to deal with the economic crisis are apt:82
What Lebanon most clearly lacks - besides
its sovereignty - is effective national
leadership. Members of the government and
most other national figures are either
artifacts of the traditional feudal system
or products of the 15-year domestic
conflict. The latter depend no less than the
former on narrow clienteles, and have been
forced by an environment dominated by
foreign powers to pursue policies just as
exciusivist as those of their predecessors.
The economic crisis in Lebanon was the first serious threat
to the stability of the pro-Syrian political order. Because the
Lebanese government was seen by many in Lebanon as a government
controlled by Syria, the Syrians were unable to escape the
fallout resulting from the Lebanese government's poor handling
of the economy. Bowing to overwhelming popular pressure, Syria
acceded to the resignation of Karami, but, as we will attempt to
show in the next section, was unprepared at this point to allow
80 For example, on 13 November, Hrawi warned that opponents
who were unhappy were free to quit.
81 For example, on 1 May, in the midst of a serious public
protest against the government's handling of the economy, the
cabinet was shaken by differences over allocation of civil
service posts.
	
"Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.4,
227. Middle East Mirror on (17 April 1992) reported that
business leaders had hoped for a cabinet reshuffle in order to
deal with the sharp disagreements between Hrawi, Karami, and
Husayni.
82 Ronald McLaurin, "Lebanon: Into or Out of Oblivion?", 33.
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a more independent Lebanese government to emerge.
1.3 The Government of Rashid Solh
1.3.1 The Formation of a New Government
Immediately following Karami's resignation, President Hrawi
travelled to Damascus to discuss the formation of a new
government with President Asad, and Syrian Vice President 2bdel
Halim Khaddam. Reports in the Lebanese press pointed to the
possibility that Rafiq Hariri, the Lebanese/Saudi billionaire,
would be Lebanons next prime minister. 83 It was reported that
President Hrawi tried to persuade the Syrians of the benefits,
particularly economic ones, to be derived from Hariri's role in
government. However, the Syrians ruled out Hariri because of his
close relationship with the Saudis and with Western countries.84
On 13 May, Rashid Solh was asked to form the next
government of Lebanon. Solh, who was Lebanon's prime minister
when the war broke out in 1975, had a reputation for being a
moderate and conciliatory politician. 85 However, critics have
pointed out that, as a traditional politician, he had nothing
new to offer during a time when Lebanon needed a dynamic leader,
and furthermore, that his lack of an independent power base
meant that his political manoeuvrability vis-a-vis Damascus
83 As we will explain below, both Hariri, and his Saudi
backers were pressing for his appointment to the prime
minis tership.
84 Hariri did, however, have close relations with some
members of the Syrian elite. This fact may have cushioned Syrian
opposition to him in 1992.
85 For a profile of Solh, see Arab Press Service Diplomat 20
Recorder Covering (9/16 May 1992).
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would be extremely limited. Solh was quick to announce that the
primary concern of his government would be to tackle the
economic crisis and to heal divisions in Lebanese society.86
However, the announcement of his cabinet on 16 May confirmed the
critics' belief that little had changed. Fifteen of the twenty-
four men named to the new cabinet were from the previous
cabinet. Most of the major cabinet posts remained unchanged, and
only eight new ministers were appointed. 87 Walid Juxnblatt, who
was selected to the cabinet, referred to it as a "comedy of
errors". 88 Samir Geagea, also nominated to the cabinet, refused
to participate, arguing that since it was almost a photocopy of
the Karami government, the Solh government was also doomed to'
failure. 89 The Lebanese daily, al Anwar, stated that the Solh
government was the same as the one "that approved excessive
public spending, that was incapable of boosting receipts and
that failed to inspire confidence abroad."9°
Taking the minimalist nature of the governmental change
86, "Lebanon Chronology", The Beirut Review no.4, 228.
His government did attempt to implement, although not
vigorously, some of the policies announced b the economic
report noted above. See excerpts of the Solh government's
intended policies in "Policy Statement of the Solh Government
(Excerpts)", The Beirut Review no.4, 138.
87 For a list of the menbers of the Solh government, see
Lebanon Information Processing Service, 5.
88 Giles Trendle, "Sticky Start for Solh", Middle East
International no.426 (29 May 1992), 7.
89 Ibid. Of course, Geagea was disappointed with the fact
that pro-Syrian politicians were awarded the most important
positions within the cabinet.
90 Arab Press Service Diplomat 22, Recorder Covering (16/23
May 1992), SP 293.
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into account, it is clear that the Syrians had little intention
of allowing the formation of a government that would stray far
from the Syrian line. Syria's main objective in Lebanon, once
again, seems to have been to ensure that the parliamentary
elections scheduled for the summer of 1992 would take place. As
one government minister was quoted as saying: "the new
government is a transitional cabinet, whose principal task is to
organise legislative elections this summer - which Syria is
banking heavily on." 9' Damascus was "adamant"92 about the
elections taking place during the summer because they were
apparently confident that they could influence the results to
ensure the election of a pliant pro-Syrian parliament prior to
the Syrian armed forces' scheduled withdrawal to the Biqa
Valley. 93 It is not too difficult to imagine, therefore, that
the Solh regime was incapable of instilling enough confidence to
improve the economy. As the government continued to press for
the parliamentary elections, even after strong public protest
against what was widely seen as a Syrian engineered election
process, the Solh regime was doomed to failure. It is to the
elections that we now turn.
91 Ibid.
92 The statement was made by the same minister.
The intimidating presence of the Syrian military and
secret police throughout Lebanon, and the cultivation of several
political factions, ensured Syrian confidence that a pro-Syrian
parliament would be elected. For an explanation of why Syria
pushed for the elections, see Fida Nasrallah, "Why Syria Forced
the Elections on Lebanon", Middle East International no.434 (25
September 1992), 17-18.
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1.3.2 The Parliamentary Elections of 1992
By the end of the civil war, there were 31 vacant seats in
parliament. 94 In addition, the Ta'if process added 9 new seats.
One of the first provisions of the Ta'if Accord to be set in
motion by the Karami government involved filling the vacant and
newly-created seats. Instead of holding bye-elections, the
government, perhaps at the urging of Syria, decided to appoint
deputies to occupy these seats. This process, which was
completed in 1991, was a very contentious one. Whether it was
strictly true or not, most Lebanese suspected that none of the
appointees would be opponents or critics of the Syrian-dominated
order in Lebanon.95
As we mentioned earlier, the last parliamentary elections
to occur in Lebanon had been in 1972, before the war. Thus, it
was natural that the elections scheduled for 1992 would be the
focus of considerable attention and political activity. On 16
July 1992, parliament passed a new electoral law establishing
the regulations for elections, which were to take place during
the months of August and September. 96 The new electoral law
28 of the 30 seats belonged to deputies who have since
passed away. The remaining two vacant seats belonged to living
presidents.
For example, some of the appointees were widely respected,
and in a fair election process, they would have probably been
elected. See Augustus Richard Norton, and Jillian Schwedler,
"Swiss Soldiers, Ta'if Clocks, and Early Elections: Toward a
Happy Ending in Lebanon?", 48. For a scathing criticism of the
appointment process, see Habib Malik, "Lebanon in the 1990s:
Stability Without Freedom?".
96 A vote on the election law was originally postponed
because of Christian opposition. See Arab Press Service Diplomat
3, Recorder Covering (4/11 July 1992) SP 32. The vote eventually
took place in which the election law was passed by a margin of
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increased the number of seats in parliament from 108 to 128. In
addition, it divided the voting constituencies; the provinces of
Beirut, the South and the North, were each treated as
constituencies, while the provinces of Mount Lebanon and the
Biqa were divided into smaller districts. The divisions were
quite complicated and led a number of critics to complain about
government gerrymandering. 97 In particular, the size of the
electoral districts varied greatly. For example, some candidates
needed 5,000 votes to win a seat while others needed 100,000.98
These changes were, of course, contrary to the letter and spirit
of those parts of the Ta'if Accord which specifically stipulated
that the number of constituencies would be reduced to 5 in order
to allow for more communally mixed groups and to lessen the
power of local warlords. In addition, Maronite critics have
argued that the additional seats allocated to the Maronite
community were within largely Muslin areas, therefore requiring
candidates to rely on the Muslin vote. As a result, such
candidates would hardly be able to represent mainstream Maronite
opinion while seeing to the needs of the majority of voters in
their constituencies. Other provisions in the new law which were
64 to 13. For reaction to the vote, see Arab Press Service
Diplomat 4, Recorder Covering (11/18 July 1992) SP 46. For a
copy of the electoral law, see The Lebanon Report 3, no.8
(August, 1992), 4.
The distribution of seats apparently benefitted such
leaders as Walid Jumnblatt and Elie Hubayqah. For details, see
Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, "Swiss Soldiers,
Ta'if Clocks, and Early Elections: Toward a Happy Ending in
Lebanon?", 49. Also see Giles Trendle, "Playing Politics with
the Vote", 14.
98 Fida Nasrallah, "Why Syria Forced the Elections on
Lebanon", 17-18.
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criticized included the denial of the vote to expatriates, and
the failure of the government to update an electoral register,
"which showed that some electors eligible to vote were lucky
enough to have reached the ripe old age of 235."
Most Lebanese groups, for a number of reasons, were even
more critical about the timing of the elections. The Maronite
community was the most vocal in its opposition.' 00 Even groups
and personalities within the community which supported the Ta'if
Accord, including the Kata'ib party, the Lebanese Forces, and
Patriarch Sfeir, opposed the timing of the elections. The main
reason for this opposition was the strong belief that with the
presence of Syrian troops and intelligence agencies in the
country, a pro-Syrian parliament would surely be voted in,
cementing Syrian dominance of the political process for many
years to come. Given that the community had the greatest number
of eligible voters of any sect, approximately 618,000 out of an
estimated 2,385,465 voters, its opposition raised serious
questions about the validity of the elections. 10' But
dissatisfaction with the timing of the elections was clearly
evident outside the Maronite community as well. In an interview
Ibid, 17-18.
100 Most Maronite leaders, although divided among themselves,
were with relative degrees of opposition, against the elections.
The groups included the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal
Party, the Awnist World Front, the National Bloc, and the
Kata'ib party. For a brief analysis of the opposition, see -----
, "Controversial Elections Shake System", The Lebanon Report 3,
no.9 (September, 1992), 2-3.
101 Many Christian MP5 warned against the boycott, which one
described as a "leap into the unknown". See Arab Press Service
Diplomat 6, Recorder Covering (1/8 August 1992), 12.
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with the Beirut weekly, Monday Morning, former Prime Minister
Salim Hoss believed that the elections should be postponed until
all of Lebanon's major communities agreed to an appropriate date
to hold them.'°2 In a candid interview with the journal Middle
East International, Walid Jurnblatt declared that it was his
belief that it was not the proper time to hold the elections. He
went on to state: "1 don't like it. Let's be frank. The Syrians
want this election to try to give themselves a kind of
credibility." 03 Other Muslim leaders who questioned the timing
of the elections included Shaykh Muhammad Mandi Shamsiddine, the
Vice President of the Higher Shiite Council, and the Druse
leader Shaykh al Aql. 104 Muslim popular indifference toward the
elections was also evident as none of the usual pomp was
displayed during the campaign.'°5
In the weeks leading up to the election, the Maronite
community spearheaded several attempts to have the elections
postponed. At the popular level, these caine mostly in the form
of general strikes and noisy demonstrations. 106
 Also, several
delegations visited Damascus to attempt to have the elections
102 Monday Morning vol XX1, no.1022 (27 July - 2 August
1992), 13.
103 Jim Muir, "Leap into the Unknown", Middle East
International no.430 (24 July 1992), 8.
104 The Lebanon Report 3, no.8 (August, 1992), 3.
105 See Monday Morning vol XX1, no.1025 (17-23 August 1992),
16.
106 General strikes in the Christian areas of Lebanon on 23
July and 21 and 22 of August were widely observed. See Arab
Press Service Diplomat 5, Recorder Covering (18/25 July 1992),
SP 60; Arab Press Service Diplomat 9, Recorder Covering (15/22
August 1992)
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postponed. As a potential inducement for a postponement, the
Maronite leadership unsuccessfully proposed a compromise deal
where the present parliament would remain and elect the next
president in 1995107
Partly as a result of the uncertainties surrounding the
elections, and partly because of continuing government
indifference to the economic situation, the Lebanese economy
continued to deteriorate. This was evidenced by the continued
sharp decline of the Lebanese pound. As noted above, when
popular protests brought down the government of Omar Karami, the
pound was trading at 2,100 to one U.S. dollar, and, at the
height of the elections debate, the pound was trading at close
to 3,000 to one U.S. dollar, the lowest ever. The Confederation
of Trade Unions, which as mentioned previously organized the 6
May strikes that brought down the Karami government, held a
peaceful "warning strike", on 29 July to demand that the
government do something to improve the economy.108
In spite of such widespread popular opposition, and the
increasingly serious crisis in the Lebanese economy, the
Lebanese government and its Syrian patrons pushed ahead with the
elections. Even elections which were initially postponed in the
Maronite parts of Mount Lebanon, Beirut and in the South,
because no candidates were willing to run, were later held after
less popular politicians within the community agreed to
107 Arab Press Service Diplomat 9, Recorder Covering (15/22
August 1992), SP 112.
108 Editorial, "Heeding the Gathering Storm", The Lebanon
Report 3, no.8 (August, 1992) .
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participate. However, low voter turnout raised questions about
the legitimacy of the election process. In Beirut, voter turnout
was reported at 13%, and in the Maronite districts in Mount
Lebanon the turnout was anywhere from 0.55% in Jubayl to a high
of 13% in the Metn. Even in the pro-Syrian Christian regions of
North Lebanon, voter turnout was very low. In the Maronite
region of Bishareh and Batrun, and in the largely Greek Orthodox
district of Kourah, only 15% of the electorate voted. In the
predominantly Muslim parts of the country, voter turnout, save
for Beirut, was somewhat better, reaching a high of
approximately 40% in both Tripoli and the Biqa.'°9
1.3.3 The Election Results: The New Parliament
In spite of the largely Christian boycott of the elections,
the low voter turnout in most regions, and the widespread
allegations of electoral fraud,"° the newly elected parliament
did assume power and at least six important trends were
reflected by the election results. 11' First, because of the
boycott, the Maronite community was largely under-represented in
'° See The Lebanon Report 3, no.9 (September, 1992), 5.
110 For example, fraud charges were levelled against Hizb
Allah and at the Interior Minister, Sami Khatib. Arab Press
Service Diplomat 10, Recorder Covering (22/29 August 1992), SP
127.
" For a succinct look at the election results, see Augustus
Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, "Swiss Soldiers, Ta'if
Clocks, and Early Elections: Toward a Happy Ending in Lebanon?"
For a table of the election results, see The Lebanon Report 3,
no.10 (October, 1992), 8; For a biography of each of the new
parliamentarians, see The Beirut Review no.4, 148-158; and -----
, "Unrepresentative Democracy", The Middle East (October, 1992),
14.
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the new parliament. In the district of Jubayl, the two Maronite
seats were won by two independents who had run unopposed, Maha
Khuri As'ad and Michel al Kuri, receiving a total number of 41
and 130 votes respectively. Other winners were on lists headed
by strongly pro-Syrian figures such as Elie Hubayqah. The most
important and/or popular Maronite leaders were left out of
government. As a result, the wisdom of the Maronite boycott
strategy may be questioned. Perhaps the words of Walid Juinblatt
are appropriate: "The opposition can't do anything to confront
the intelligence services and the cheating. But despite it all,
we must play the game to try and limit the damage. The boycott
decided by the Christians is stupid; they're just putting
themselves out of the game.""2
 Second, those who voted showed
their disapproval of the government, as several government-
sanctioned candidates lost.' 13
 Lists headed by Prime Minister
Solh and House Speaker Husayni lost badly, and even President
Hrawi's son was defeated.' 14
 Third, the elections indicated that
the wartime elite within the Shiite community, .Pmal and Hizb
Allah, were to continue as the dominant political elite of that
community. 2mal won the most seats," 5 while Hizb Allah managed
112 Quoted in Arab Press Service Diplomat 10, Recorder
Covering (22/29 August 1992), SP 127.
113 Fida Nasrallah has suggested that Syria rigged the
elections in such a manner as to engineer the defeat of some
pro-Syrian candidates, thereby arguing that the elections were
indeed fair. Fida Nasrallah, "Why Syria Forced the Elections on
Lebanon", 17.
114 He lost to his cousin. See -----, "Controversial
Elections Shake System", 2-3; and -----,"Beirut: Hoss List
Overwhelms Solh", 8.
115 For a brief analysis of the electoral success of Arnal,
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to secure 8 of the 29 Shiite seats." 6 The victories of the two
former militias came at the expense of the traditional Shiite
zu'ama. Fourth, the election results showed the electoral
success of Islamist groups, both within the Shiite corrirnunity, as
indicated by Hizb Allah's success, and within the Sunni
community. The Sunni Islamist group, al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah,
won three seats, two in North Lebanon, and one in Beirut.'17
Fifth, the election results showed the continued strength of
Lebanon's traditional leaders, especially within the Druse
community, and to a lesser extent, within the Sunni community.
In fact, in spite of the Maronite-led boycott, the Maronite
deputies who were elected, especially in North Lebanon, also
reflected this trend. And finally, several staunchly pro-Syrian
parties were represented, particularly candidates on the Elie
Hubayqah list, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
(SSNP), which won 6 seats.
2 The Rise of Rafiq Hariri
2.1 Questions for Syria
The very fact that the elections went forward according to
a schedule dictated by Syria, not to mention the success of pro-
Syrian candidates at the polls, shows the extent to which
Damascus had become the arbiter of Lebanon's political fate.
see "Birri List Easily Sweeps South", The Lebanon Report no.10,
4.
116 For a look behind the success of Hizb Allah, see Giles
Trendle, "The Grass Roots of Success", The Middle East
(February, 1993), 12-13.
117 See "Controversial Elections Shake System", 2-3.
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Having secured their dominance within the Lebanese system
through the election process which had been their chief
priority, however, Syria had to find some way to deal not only
with ongoing domestic and international challenges to the
legitimacy of their role in Lebanon, but also with the problems
which the Karaini and Solh governments had failed to solve. As
the editors of The Lebanon Report commented directly after the
election, several important questions remained to be answered.
These included: Would the remaining clauses of the Ta'if Accord
be implemented? Would Syrian forces redeploy to the Biqa Valley
as the accord specified? Would measures be taken to improve the
economy? Would the issue of the displaced gain the attention it
deserved? In short, would a new government alter the status
quo?118 Ideally, Syria would have hoped to have a compliant
government in Beirut, along the lines of the Karami and Solh
administrations. However, all of these problems and hard
questions constrained Damascus' preferences in the formation of
the next Lebanese government. We will now proceed to demonstrate
how these concerns forced Syria to acquiesce to the appointment
of a relatively formidable figure like Hariri as the leader of
the next government.
2.2 The Post-Election Process: International Reaction
International reaction to the election process was cold. On
8 September 1992, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher said that the election results did not reflect the "full
118, " Fault Lines of the Future", The Lebanon Report 3,
no.10 (October 1992), 2.
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spectrum of the body politic in Lebanon."" 9 Furthermore, the
U.S. demanded that the Syrians withdraw their troops from
Beirut. On 14 September, Boucher said that U.S. policy called
for the "full implementation of both the letter and the spirit
of the Ta'if Accord & the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces
from Lebanon." 2° U.S. government figures, including James Baker
and Edward Djerijian also made public statements demanding the
redeployment of Syrian troops.' 2' On 11 September, the European
Community issued a joint statement to the effect that the
democratic process in Lebanon had been impeded by irregularities
which had produced a non-representative parliament.' 22 France's
reaction to the elections was strongest. On 3 September, French
President Francois Mitterand condemned as "deplorable" the
holding of elections under foreign occupation.' 23 On 24
September, French Foreign Minister Dumas and Syrian Foreign
Minister Sharaa met at the 47th U.N. General Assembly to discuss
French concerns about the situation in Lebanon. Dumas stressed
that the French would push for the continuing implementation of
the Ta'if timetable. Dumas also discussed French concerns about
Lebanon with Arab League Secretary-General .lbdel Maguid.'24
" "Lebanon Chronology", The Lebanon Report 3, no.10
(October, 1992)
120 Arab Press Service Diplomat 13, Recorder Covering (12/19
September 1992), SP 174.
121 "Lebanon Chronology", The Lebanon Report (October, 1992).
122 Ibid.
123 "Lebanon Chronology", The Lebanon Report (October, 1992).
124 Arab Press Service Diplomat 14, Recorder Covering (19/26
September 1992), SP 190.
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Moreover, France went on the diplomatic offensive to try to
persuade the international community to become actively involved
in the political situation in Lebanon.125
In spite of this reaction, the international community
effectively accepted the election results as a fait-accompli.
However, in return for a tacit recognition of the election
results and the promise not to become more actively involved in
Lebanese affairs, the international community tried to secure
from the Syrians two main concessions. This included a Syrian
military withdrawal from most of Lebanon, and the appointment of
a more popular government. In the latter case, the international
community,' 26 and in particular the Saudis, pushed for the
appointment of Rafiq Hariri to the prime ministership.'27
The Saudis' support for Hariri is an important point. As we
will explain below, Hariri was very close to the Saudi
leadership, and he represented Saudi political interests in
Lebanon. In fact, the Saudis had been pushing for the
appointment of Hariri to the prime ministership since at least
the early 1980s. 128 They had long been concerned about the
125 Since Ta'if, the international community has apparently
been content with allowing Damascus to dominate the Lebanese
political scene. France's diplomatic offensive was aimed at
reinvigorating the Ta'if Accord, and thus, lessening Syrian
influence over Lebanon. This included a 25 September meeting
between Dumas and his counterparts from the tripartite committee
which prepared the Ta'if agreement, Prince Saud al-Faisal of
Saudi Arabia, bdellatif Filali of Algeria & Abmad Taleb
Ibrahimi of Morocco. See ibid.
126 This also included the Americans and the French.
127 See Arab Press Service Review 18, Downstream Trends (2/9
November 1992), SP 74.
128 Ibid.
86
increase of Shiite power in Lebanon, and in other parts of the
Middle East. Within Lebanon, therefore, the Saudis wished to
install a powerful Sunni ally who would help stymie Shiite power
in the country, while at the same time moving Lebanon away from
pro-Shiite Iran and Syria.' 29 Prior to the early 1990s, relations
between Saudi Arabia and Syria were such that the Saudis'
support for Hariri could hardly have helped him very much.
Crucially however, after the demise of the Soviet Union, and
Syria's participation in the coalition against Iraq during the
Gulf War, Saudi-Syrian relations warmed somewhat, and Syria
hoped to take advantage of an opportunity to align itself more
closely with the Saudis, in order to gain greater Saudi
political and economic support. This consideration must have
weighed heavily with the Syrian leadership when they were
considering the formation of the next Lebanese government.'30
2.3 The Post-Election Process: The Domestic Reaction
The position of the Maronite community probably also
continued to weigh heavily in Syria's calculations concerning
the next government. Although some Maronite politicians were
elected to parliament, due to the boycott, most of the popular
Maronite leadership remained outside of the confines of power.
Their refusal to participate in the newly elected government
seriously undermined its legitimacy and posed a continuing
129 Interview with Nadim Shehadi in London in January 1997.
130 On some of the possible reasons why the Syrians
acquiesced to the appoint of Hariri, see -----, "Hariri's
Appointment Raises Hopes and Some Questions", The Lebanon Report
3, no.11 (November, 1992), 2-3.
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threat to Damascus' position in Lebanon. The appointment of a
more popular government would have the advantage, for Syria, of
weakening the influence of these leaders by adding an air of
legitimacy to the post-election political order.
Another matter of particular concern to the Syrians was the
popular unrest over the state of the Lebanese economy. As we
have explicitly pointed out elsewhere, poor economic conditions
played a major role in causing the fall of one government
associated with Syria. The uncertainties surrounding the
elections only caused a further decline of the economic
situation, and were likely to cause similar problems for the new
government if the situation did not improve. Lebanon's labour
movement made it clear that unrest would ensue if the economy
continued to deteriorate. On 15 September, the Confederation of
Trade Unions gave the government a two-week ultimatum to improve
the worsening economic situation, or face the possibility of an
open-ended strike.' 31 A one day C.T.U. organised general strike
was held, and widely observed, on 14 October. Two days
previously, Lebanon's schools had been shut down because of a
one-day teacher's strike.'32
A third consideration for Damascus was the position of
Lebanon's business community, whose confidence was essential for
the improvement of the economy.	 As we hope we clearly
demonstrated elsewhere,	 Lebanon's business leaders were
outspoken concerning their unhappiness with the Karami and Solh
131 "Lebanon Chronology", Lebanon Report 3, no.10 (October,
1992)
132 Ibid.
88
governments', which were viewed as being corrupt, inefficiert,
and, moreover, a general hindrance to the economic recovery of
Lebanon. Naturally, it was likely that a new, but similar
government would also fail to attract business confidence. In
fact, we will proceed to argue that elements within the business
community, led by Rafiq Hariri, demanded a role in the new
Lebanese government, a role which, in the face of the
aforementioned international and domestic considerations, Syria
felt compelled to submit to.
2.4 Hariri's Background
Before continuing to look at the reasoning behind Syria's
decision to appoint Hariri, however, it will be useful to
examine the role he played in Lebanon prior to his appointment
to office and his possible motives in accepting the position of
prime minister.
Rafiq Hariri was born into a poor family in 1944 in the
predominantly Sunni Muslim town of Sidon, in South Lebanon. At
the age of twenty-two, he moved to Saudi Arabia where he worked
first as a teacher, and then as an accountant for the French
construction company, Oger. In the 1970s, he established a sub-
contracting firm. He had formed a close relationship with King
Fand of Saudi Arabia (then Crown-Prince Fand) originally through
a marriage relationship, and then by building the Ta'if Massara
Hotel in only six months to host an Islamic Summit. In 1978, he
was granted the rare privilege of Saudi citizenship. In 1979, he
bought Oger, establishing Oger International. Hariri has since
built up a vast world-wide network of business interests ranging
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from banks to real estate companies. We will cite a number of
notable examples. First, Hariri holds a 35% stake in Banque
Francaise de l'Orient, one of the largest financial institutions
in Europe, with an equity of $143 million, and a balance sheet
of about $3 billion. 133 Second, his company, Oger Liban, is the
largest construction company in Lebanon, and Oger
Internationale, is one of the leading Construction firms in
Saudi Arabia. Finally, he is one of the prime real estate
holders on France's Cote D'Azur. Hariri's fortune is estimated
at between $3 to $4 billion.134
In Lebanon,	 Hariri gained a reputation for his
philanthropic enterprises. For example, since the 1980s, his
Hariri foundation has granted over 20,000 scholarships to
Lebanese students. As one observer of the Lebanese scene put
it: "Hariri should be commended for this. He saved thousands of
Lebanese students. ... a study should be conducted to see what
133 In 1992, four banking groups, including Hariri's Banque
de la Mediterranee, Riyadh-based al Bank al Saudi al Fransi,
France's Indosuez group, and Lebanon's Banque Libano-Francaise
merged to form Banque Francaise de l'Orient. Arab' Press Service
Review 18, Downstream Trends (2/9 November 1992), SP 74.
134 This brief biography of Hariri was adapted from Arab
Press Service Diplomat 18, Recorder Covering (17/24 October
1992), 5P 244; and The Lebanon Report 3, no.11 (November, 1992),
3.
Given the fact that Hariri acquired an extensive fortune in
such a short period of time, it is not surprising that several
theories have been promoted concerning the origins of his
wealth. One interesting theory states that much of Hariri's
alleged wealth actually belongs to members of the Saudi royal
family, and that Hariri is simply a front man for them.
Proponents of other theories have argued that Hariri's wealth
has been greatly exaggerated. This information was based on a
number of interviews carried out in Beirut in the winter of
1997.
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contribution this has made to the Lebanese economy."135
While Hariri's business successes and his generosity have
been much commented upon, very little has been written
concerning his political involvement in Lebanese affairs prior
to his becoming prime minister. However, two points can be
clearly established. First, he was Saudi Arabia's representative
in Lebanon during the 1980s; second, he was clearly interested
in building political influence in Lebanon as early as 1982.136
We will take a closer look at each of these points.
Hariri acted as King Fand's personal representative in
Lebanon during the 1980s. In this capacity, he acted as a
mediator between President Gemayel and Damascus,' 37 and he
disbursed various, forms of Saudi grants to Lebanon.'38
Furthermore, King Fand was personally behind Hariri's role in
financing the Ta'if conference, which produced the Ta'if
Accord.' 39
 In fact, according to some commentators, Hariri was
groomed by King Fand to become prime minister starting in the
early 1980s.'°
135 Interview with Kamal Shehadi in Beirut on 25 February
1997.
136 The information was based on two interviews conducted in
Beirut in the winter of 1997.
137 Whether this was just a one time deal, is unclear. Elie
Salem, "A Decade of Challenge: Lebanon 1982-1992", The Beirut
Review no.3 (Spring, 1992), 33.
138 Arab Press Service Review 18, Downstream Trends (2/9
November 1992), 3.
According to Michael Young, Hariri played the role of
"whip". Interview with Michael Young in Beirut on 24 February
1997.
140 MEED (6 November 1992), 2-3; David Garner, "Lebanon
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By using his enormous financial resources, Hariri certainly
was able to acquire considerable political influence. For
example, many politicians, including the President of Lebanon,
were receiving financial support from him. At the same time, he
also formed close ties with some members of the Syrian elite,
and in particular, the Syrian Vice President Khaddam and his
son, with whom Hariri had some sort of business association.14'
It is unclear, however, that Hariri necessarily intended to use
this influence to further a political career. Throughout the
1980s, he may have been primarily concerned with protecting his
business interests. Whether or not he was interested in pursuing
a high political office, as an outsider to the Sunni political
establisbment, Hariri actually had little or no chance of
becoming prime minister during the 1980s. 142 It is important to
note, however, that when the proper circumstances arose, and
Hariri did decide to make himself available, he had enough
resources and support that he was generally considered the most
credible candidate to lead the government.
While very little has been written concerning his political
involvement, Hariri's name was closely associated in Lebanon
with various economic plans to rebuild the country. In 1982,
Hariri's company, Oger-Liban, played a role in clearing debris
Survey", Financial Times (6 June 1995), 1.
141 Hariri also built a palace complex for President Asad.
Arab Press Service 18 Downstream Trends (2/9 November 1992), 3.
142 The information was based on various interviews conducted
in Beirut in February 1997.
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in Beirut.' 43 In 1983, he was ready to bankroll a planned
reconstruction of Beirut, and Oger-Liban began the process of
restoring numerous buildings. However, continued violence put
the scheme on hold.'44 In 1986, Oger-Liban developed a plan for
the rehabilitation of the central district, but it was not
carried out.'45
In post-Ta'if Lebanon, Hariri was considered to be the main
figure behind the 1991 master plan, designed by the consultants
Dar al Handasah and Bechtel, to rebuild Beirut city centre.'46
The plan was supposed to be the showpiece of Lebanon's
reconstruction project, and it was to help Lebanon regain its
role as the business and financial hub of the region. The C.D.R.
initially commissioned the plan, but it was financed by Oger-
Liban, which also had a say in the drafting of the plan.' 47 In
fact, Hariri essentially became the main force behind the C.D.R.
when Fadi Chalak, the director of the main firm of the Hariri
conglomerate, and Hariri's right hand man, was named its
chairman in 1991.
The contents of the $3 billion plan were severely
143 Interview with Michael Young in Beirut on 24 February
1997.
144 Interview with Paul Mourani in Beirut 14 February 1997.
Also see Giles Trendle, "Hariri the Panacaea", Middle East
International no.437 (6 November 1992), 11.
" Interview with Paul Mourani in Beirut on 14 February
1997.
146 See Nabil Beyhum, "The Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three
Reconstruction Plans for Beirut", The Beirut Review no.4 (Fall,
1992), 43-62.
147 Interview with Paul Mourani in Beirut on 14 February
1997.
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criticised. It called for the establishment of a private real
estate company, which was later named Solidere, to take over and
manage the reconstruction of the 130 hectare city centre. The
owners and the tenants of the property, who were not consulted,
or given a right to opt out of the plan, were entitled to 50% of
the shares in the company, while the other 50% would be made up
of cash from investors. The proponents of the plan justified the
takeover of the property on the grounds that its owners would be
unable to properly finance the reconstruction. 148 Opponents of
the plan came from several circles, including the tenants and
landlords of the downtown property, who opposed the heavy handed
takeover of the area, and many specialists, who opposed certain•
technical aspects of the plan. The plan was also criticised by
political authorities. Even though the plan was finally adopted
by parliament, the debate caused the implementation of the plan
to be delayed for several months.
We will argue that political ambition, combined with a
desire to push forward the plans for the reconstruction of the
Beirut Central District were the main reasons why Hariri put
himself forward to accept the prime ministership. As we
mentioned previously, he had already succeeded in putting his
man at the head of the most important body in the reconstruction
program, the C.D.R.. In addition, his construction company,
148 The proponents of the plan make a very strong argument
that in several cases, the ownership of property is unclear, or
that several owners own one piece of property. Under such
conditions, it is unlikely that all will agree on appropriate
plans to rebuild, or that the process will be tied up in the
courts for a very long time, further frustrating reconstruction
efforts.
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Oger, had played a prominent role in assisting the C.D.R. in all
its projects.149
2.5 The Decision to Appoint Hariri
We have argued throughout this chapter that, by the autumn
of 1992, Syria had successfully established itself as the
dominant player in Lebanese political life. It had secured from
the Lebanese a number of favourable bilateral agreements, as
well as securing the election of a pliant Lebanese parliament.
However, given the extensive international and domestic
opposition to the instalment of another weak pro-Syrian
government, Damascus felt that it needed to appoint a more
credible government. It is therefore, perhaps, not quite so
surprising that, on 22 October, after consultations between
President Hrawi and the Syrian leadership, the Syrians reversed
their initial opposition to the selection of Rafiq Hariri, and
he was asked to form a new government. Most observers of the
Lebanese scene see the decision as a bargain aimed at appeasing
the domestic and international opposition to Syria's continuing
role in Lebanese affairs. The essence of this accommodation was
that Hariri was to be given free reign to deal with economic
issues, while the larger political and military issues,
including the redeployment of Syrian troops and the disarming of
Hizb Allah, were to be decided (ultimately delayed) by Syria.
This arrangement was acceptable to the international community
because it allowed for the possibility of greater independence
149	 C.D.R.,	 Progress	 Report,	 January	 1995	 (Beirut:
Mediterranean Press, 1995), 38.
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on the part of the Lebanese government. The Saudis and the U.S.
were particularly satisfied because of their links with Hariri.
The arrangement was acceptable domestically because,
economically, it raised the possibility of a credible
reconstruction programme. This pleased business interests and
blunted the opposition of the Lebanese masses to continued
Syrian involvement by giving then a stake In supporting the
government.
2.6 Reaction to Hariri's Appointment
It is, perhaps, appropriate to recall the words of Beirut
Greek Orthodox Bishop, Ilyas Audi, when he said that the country
was in need of a hero. For many Lebanese, Rafiq Hariri was that
hero. Part of the initial attraction to Hariri was that he did
not belong to Lebanon's traditional political class or to the
war elite. With his vast fortune, and his connections to Saudi
Arabia and the West, he was seen as the one figure capable of
rebuilding the Lebanese economy. As one author put it, Hariri
was "the ultimate Mr. Fix it, the Ross Perot who made it."5°
The all-important economic markets showed immediate signs
of improvement on the announcement of Hariri's appointment. The
Lebanese pound rose from 2,205 to one U.S. dollar to 1,950 to
one U.S. dollar.'5'	 Domestic reaction was overwhelmingly
150 Jim Muir, "The Bandwagon rolls on", Middle East
International no.440 (December, 1992), 8.
151, "Hariri Appointment Raises Hopes and Some
Questions", The Lebanon Report 3, no.11 (November, 1992), 2.
Also see -----,"The Hariri Factor", The Lebanon Report 3, no.11
(November, 1992), 13.
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positive. Optimistic statements were forthcoming from leaders in
the Maronite community, including Patriarch Sfeir who was a
prominent player in the anti-elections campaign,' 52 and, from the
trade union movement. Antoine Bishara, head of the Confederation
of Trade Unions said that a "qualitative change" occurred in the
appointment of the Hariri government.' 53 International reaction
to Hariri's appointment, including the reactions of Paris and
Washington, was also optimistic.' 54 As a sign of its positive
attitude towards Hariri's appointment, on 23 October, the U.S.
promised to provide military aid, mostly in the form of military
hardware, to Lebanon, for the first time since 1984.155
2.7 The Hariri Government
On the announcement of his appointment to the position of
prime minister on 22 October, Hariri pledged to form a
government of "economic salvation".'56 He said he would name
"representative and competent people capable of bringing the
qualitative change hoped for" to the cabinet.' 57 On 31 October,
he announced his new 30 man government which was equally divided
between Christians and Muslims. Twenty members were new,
152 Giles Trendle, "Hariri the Panacaea?", 11.
153 "Lebanon Chronology", The Lebanon Report 3, no.11
(November, 1992), 14.
For U.S. reaction, see Arab Press Service Diplomat 18,
Recorder Covering (17/24 October 1992), SP 244.
Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
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including 12 experienced technocrats appointed to the economic
portfolios, many of whom had close ties to Hariri. To cite a
number of notable examples; Fuad Saniora, who was named Minister
of State for Finance, was Vice President of the Board of
Trustees of the Hariri Foundation and Chairman of the Board of
the Saudi-Lebanese Bank; Michel Edde, who was named Minister of
State for Cultural Affairs, served as an executive of the Banque
de la Mediterranee owned by Hariri; Samir Moqbel, who was named
Minister of State for the Environment, and is owner of the
Banaque du Credit Commercial pour le Moyen - Orient and a member
of the board of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry was a close
associate of Hariri; Bahije Tabbara, who was named Minister of
Justice in charge of Administrative Reform, was also a close
associate of Hariri; and Adil Qortas, who was named Minister of
Agriculture, was a former employee of the United Nations Food
and Agricultural Organisation. Hariri kept the all-important
Minister of Finance portfolio for himself.
Although the Syrians gave Hariri some autonomy in
appointing ministers to the economic portfolios, pro-Syrian
figures retained the key non-economic ministries. Mushin Dalloul
was named Minister of Defence,' 58 Fans Buwayz was named Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Michel Murr was named Deputy Prime Minister,
and Bishara Merhej was named the Interior minister. Other pro-
Syrian candidates to be awarded cabinet positions included Elie
158 In an interview on local radio on 20 November, Defence
Minister Dalloul said that "to talk about Syrian redeployment is
tantamount to treason at a time when Israel continues to occupy
Lebanese territory.' t Quoted in Arab Press Service Diplomat 23,
Recorder Covering (21/28 November 1992), SP 327.
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Hubayqah, and Sulayman Tony Franjiyyeh.159
In spite of the presence of several pro-Syrian figures from
the previous cabinet, Hariri's cabinet was described by Beirut
observers "as being the first credible post-civil war government
and is regarded as freer of Syria than its two predecessors."6°
2.8 Hariri's Mandate
As we have indicated elsewhere, Hariri's mandate appears to
have been limited by Syria to economic matters. As the editors
of the Lebanon Report explained: "Hariri is supposed to
stabilise the national currency, revive the public sector, begin
reconstruction, and revive the private sector?" 6' Certainly, no
small task. Considering that his room for manoeuvre has been
limited by Syria and its allies in government, such as Speaker
of the House Nabih Birri, the task is probably even larger than
it may initially appear. The limits placed on Hariri by Syria
and its allies are discussed in detail in chapters five and
seven. At this point, let it suffice to say that Hariri has
understood Syria's role in Lebanon very well. In a speech to the
Lebanese parliament, he readily admitted Lebanese subordination
to Syria: "There are no parties with any reservations about the
full and complete co-ordination between Lebanon and Syria...
When they stop, we stop.
	
When they step backwards, we step
159 For a list of the cabinet ministers, as well as brief
biographies on each minister, see Arab Press Service Diplomat 19
Recorder Covering (24/31 October 1992), SP 262.
160 Ibid.
161 "Hariri Appointment Raises Hopes and Some Questions", The
Lebanon Report 3, no.11 (November, 1992), 3.
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backwards. There is no argument over this."162
3. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State?
In chapter one of this study, we introduced Chalmers
Johnson's model of the capitalist developmental state, and we
raised the possibility that the Hariri government may share many
of its features. From the evidence presented in this chapter, we
feel that the Hariri government has clearly met the first
criterion of Johnson's developmental state: that is, economic
development is its top priority. As we demonstrated above, the
Hariri government's mandate was to rejuvenate a faltering
Lebanese economy. In fact, the government's very legitimacy has
rested on its ability to successfully implement a recovery
programme(s). The Hariri government's commitment to economic
development can be contrasted with the lack of a strong
commitment to economic matters which characterised the two
previous post-Ta'if Syrian-backed regimes. In fact, as the
student of Lebanese politics will be aware, most Lebanese
politicians have not traditionally adhered to specific
programmes or policies, but have been elected, for the most
part, simply on the basis of their personal standing and/or
their connection to important power blocs. In many ways,
therefore, the Hariri government, at least as it was initially
seen, was a break with traditional Lebanese political practices.
At this point, we can also comment on the relative strength
162 "Restive Lebanon", Foreign Report (London: The Economist
Newspaper Limited, 23 November 1993), 6.
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of the Hariri government vis-a-vis societal actors, other
political forces, and the dominant external power in Lebanese
affairs, Syria. As we explained in chapter one, Johnson, as well
as others, such as Wade and Haggard, argued that a strong state,
somewhat autonomous from societal and other pressures, has
demonstrated considerable success in implementing economic
development programmes. We feel that, at least to some extent,
the Hariri government has been allowed to circumvent the
traditional Lebanese political process in order to implement his
economic policies and programmes. Hariri was able to gain
control over most of the major economic institutions in the
country including the Central Bank, the Finance Ministry, and
the C.D.R. However, as we noted above, his room for manoeuvre on
other aspects of the political process has been limited by Syria
and a number of its Lebanese political allies. A more detailed
analysis of the relative strength of the Hariri government vis-
a-vis other actors, particularly relating to his ability to
implement his economic programmes, will be introduced in
subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PLAN FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF LEBANON - "HORIZON 2000"
Prime Minister Hariri's task of rebuilding Lebanon has been
difficult to say the least. As we have briefly explained in the
previous chapter, the war caused enormous devastation to
Lebanon's social-economic situation. On the whole,	 the
population became poorer,	 income inequalities increased
considerably, and the middle class all but disappeared.'
To cite a number of important figures provided by the
United Nations concerning the decline of social conditions in
Lebanon in 1992: nearly one fifth of the population had been
displaced; about 55% of the population suffered from severe
overcrowding; 21% did not have private water supply connections,
as opposed to 8% prior to displacement; and 48% of the
population were housed in dwellings constructed on illegally
occupied land or in illegally occupied buildings.2
A number of important economic figures, also provided by
the U.N., include: the monthly minimum wage, which was $135 in
1975, decreased to $50 by October of 1992; real per capita GNP,
which was estimated to be about $1000 in 1992 had fallen to
approximately one third of the 1975 level; and approximately 35%
of the labour force was unemployed.3
' Some 200,000 professional and skilled Lebanese have sought
employment in neighbouring countries or in the West.
2 The U.N. figures were obtained from a World Bank report.
World Bank, Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the
Executive Directors on a proposed loan to the Lebanese Republic
for an Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project -
Report # p -5982 - LE. (Unpublished, 9 February 1993), 17.
Ibid, 17.
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Damage to Lebanon's physical infrastructure was also
extensive. The U.N. estimated total damage to physical assets in
the billions of dollars. More specifically: approximately 50% of
telephone connections were in service and a person had only
about a 10% chance of completing a call; 4 the electricity system
had a generating capacity of about 1600 MW but only about 500-
600 MW were working, and the government rationed electricity to
about six hours a day; all water treatment plants operated at
reduced capacity; there were no functioning sewage treatment
facilities in the entire country; 80% of water samples collected
from springs, wells, reservoirs and water distribution networks
were polluted; 5 the system for solid waste collection was
destroyed; most schools, hospitals and vocational and technical
training colleges were damaged; and nearly a quarter of the
housing was at least partially damaged.6
A more detailed analysis of the effects of the war on the
Lebanese economic and social systems can be found in the 1991
Bechtel - Dar al Handasah consultancy report on the
rehabilitation of Lebanon, 7 but it can be seen just from the few
examples listed above that the Hariri government has had a very
With reference to this, a related problem was that most of
the public sector institutions suffered from a serious shortage
of skilled manpower. In this case, the telecommunications
section of the ministry of post and telecommunications had a
vacancy rate of 66%. Ibid, 17.
The water was probably contaminated by sewage.
6 Ibid, 17.
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program
(Beirut: Council for Development and Reconstruction, December
1991) section 3, 3-1 to 3-24.
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difficult task. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a
detailed account of the Hariri government's plan, called Horizon
2000, for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon. The
chapter is divided into three sections. In section one, we will
give a brief overview of the government's stated objectives for
reviving Lebanon's economic fortunes. In section two, we will
account for the origins of the Horizon 2000 plan. And in section
three, we will give a more detailed treatment of the plan
itself.
1. "Horizon 2000" - The Government's Stated Objectives for
Reviving Lebanon' s Economic Fortunes
In a speech to the Lebanese parliament on 9 November 1992,
Hariri outlined the most pressing issues on his government's
agenda. In addition to the obligatory statements concerning
"brotherly" relations with Syria, and the liberation of the
South from Israel, the speech concentrated heavily on economic
themes. While stressing the point that Lebanon's economic
fortunes rested with the private sector, Hariri gave details of
his government's strategy to help facilitate economic
reconstruction. This included plans and policies to rebuild the
infrastructure, to ensure macroeconomic stability, and to
introduce institutional reforms intended to maximise economic
productivity. 8 On plans to reform the public sector, Hariri
declared, "The implementation of administrative reform requires
8 For excerpts of the speech see, "Policy Statement of the
Harjri Government", The Beirut Review no.4 (Fall, 1992), 140-
144; "Policy Statement of the Hariri Government", The Lebanon
Report 3, no.12 (December, 1992), 5.
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the lifting of immunity for a certain period of time on all
civil servants and public sector employees, and the adoption of
a policy of reward and sanction to get rid of corrupt employees,
and reward honest ones." 9 On his government's plans to rebuild
the economy, Hariri stressed the need to rebuild the country's
10
The government will pay attention to
modernising the country's infrastructure
destroyed by the war. This includes
improving the water and electricity
networks, the reopening and restoration of
Lebanon's	 principal	 roads,	 and	 the
development	 of	 communications	 and
telecommunications, taking into
consideration the most recent developments
in modern technology, without which Lebanon
cannot aspire to regain its pivotal role as
a business centre in this part of the world.
On 17 March 1993, the secretary general and the vice
president of the C.D.R., Nohad Baroudi and Boutros Labaki,
respectively, unveiled the concrete details of the government's
plan for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon. Dubbed
Horizon 2000, it is a ten year economic plan which sets public
investment goals for the period 1993-2002 in all economic
sectors. At the time, it was estimated that Horizon 2000 would
cost $11.7 billion, in 1992 constant dollars. As the authors of
the plan point out, it is hoped that:1'
Quoted in "Policy Statement of the Hariri Government", The
Lebanon Report, 6. 	 -
10 Ibid, 7.
" Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000
for Reconstruction and Development: Main Report (Beirut: Council
for Development and Reconstruction, 1993), 2.
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government action, in short, will serve as a
catalyst	 for	 the	 recovery	 process,
providing, through the Horizon 2000
programme, essential public services and
facilities, and supporting an economic and
social environment in which the private
sector, and all Lebanese, may grasp recovery
and development opportunities.
The overall goal of Horizon 2000 is to double per capita GJJP
over the 10-year period, thus allowing Lebanon to regain its
position among the world's middle income countries.
According to the authors of the plan, Horizon 2000 sets two
essential tasks for the government. One task is for the
government to provide the private sector with an environment
conducive to investment. To ensure this, the government must
provide a state-of-the-art physical infrastructure including
electricity, telecommunications, water supply, wastewater
collection and treatment, stormwater drainage, solid waste
disposal, roads and expressways, public transport and railways,
ports and the airport, and government buildings. Second, the
government must provide acceptable social infrastructure in
several areas, including adequate housing and resettlement,
public health, social affairs, improvements in education, as
well as culture and sport. Third, the government must aid the
productive sectors including agriculture, industry and tourism.
Finally, the government must ensure macroeconomic stability by
employing its resources to facilitate the solution of such
serious problems as the fluctuation of the national currency and
high levels of inflation. This is to be done, primarily by
eliminating the budget deficit. The second task that the Horizon
2000 plan sets for the government is to ensure public confidence
in the state, and in the future of the country generally. To
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achieve this, the government is planning to reform what many
observers see as an incompetent and sometimes corrupt public
service. Second, the government is hoping to inspire the
confidence of the Lebanese public by demonstrating that it has a
competent plan (i.e. Horizon 2000) to rebuild the economy of the
country. Third, it is hoped that public confidence will be
further enhanced by the government's introduction of an
effective fiscal policy. And fourth, the government hopes that,
through securing external funding at favourable terms for the
plan, it will be able to demonstrate that it has international
support and thereby improve public faith in its prospects.'2
It is worth noting at this point that the authors include a
cautionary note about the nature of Horizon 2000. "The Horizon
2000 plan is indicative in that although it gives a well defined
public recovery programme, it allows the private sector
activities to evolve at will. The plan cannot be considered as
static. It has been established as a starting point in the quest
for progress." 3 In other words, the ultimate costs of the plan,
or even its contents, may be subject to change, and furthermore,
in any event, the success of the reconstruction is dependent
upon the performance of the private sector. Therefore, it is out
of the government's hands to some extent.
2. The Origins of the Horizon 2000 Plan
Because the Horizon 2000 plan has been subject to criticism
as a personal project of Hariri, which may therefore be
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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motivated to some extent by his own private agenda, we think
that it is important to establish that the whole of the plan was
not developed in a vacuum during a relatively short period of
time by a small group of experts working for Hariri. In fact,
the plan incorporates elements from a combination of several
earlier plans and studies, some of which may have originated as
far back as 1978. Therefore, it may be of some value to explore
the origins of many aspects of the Horizon 2000 plan by
presenting a brief history of the various attempts by successive
Lebanese governments to rebuild the economy following the
outbreak of war in 1975.
After the first wave of hostilities ended in late 1976, the
government, on 31 January 1977, set Sup the Council for
Development and Reconstruction 	 (C.D.R.)	 giving it the
responsibility of preparing a general plan and programme for the
development and reconstruction of the country.'4 In spite of the
renewal of violence, the C.D.R. inaugurated a reconstruction
plan, in December of 1978, which included public sector
infrastructure projects and infusions of public credit for the
private sector.' 5 The basic aim of the plan was to restore the
" The Council for Development and Reconstruction, The
Reconstruction Project (Beirut: Council for Development and
Reconstruction, April 1983)
15 The decision to begin the plan was prompted by the offer
of aid by Arab leaders meeting in Baghdad in October 1978.
Since it was created in 1977, the C.D.R. prepared 21 agenda
papers dealing with the main sectors of Lebanon's economy, as
well other things such as social policy, and regional
development. The 1978 reconstruction programme was based on
these agenda papers.	 See Council for Development and
Reconstruction, Progress Report on Reconstruction 1983- 1987
(Beirut, Council for Development and Reconstruction, September
1988), ch.4, 31.
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infrastructure to its pre-1975 level. It did not include a
definite timetable for the reconstruction projects, and, because
of the continuing violence, many of the projects had to be
postponed in any case. During the course of the war, additional
damage occurred in virtually every sector. In the aftermath
of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the C.D.R., in
consultation with the ministries, assessed the additional
damages to each sector, and from that assessment, developed a
new reconstruction plan. The 1983 C.D.R. plan was, with some
minor exceptions,' 6 essentially an update of the 1978 plan. Like
the 1978 plan, it did not offer a definite time period for
completion of the projects, and the general aim was to restore
Lebanon's basic facilities to their pre-1975 level. Again,
continuing civil strife limited the implementation of the
programme.
Following the conclusion of the war in 1990, the Lebanese
government once again began the process of rebuilding the
country. As with previous attempts, the government entrusted
the C.D.R. with the task of drawing up a plan for the recovery
process. As noted elsewhere, in May of 1991', the C.D.R.
commissioned International Bechtel Incorporated and Dar al
Handasah consultants to undertake studies for the reconstruction
and development of Lebanon. The first phase of the study, which
was intended to prepare a priority programme, was conducted over
a four month period and was based on a "first cut" appraisal of
16 The national waste management programme was added to the
1983 project.
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available information. 17 Identification of the individual
projects in the priority programme was largely based on
secondary information including existing information held by
various government ministries and departments, extensive
discussions with officials and other secondary sources. No
detailed physical survey was undertaken by the consultants to
assess the extent of damage and deterioration of physical and
social infrastructure.' 8
 The priority programme was divided into
fifteen sectors and included 126 projects to be completed in a
three year period (1993-95). The aim was to restore the capacity
of Lebanon's infrastructure to its 1975 level or, where
appropriate, at the maximum level since 1975.19 The Bechtel - Dar
al Handasah plan was adopted by the Lebanese government in April
of 1992. The consultants also discussed and recommended, in
detail, the appropriate institutional mechanisms to implement
and monitor the progress of the priority programme. These
recommendations will be discussed in the next chapter.
In December of 1991 the priority programme was presented to
international donors at a meeting convened in Paris by the World
Bank, which resulted in funding from the Commission of the
17 International Bechtel Inc., & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery and Planning for the Reconstruction
and Development of Lebanon - Phase One Volume One: Executive
Summary (Beirut, Council for Development and Reconstruction,
1991)
18 However, visual inspection of international, primary, and
some secondary roads was undertaken. International Bechtel
Incorporated, and Dar al Handasah Consultants, Recovery and
Planning for the Reconstruction and Development - Volume Two:
Priority Programme, 2-1.
19 Boutros Labaki, The Reconstruction Program of Lebanon:
Present and Prospects, 6.
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European Communities for further damage assessment studies to
key infrastructure sectors including electricity,
telecommunications, water supply, waste water, and solid waste.
The results of these studies, combined with further consultation
from at least three World Bank missions to Lebanon during 1992,20
led to the upgrading of the priority programme, which
subsequently became	 known as
	
the National Emergency
Reconstruction Programme (N.E.R.P.) 21
The Horizon 2000 plan introduced by Hariri's government in
April of 1993 did not preempt the implementation of the
N.E.R.P., but, in fact, incorporated the N.E.R.P. in its
entirety. As this substantial segment of the plan actually pre-
dated Hariri, it is clear that the characterisation of Horizon
2000 as a personal project of Hariri's may be overstated. Indeed
there are significant points of continuity between Horizon 2000,
the latest reconstruction plan, and plans that were introduced
as early as 1978. Important aspects of the 1978 and 1983 plans
can be clearly seen to have been incorporated into the Horizon
2000 plan. For example, some of the specific projects listed in
the 1978 and 1983 plans are also to be found in Horizon 2000. To
cite one very prominent example, "grandiose" plans for the
expansion of Beirut International Airport, often attributed to
20 The views and recommendations of the three World Bank
missions which visited Lebanon in 1992 can be found in an
unpublished internal World Bank report entitled, Memorandum and
Reconstruction of the President of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a
proposed loan to the Lebanese Republic for an Emergency
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project Report #P-5982-LE.
21 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000
for Reconstruction and Development, 19.
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Hariri, can be found articulated in the earliest reconstruction
plans. Both the 1978 and 1983 plans specifically called for an
expansion of the airport which would enable it to handle over 6
million passengers a year, which is exactly what the Horizon
2000 plan calls for.22
However, it should be recognised that the Horizon 2000 plan
also included new projects designed for medium and longer term
development. These projects originated from a number of post-
N.E.R.P. infrastructure studies in such areas as electricity,
telecommunications, water supply, and waste water. These were
supplemented by sectoral planning studies which were ongoing at
the time that Horizon 2000 was developed, including studies on
Beirut International Airport, Beirut Port, roads, education,
sports facilities, health, tourism, and further studies on
electricity and telecommunications. Using the above studies, the
C.D.R., sometimes in consultation with the relevant ministries,
decided which components would eventually go into the Horizon
project. In sectors or areas in which studies have not been
conducted, the C.D.R., again possibly in consultation with the
relevant ministries, developed a broad outline, based on
available data, for additional projects to be included in the
Horizon 2000 programme. 23 It is worth remembering that Hariri
effectively had control of the C.D.R. by this point. Therefore,
he presumably had the final say over which projects were or were
22 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Progress
Report on Reconstruction 1983- 1987 , Ch.4, 25.
23 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000
For Reconstruction and Development, 7.
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not incorporated into the plan.
Once the components of the plan were identified, the C.D.R.
estimated the cost for each of the projects, a timetable for
their completion, and the ability of the government to finance
the programme.24
3. The Contents of the Horizon 2000 Plan
In this section, we will take a detailed look at the
contents of the ten year Horizon 2000 programme. In short, one
could separate the plan into two phases - a reconstruction phase
and a development phase. Much of the reconstruction phase was
supposed to take place during the first three years of the
programme and it consisted of the entire N.E.R.P. project (1993-
1995) and the "Parallel Programme for Recovery and Development"
(P.P.R.D.). The P.P.R.D. was designed with tha intent of
complimenting the N.E.R.P. It is similar in size to the
N.E.R.P., and it devotes one-third of total expenditures to
expanding a number of the N.E.R.P. projects, and two-thirds to
new projects. According to the authors of Horizon 2000, the
P.P.R.D. was designed to help alleviate social' and economic
imbalances and support medium and longer term recovery and
development. 25 The remaining seven years of the Horizon 2000 plan
are aimed at activities which go beyond initial recovery
programmes through to medium-term recovery and longer term
development 26
24 Ibid, 8.
25 Ibid, 19-20.
26 Ibid, 20.
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Three types of expenditures are identified in the Horizon
2000 programme, including physical investment expenditures, non-
physical investment expenditures, and grant & credit support
expenditures.
Physical investment expenditures: "are for the
rehabilitation of existing public facilities and the expansion
and development of new facilities." Non-physical investment
expenditures include: "strengthening public institutions;
enhancing the public sector's capacity to implement and monitor
the recovery programme, manage, operate and maintain facilities;
carrying recovery planning and implementation forward;
undertaking master planning and other studies; and providing
technical assistance in various areas." And grant and credit
support expenditures: "are for private sector recovery including
support for housing and resettlement, social institutions and
artisans, and agricultural, industrial, touristic & private
service activities. ,,27
The Horizon 2000 public recovery programme is organised on
a sector by sector basis. It consists of 19 sectors, and four
major sectoral groups. The sectors are identified as follows:28
Physical Infrastructure Sectors
1. Electricity
2. Posts & Telecoirtmunications
3. Water Supply
4. Waste Water
5. Solid Waste
6. Transport, divided into four sub-sectors:
6.1 Roads
6.2 Public Transport & Railways
6.3 Airport
27 Ibid, 22.
28 Ibid, 17-18.
114
6.4 Ports
Social Infrastructure Sectors
7. Education, Divided into three sub-sectors:
7.1 General Education, Youth & Sports
7.2 Vocational & Technical Education
7.3 Culture & Higher Education
8. Public Health
9. Social Affairs
10. Environment
11. Housing & Resettlement
Productive Sectors
12. Agriculture & Irrigation
13. Industry
14. Oil & Gas
15. Private Sector Services (other than Tourism)
16. Tourism
Other Sectors
17. Information
18. Government Buildings
19. Management & Implementation (encompassing a range of
requirements for institutional strengthening & technical
assistance supporting recovery planning, master planning,
overall programme management and sectoral programme
implementation).
Table 1 lays out the expenditures in these sectors of the
Horizon 2000 plan in detail. An analysis and interpretation of
these tables will be undertaken in chapter five.29
29 The table was obtained from the Horizon 2000 Programme.
See Ibid.
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Having listed the expenditures in each sector, we will now
proceed to look in more detail at the individual sectors
concentrating on three areas: the extent of war-time damage; the
projected expenditures for reconstruction and development; and
what the government hopes to achieve as a result of the
programme.
Physical Infrastructure 	 -
The physical infrastructure sector accounts for 56.7% of
the total Horizon 2000 programme.
1) The Electricity Sector
The extensive damage to Lebanon's electricity sector has
already been discussed.3°
Given the fact that electricity supplies are crucial to the
revitalisation of business and industry, as well as to the
general improvement in the everyday lives of the Lebanese, it is
of little surprise that this is the largest sector in the
N.E.R.P./P.P.R.D programme at 23%, and it represents 14% of the
total Horizon programme.
Over 60% of the electricity programme was scheduled to be
implemented within the first three years of Ho'rizon 2000. The
target of the electricity program is to provide increased and
continuous electricity with a per capita electricity consumption
of 1780 KWh by the year 2002. The government also planned to
30 For a detailed account of the destruction in the
electricity sector, see International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al
Handasah Consultants (Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for
the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One -
Volume 2 Priority Program, 3-26 to 3-29.
For a more succinct look at the problems in the electricity
sector, see -----, "Electricity for the Year 2003", The Lebanon
Report 3, no.10 (October, 1992), 12.
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implement measures aimed at preventing theft and non-payment of
bills.3'
2) Posts & Telecommunications
As we have noted previously, the telecommunications network
was severely damaged as a result of the war.32
Improvements in the posts and telecommunications sector is
essential if Beirut hopes to recover its role as the financial,
business and trade hub of the region. The aim of the projects in
this sector, which represent 6% of the total Horizon programme,
was not only to restore services but also to close a
technological gap which emerged during the war years. As the
authors of the plan put it, "the development of modern,
efficient, domestic and international telecommunications links
is a necessary condition for Lebanon to emerge as a competitive
force and reclaim its role as a financial, commercial and
tourist centre of regional and international significance."33
The Horizon plan set a target of 295 lines density per one
thousand people by the year 2002. In addition, the C.D.R.
developed plans, not included in the Horizon prograniine, to
introduce a mobile telecommunications system.34
' The EDL estimated that 50% of its production had been
stolen by people who have hooked up their lines to the main
cables on the street. See, "Electricity for the Year 2003", 12.
32 For exact details of the damage to the sector, see
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants (Shair
& Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
3-41 to 3-45.
Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
58.
Ibid, 58.
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3) Water Supply
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, some 80% of the
water supply was polluted to some degree as a result of the war.
All eighteen of the water treatment plants were damaged or
operated at a reduced level. Chiorinators, whether in plants or
in wells, were not maintained for lack of both technical staff
and funds. In the South, most of the water infrastructure was
damaged or completely destroyed as a result of Israeli
invasions
The Water Supply sector represents 3.3% of the Horizon
programme.
The aim of the repairs and extensions in this sector was to
provide an average of 150 litres per capita per day by 1997 and
160 litres by 2002.36
4) Waste Water
As we noted previously, there were no functioning sewage
treatment facilities in the entire country. Coastal communities
disposed of their sewage directly along the shore, while inland
communities disposed of their sewage in rivers or streams used
for domestic water supply by downstream communities.37
The waste water sector accounts for 6.2% of the Horizon
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
3-35.
36 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
57.
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
3-30.
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2000 programme. Projects in this sector have been focused at
mitigating public health hazards, particularly the levels of
pollution in the water sources, and at collection, treatment and
disposal of waste water.
The aim of the prograinrae in this sector was to connect 50%
of the total population to waste water facilities (collection
and disposal systems) by the year 1997 and 98% of the urban
population and 70% of the rural population by 2002.38
5) Solid Waste
As noted elsewhere, the system for solid waste collection
was destroyed. Equipment such as collection vehicles and
community collection containers were either stolen or destroyed,
and disposal plants were directly shelled during the war. As a
result of the breakdown of the system, solid waste has been
disposed of in open dumps virtually everywhere. Coastal
communities have disposed of waste on the seashore or into the
mouths of rivers, while inland communities tended to use
ravines, rivers, the roadside, and other vacant lands. 39
 As a
consequence, there has been real concern over pollution and the
general health of the population.
The solid waste sector accounts for 1.5% of the Horizon
programme. Programmes are geared toward the development of
appropriate collection and disposal facilities for solid waste.
The aim of the programme was to extend collection and
Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
57.
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
3-37.
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disposal facilities to virtually all of the urban population and
75% of the rural population by the year 2002.°
6) Transport
The Transportation sector accounts for 25.4% of the Horizon
2000 programme. This sector is divided into four sub-sectors,
including roads, public transport and railways, the airport, and
ports. Improvements to Beirut International Airport and
Lebanon's ports, which, combined, account for 6% of the Horizon
programme are viewed by the government as crucial to Lebanon's
links to international trade, and the increase of custom duties
for the government.41
6.1 Roads
Damage to Lebanon's road network has been discussed in the
previous chapter.
The roads sector is the single largest sector in the
Horizon programme accounting for some 18% of the total. Compared
to neighbouring countries, Lebanon has been able to maintain a
good road network. The programme was aimed at improving the
quality of the roads, upgrading key links, and redressing the
deterioration that occurred due to a lack of adequate
maintenance •42
6.2 Public Transport and Railways
Lebanon's railway and bus systems were severely affected by
the war. The railways' fixed facilities, such as stations,
40 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
57.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, 56.
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workshops and tracks and its rolling stock were damaged or
stolen. Much of the bus fleet was also damaged or stolen, and
those which remained lacked essential spare parts.43
The public transport and railways sector accounts for 1.4%
of the Horizon programme. It includes work on the rehabilitation
of railways and on a public bus transport system.
In the latter project, the aim was to increase services to
six times the present level.
6.3 Airport
Beirut	 International	 Airport	 suffered	 severe
infrastructural damage as a result of the war. This includes the
majority of buildings, electromechanical installations, and some
of the aviation safety and control equipment.44
JAn ambitious project to rehabilitate and expand Beirut
International Airport accounts for 3% of the Horizon programme.
As noted previously, the aim was to expand the capacity of
the airport to handle six million passengers a year.
6.4 Ports
The rehabilitation45 and expansion of Lebanon's main ports,
including Beirut port, Tripoli port, and ports in Sidon, Jounieh
and Tyre, account for 3% of the Horizon programme.
The aim of the project for the main Lebanese port, Beirut
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
3-49 to 3-52.
"i' Ibid, 3-55
For an assessment of the damage, see ibid, 3-57.
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port, was to double its 1993 capacity.46
Social Infrastructure Sector
The social infrastructure sector accounts for 27.8% of the
Horizon 2000 programme.
7) Education
On the whole, Lebanons educational facilities are quite
strong, but mostly in the private education sector. Lebanon's
public school system is in need of serious upgrading. Alnost
half of the teaching staff, particularly at the primary level
are unqualified; damage, theft or lack of money has reduced the
level of teaching aid; four-fifths of the schools are not
considered functional and 90% have no external recreation area.47
The education sector, which is divided into three sub-
sectors, accounts for 13% of the Horizon programme. The aim of
the programme was to try and improve the level of public
education, through physical investments and by improving the
quality of teachers.
7.1 General Education, Youth and Sport
This sub-section represents 8.3% of the Hotizon programme.
A significant portion of this section was geared towards the
development of national sports facilities, in anticipation of
the Arab games which were supposed to be held in Beirut in the
46 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
58.
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
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summer of 1996.48
7.2 Vocational and Technical Information
This sub-section represents 1.2% of the Horizon programme.
7.3 Culture and Higher Education
This sub-section represents 3.6% of the Horizon programme.
8) Public Health
Prior to the war, Lebanon had a strong reputation for
health care services, although the system tended to be dominated
by private sector health care which was relatively expensive.49
While there are plenty of good hospitals and no shortage of
doctors, the vast majority of the health care services are
located in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, leaving nearly one million
people without direct access to health facilities at the local
level. Only fifteen of the 24 public hospitals were operating,
and only one at full capacity.5°
The public health sector accounts for 4.3% of the Horizon
programme. The goal was to rehabilitate the public health sector
in order to make good health care accessible to the majority of
the population.5'
48 In fact, construction to the sports stadium was halted
during the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon in the spring of 1996,
resulting in the postponement of the Arab games.
For details, see International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al
Handasah Consultants (Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for
the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One -
Volume 2 Priority Program, 3-72.
° Ibid, 3-72.
' Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
60.
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9) Social Affairs
The social affairs sector accounts for 1.1% of the Horizon
2000 programme. Similar to the public health sector, the aim was
to extend social services to the majority of the population. For
example, some of the non-physical investments were to include
reforms to social security and national insurance schemes.52
10) Environment Sector
The environment sector represents 0.3% of the Horizon
programme. This aim of this sector was to set up an
environmental laboratory to study, establish and enforce
environmental protection regulations and standards, and to
establish national nature parks and reserves. As the authors of
the programme point out, the major envirorunental issues are
dealt with in other sectors. For example, the protection of
water resources and coastal areas are dealt with in the water
and sanitation sector.53
11) Housing and Resettlement
As we noted elsewhere, 48% of the population were housed
under dubious conditions (i.e., in illegally occupied land or
buildings) as a result of the war.
The housing and resettlement sector accounts for 9% of the
Horizon progranilne. More than half of the programme was geared
towards offering grants and loans to the displaced and to those
living in war damaged housing.
The aim of the programme was to cover about 90% of the
informal housing, and to provide an average of 2,000 serviced
52 Ibid, 60.
Ibid, 61.
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plots annually for lower income housing.54
Productive Sectors
The productive sectors, including agriculture, industry,
and tourism are dominated by the private sector. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Horizon programme allocates the
majority of the funding in these sectors to private sector
credit support.
12) Agriculture and Irrigation
Total losses incurred by the agricultural sector during the
war years is estimated to be more than $600 million. This
included direct damages such as the destruction of fields and
equipment, the introduction of cheap agricultural goods by
Lebanon's neighbours (such as Israel), and the closure of
external markets
The agriculture and irrigation sector accounts for 5% of
the Horizon programme. Over half of the programme in this sector
was directed to credit support. Some of the projects in the
sector included: land preservation and reclamation,
reforestation, rehabilitation and development of agricultural
roads, and the rehabilitation and extension of agricultural
schools and training centres.
Ibid, 61.
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants
(Shair & Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
3-38.
5613) Industry
The industry
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sector represents 3.4% of the Horizon
programme. Approximately 38% of the programme in this sector
was for the provision of industrial credit. Much of the
remainder was geared towards the creation of industrial sites.57
14) Oil and Gas58
The oil and gas sector represents 0.8% of the Horizon
programme, and most of the work in this sector was concerned
with the rehabilitation and development of the Tripoli oil
refinery.
15) Private Sector Services
This sector accounts for 0.9% of the Horizon programme, and
included the provision of credit for truck purchasing and for
storage/distribution facilities.
16) Tourism
Prior to the war, the tourist industry was very important
to the Lebanese econony, as it amounted to approximately 15-20%
of the country's GDP. The nearly 1.5 million 'annual tourists
were attracted to Lebanon's location, weather, and the custons
and hospitality of the people. The war, however, effectively
56 For the effects of the war on Lebanese industry, see ibid,
3-86 to 3-88.
E Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
62.
58 For the effects of the war on the Lebanese economy, see
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants (Shair
& Partners), Recovery Planning for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume 2 Priority Program,
3-89 to 3-91.
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killed the tourist industry. Very few visitors came for
touristic reasons, and nearly 50% of the hotels closed for
various reasons related to the war.59
The tourist sector accounts for 1.6% of the Horizon
programme, with projects aimed at rehabilitating tourist
facilities such as the establishment of public beaches, and
national and international tourist offices. Four-fifths of the
sector, however, consisted of credit support for the tourist
industry. 60
The government understood that stability and hence,
personal security, as well as the rehabilitation of the
country's infrastructure are prerequisites for the
revitalisation of the tourist industry.
Other Sectors
17) Information
The information sector represents 0.4% of the Horizon
programme with projects intended to strengthen official
television and radio networks.61
18) Government Buildings
2.3% of the Horizon programme was geared towards the
rehabilitation of Government buildings.
19) Management and Implementation
Management and implementation accounts for 1.3% of the
Ibid. 3-101.
60 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000,
62.
61 Ibid, 62.
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Horizon programme and was geared towards enhancing the ability
of the public sector to manage the reconstruction of the
country.62
Financing Horizon 2000
Having laid out the Horizon 2000 plan in some detail, it
may be useful, at this point, to look briefly at the overall
cost of the programme and at how the Lebanese government plans
to finance it. As noted above, the cost of Horizon 2000 was
estimated at $11.672 billion at constant 1992 prices, Of this
amount, $10.212 billion was allocated to physical investment -
64% of which was supposed to go to physical infrastructure and
25% to social infrastructure, $270 million was allocated to non-
physical investments related to institutional strengthening,
programme planning and implementation support, and $1.190
billion was designated for grant and credit support to the
private sector.63
When counted in current prices over the entire Horizon
period, the C.D.R. estimated that the plan would cost the
Lebanese government approximately $18.4 billidn. The initial
$11.7 billion would add up to approximately $14.3 billion when
valued at the time of spending. The C.D.R. also estimated that
additional financing of $4.1 billion would be needed to meet
budget deficits in the first two years of the Horizon period,
and debt repayment commitments throughout the rest of the
62 Ibid, 63.
63 Ibid, 8-9.
138
period. 64
The government expects funding for the project to originate
from three sources. For the time being, we will merely identify
these and comment on the amount of funding the government
expected to derive from each. ?n evaluation of the accuracy of
these expectations will be dealt with in chapter five. The first
and most significant portion of financing was supposed to come
from government budget surpluses which the C.D.R. believed would
materialize in 1996. Budget surpluses were expected to amount to
$8.7 billion or 47% of gross financing requirements over the
Horizon period. This included $7.1 billion, or 50% of the $14.3
billion Horizon 2000 programme, and $1.6 billion, or 38% of
other requirements. The second major source of financing was to
originate from foreign currency borrowing, which was supposed to
contribute $4.9 billion or 34% of the public recovery programme.
No foreign currency borrowing was expected for non-recovery
expenditures such as government debt. 65 Finally, funding for the
recovery plan was also expected to come from foreign grants
which were to account for 6% of financing, and from receipts of
interest and principal repayments under the credit support
programme which were to contribute 4%•66
64 Ibid, 14.
65 Although domestic currency borrowing by the government is
expected to cover a modest 6% of the Horizon 2000 plan, it will
remain a significant source of financing to meet other
government expenditures including current budget deficits and
debt repayments. Ibid, 14.
66 Ibid, 15.
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4. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State?
As we explained in chapter two, the Hariri government's
primary concern, and, indeed its very raison d'etre, appears to
have been the reconstruction and the development of the Lebanese
economy. Its economic programme, outlined in this chapter,
clearly gives more evidence that the Hariri government is
committed to the recovery of the Lebanese economy. On the whole,
it has pursued policies to this end, such as ensuring
macroeconomic stability and rebuilding and developing
infrastructure. However, we feel that the level, or type, of
government participation may not correspond to Johnson's model
of the capitalist developmental state, which envisioned a much
more active role for the state in the economy.
A key feature of Johnson's model is that the government
guides, or assists, the private sector and the market in order
to promote economic growth. For example, in the context of the
East Asian NICs, such as Taiwan or Korea, the governments played
the leading role in directing key aspects of the economy. They
used a combination of incentives, controls and mechanisms, which
resulted in more investment in certain key indusiries than would
have occurred in the absence of government intervention. The
Hariri government's Horizon 2000 plan, however, is simply a
public expenditure programme aimed at rebuilding Lebanon's
shattered physical, and to a lesser extent, social
infrastructures. The Hariri government has allowed private
sector investment to evolve at will, as opposed to giving it
direct guidance. It should be noted, at this point, that the
Hariri government did apparently plan to encourage private
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sector participation in some specific areas by fostering
government-assisted redevelopment schemes, but for a number of
reasons, which we will consider in chapter six, we do not feel
that these schemes are such that the Lebanese government can be
said to conform to Johnson T s model of the developmental state in
this context.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE INSTITUTIONS MANAGING & IMPLEMENTING THE
HORIZON 2000 PLAN
In the previous chapter, we described the government's
prograinme for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon. At
its peak, the programme was to involve large financial
requirements, the management and monitoring of thousands of men
as well as a wide range of project types (from very small to
very large), the worldwide procurement of goods and services,
and the need to deal with diverse sources of international
financing. Clearly, the programme was ambitious for a country
with Lebanon's limited financial, institutional, and technical
capabilities.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the various
institutions which have been managing the reconstruction
programme. In fact, the institutional arrangement used to
manage the recovery programme is not particularly new. Generally
speaking, the Council for Development and Reconstruction
(C.D.R.) has been responsible for overall programme management
and coordination, as well as for contracting and disbursements
associated with the implementation of the projects in Horizon
2000. In many cases, it has also been responsible for
implementing the individual projects which were initially
supposed to be the responsibility of government ministries and
agencies. This institutional arrangement was in evidence with
all of the former reconstruction projects including the original
one dating back to 1978. Considering the failure of all of
these former plans, it may be appropriate to question the use of
this arrangement for managing Horizon 2000. Additionally, one
might question the eagerness of the private sector, whose
142
participation in Lebanon's economic recovery is essential, to
deal, to such a great extent, with a public sector which it has
tended to view as being incompetent and corrupt. We will give
fuller consideration to this latter point in chapter six.
With respect to the institutional arrangement, however, at
least three critical changes have taken place which may bode
well for a successful implementation of the programme. First,
security has returned to Lebanon. The violence has effectively
ceased, and the political and economic systems have stabilised
under the leadership of Rafiq Hariri. Second, important changes
have been introduced to strengthen the institutions. In light of
the technical and structural weaknesses of both the C.D.R. and
the ministries and agencies, highly professional international
consultants have been contracted to work with the institutions
to add the necessary technical and organisational skills. This
system has the double advantage of strengthening the
institutions without a very time-consuming and politically risky
attempt to reform the bureaucracy, and, at the same time, of
giving the recovery programme greater international credibility.
The third critical difference is the way in hich Hariri has
managed to take personal control of the reconstruction programme
in such a way that it is removed, to some extent, from the
political process, in which it would, more than likely, have
been delayed or effectively crippled by frequent political
disputes. By appointing men loyal to him to leadership positions
in the major economic institutions of the country, including the
Central Bank, vital ministerial portfolios, and, perhaps most
importantly, the C.D.R., Hariri has been able to use his
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personal influence to mediate disputes and facilitate the
implementation of the programme.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first two
give an overview of the state of the institutions implementing
Horizon 2000, with section one concentrating on the C.D.R. and
the second section on the ministries and agencies. In section
three, we will explain the institutional set-up for implementing
the Horizon 2000 programme, concentrating on the changes
employed to strengthen the institutions. Finally, in section
four, we will examine the nature and scope of Hariri's personal
involvement in the programme.
1. The Council for Development and Reconstruction
(C.D.R.)
The C.D.R. has been, and continues to be, the most
important institution in the reconstruction programme. In spite
of this, very little is known about it, even by the serious
student of Lebanese politics. This is primarily because most of
the recent material on Lebanon tends to concentrate on the
political-military aspects of the situation, and even material
written specifically on the Lebanese economy does not offer much
on the role of specific organisations like the C.D.R. In this
section, we will attempt to address this problem by giving an
overview of the history of the C.D.R. from 1977 to 1990.
1.1 The Origins of the C.D.R.
When the first round of fighting ceased in 1976, the
Lebanese public sector was too weak, inefficient, and
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demoralised to provide an effective institutional framework to
carry out the planning, programming and implementation of a
recovery programme. Given this, the extensive damage to
Lebanon T s basic infrastructure, and the disruption of its social
services and economy, extraordinary measures were needed to deal
with the rebuilding of the country. On 31 January 1977, the
reform-minded Lebanese government of President Elias Sarkis and
Prime Minister Salim Hoss issued Decree Law no.5 which created
the Council for Development and Reconstruction. The
organisation was to act as an apolitical technical advisory unit
reporting to, and answerable only to, the Council of Ministers
(the Cabinet)
The idea to create the C.D.R. originated with P.M. Hoss.' In
brief, by creating the C.D.R., he wanted to bypass the
inefficient Lebanese bureaucracy, and the many restrictive
practices associated with it. As Hoss put it, he wanted an
organisation "free from the shackles" of the public sector. 2 For
example, he wanted to attract talented new people to the C.D.R.,
something that could not have been done in any of the
ministries, such as the Ministry of Planning, because of the
restrictive confessional and seniority-oriented practices
involved in hiring new employees. Furthermore, the plan was to
give the organisation "vast authority to free it from red tape."3
To once again quote the former prime minister, "we wanted to
' Interview with the former Prime Minister Saljm Hoss in
Beirut on 21 February 1997.
2 Ibid.
Ibid.
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create an island to get rid of the inefficiency of the
ministries . !!4
 Since the C.D.R. would basically have many of the
same responsibilities as the Ministry of Planning, the
government abolished the latter organisation.5
1.2 The Structure of the C.D.R.
Originally, as specified by Decree Law no.5, the C.D.R. was
controlled by an executive board of twelve members, of whom four
were full-time. The four full-time members, each appointed by
the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, consisted of
the president of the C.D.R, two vice presidents and a secretary-
general. 6 The C.D.R. was divided into four departments including
Programmes, Project Management, Finance, and Administration.
According to a C.D.R. progress report, security conditions
during the war years made the recruitment of senior staff
difficult, leaving it essentially devoid of qualified
leadership. Apparently, the directors of the C.D.R. chose to
keep the organisation small and refrained from filling senior
positions until qualified applicants were found. 7 Presumably,
the number of people involved fluctuated to som'e extent. As of
1983, however, the C.D.R. reported that it had a full time staff
of 158 including 74 professional staff and 84 administrative
Ibid.
In fact, Decree Law no.5 abolished the Ministry of
Planning.
6 According to P.M. Hoss, the first president of the C.D.R.
was a highly respected individual. Interview with the former
P.M. Salim Hoss in Beirut on 21 February 1997.
The Council for Development and Reconstruction, The
Reconstruction Project, 2.
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staff. In addition, 22 consultants and advisors worked with the
organisation.8
Since 1990, as we will discuss in sections three and four,
the C.D.R. has become a different organisation. Although the
basic structures have remained the same - with the organisation
consisting of an executive board and four departments - new
management personnel, connected with Hariri, have taken control
of the organisation.9
1.3 The Stated Role of the C.D.R.
Even at its inception, the C.D.R. was granted unprecedented
powers for a Lebanese government unit. It was seen as being so
powerful, that some parliamentary debates during the late 198 Os
centred around whether or not the C.D.R. should be abolished.'0
In fact, at one point a bill calling for the abolition of the
C.D.R. was submitted to the Lebanese parliament, but it failed
to pass."
The C.D.R.'s principal role was to draw up an overall
framework for the reconstruction of the country, and to mobilise
and coordinate external finance, including loans ' and grants, for
8 Ibid, 19.
As we will discuss elsewhere, a restructuring of the
organisation was suggested by consultants in 1995. However, as
of February 1997, the plan had yet to be adapted, and it is
unclear whether the changes would take place. Interview with
Jim McCredie, lead consultant at the C.D.R. in Beirut on 20
February 1997.
10 Interview with the former P.M. Salim Ross in Beirut on 21
February 1997.
" Ibid.
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the reconstruction effort.' 2 It was made responsible for the
financing of any project or programme assigned to it, and, in
special circumstances, it could also be called upon to implement
individual projects. For example, if the line ministries or
other government agencies were unable to fulfil duties within
their respective areas of interest, provision was made for the
intervention of the C.D.R.' 3 In some cases, such as the
redevelopment of the ports, Beirut International Airport, or the
national waste management program, the C.D.R. set up special
implementation units under its authority because there was no
other national agency able to assume responsibility. Concerning
most of the other projects, it was envisaged that the C.D.R.
would play a supervisory role in the implementation stage,
thereby giving the line ministries and agencies added technical
expertise. The role of the C.D.R. in the implementation stage
was supposed to decline as the public sector became efficient
enough to manage the new projects, and responsibility for
funding projects was supposed to return to the line ministries
and agencies.'4
1.4 The Actual Role of the C.D.R: From 1977-1990
As we have specified above, the C.D.R. was initially
12 International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants,
Recovery Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon:
Phase One - Volume Two Priority Program, 3-21; Council for
Development and Reconstruction. Progress Report on
Reconstruction 1983 - 1987, 16.
13 Ibid, 3-21.
' Council for Development and Reconstruction, Progress
Report on Reconstruction 1983 - 1987, 12.
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created to help develop a reconstruction plan, and to mobilise
external funds for the reconstruction of the country. For much
of the war, and particularly during the 1980s, the C.D.R.'s role
in Lebanon went beyond its original mandate in at least two
significant ways.
First, the C.D.R. was meant to act as an implementation
agency only under special circumstances. In practice, however,
the ministries were so weak that the C.D.R. came to play a very
active role in the implementation of not only the individual
projects of the reconstruction programme, but also the day to
day projects of the ministries including public sector
investment. From 1987 until the end of 1990, for example, the
C.D.R. was responsible for the implementation of externally
funded projects to repair/upgrade schools and health care
facilities. 15
Second, the C.D.R. was meant to concentrate on raising
funds from external sources. In practice, because of the war,
the projected amounts of external funding were not forthcoming,
and so the C.D.R. came to rely on public funding for its
projects.' 6 Prior to 1983, the C.D.R.'s programmes were largely
financed from external sources. Ninety-one percent of total
commitments and 78% of total expenditures were externally
financed. After that, the contribution of external sources of
' In addition, the C.D.R. did some work to Beirut
International Airport. The rehabilitation of the schools was
funded by the E.E.C.
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants,
Recovery Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon:
Phase One - Volume Two Priority Program, 3-21.
16 Council for Development and Reconstruction, Progress
Report on Reconstruction 1983 - 1987, 46.
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finance to the total C.D.R. programmes declined substantially.
For example, in 1983, external finance accounted for 25% of
total expenditures, and in 1985 it accounted for 12%. During
this period, financing for the C.D.R. programmes came largely
from general government fiscal sources.17
A classic example of both of these changes in the mandate
of the C.D.R. was its role with respect to Lebanon's roads. By
the mid-1980s, the C.D.R. concentrated much of its attention on
primarily domestically funded programmes involving the road
network. Sixty-three percent of the C.D.R.'s expenditures in
1985 were for such programmes.'8
1.5 The Failure of Past Reconstruction Plans: Problems with
the C.D.R.
As we explained in the previous chapter, the inability of
the C.D.R. to effectively carry out previous reconstruction
projects was largely due to circumstances beyond its control.
Foremost among these were the deterioration of the political
situation, rapid inflation, and a general lack of financing.
However, problems within the C.D.R. also affected its ability to
effectively carry out the reconstruction projects.
These problems were reported on in a 1990 study of the
C.D.R. conducted by the accountancy team of Coopers & Lybrand -
Deloitte, which is the most definitive work on the C.D.R. to
17 Ibid, 49.
18 Council for Development and Reconstruction. Progress
Report on Reconstruction 1983 - 1987 , 50; International Bechtel
Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants, Recovery Plan for the
Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume
Two Priority Program, 2-21.
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date. 19 The study cited serious organisational problems,
including, most significantly, a lack of well defined procedures
for implementing and monitoring the individual projects, and
significant political interference in the C.D.R.'s decision
making process. These problems were partly created, and
certainly exacerbated, by the presence of inadequately trained
staff in virtually every section of the C.D.R.'s operations.2°
The lack of well defined procedures was a very serious
problem.	 To cite one example, prior to 1990 there was no
procedure for the crucial process of the prequalification of
consultants and subcontractors. Obviously, without a
prequalification procedure, it would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to prevent a situation where a bidder of
questionable credentials would be awarded a contract simply on
the basis of having made a competitive bid. 2' Other procedural
problems included the lack of standard contracts and purchase
order documents, and inadequately standardised codes and
specifications for construction contracts. 22 Procedures for
19 The study was for the Arab Fund. For an abridged version
of the study, see International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah
Consultants, Recovery Plan for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One, Volume One - Executive
Summary.
20 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study. See Ibid, 20.
21 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study. See International
Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants, Recovery Plan for
the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One, Volume
Three - Program Implementation and Monitoring Procedures
(Beirut: Council for Development and Reconstruction, 1991), 2-
15.
22 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study. See International
Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants, Recovery Plan for
the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One, Volume
One - Executive Summary, 26.
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monitoring the progress of projects were also poorly defined or
flawed. In addition to a general lack of satisfactory
supervision, inadequate procedures created a situation in which
contractors were allowed to select their own consultants to
certify their work, a circumstance which clearly created the
potential for massive abuse.23
In addition to the problems created by a lack of well
defined procedures, the Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study
reported an increased level of political interference in the
C.D.R.'s decision making process as a serious problem,
particularly after a new administration caine to power in 1983.24
As a result of politically motivated decisions, the C.D.R. was
unable to make the most efficient possible use of resources for
the reconstruction of the country. A classic example of this
was, again, the prequalification and contract tendering process.
Part of the problem was a lack of coordination amongst
government departments, which created delays in preparing tender
packages. More personally-motivated political interference also
contributed to a climate in which tendering procedures were
frequently bypassed in favour of restricted tenders, quotation
requests and mutual agreements. 25	While one could see the
23 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study. See International
Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants, Recovery Plan for
the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One, Volume
Three - Program Implementation and Monitoring Procedures, 2-12.
24 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study. See Ibid.
25 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study. See International
Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants, Recovery Plan for
the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One, Volume
One - Executive Summary, 20.
152
advantage of restricted quotations in some circumstances, 26 on
the whole such a system tended to favour those with political
connections and increased the potential for corruption
throughout the entire system. It would also increase the risk of
alienating segments of the international community, including
donors, lenders and investors, which would be concerned with the
accountability and openness of the overall reconstruction
programme 27
In addition to the difficulties created by poorly defined
procedures and political interference in the C.D.R.'s decision
making, the Coopers & Lybrand - Deloitte study identified staff
weaknesses at all levels of the C.D.R. as a very significant
obstacle to the success of the recovery process, and recommended
the recruitment of additional personnel in the areas of
management, administration, procurement, engineering, and
construction.
At the management level, the report found a real shortage
of experienced managers able to administer multiple contracts
for a large programme. In the administration division, there was
a shortage of experienced accountants, auditors, and computer
specialists.	 The procurement division was in urgent need of
personnel experienced in dealing with the prequalification of
contractors, contract package formulation, including
instructions to bidders, bid forms, contract conditions, the
26 See ibid, 26.
27 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte study. See International
Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants, Recovery Plan for
the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon: Phase One, Volume
Three Program - Implementation and Monitoring Procedures, 2-3.
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evaluation of tenders and the adminstration of purchase orders.
The engineering division required design engineers experienced
in all of the basic engineering disciplines including civil,
mechanical, electrical, and related technical disciplines.
Finally, the construction division required construction
engineers experienced in all of the basic engineering
disciplines and in the technical administration of contract
documents 28
It should go without saying that, if these organisational
and structural difficulties are not rectified by the current
leaders of the reconstruction process, something which we will
look at in chapter five, the success of the Horizon 2000
programme, or any other programme designed to be administered by
the C.D.R. will continue to be seriously doubtful.
1.6 Recommendations for Reforms to the C.D.R.
In 1991, the consultancy team of Bechtel/Dar al Handasah
made several recommendations to improve the C.D.R.'s capacity to
manage the reconstruction programme. 29 Some of the more obvious
ones included attracting qualified staff by offring incentives
such as higher wages, and improvements to procedures relating to
tendering, bidding, the monitoring of projects, and the
standardisation of contracts and codes for construction
contracts.
The consultants argued that the quickest and most efficient
28 Coopers & Lybrand-Deloitte Study. See Ibid, 3-12.
29 These recommendations are reported in the 1991 consultancy
report.
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way to strengthen and expand the organisational capabilities of
the C.D.R. would be to hire a Programme Management Consultant
(P.M.c.) body to work within the C.D.R. The P.M.C. would be
staffed by international consultants, and would work in concert
with the C.D.R. in providing technical and management
assistance. The P.M.C. would be responsible for providing
training to C.D.R. members to improve their technical and
management skills, and would be involved in most aspects of the
reconstruction programme. Its duties would include assisting the
C.D.R. in the preparation and maintenance of a programme plan,
the prequalification of consultants and contractors, contract
tendering, tender evaluation, recommendation for contract
awards, and the monitoring of contractor performances.3°
The use of a Programme Management Consultant body, staffed
by international consultants, offered several advantages over
potential alternative reform plans. First, and above all, it had
the crucial advantage of being able to be initiated rapidly.
Second, it was flexible. Finally, the use of well known
international consultants would give the C.D.R., and the entire
reconstruction programme, an aura of international credibility -
crucially important to a country trying to attract foreign funds
and investors. 31	As we will explain below, this system was
essentially adopted by the Lebanese government.
2. The Collapse of the Lebanese Public Sector
In this section, we will explain some the weaknesses found
° Ibid, 2-23.
31 Ibid, 2-23.
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in the Lebanese public sector. In brief, we will argue that the
poor state of the Lebanese public sector ensured the necessary
and the dominant role of the C.D.R. both in managing the
reconstruction programme and in implementing many of the
individual proj ects.
The poor state of the Lebanese public sector is well known
and frequently cortunented on by both the Lebanese public and the
specialists on Lebanon's political and economic systems. Some
of the most frequently heard complaints concerning the public
sector are that it is corrupt, inefficient, and is staffed with
poorly qualified personnel. 32 Moreover, the public sector is seen
as a place staffed, or to be more precise, overstaffed, with
personnel who received their jobs through the political
patronage network, rather than through merit. To cite one
prominent example, Lebanon's Central Bank was, and continues to
be, severely overstaffed. 33 As one observer put it, the Central
Bank "is a favourite dumping ground", for political patronage.34
The public sector has been, and still is, a major drain on the
Lebanese government finances, and reforms to the sector are
needed if the government budget deficits are to be brought under
control.
In spite of widespread concerns pertaining to the state of
32 See chapter 2 of this study for private sector views of
the public sector.
Some Lebanese observers believe that over half of jobs at
the Central Bank should be eliminated. This information was
based on interviews in Beirut in the Winter of 1997. See also
Philip Khoury, "Not Banking on the Future", The Lebanon Report
6, no.3 (March, 1995), 5.
Interview with Lebanese economist in Beirut in the winter
of 1997.
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the Lebanese public sector, no recent detailed study has been
published about it in the English language. Because of this, we
will base much of the information in this section on the 1991
Bechtel - Dar al Handasah report.
2.1 The Weaknesses of the Lebanese Public Sector
The Bechtel - Dar al Handasah report indicated that
Lebanon's public sector was the sector most severely affected by
the war. 35
 We have already documented the extensive physical
damage to Lebanon's public sector. Perhaps, the extent of the
public sector's problems can be more readily understood in light
of the fact that it was, and still is, unable to measure or keep
record of vital statistics including crucial ones related to the
economic, social and health fields. To cite one very important
example, the government is unable even to measure the country's
GNP, 36 which obviously is going to seriously restrict its ability
to pursue programmes or policies which may be beneficial to the
Lebanese public.
In this section, we intend to give a brief overview of two
crucial factors - the loss of authority and the poor quality of
personnel - which have considerably weakened the ability of the
Lebanese public sector to perform its duties. In addition, we
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al I-iandasah Consultants,
Recovery Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon:
Phase One - Volume Two, 3:5.
36 This situation may have existed as far back as 1976.
Proponents of one school of thought in Lebanon argue that the
Hariri government is not particularly interested in reviving the
various	 statistical	 departments,	 or providing accurate
measurements of the economy for fear that the figures would be
unfavourable to the government.
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will take a closer look at the problems faced by the individual
ministries and agencies which have played a role in the
implementation of the Horizon 2000 recovery programme.
The most serious problem faced by the Lebanese public
sector was the loss of authority. This has been evident in its
continuing inability to collect revenues, including taxes,
utility tariffs and a variety of fees. 37 Important public utility
services, such as the telephone and electricity networks, have
faced problems not only with collecting fees from registered
users but also with numerous people who have connected into the
systems illegally. 38 At the same time, the public sector was
expected to continue to provide such basic services, and to pay
the salaries of its employees. The obvious consequence of this
situation was the occurrence of huge budget deficits. To cite
one example, while the Lebanese public sector reported modest
surpluses in the years before the war, total revenues only
covered 8% of expenditures in 1988. In addition, a large
proportion of government expenditures were earmarked to pay off
interest on government debt.39
The other serious problem was related to the shortcomings
of Lebanon's public servants. While the Lebanese public sector
had a certain level of staff-related problems before the war,
the situation deteriorated significantly for at least two
Either the public evaded payment or the system of
collection broke down.
38 International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants,
Recovery Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon:
Phase One - Volume Two,, 3:11.
Ibid, 3:9.
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reasons.
First, there was a critical shortage of qualified staff,
caused, to a great extent, by the emigration of many skilled and
professional Lebanese, who left either to escape the war or to
find more attractive opportunities abroad.4°
Second, a lack of professionalism among the staff was
widespread.	 Corruption,	 including	 bribery,	 favouritisrn
(political or otherwise), influence peddling, diversion of
funds, conflicts of interest and racketeering reached epidemic
proportions. 4' Bribes, for instance, were widely required in
transactions between citizens and the government, including such
things as the registration of a vehicle, obtaining a driver's
license, acquiring telephone service and the registration of
deeds establishing the ownership of property. In the latter
case, the fee (i.e., bribe) was usually a percentage of the
value of the transactions, which could run into thousands of
dollars. 42 Jthsenteeism among public servants was another
widespread problem. For example, out of the 2,200 staff on the
Ministry of Health's payroll, only 4% reported regularly to
work. 43 There may be certain functional advantages to allowing a
moderate level of bribery and absenteeism to exist in a war-time
situation.	 Maroun Kisirwani, a specialist on the Lebanese
40 Ibid, 3-12.
' Maroun Kisirwani, "The Lebanese Bureaucracy Under Stress:
How Did It Survive? T1 , 33.
42 Ibid, 34.
International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah Consultants,
Recovery Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon:
Phase One - Volume Two, 3:73.
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bureaucracy, has indicated that political and economic
corruption helped the bureaucracy to survive by offering enough
economic incentives to keep low paid civil servants on the job.
Allowing absentee workers to stay on the payroll helped to keep
them loyal to the bureaucracy, and to the state in general, and
thereby reduced the number of people joining the militias. 44 Now
that the war has ended, however, these practices no longer serve
any useful purpose, and, indeed, have become an obstacle which
must be overcome if Lebanon's economic recovery is to succeed.
2.2 A Brief Examination of Some of the Ministries and Agencies
Having given a general idea of the state of the Lebanese
public sector, we will now proceed to take a closer look at some
of the government ministries and agencies which have been given
the critical task of implementing the individual projects in the
recovery programme. As we shall see, the weaknesses in these
ministries and agencies has made the role of the C.D.R. even
more crucial in the recovery programme. In particular, the
C.D.R. performed much of the implementation duties that were
supposed to be conducted by the ministries and agencies.
The agency responsible for providing Lebanon with its
electricity needs is Electricite du Liban (E.D.L.), which is an
autonomous state-owned organisation responsible to the Ministry
of Hydraulic & Electric Resources. The E.D.L. has experienced
both financial and institutional problems. As we noted
prvious1y, the financial difficulties emanated partially from
Maroun Kisirwani, "The Lebanese Bureaucracy Under Stress:
How Did It Survive?", 39.
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the agency's inability to collect bills, and to prevent theft
from the electricity network (estimated at 50% of production)
This was coupled with an increase in both employee wages and in
the price of providing electricity. Institutional weaknesses
were related to a lack of technical capabilities among the
staff. It should be stressed that some of the difficulties
facing this agency, in particular the collection of payments and
the ability to prohibit theft, have been rectified with the
reassertion of government authority throughout the country.45
With respect to the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications,
local and national services are provided directly by the
ministry while international services are operated by two semi-
public companies: S.O.D.E.T.E.L. which operates and maintains
submarine cables, and O.G.E.R.O. which operates and maintains
high frequency radio links. 46 The ministry and these
organisations also suffered from institutional and financial
problems. Institutional problems ranged from a lack of fully
qualified staff to more general kinds of staff shortages. As of
1991, the number of regular employees at the ministry was
estimated at 3,200 as contrasted with the approximately 8000 who
were supposed to be employed. 47 Part of the reason for a shortage
of skilled labour was the inability of the administrative staff
'	 See International Bechtel Inc. & Dar al Handasah
Consultants,	 Recovery Plan for the Reconstruction and
Development of Lebanon: Phase One - Volume Two, 3:27-28. For a
succinct look at the problems faced by the E.D.L., see -----
!vElectricity for the Year 2003", 12-13.
46 Ibid, 3:41.
Ibid, 3:41.
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to provide adequate training.48
Responsibility for the wastewater sector, which includes
sewage and stormwater, rests with several organisations. The
municipalities are supposed to provide and maintain public
works. In addition, the municipalities along with the Ministry
of the Interior are supposed to fund projects within the sector.
Other responsibilities are assigned to the Ministry of Housing &
Cooperatives and the Ministry of Public Health, and to three
agencies (namely, the Executive Council for Large Projects, the
Council for Scientific Research for Controlling Environmental
Pollution and the C.D.R.). This sector faced the same general
difficulties as the other sectors. Some of the more specific
problems associated with this sector include both a lack of
coordination and a great deal of competition amongst the various
agencies and ministries. In addition, the whole chain of command
has been highly politicised. For example, the Ministry of the
Interior, which is responsible for distributing government
revenue to the municipalities, has done so on political
grounds
Responsibility for the solid waste sector also rests with
several organisations, including the municipalities, which are
responsible for collecting refuse, and the Ministry for Public
Health, which is responsible for setting the level of industrial
& commercial discharges and studying pollution problems. The
C.D.R. and the Council for Scientific Research also play a role
in this sector. In addition to the common problems faced by all
48 Ibid, 3:43.
Ibid, 3:33.
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of the ministries and agencies, a key problem in this sector is
that there is no national authority responsible for solid waste
planning & management, and that, therefore, there was a need to
establish a "National Waste Management Authority."50
The Ministry of Health is responsible for Lebanon's public
health care needs. In effect, like many of the other ministries,
it is only a shell. We have already noted the extraordinary
level of absenteeism in the ministry, which has all but closed
down daily operations.
Basically, all of the other ministries and agencies
involved in the recovery programme suffer from similar
institutional and financial circumstances.
2.3 Recommendations for Improving the Ministries & Agencies
Concerning the problems faced by the C.D.R., it should go
without saying that if the organisational and structural
problems of the ministries are not rectified by the current
leaders of the reconstruction process, the prospects of the
Horizon 2000 projects designed to be implemented specifically by
the ministries and agencies will continue to be put in doubt.
The World Bank recommended that the quickest, the most
flexible, and the most politically tenable option to enhance the
technical and organisational level of the public sector would be
to hire international consultants to work within each of the
major ministries and agencies. The consultants would assist the
staff of the ministries and agencies at all levels of the
implementation phase of individual projects of the Horizon 2000
50 Ibid, 3:39.
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plan. 51 As we shall explain in the next section, this
recommendation was adopted in some of the most important
ministries and agencies, while financial constraints have
prevented the recommendation from being adopted at many of the
other ministries and agencies.52
3. The Institutional Arrangement for the Implementation of the
Horizon 2000 Programme
We have argued, in the previous two sections, that
Lebanon's public institutions were not in any real position to
effectively manage any recovery programme, let alone one as
large as Horizon 2000. Since reforming the public sector was
not seen to be a realistic option, the government decided that
the most viable alternative was to employ a number of
international consultants to assist the C.D.R. and the
ministries and agencies with the implementation of the recovery
programme. The purpose of this section is to explain the
institutional arrangement for implementing Horizon 2000.
3.1 Origins of the Institutional Arrangement
As we have previously noted, the plan to hire international
consultants to assist the public sector with the implementation
of the recovery programme came originally from the Bechtel-Dar
al Handasah report in 1991. However, the idea was further
developed by the World Bank, which sent a few missions to
51 As we will explain below, the recommendations came from
the World Bank reported cited earlier.
52 Interview with Jim McCredie, the chief foreign consultant
at the C.D.R., in Beirut on 20 February 1997.
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Lebanon in 1993. The existing institutional arrangement was
revised, in accordance with World Bank recommendations, and,
beginning in 1993, was supposed to work in the following way:
The C.D.R. was given responsibility for overall programme
management and coordination, as well as for contracting and
disbursements associated with the implementation of the
projects. In light of the C.D.R.'s weaknesses, a Programme
Management Unit (P.M.U.) staffed by international consultants
was hired to assist the organisation at every stage of the
recovery programme. The ministries and agencies were responsible
for overseeing the implementation of the individual projects.
Given their weaknesses, a Sector Implementation Unit (S.I.U.)
staffed by international consultants was to be added to each
ministry and agency to reinforce their respective capacities to
implement the projects. In order to ensure proper coordination,
the C.D.R. established a Technical Coordination Committee
(T.C.C), consisting of senior members of the P.M.U., the
S.I.U.s, and donor organisations.54
3.2 The C.D.R. and the P.M.U.
The C.D.R. and P.M.U. were supposed to function in the
following manner. The operational activities of the C.D.R. were
to be carried out by the four divisions - Programmes, Project
Management, Finance, and Administration - under the direction of
World Bank. Memorandum and Recommendation of the President
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to
the Executive Directors on a proposed loan to the Lebanese
T- 1	 1D	 1	 .f
Ibid, 32.
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the President, the Board of Directors, and the Bureau of the
C.D.R. 55
 In 1995, the C.D.R. had a staff of 141, although new
staff were supposed to be hired over the next couple of years,
increasing the number to 270.56
The Programmes division was primarily responsible for the
planning and coordination of the recovery programme, but it was
also to play a role in monitoring the progress of the projects
during the implementation stages. This division was mainly
staffed with economists, but also consisted of personnel
specialising in other disciplines including information science,
urban planning, sociology, and biology. 57 At the time of writing,
it was led by Najib Baroudi, who also sits on the advisory board
to the President of the C.D.R.58
The Project Management division was primarily responsible
for preparing bidding documents, managing consultancy and
The current president of the C.D.R. is Nabil Jisr, an
associate of Hariri. At least five man act as advisors to the
President including Francis bou-Assi, Najib Baroudi, Yasser
Bern, Ali Serhal, and Nader Sraje. The Bureau consists of the
vice-president, who is currently Boutros Labaki, and the
secretary-general, who is currently Nohad Baroudi. The Board of
Directors includes Nadra Aboukhater, •Imad Cbatila, Georges
Maroun, Au Dandash, Georges Samaha, Yahiya Sankari, and Walid
Takieddine.
The information was given to the author by the office of
the C.D.R. Vice President, Boutros Labaki, in Beirut in February
1997.
56	 C.D.R.,	 Progress	 Report	 - March	 1996	 (Beirut:
Mediterranean Press, 1996), 57.
C.D.R.,	 Progress Report - January 1995	 (Beirut:
Mediterranean Press, 1995), 60.
58 Approximately 30 people worked in the programmes
department, not including the consultants from the P.M.U.C. The
figures were given to the author by the office of the vice-
president of the C.D.R.
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engineering contracts, and managing the interface with the
consultants handling major projects, including the ones related
to Beirut International Airport and the Beirut central district
infrastructure works. This division is staffed primarily with
engineers and architects. 59 At the time of writing, it was headed
by Hassan Deghayli, and consisted of at least thirty employees,
not including the consultants from the P.M.U.C.6°
The Finance division, which is divided into three
departments - the Contracts department, the Financial Accounting
department, and the Information Technology department - was to
have been responsible for the management and accounting of
government funding and all external loans and grants. It was
also to have kept account of disbursements and debt servicing.
The Contracts department was to have been primarily involved in
bid evaluation, contract preparation and verification of
payments to contractors and consultants. The Financial
Accounting department was to have been mainly responsible for
managing the C.D.R.'s accounts. 1nd the Information Technology
department was to have been responsible for monitoring the
project implementation process. 6' At the time of writing, this
division was headed by Riad Zaouk.62
The Administration division is also divided into three
C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 60.
60 The information was given to the author by the offices of
the vice-president of the C.D.R.
61 The Council for Development and Reconstruction, Progress
Report - January 1995, 60.
62 The information was given to the author by the offices of
the vice-president of the C.D.R.
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departments including Personnel, General Services, and Legal.
The Legal department is particularly important. It had a number
of responsibilities including the preparation of ministerial
decrees, coordination with the Ministry of Justice related to
opinions about legal documents concerning protocols and loan
agreements, preparing contractual agreements and dealing with
expropriation documents, law suits, and tax matters. 63 At the
time of writing, it was headed by Antoine Samaha.64
In September 1993, a joint venture of the U.K.'s KPMG Peat
Marwick and Nedeco of the Netherlands was awarded a three year
contract to run the P.M.U. 65 In fact, the P.M.U. technically
consists of not just the consultants, but also the permanent
staff from the four divisions of the C.D.R. The consultants have
been integrated into the C.D.R. divisions and were supposed to
report to the relevant division heads. A consultant team leader
is responsible for the quality of work of the consultants and
for coordination between the consultants and the division heads.
The division heads and the team leader constitute a permanent
task force which was to be responsible for ensuring coordination
between divisions, and reporting to the president of the C.D.R.
The KPMG/Nedeco team, whose contract ended in the spring of
1997, consisted of up to 16 consultants. 66
 The team was led by
63 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 60.
64 Information given by the offices of the vice-president of
the C.D.R.
65 The Council for Development and Reconstruction, Progress
Report - January 1995, 38.
66 The number fluctuated between 12 and 16. Interview with
Jim McCredie in Beirut on 20 February 1997.
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Jim McCredie, who is a management consultant, and included
several accountants, engineers, management consultants and
lawyers. 67 As noted above, the consultants were integrated into
the various C.D.R. divisions. For example, three consultants
worked in the Programmes department, and three consultants
worked in the Project Management division.68
The consultants were supposed to - have five main
responsibilities. First, they were to establish management
procedures for the implementation of the recovery programme,
including the implementation of a management information system.
Second, they were to participate directly in the C.D.R.'s work,
helping the four divisions perform their duties more efficiently
and providing on the job training. Third, they were to assist
the heads of divisions and departments in the planning of
operations. Fourth, they were to contribute to streamlining the
work of the C.D.R. divisions. Finally, they were to compensate
for any shortage of expertise within the four divisions. 69 This
67 Interview with Jim McCredie in Beirut on 20 February 1997.
Other members of the consultancy team included Hans Rood, Giles
Roche, and Joyce Damiani.
The World Bank had recommended 21 consultants to be
integrated into the C.D.R. divisions. For details see World
Bank, Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the
Executive Directors on a proposed loan to the Lebanese Republic
for an Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project -
Report # P-5982-LE, 37.
68 The three consultants which worked in the Programmes
division at the time of writing included Bob Klaversteijn,
Maurice Stafford, and Fulco Van Deventer. The three consultants
which worked in the Projects sector at the tine of writing
included John Bourke, Brian Irving, and Bill Edmondson.
Information given to the author by the offices of the vice-
president of the C.D.R.
69 World Bank, Memorandum and Recommendation of the President
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to
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last point is particularly interesting. Given that the C.D.R. is
seriously understaf fed, 7° members of the consultancy team have
actually performed specific jobs to make up for the staff
shortages. In effect, this creates a situation in which non-
Lebanese consultants are, essentially, managing and implementing
much of the recovery programme.7'
3.3 The Ministries, Agencies, and the S.I.U.s
In order to help strengthen the public sector T s capacity to
implement the individual projects in the Horizon 2000 programme,
Sector Implementation Units were supposed to be attached to most
ministries and agencies. The S.I.U.s were to be responsible for
the management and supervision of the implementation of sectoral
projects, as well as providing institutional support to the
sectors. In addition, they were to report to the P.M.U.
concerning the progress of work in the sectors. 72
 Each S.I.U.
includes a team of consultants - international ones - plus a
number of staff from the related ministry and agency and one
representative of the C.D.R. The group was to work under the
the Executive Directors on a
Republic for an Emergency R
Project - Report # P-5982-LE, 3
70 Ibid, 36.
proposed loan to the Lebanese
onstruction and Rehabilitation
Abmed Sbaiti, "Reflections on Lebanon's Reconstruction",
171.
72 World Bank, Memorandum and Recommendation of the President
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to
the Executive Directors on a proposed loan to the Lebanese
Republic for an Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Project - Report # P-5982-LE, 39.
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authority of the leader of the S.I.U.'s team of consultants.73
The S.I.U. was to report directly to the Director General of the
relevant ministry or agency.
As noted elsewhere, due to financial constraints, the
C.D.R. has been able to establish only six Sector Implementation
Units. 74 Some of the sectors in which they were operating
included: electricity, solid waste, water & wastewater, and
public works. The consultant for the electricity sector is the
Electrical Supply Board of Ireland. The consultant was to be
responsible for assisting Electricite du Liban (E.D.L.) with the
management of the rehabilitation programme, and was to
participate in the evaluation of bidding documents and in the
preparation of prequalification documents. The consultant was
also to assist with structural reforms at the E.D.L. 75
 The
consultant for the water & waste water sector is Binnie and
Partners of the U.K., which is working with the Ministry of
Hydraulic and Electrical Resources and the Ministry of the
Environment. Binnie and partners was to be responsible for
managing the consultants and contractors engaged in sectoral
projects. 76 The joint venture Transtec/Fichtner is the consultant
for the solid waste sector, and is working with the Ministry of
Environment. 77 Dangroup is the consultant working at the Ministry
of Public Works and it was to deal with a range of projects in
Ibid, 39.
. Interview with Jim McCredie in Beirut on 20 February 1997.
C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 38-39.
76 Ibid, 39.
Ibid, 39.
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the education, health, and transport sectors and in the sector
dealing with government buildings.78
3.4 The Technical Coordination Committee
Theoretically, in order to avoid overlapping
responsibilities and to ensure coordination between the C.D.R.
and S.I.U.s, a Technical Coordination Committee (T.C.C.) was
established with representatives from the C.D.R. and each S.I.U.
In addition, since the European Community funded the S.I.TJ.s,
it is also represented on the T.C.C., as are observers from
other donor organisations. In effect, the T.C.C. has been
staffed mostly by non-Lebanese.79
3.5 The Actual Workings of the Institutional Arrangement
Technically speaking, what we have described above is the
institutional arrangement for managing and implementing the
Horizon 2000 programme. The C.D.R., which is responsible to the
Council of Ministers, is supposed to manage the programme, and
assist the ministries and agencies with implementing the
individual projects. In practice, however, the situation is
different.
To begin with, the divisions of power between the C.D.R.
and the ministries are highly complicated and not altogether
clear, even to some members of the organisations themselves.
This has led to a great deal of competition between the two. In
78 Ibid, 39.
lthmed Sbaiti, "Reflections on Lebanon's Reconstruction",
171.
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fact, as we will explain below, the C.D.R. is the dominant
organisation. Not only has it been responsible for managing the
prograirime, but it has also implemented much of the programme as
well. Moreover, the C.D.R. has tried to marginalise the role of
the ministries in the recovery programme. 8° Second, coordination
between the C.D.R. and the ministries is practically non-
existent. The Technical Coordination Coinniittee, which includes
representatives from the C.D.R., the P.M.U. consultants, the
Sector Implementation Units, and the donor organisations, is
devoid of any significant power. 81 It mostly deals with technical
details or other routine issues. 82 There is no clear mechanism to
decide issues such as which organisations will Implement various
projects.
As we will argue in the next section, Hariri has attempted
to take personal control of the recovery programme. He put his
associates in the top positions of the C.D.R., and proceeded to
try to remove the CD.R., and hence, the recovery programme,
from the political arena. As we will discuss in chapters five
and seven, he has been only partially successful. Briefly, many
of the significant decisions relating to the recovery programme
emanate from Hariri through the C.D.R., and other organisations
over which Hariri exercises effective control. In theory, this
should allow the C.D.R. to operate outside the sphere of
For a very brief look at this point, see Philip Khoury,
"Hariri is Getting Personal", The Lebanon Report 5, no.3(August, 1994), 9.
81 This information was based on an interview with a high
ranking official at the T.C..0 in Beirut in the Winter of 1997.
82 Ibid.
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complicated political disputes. However, since Hariri himself
has had to operate inside the political process, in which he has
had to bargain with other political forces, he has not been able
to completely immunise the recovery programme from the problems
inherent to the Lebanese political system.
4. Hariri T S Dominance Over the Recovery Programme
The purpose of this section is explain how P.M. Hariri has
attempted to take personal control of the reconstruction
programme. Essentially, Hariri has succeeded in this, to a great
extent, by controlling the most important levels of command in
the economic recovery process.
To begin with, P.M. Hariri has played a dominating role in
the government. He is, for all intents and purposes, the
principal figure in the cabinet. He has even kept the all-
important Ministry of Finance portfolio for himself. Moreover,
as we explained in chapter two, he has allocated many of the
ministerial posts, particularly the key economic ones, to men
loyal to him.
Second, Hariri had managed to ensure his dominance over the
C.D.R, by appointing his business associates to the top posts of
the organisation. 83
 For example, from 1991 to June of 1995, the
C.D.R. was headed by Fadi Chalak, Hariri's right hand man. On 9
June 1995, another associate of Hariri, Nabil Jisr, was
appointed chairman. Jisr, who is a member of a notable Sunni
family from Tripoli, held senior management positions in
83 The process began well before Hariri became prime
minister.
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Hariri's Saudi Oger and Oger International. 84 In addition,
Hariri's construction company, Oger International has played a
prominent role in assisting the C.D.R. in the implementation of
the recovery programme. 85 As one senior consultant put it, "we
think of Oger as part of the C.D.R."86
As we noted above, technically the C.D.R. was accountable
to the Council of Ministers. In actuality, however, Hariri has
allowed the C.D.R. to act, to some extent, with impunity in
implementing the Horizon 2000 recovery programme. As a result,
the ability of Hariri's critics within the cabinet to influence
the recovery programme has been somewhat limited. This
situation has led some cabinet ministers to complain both
privately and publicly about the lack of ministerial influence
over the recovery programme. For example, in the spring of 1993
the Tourism Minister, Nicolas Fattouh, criticised the role of
the C.D.R. saying "the cabinet was kept in the dark about many
details of the goverrunent's finances and the C.D.R. was allowed
to operate as a kind of super ministry accountable to no-one"87
In an attempt to placate criticism of the C.D.R.'s power,
Hariri decided to submit the organisation to the scrutiny of the
national audit office. 8° In addition, political pressure played a
role in the decision by Hariri and the leaders of the C.D.R. in
1995 to allow an external consultant to carry out a study on
84 NEED (23 June 1995), 15.
85 See chapter two of this study for details.
86 Interview in Beirut in the winter of 1997.
87 NEED (23 April 1993), 27.
88 NEED (22 July 1994), 25.
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restructuring the C.D.R.89
As we explained above, it is also evident that the
divisions of power between the C.D.R. and the ministries are
highly complicated and not altogether clear, even to the
organisations themselves. This has led to a great deal of
competition between the two. Hariri has tended to support the
C.D.R. in its disputes with the ministries, especially those
ministries led by ministers not closely associated with Hariri.
To cite one example, a dispute between Hariri and the then
electricity and water resources minister Georges Frem,
apparently over the latter's handling of contract negotiations
with Ansaldo Energia in June 1993, led to Frem's dismissal from
his post. Beirut observers, however, noted that the C.D.R.
carried out the main tender evaluations for the .Ansaldo's
contract and that furthermore, the minister's role was marginal.
Protesting about his lack of power during a 9 June 1993 cabinet
meeting, Frem was reported to have stated that Muslin ministers
in charge of other sectors had been given more influence over
infrastructure contracts. 9° It may be more accurate to state
that ministers, both Muslim and Christian, who are allied with
Hariri have been given more power over the recovery programme.
In addition to his dominant role in government and his
influence over the C.D.R., Hariri also managed to place allies
at the most important economic institutions, such as the Central
Bank.
89 The report was conducted by Team International and the
P.M.TJ.C.
90 We will give more consideration to this case in chapter
five. MEED (25 June 1993), 11.
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Even though P.M. Hariri has considerable power over the
recovery programme, his dominance can be overstated. His
programme and policies continue to be criticised and partially
frustrated by pro-Syrian elements in the cabinet, by his
relationship with the other two members of the ruling troika, by
the parliament, which has the power to pass budgets, and by the
trade unions, who have, at several points, threatened to call a
general strike.
In response to such criticism, Hariri has played, and can
continue to play, his trump card - he can threaten to resign
from the government. Given his immense economic weight and the
support he has with the international community, and in the
private sector, such a move may have devastating consequences
for the recovery programme, and for the stability of the
Lebanese economy in general. For the moment, therefore, the
recovery programme, and the economy in general, will continue to
be led by P.M. Hariri.
5. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State?
A key institutional characteristic of Johnson's capitalist
developmental state is the existence of a small but powerful
elite economic bureaucracy, a pilot agency which is autonomous
from the political process and societal influences, and plays a
key role in directing economic policy. 9' For example, it helps to
decide industrial policy, offering government support to certain
industries. In addition, it has some powers to implement
' For a summary of its role, see Robert Wade, Governing the
Market, 195.
177
policies, rather than relying solely on the ministries. The
pilot agency often employs the use of foreign consultants to
help it plan economic, particularly industrial policy. For
example, the consultants Arthur D. Little of the U.S. advised
the Taiwanese government on industrialisation policies.
To some extent at least, the C.D.R. conforms to Johnson's
model of an elite economic bureaucracy. It has been staffed by
some qualified people, and its main function has been to develop
plans, with the assistance of foreign consultants, for the
recovery of the Lebanese economy. In addition, by taking
personal control over the organisation, Hariri has attempted to
remove it from political and societal influences. While it has
been quite similar, in these respects, to the pilot agencies
found in the East Asian NICs, its actual role has probably been
considerably different from the roles of those agencies.
The focus of the pilot agencies in the NICs has been
planning development strategies, and, in particular, industrial
policy. The implementation of these strategies and policies is
the responsibility of the ministries and other parts of the
economic bureaucracy. Due to the weaknesses of the Lebanese
bureaucracy, the C.D.R. has developed a greater role. in one
sense: it has become the main agency responsible for both
managing and implementing the recovery programme. In effect, it
has become a super-ministry. In another sense, however, its role
is not as extensive as those of the agencies in the NICs: it
does not formulate industrial policy, or interact with the
private sector to any great extent. For example, the agencies in
the NICs would formulate policies to provide incentives for
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private sector investment in industries where there is a
perceived potential for growth, and would also formulate
policies to discourage investment in industries which are not
seen as profitable. The role of the C.D.R. clearly does not
extend into this area of policy formulation.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROGRESS OF THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME
In chapter three of this paper, we gave a detailed
description of the Hariri government's ambitious Horizon 2000
programme. It will be remembered that the programme contained a
series of projects which were aimed at rehabilitating the
country's infrastructure, and, to a lesser extent, the social
and productive sectors. In chapter four of this paper, we looked
at the C.D.R. and the other institutions responsible for
managing and implementing the programme.
In this chapter, we will examine the progress of the
Horizon 2000 programme itself. In doing so, we plan to address
two important questions. First, we intend to find out whether or
not the programme, which is in its fourth year of
implementation, has succeeded in its goals with respect to
improving the country's infrastructure and facilitating economic
growth. Second, we intend to identify both national and
international	 forces,	 including	 foreign	 governments,
institutions, companies, and personalities, which have
participated to some extent in the programme. By identifying
these forces, we should be able to judge the level of national
and international interest, in the reconstruction programme
specifically, and in Lebanon in general.
Before proceeding with this chapter, however, we must note
that the Horizon 2000 Plan was never passed by parliament. The
government had attempted to get the entire plan passed with the
1995 budget, but that idea was rejected by parliamentarians who
argued that, since the plan stretched over a ten year period, it
must be dealt with separate from any annual fiscal legislation.
180
In a compromise, some of the most crucial projects were
included in the 1995 budget. Other projects were dealt with
separately. Theoretically speaking, therefore, there was no
official programme for the reconstruction of the country.'
Unofficially, however, the government has pushed ahead with the
implementation of the Horizon 2000 programme. In cases where the
government needs parliament's approval to receive funds for
projects, it promulgates government decrees. For example, In
the fall of 1994, the parliamentary commission for Budget and
Finance approved a government decree ordering the immediate
freeing of $536 million for the construction of two new power
stations 2
This chapter will be divided into two sections. In section
one, we will provide data on the projects which have been
implemented. In section two, we will analyse the data, with the
aim of answering the above two questions.
1. The Implementation of the Horizon 2000 Programme
As we noted above, the purpose of this section is to
provide data on the projects in the Horizon 2000 prograitune which
have been implemented by the C.D.R. between 1 January 1992 and
30 September 1996. We feel that we should indicate, at this
time, that there are two basic constraints which must be kept in
mind concerning the information given in this section.
' For a brief summary of this situation, see -----,
"Parliament and the Horizon 2000 Plan", The Lebanon Report 5,
no.12 (December, 1994), 8.
2	
"Funds Released for Two Power Stations", The Lebanon
Report 6, no.1 (January, 1995), 9.
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The first constraint concerns the sheer size of the
programme. A detailed examination of each individual project is,
unfortunately, beyond the scope of this study. For example,
during just the four year period we are examining, the CD.R.
alone awarded 1,131 contracts at a cost of approximately $3.3
billion. This included several different types of projects -
from pre-feasibility studies to construction management - which
have varied in price from a few thousand dollars to hundreds of
millions of dollars. In addition, a number of other contracts
were awarded by ministries and other agencies. 3 It would,
obviously, be impracticable to deal with each and every one of
these projects, but because it is important to look at least at
a cross section of activity over the past four years, in order
to assess the overall success of the programme, we will give a
fairly broad sample of projects, including, of course, the most
significant ones.
The second constraint involves the fact that the
reconstruction is a dynamic and ongoing process. One of the
inherent problems of studying such a process is that details
tend to change as circumstances change, and hard information
becomes outdated very quickly. Within this section, this
constraint applies to three areas particularly. First, it should
be borne in mind throughout this section that the cost of each
project, as stated in the contract, was not necessarily the
final cost of the project. The cost and the condition of many,
or perhaps even most, of the contracts have been subject to some
With the exception of a few cases, we will only list the
projects implemented by the C.D.R.
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readjustment. 4 One of the most significant examples of this was
the contract awarded to the Italian firm Ansaldo Energia for
repairs to the electricity network. Ansaldo was given the
contract on 13 June 1993 for $66 million. However, the price was
later readjusted to $106 million to account for further work on
the project. When going through the individual projects, we will
try to take account of these sorts of changes, but where limited
data is available, we will simply note the agreed price at the
time the contract was signed. A second area where this
constraint applies is external funding for the projects. It is
likely that some funding promised by external sources may have
been delayed or reduced, or for that matter, may not have even
materialised. Finally, one must also bear in mind that, in many
cases, international firms which were awarded contracts in
Lebanon have sub-contracted the work to a local company.
Apparently, this procedure is standard practice for
international firms working in the Middle East, but it does tend
to create some confusion both in terms of who is responsible for
the work, and in terms of the actual amount of international
involvement in the reconstruction process.5
1.1 The Rehabilitation of Lebanon's Physical Infrastructure
As we have documented elsewhere, Lebanon's physical
According to Jim McCredie, a senior consultant with the
C.D.R., this situation was to be expected. Interview with Jim
McCredie in Beirut on 20 February 1997.
This information was based on an interview with Paul
Mourani, an economist specialising in the region, in Beirut on
14 February 1997.
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infrastructure was extensively damaged. It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that the majority of the projects implemented in the
early stages of the reconstruction programme were directed
towards rehabilitation in this area. Out of the approximately
$3.3 billion worth of contracts signed by the C.D.R., nearly
$2.8 billion, or about 85%, were for physical infrastructure.6
Six out of the fifteen sectors in the Horizon programme were
classified under physical infrastructure, including electricity,
posts & telecommunications, transport (roads, public transport &
railways, airport, and ports), water supply, wastewater, and
solid waste. We will now take a closer look at the projects
implemented in these six sectors.
1.1.1 The Electricity Sector
As we have noted previously, as late as 1993 the government
was able to provide Lebanese households with only about six
hours of electricity a day. Given the importance of continuous
electricity to the revitalisation of business and industry as
well as for improving the everyday lives of all Lebanese, it is
not surprising that the most extensive projects implemented in
the first four years of the Horizon 2000 programme were in the
electricity sector. The C.D.R. awarded 36 contracts between 1
January 1992 and 30 September 1996. The contracts were valued at
over $1.1 billion, or about one-third of the value of all
contracts signed. These included several consultancy contracts
to provide for technical and organisational support, and for
6 C.D.R.,	 Progress Report - October 1996
	 (Beirut:
Mediterranean Press, 1996), 5.
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supervision of major works, four main contracts for repairs to
the electricity network, a contract to rehabilitate substations,
a major contract to build two new power plants, and a contract
to install gas turbines. All of the major contracts in this
sector were awarded to international firms, and most of the
funds were secured from external sources.
7Table 2: Electricity Sector
Consultancy	 _________ _________________ ____ ___ ______j
Contractor	 Countxy of	 Deacription	 [Value Date Funding
Origin
1.	 Electricity Supply Board of	 Ireland	 Management S.I.U.	 4	 1993	 E.U.
Ireland
2.	 Electricite du France	 France	 Project Supervising Engineer 	 8.8	 1993	 France
3.	 Electricite du France	 France	 Assist E.D.L Restructuring	 3.3	 1993	 France
Physical Rehabilitation & Development Projects
I contractor	 I Country of	 Description	 Value Date Funding
______ I ___________________________ I 
Origin
1. Ansaldo Energia	 Italy	 Repairs to network	 106	 1993	 Various
2. Hyundai	 S. Korea	 85	 1993	 AFESD,
KFAED
3A. Clemessy	 France	 51	 1993	 WB, EIB
3B. Bouygues	 France	 52	 1993	 WB, EIB
4.	 M. Elec	 France	 Rehab. of substations 	 7.8	 1993	 France
5.	 Ansaldo/Siemens	 Italy/Germany	 Construction of Power Plants	 534	 1995	 Italy,
Germany
6.	 European Gas Turbine 	 Fr./English	 Install gas turbines	 61	 1995
* The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
1.1.1.1 The Consultancy Contracts
As we have explained elsewhere, the Lebanese public sector,
including Electricite Du Liban (E.D.L.), was in no real position
to help implement projects in the reconstruction programme, or,
for that matter, to administer the projects once they have been
completed. To help rectify the situation, the C.D.R. signed
The table was derived by the author from a number of C.D.R.
reports.
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several contracts with international consultants to assist the
E.D.L. with technical and organisational support.
One of the most important consultancy contracts involved
the operation of a Sector Implementation Unit (S.I.U.) within
the E.D.L. to help strengthen its ability to implement projects.
This $4 million contract, which was funded by an E.U. grant, was
given to the Electricity Supply Board of Ireland. The consultant
was to be responsible for helping to manage the rehabilitation
programme, for carrying out specific duties, such as preparing
prequalification documents and evaluating bidding documents, and
for assisting the E.D.L. with structural reform.
Most of the other consultancy contracts were given to
Electricite flu France (E.D.F.). 8
 We will list a couple of
examples. In the first half of 1993, the E.D.F. secured a $8.8
million contract, which was funded by the French government, to
act as the supervising engineer for all of the contracts in the
electricity sector. In the same year, it was given a $3.3
million contract, which was also funded by the French
government, to hel] the E.D.L. reorganise and develop ne
business procedures, especially practices related to customer
accounting.9
1.1.1.2 Repairs to the Electricity Network
The first major set of infrastructure projects in the
Horizon 2000 programme included four contracts which were given
In 1992 the C.D.R. commissioned the E.D.F. to produce a
master plan for the electricity sector.
The E.D.F. was also responsible for preparing tender
documents for the construction of the two 415 MW combined-cycle
power stations.
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to different international firms for work on rehabilitating the
generating plants, the transmission system, and the distribution
system. The level of international interest in the projects was
strong, as an impressive array of international companies bid
for the contracts, including Germany's Siemens, Japan's Mitsui &
Company and Toshiba Corporation, Italy's Ansaldo Energia, South
Korea's Hyuandai and Lucky Goldstar, the IJ.K.'s Balfour Beatty
and NEI International, the Anglo-French company GEC Aisthom, and
several French companies including Bouygues, GTIE, Entreprise
Industrielle, SGE/SDEL, and Clemessy, as well as companies from
Norway, Austria, Finland, Switzerland, China, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey. 10
Package A, which involved repairs to thermal power stations
and hydro plants, was awarded on 13 June 1993 to Ansaldo Energia
for $66 million." The starting date of the contract was 1
October 1993, and it was to be completed in 18 months.' 2 As noted
above, however, additional work was found to be necessary,
causing both a delay in the conpietion of the project,' 3 and a
substantial increase in cost.' 4 Approximately three quarters of
the project was to be funded by external loans from the Arab
10 1merican companies, however, were notably absent. HEED (26
February 1993), 27.
11 For some background material concerning both Ansaldo's
previous work in Lebanon, and international expertise, see
Marwan Iskandar,Lebanese Economy 1995 (Beirut: Raidy Press,
1996), 81-82.
12 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 14.
13 For more information, see C.D.R., Progress Report -
January 1995, 4.
' As noted, the price was adjusted to $106 million. C.D.R.,
Progress Report - October 1996, 6.
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Fund for Economic and Social Development (A.F.E.S.D.), the
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (K.F.A.E.D.), and the
Italian government. The remaining amount was to come from the
Lebanese government •15
Package B, which entailed work on the rehabilitation of
high voltage transmission lines and substations,' 6 was awarded on
24 June 1993 to Hyundai for $80 million,' 7 although the price was
later adjusted to $85 million.' 8 The starting date of the
contract was 20 October 1993, and the work was to be completed
in 18 months.' 9 External loans from the A.F.E.S.D, and the
K.F.A.E.D., were supposed to fund most of this contract. 2° As
noted above, many international firms have sub-contracted their
work. In this case, Hyundai sub-contracted work to Bulgarian and
Lebanese contractors •21
Package C, which involved work to distribution equipment,
was divided into two separate contracts. Clemessy was awarded
package Cl for $42 million, for work in the Greater Beirut area.
15 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 14; and C.D.R.,
Progress Report - October 1996, 10.
Interest on the loans advanced by the A.F.E.S.D. and the
K.F.A.E.D. were 4.5% and 3% respectively. See Marwan Iskandar,
Lebanese Economy 1995, 82.
16 This included repairs to over 50 substations, 19 main high
voltage overhead lines, and underground cable links. C.D.R.,
Progress Report - January 1995, 4; and Progress Report - March
1996, 6.
' For a brief look at Hyundai T s work in the region, see
Marwan Iskandar, The Lebanese Economy 1995, 82.
18 C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 6.
' C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 14.
20 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 10.
21 Marwan Iskandar, The Lebanese Economy, 1995, 82.
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The price of the contract was later increased to $51 million.
The company was supposed to have begun work on the project by 4
November 1993. In addition, Clemessy signed a $10 million
contract in September 1995 to carry out further work in the
capital. 22
 Package C2, for work in other areas of Lebanon, was
awarded to Bouygues for $52 million. 23 Work on the project was
supposed to have begun on 25 October 1993. Both projects were to
be funded by loans from the World Bank and the European
Investment Bank •24
1.1.1.3 The Rehabilitation of the Jainhour & Bsalim Substations
A contract to rehabilitate the Jamhour and Bsalim
Substations was given to M.ELEC of France for $7.8 million. The
work, which began in April of 1993, and which was to be
completed in a year, included the rehabilitation of the main
transformers and the construction of a new 245 KSJ substation.
Funding for the contract was provided by the French government.25
1.1.1.4 The Construction of Two New Power Plants at Zahrani
and Beddawi
A major project to construct two 450 MW combined-cycle
power stations to be built at Zahrani, in the South, and
Beddawi, outside of Tripoli, was awarded on 7 January 1995 to a
consortium of Ansaldo Energia and Siemens for $534 million. The
bid by the consortium beat out several other bids by
22 C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 7.
23 It should be noted, however, that the contract did not
include all areas of Lebanon.
24 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 14.
25 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 7
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international firms, including ones submitted by GEC Aisthom,
Zurich based ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Mitsubishi, and John Brown
Engineering of the TJ.K. 26 The aim of the project was to add 870
MW to the country's generating capacity. Work on the project
began in June of 1995 and was scheduled to be completed in three
years. The Lebanese government planned to fund the project
primarily through international loans. Most of the money was to
come from Italian and German banks, which received strong
backing by their governments and respective export credit
agencies, SACE and HERMES. In addition, the C.D.R. secured
concessionary loans from the A.F.E.S.D., and loans from local
banks 27
Weir Westgarth of the U.K. secured a sub-contract, worth
$53.9 million from Ansaldo/Siemens to supply water treatment and
pumping equipment to the two power stations. An affiliate of
Weir Westgarth, Glasgow based Weir Pump, was responsible for
supplying pumping equipment. In addition, the company was to
procure a range of specialised engineering goods from U.K.
firms 28
1.1.1.5 The Installation of New Gas Turbines in Baalbeck and
Tyre
In May 1995, the C.D.R. gave two contracts to European Gas
Turbine, an affiliate of GEC Alsthom, to supply and install four
gas turbines, two in the city of Baalbeck and two in the
Southern city of Tyre. The contracts were valued at $29 million
and $32 million respectively. The project, which had the
26 MEED (20 January 1995), 25; (11 November 1994), 22.
27 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 83.
28 MEED (20 January 1995), 25; (3 February 1995), 24.
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capacity to produce 150 MW, was completed on schedule in June
1996.29
1.1.2 The Posts & Telecommunications Sector
As detailed elsewhere, the telecommunications network was
severely damaged as a result of the war. As late as 1992, only
about 50% of telephone connections were in service and one had
only about a 10% chance of completing a call. In addition to
restoring services and expanding the network's capacity to over
one million lines (although it was later estimated that even
more lines would be required to satisfy the country's needs),
the aim of the programme was to close the technological gap
which had emerged during the war years.3°
Lebanon's postal service has also barely functioned since
the beginning of the war, and when it has functioned, it has
been immensely inefficient. A frequent complaint has been that
it could take up to two weeks for mail to travel just from one
part of Beirut to another. Suffice it to say, most people used,
and continue to use, private courier services. The government
has planned to privatise the postal service, turning it over to
an international postal company.
It should go without saying that a modern and efficient
telecommunications network is essential if Beirut is to recover
its role as a regional business centre. The posts and
telecommunications sector was second, after the electricity
29 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 7.
30 Previously, only 300,000 lines were working, and not very
well.
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sector, in the value of contracts awarded by the C.D.R. Eighty-
seven contracts, valued at over $580 million were signed between
1 January 1992 and 30 September 1996.' The contracts awarded in
this sector were for consultancy work, supplying equipment,
repairing buildings, rehabilitating the fixed telephone network,
and creating a mobile telephone network. Similar to the
electricity sector, the major contracts were secured mostly by
international companies. However, the Lebanese government has
had to use its own resources to fund some of these projects.
31 C.D.R, Progress Report - October 1996, 5.
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Table 3: Post & Telecommunications Sector32
Consul tancy
Contractor	 Country of	 Description	 Value Date Funding
Origin
1. Cable and Wireless	 U.K.	 Management	 5.6	 1994	 WE
2. Norconsult	 [orway	 supervising Projects	 13	 1993
3. Deloitte & Touche	 France	 Conduct Study on the Sector	 2.1	 1994
Physical Rehabilitation & Development Projects 	 ____ ___
Contractor	 Country of
	
Description	 Value Date1 Funding
Origin
I __________
1. Siemens	 Germany	 Repairs to Telephone	 33.6	 1993	 Lebanon
Exchanges
2. Alcatel	 France	 21.6	 1993	 Lebanon
3. Ericsson	 Sweden	 22.7	 1993	 Lebanon
4. Siemens	 Germany	 Expansion of Telephone	 153	 1994	 Lebaoon
Network
5. Aicatel	 France	 130	 1994	 Lebanon
6. Ericsson	 Sweden	 147	 1994	 Lebanon
7. Siemens Telecomunicazini	 Italy	 Installation of Link with 	 4.95	 1994
Syria
8. AT&T	 U.S.A.	 Laying Undersea Fibre Optic 	 8.8	 1994
Cable to Cyprus and Syria
9. France Telecom	 France	 Operate Mobile Telephone	 BOT	 1994
Network
10. Finnish Telecom	 Finland	 BOT	 1994
11. La Paste	 France	 Management of Postal Service 	 35	 1997
* The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
1.1.2.1 The Consultancy Contracts
The C.D.R. signed several contracts with firms for
consultancy work in the telecommunications sector. We will note
three examples. To begin with, a major contract to provide
management for the entire telecommunications system was secured
by Cable & Wireless of the U.K in 1994. The three year $5.6
million contract was funded by the World Bank. 33 Second, in July
1993, Norway's Norconsult was awarded a $13 million contract to
assist the C.D.R. with the preparation of tender documents, the
32 The table was derived by the author from a number of
C.D.R. reports.
C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 10.
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evaluation of bids, and the supervision of work on both the
fixed telephone network, and on the mobile network. 34 Finally,
Deloitte & Touche was awarded a $2.1 million contract to conduct
a study on the restructuring of the telecommunications sector.
The contract, which was to have begun in February 1994, was to
last for 12 months, although the contract was later extended due
to additional responsibilities given to the consultant.35
1.1.2.2 The Supply of Spare Parts and Equipment & the
Rehabilitation of Buildings
Several contracts for supplying spare parts and equipment,
and for rehabilitating government buildings were awarded by the
C.D.R. to international and local companies. We will list a few
examples. To begin with, France's Alcatel secured a $1.8 million
contract in September 1993 to provide spare parts and equipment
to the Ministry of Telecommunications. 36 Second, a consortium of
Lebanese firms was given a $500,000 six month contract in the
sununer of 1993 to supply miscellaneous equipment. 37 Third,
another consortium of Lebanese firms, which included 3
consultants and 15 contractors, was awarded a six month $750,000
contract, in the same year, to prepare buildiigs for the new
The contract was to be funded by the government. C.D.R.,
Progress Report - January 1994, 19; and C.D.R., Progress Report
- May 1994, 30. However, in July 1995 that contract was reissued
to the local firm Dar al Handasah. C.D.R., Progress Report -
March 1996, 13.
This included conducting a study on the financial
situation of the sector, and of the organisation of the
financial and administrative functions of the Ministry. The
contract was funded by the World Bank. C.D.R., Progress Report -
March 1996, 9.
36 C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 19.
The consortium included Kaiser International, Datcom,
Mideast Tech. Dev., and Ramalek. See ibid.
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equipment. Finally, near the end of 1995, the C.D.R. granted
several contracts to local firms to rehabilitate the ministry's
buildings 38
1.1.2.3 Repairs to Exchanges (Upgrading telephone exchanges)
In the spring of 1993, the Lebanese government awarded
contracts to three international companies, Germany's Siemens,
France's Alcatel, and Sweden's Ericsson, to upgrade the
telephone exchanges by supplying new digital telephone
exchanges. Siemens' contract, valued at just over $33.6 million,
included supplying over 400,000 lines in the Beirut area.
Alcatel's contract, valued at just over $21.6 million, included
supplying 271,000 lines in North Lebanon and Beirut. Ericsson's
contract, valued at over $22.7 million was for 284,000 lines in
the South, the Biqa Valley and parts of Mount Lebanon. In
addition, Ericsson was also to supply $23 million worth of
hardware supplies. Work on all three projects was due to begin
in the autumn of 1993 and was to last for up to two years. 39 The
projects have been financed by the Lebanese government.
1.1.2.4 The Rehabilitation and Expansion of the Telephone
Network
The major project in the telecommunications sector was the
rehabilitation and expansion of the telephone network. Costing
$431 million, it was awarded on 9-10 March 1994 to Siemens,
Ericsson, and Alcatel, the same trio who secured the first
telephone contract. Siemens' $153 million contract, which was
for work in the Beirut area, was to be carried out by the firm's
38 For several of these examples, see C.D.R., Progress Report
- March 1996, 13.
C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 19; C.D.R., Progress
Report - January 1995, 8.
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Italian subsidiary, Siemens' Telecomunicazini. Ericsson's
contract was for $147 million and entailed providing an access
and transport network in the Northern part of Beirut and in the
South of the country. Ericsson was also to supply buildings for
switching equipment. Alcatel's $130 million contract included
work on a national transmission network and the installation of
cables in parts of Beirut and in the North of the country. 4° The
work, which is expected to be completed in two years, included
the supply of all network needs for 600,000 new lines and
200,000 existing lines, with the option of adding a further
200,000 lines. 4' The Lebanese government planned to finance the
project on a cash basis, without any special foreign financing
facilities.42
1.1.2.5 Contracts for the Reinstatement and Improvement of
International Telephone Connections
Several contracts were awarded for projects aimed at
improving Lebanon's international telephone links. 43 We will note
three of them. Siemens Telecomunicazini was awarded a $4.95
million contract in April of 1994 for the installation of a
digital microwave link with Syria. As a result o the work, the
40 Alcatel was also responsible for work on the
rehabilitation and extension of the transmission network, the
construction of two earth stations, and civil works.
' Italy's Sirti was awarded a $93 million sub-contract from
Siemens to work on upgrading the telephone system. See MEED (22
July 1994), 25.
42 At the beginning of 1996, the three companies were awarded
contracts to provide equipment for inter-exchange traffic. The
three contracts, which were funded by the Lebanese government,
were all under $2 million.
' For a summary of the contracts, see C.D.R., Progress
Report - October 1996, 13.
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number of telephone lines between the two countries was expected
to increase from 220 to 1,920. The project was expected to be
completed in about a year. A second contract, worth $8.8
million, was secured by the Imerican company AT&T in April 1994
to lay a fibre optic undersea cable linking Lebanon and Syria
with Cyprus. Work was expected to be completed in 14 months. 44
 A
third contract was awarded to Alcatel/Submarcom to establish a
submarine telephone cable link with Egypt and Syria.45
1.1.2.6 GSM Network (Global System for Mobiles)
Another major project undertaken in the telecommunications
sector was the introduction of a mobile telephone network. This
project was particularly unique as it was based on a build
operate transfer (B.O.T.) basis. Essentially, this meant that a
company would be responsible for building the system using its
own financial resources, operating the system for a specified
period of time with the aim of making a return on its
investment, and then turning the system over to the government.
Several international firms from a number of countries including
Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Finland, and the U.S. showed
interest in the project. In June 1994, two companies, France
Telecom and Finnish Telecom, were awarded contracts to set up
competing mobile telephone companies. The companies, which were
to have 12 year concessions, began offering services in 1995.
The company set up by France Telecom was called France
Telecom Mobile Liban (F.T.M.L.) or Cellis, which is majority
The cable, which was to carry at least 3,800 lines, was to
be owned 42% by Lebanon, 42% by Cyprus, and 16% by Syria. MEED
(1 April 1994), 22; C.D.R., Progress Report - 1995, 9.
45 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 13.
197
owned (nearly 70%) by France Telecom Mobile International, a
subsidiary of France Telecom, with the remaining shares owned by
Lebanese investors including the Mikati group. The company set
up by Telecom Finland was called Libancell, which is 14% owned
by Telecom Finland International, with the remaining shares also
held by Lebanese investors, including Dalloul and the al Mabini
groups. 46 As of June 1996, both companies had more than 70,000
subscribers, and were planning to extend their networks to
accommodate even more subscribers.47
1.1.2.7 The Postal Service
The German consultant, Deutsche PostConsult, was given a
contract to restructure the postal service, and to help with the
preparation of tender documents for the contract to manage the
postal service. This major contract to manage the postal service
went to La Poste of France. The $35 million project was awarded
on a B.O.T. basis for 25 years. 48
 In addition, some minor
contracts to refurbish postal buildings were awarded to local
companies. This included an eight month $500,000 contract given
to the local contractor Mohamed al Hajj in 1994 for the
rehabilitation of the Bir Hassan Post Office.49
46 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 8-9.
For a brief discussion on some of the problems faced in
the mobile telephone sector, see -----, "Communication
Breakdown", The Lebanon Report no.3 (Fall, 1995), 18.
For a look at the extension plans of the two mobile
telephone companies, see The Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 2nd Quarter 1997, 22.
48 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon -
2nd Quarter 1997, 23.
The project was to be funded by the Lebanese government.
C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 10.
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1.1.3 The Transportation Sector
Some of the most extensive projects in the reconstruction
programme, including various ones associated with Hariri and
criticised by some as grandiose, such as the expansion of the
airport, were located in the transportation sector. 5° This sector
was divided into four sub-sectors including airports, ports,
public transport & railways, and roads. As we noted in chapter
three, the sector accounted for 25.4% of the entire Horizon 2000
programme, the largest percentage of any of the sectors. The
Hariri government has made the sector one of its prime concerns,
as an efficient transportation network is seen as being crucial
to extending Lebanon's trade and other links with the outside
world.
From 1 January 1992 to 30 September 1996 the C.D.R. awarded
86 contracts totalling $760.4 million in the transportation
sector. 5' Below, we will look at some of the contracts
implemented by the C.D.R. in the four sub-sectors. Before
proceeding, however, it should be noted that many other
contracts, especially in the road network, were awarded to firms
by other agencies including the Conseil Executif des Grands
Projets (C.E.G.P.), the Conseil Executif des Grand Projets de la
Ville de Beyrouth (C.E.G.P.V.B.), and the Roads Directorate of
the Ministry of Public Works (M.P.W.).
50 As we noted in chapter three, however, plans for the
airport expansion project dated back to 1978.
' C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 5.
Value Date I Funding
13	 I 1993 I
Value Date Funding
387	 I 1994 I Various
59	 I 1994
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1.1.3.1 The Rehabilitation of Beirut International Airport
As we explained in chapter three, Beirut International
Airport suffered extensive damage as a result of the war,
including damage to the majority of buildings, some of the
aviation and control equipment, and the runway. The plan was to
rehabilitate and expand the airport with the ultimate goal of
creating a world class facility capable of handling up to six
million passengers a year. Basically, three types of contracts
were awarded in this sub-sector, including the consultancy
contract to oversee the rehabilitation and expansion work, the
main contract to rehabilitate and expand airport facilities, and
a few contracts given to firms to operate certain facilities at
the airport such as the duty-free shop.
Table 4: Transportation - The Ai
Consul tancy
Contractor	 Country of	 Description
Origin
1.	
J 
Dar al Handasah	 [ Lebanon	 ] Design and Supervision
Physical Rehabilitation & Development Projects
Contractor	 Country of	 Description
Origin
1. Hochtief/CCC	 Germany/	 Rehab. and Expansion of
Lebanon	 Airport
2. Fahod Karagulla	 Lebanon	 Work on East Runway
* The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
1.1.3.1.1 The Consultancy Contract
The main consultancy contract was awarded in 1993 to Dar al
Handasah for $13 million to design and then supervise work on
the passenger terminal and the new runway. 53
 The contract was
52 The table was derived by the author from a number of
C.D.R. reports.
Funding for the service was from the Lebanese government.
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expected to be completed in 1997.
1.1.3.1.2 The Rehabilitation and Expansion of the Airport
There was very strong interest from both local and
international companies for the main project to rehabilitate and
expand the airport. The project included the following
components: adding a new West runway, part of which was to be
reclaimed from the sea; the building of an aircraft parking area
and taxiways; the rehabilitation and extension of the terminal
building; the construction of a new air traffic control tower;
and associated infrastructure work. 54 Twenty-three companies and
joint ventures prequalified for the project, including ones from
major European countries - Germany, France, Italy, and Great
Britain - as well as from South Korea, Brazil, the U.S., Spain,
Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. 55 The contract was awarded on 22
July 1994 to a consortium of Germany 1 s Hochtief and the Athens-
based Lebanese company Consolidated Contracts International
Company (C.C.C.) for $387 million. 56 The project, which was
scheduled to begin in September 1994 was to be completed in four
years. The government planned to finance the project by levying
fees to passengers and freight operators for use of the airport.
Additional funding was to have come from the European Investment
Bank and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.57
C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 22-23.
Designs for the expansion were drawn up by France's
Aeroports de Paris in the early l980s, and later updated by the
Dar al Handasah, and Perkins Will of the United States.
MEED (11 March 1994), 15.
56 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 21.
' The Lebanese government was supposed to have received ECU
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In addition to the main contract, a $59 million contract
was awarded to the local firm Fabmi Karagulla in December 1994
for work on the East runway. The contract was expected to be
completed in June 1997.58
1.1.3.1.3 The Operation of Facilities at Beirut International
Airport
Several facilities at Beirut International Airport were
offered to the private sector on either an operate transfer
(O.T.) basis or on a build operate and transfer (B.O.T.) basis.
The projects included a car park, catering and restaurants, a
duty free shop, a four star hotel, cargo handling, fuel
facilities, and a free zone. The Investment Development
Authority of Lebanon (I.D.A.L.), an agency established in 1994
to attract and facilitate investment into Lebanon, has been in
charge of the projects.59
Some of the contracts that have been awarded by the
I.D.A.L. include ones for the duty free shop, the restaurants
and catering, and the fuel facilities. The duty free shop was
given to a consortium of firms for $180 million, the operation
of fuel facilities was also awarded to a number of firms for $48
million, and the restaurants and airport catering services were
awarded to the Lebanese Beirut Airport Catering Company for
$30.5 million. All three contracts were let on a O.T. basis for
80 million and 15 million Kuwaiti dinars respectively. C.D.R.,
Progress Report - March 1996, 15.
58 C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 15.
We will take a closer look at the I.D.A.L. in chapter six.
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15 years.6°
1.1.3.2 The Rehabilitation and Extension of Beirut Port
The one time importance of Beirut's port to the country's
commercial and services industry has been well documented. In
1994, 3.7 million tonnes of goods, not including petroleum
products, passed through the port. The aim was to rehabilitate
and extend the port with the ultimate goal of increasing its
capacity to 11.6 million tonnes by 1999, making it a first class
facility able to compete with other Eastern Mediterranean
ports 61
Several contracts were awarded in this sector, including
ones for consultancy work and ones for rehabilitating and
expanding the port's basins 2, 3 and 4 with associated
infrastructure work.
Table 5: Traristortation - The Port62
Consul tancy
Contractor	 Country o	 Description	 Value Date Iunding
Origin
1. Port Autonome de Marseille	 France	 Prolect Supervision	 1.5	 1993	 EIB
2. Posford Duvivier	 U.K.	 .416	 1994
3. Sogreah	 France	 Work on Marine Infrast.	 .118	 1994
*The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
1.1.3.2.1 The Consultancy Contracts
Most of the consultancy contracts for the port were secured
60 For more information on the projects, see the information
package provided by the Investment Development Authority of
Lebanon. I.D.A.L., Lebanon: The Will to Reconstruct, The
Opportunity to Invest. (I.D.A.L: Beirut, January 1997).
61 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 52.
62 The table was derived by the author from a number of
C.D.R. reports.
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by European firms. In November 1993, France's Port Autonome de
Marseille signed a $1.5 million three year contract with the
C.D.R. for supervising the various projects for improving the
Beirut Port. The contract was financed from a European
Investment Bank loan. 63 In August 1994, the IJ.K.'s Posford
Duvivier and France's Sogreah were awarded consultancy contracts
for various projects. Posford Duvivier (with Lebanese partner
Rifik Khoury) was awarded four of the five contracts valued at
$416,000 total. They were for land infrastructure ($133,200),
superstructure ($109,500), power & lighting ($140,000), and
water supply & fire-fighting equipment ($33,000). Sogreah's
contract was worth $118,000 and was for work on the marine
infrastructure, including the breakwater.64
1.1.3.2.2 The Physical Rehabilitation of Beirut Port
The Beirut Port authority, the Societe de Gestion du Port de
Beyrouth, in coordination with the C.D.R.., invited companies to
prequalify by 20 January 1995 for work on an estimated $130
million worth of contracts to develop Beirut Port. 65 The
estimated cost of the projects was later revised to
approximately $200 million. 66
 The work was to include the
rehabilitation of basins 2 and 3, and the completion of basin 4.
The project was also to involve rebuilding infrastructure and
buildings, and civil works and equipment.67
63 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 23.
64 NEED (26 August 1994), 21.
65 NEED (16 December 1994), 14.
66 C.D.R., October 1996 - Progress Report, 52.
67 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 52.
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The project was to be divided into several contracts. Five
initial packages - for a power station, a quay, roads, and
infrastructure upgrading, including repairs to the breakwater -
were the first to go to tender. Interest in the projects was
high as sixty-nine companies bid for the initial five packages.
Bids came from companies based in France, Italy, Great Britain,
Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Greece, South Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and Lebanon. The port authority also invited companies to
prequalify by 3 March 1995 for two more contract packages, the
removal of debris and dredging in the main basin. 68 Bids for work
on marine infrastructure, onshore infrastructure and buildings
were invited on 31 May 1996. Financing for the improvement to
Beirut Port was to come from the European Investment Bank, which
promised loans amounting to approximately $57 million, and from
the Port's own funds.69
1.1.3.3 The Rehabilitation and Expansion of the Road Network
.Pnyone who has lived or travelled in Lebanon is aware of
the chaotic nature of the transportation network. On the one
hand, there are far too many cars on the roads, and, on the
other hand, there are far too few modes of public
transportation. Approximately 1.4 million vehicles were
officially registered in Lebanon in 1995 compared to 243,584
registered vehicles in 1974, an increase of 460%. Moreover,
during the same period, the road network actually deteriorated.70
68 MEED (17 February 1995), 21.
69 Ibid.
70 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 175. For a
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A 1994 study by the Industrialists Association found that the
loss of efficiency caused by traffic congestion cost the
Lebanese economy approximately $1 billion a year, or about 10%
of GDP. 7' It is not surprising, therefore, that the road network
is the single largest sector in the entire Horizon programme
accounting for some 18% of the total.
Numerous contracts were awarded to firms for rehabilitating
and expanding the country's road network. From 1 January 1992 to
30 September 1996, the C.D.R. awarded 65 contracts valued at
$250 million. However, the real push was supposed to have taken
place by the end of 1997, when an estimated $700 million of
contracts were expected to be settled. 72 Furthermore, three other
organisations, the C.E.G.P.V.B., C.E.G.P., and the M.P.W., were
also responsible for awarding contracts in the sector.
A few interesting points can be observed relating to the
projects in this sector. To begin with, although this is the
largest sector, none of the projects being implemented by the
C.D.R., during the period under study, were funded by foreign
sources. 73
 Only a few projects, implemented by the C.E.G.P.V.B.,
and the C.E.G.P., were externally funded, mostly by the Saudi
Fund. 74 Second, almost all of the contractors and the consultants
involved in the projects were Lebanese. Finally, extensive
criticism was directed at the tendering process in the sector.
breakdown of the type of vehicles in Lebanon, see ibid, 177.
71 Ibid, 176.
72 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 5.
Ibid.
C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 20.
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In particular, the criticism centred on the alleged favouritism
shown to some contractors, and the allegedly exorbitant prices
charged by the contractors for the work on the projects. 75
 We
will give these points more consideration in section two of this
chapter.
The C.D.R. divided the projects in the sector into five
main components. These include the following: the rehabilitation
and maintenance of the international, primary, secondary and
local road networks; the completion of the coastal expressway;
the construction of the Beirut ring road and the associated
penetrator roads; the improvement of the road network in the
Greater Beirut area; and the construction of the Beirut
Damascus highway. Below, we will look at some of the projects
implemented in the five main areas of the sector.
1.1.3.3.1 The International, Primary, Secondary, and Local
Road Networks
Compared with the number of road projects which have taken
place in the Beirut area, relatively few projects were
implemented in the rest of Lebanon. 76 However, this may change in
the next few years. Based on a 1994 report prepared by Dar al
Handasah concerning the condition of Lebanon's road network
outside of Beirut, the Ministry of Public Works is in the
process of preparing a major roads rehabilitation programme. The
I'm basing this information on some of the interviews
which I conducted in Beirut in the winter of 1997.
76 To site one example, in the sunimer of 1994, the contractor
Edmon Akkar was awarded two contracts worth a total of $5.83
million to rehabilitate and extend the Jounieh-Bkerke-Harisa
road in the Kesrouan area of Lebanon. Dar al Hanadash was
responsible for the supervision of the work. For other examples
see C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 23.
207
programme is to cover the rehabilitation of over 6,500 km of
roads over a five year period at a cost of $1.25 billion. Dar al
Handasah is preparing the project, which may get some financial
assistance from the World Bank and the Japanese government.77
1.1.3.3.2 Completion of the Coastal Expressway
Most of the responsibility for work on the coastal
expressway rested with the C.E.G.P. Contracts for at least two
main projects, both of which were partly funded by Saudi Arabia,
have been awarded for work on the coastal expressway. This
included consultancy and contract work on two sections of the
expressway -- the Chekka-Tripoli section and the Damour-Sidon
section. 78 Other projects connected with the rehabilitation and
extension of the coastal expressway included two consultancy
contracts awarded to Dar al Handasah and Gicome/Salame, and a
$22.8 million contract given to ELCO/Rashid al Khazen for
improvement to the Nahr el Kaib section of the coastal road.79
C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 21.
78 The project was partially funded by the Saudi fund, and
included both consultancy and contract work. For more details,
see the following progress reports: January 1994, 25-26; May
1994, 33; January 1995, 20; and March 1996, 19.
All three of these contracts were funded by the Lebanese
government. Dar al Handasah was to conduct an alignment study of
the Pntelias to Casino du Liban section. The contract, which was
worth $500,000, was due to begin in October 1994. The other
consultancy contract, which was worth $160,000, was for
preparing preliminary designs for the Beirut River to Tabarja
road section. C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 22.
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1.1.3.3.3 Construction of the Beirut Ring Road and the
Associated Penetrator Roads
Table 6: Transportation - Ring & Penetrator Roads8°
Consul tancy
Contractor	 Country of	 Description	 Value Date Funding
Origin
1.	 Dar al Handasah	 Lebanon	 [ Design, Prep. of Tender	 4.7	 1993	 Lebanon
Docs. and Supervision
4.4	 1993	 Lebanon
4	 1993	 Lebanon
2. Kbatib & Alami	 Lebanon
3. ACE	 Lebanon
Physical Rehabilitation & Development Projects
Contractor	 Country of	 Description
Origin
Value I Date I Funding
1. Heads Haidar	 Lebanon	 Construction of Roads 	 5.42	 1995	 Lebanon
2. Sleiman Haddad	 Lebanon	 8.74	 1995	 Lebanon
3. Elie Seiwan	 Lebanon	 16.87	 1995	 Lebanon
4. Jalk and Fils	 Lebanon	 6.54	 1996	 Lebanon
5. BETH (Seiwan)	 Lebanon	 14.3	 1995	 Lebanon
* The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
Not surprisingly, most of the roads which have been
rehabilitated or constructed were centred in the Beirut area.
This included the construction of a ring road which was to
connect the Northern and Southern sections of the coastal
expressway, and which would also link the Beirut road network
with the Damascus expressway. When completed, the ring road was
supposed to improve traffic flow into Beirut. 81 The projects were
divided into three areas including the Northern access roads,
the Central section, and the Southern section.
Three local consultants were awarded contracts for
designing, preparing tender documents, and supervising work on
80 The table was derived by the author from a number of
C.D.R. reports.
81 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 16.
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the network. Dar al Handasah was responsible for the Northern
section, Associated Consulting Engineers (A.C.E.) for the
Central section, and Khatib & Alami for the Southern section.82
By October 1996, the consultants had completed the design
portion of their work, while the contracts to build the ring
road were in the process of being awarded.
By October 1996, some work on the ring road and the
penetrator roads had begun. We will note a few examples. The
contractor, Heads Haidar was awarded a $5.42 million contract
for the construction of a penetrator road in the Southern
section. The contract was supposed to begin in July 1995 and was
to be completed in five months. 83 The contractor Sleiman Haddad
secured a $8.74 million contract for work on a penetrator road
in the Southern section, while the contractor Elie Seiwan was
awarded a $16.87 million contract, also for work on a penetrator
road in the Southern section. Both contracts were to have begun
in February 1995 and were to have been completed in a year and a
half. 84 The contractor Jalk & Fils was granted a $6.54 million
contract for the construction of a penetrator road in the
Central section. That contract was supposed to have begun in
March 1996 and was to be completed in 18 months. 85
 The contractor
82 Dar al Handasah's contract was for $4.7 million, ACE's
contract was for $4 million, and Khatib & Alami's contract was
for $4.4 million. The starting date of all three contracts was
December 1993. C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 24.
83 The penetrator road was called Chatila-Choueifat 1.
C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 16.
84 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 22.
85 The penetrator road was referred to as the Hazmieh-Airport
road. See C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 16.
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BETH (Seiwan) secured a $14.3 million contract for the
construction of a penetrator road, also in the Central section.
That contract was due to begin in November 1995 and was to be
completed in 21 months. 86 In addition to the contracts awarded by
the C.D.R., other organisations, including the C.E.G.P.V.3. and
the C.E.G.P., have awarded contracts related to the ring road
and penetrator roads. For example, the C.E.G.P.V.B. let two
contracts, funded by the Saudi Fund, for work on two penetrator
roads 87
As we noted above, the Lebanese government has funded most
of the projects. The parts of the ring road which were to be
connected to the Damascus expressway were supposed to be given
out on a B.O.T. basis, and subsequently to become toll roads.
However, due to certain difficulties, this has not been able to
go forward as of this writing, and the plan will have to be
reorganised.88
86 The penetrator road was called the Adlieh-Damascus road.
See ibid.
87 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 20.
88 For a list of those parts of the ring road which will be
let on a B.O.T. basis, see C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996,
19.
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1.1.3.3.4 Improvement of the Road Network and Services in the
Beirut Conurbation°9
Basically, responsibility for the road network in Beirut
and its suburbs has been divided between the C.D.R. and the
Conseil Executif des Grands Projets de la Ville de Beyrouth. The
C.E.G.P.V.B. was responsible for roads in Beirut proper, and the
C.D.R. was responsible for projects in the capital's suburbs.
The C.D.R. awarded several contracts for the rehabilitation
of the road network and associated infrastructure in the
suburbs. Dar al Handasah was the consultant on most of the
projects in both the Northern suburbs and the Southern suburbs.
Its responsibilities ranged from designing to supervising
projects. The consultant A.C.E. also played a 'role in designing
projects located in the Northern suburbs. The contractors
awarded projects in the Northern suburbs included Habib Hakim,
Hamid Kayrouz, Ramco, Societe Nationale d'Entreprises, Estephen,
and South Construction. Contractors awarded projects in the
Southern suburbs included Teccen, Inpresem/Batco, Hourieh,
Contra, and South for Construction. As of the end of September
1996, the total cost of all of these contracts was less than
$100 million.90
89 A consortium of Lebanese and French consultants were given
a $2.4 million contract, which was to have begun in January
1994, to prepare a study on traffic needs in Metropolitan Beirut
over the next 20 years and to offer both short-term and long-
term solutions to the problems.
90 For precise details of each contract, see the following:
C.D.R., Progress Report - 1996,19-20; Progress Report - March
1996, 16, 19, 21; Progress Report - January 1995, 19, 20, 22,
23; •Progress Report - May 1994, 33; Progress Report - January
1994, 22.
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1.1.3.3.5 Beirut - Damascus Motorway
A major project to build a 64 km motorway from Beirut to
Damascus was launched in 1994. The estimated $500 million
project, which was supposed to be a toll road, and one of the
few road projects that was opened to international tender, was
based on a build-own-operate-transfer basis (B.O.O.T.). Many
international groups prequalified for the project, including the
German companies Walter Bau, Dornier Autostrade, Dasa,
Dyckerhoff, Widmann, Wayss and Freytag, and the French companies
Bouygues with its affiliate SCREG, Dumez, and Campenon Bernard
SGE. 9' The C.E.G.P. was responsible for the project. 92
 Its
supporters claimed that, once the road is completed, the trip
from Beirut to Damascus would take less than one hour. 93 However,
difficulties with the viability of the toll road have meant that
the government has had to rethink this whole project. As of this
writing, its future is uncertain.
1.1.3.4 Public Transport & Railways
As we have explained above, Lebanon's public transportation
system is woefully inadequate. In fact, it is practically
nonexistent. 94 There was, and continues to be, no railway service
and prior to the implementation of the programme there were less
91 MEED (8 July 1994), 28; (22 July 1994), 25.
92 For more information concerning the project, see -----,
"New Beirut-Masna Toll Highway Planned", The Lebanon Report 5,
no.3 (March, 1994), 8-9.
Ibid, 8.
For a succinct study of the public transportation system,
see Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 186-190.
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than thirty buses operating in the entire Beirut area. The
government plan was to rehabilitate the rail system, and to
purchase buses to meet some of the transportation needs in the
Beirut area.
1.1.3.4.1 The Purchase of Buses
In January 1993, the local consultant A.C.E. was given a
six month $500,000 contract, which was funded by Italy, to
prepare tender documents for the purchase of buses in the
Greater Beirut area. 95
 The plan was to add 140 new buses to the
Beirut area, 96
 although the number may have increased to 490.
1.1.3.4.2 The Railway Network
In the summer of 1993, France's Sofrerail was awarded a
$4.8 million contract to carry out a study on the rehabilitation
and extension of the 170 km coastal railway from the Southern
city of Tyre to the Northern city of Tripoli. Based on the
study, international companies were invited to bid by 10 May
1994 for an estimated $500 million contract to rehabilitate the
coastal railway. Twenty international companies applied to
prequalify including major European ones such as the U.K.'s
Trafalgar House Construction, Balfour Beatty Construction, and
Taylor Woodrow, Italy's .1\nsaldo Trasporti, and a consortium of
Germany's Siemens, France's Compenon Bernard, and Spain's
C.IJ.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 24.
96 C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 31.
Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 187. The E.I.U.
noted that the Lebanese government had leased 200 Czech made
buses from Sogelease-Liban. See Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 2nd Quarter 1996, 19.
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Dragados & Construcciones. The contract called for the
rehabilitation of the 205 Jan line from Tyre to the Syrian
border. The 170 km stretch from Tyre to Tripoli was to be
double-track and fully electrified. The stretch from Tripoli to
the Syrian border was to carry diesel trains on a single track.
The aim of the project was to relieve congestion on the coastal
roads. The implementation of this project, however, was delayed,
and it is unclear whether or not the government planned to go
ahead with it.98
1.1.4 The Water Supply and Wastewater Sectors
As we explained in chapter three, the water supply and
wastewater networks in Lebanon were severely damaged as a result
of the war. For example, 21% of households did not have a
private water supply connection, an estimated 80% of the water
supply was polluted to some degree, the water treatment plants
were damaged or operated at reduced levels, and there were no
functioning sewage treatment plants in the entire country.
The two sectors accounted for 9.5% of the Horizon 2000
programme. Between 1 January 1992 and 30 September 1996, the
C.D.R. awarded a total of 85 contracts valued at $193.4 million
in the two sectors. 99 Unlike the road network, the Water Supply
and Wastewater sectors received funding from a number of
external sources including the French, the Italian and the Saudi
governments, the World Bank, the European Community, the
98 See the following sources. See C.D.R., Progress Report -
January 1995, 20; May 1994 ,31; and MEED (4 March 1994), 27.
99 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 45.
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European Investment Bank, the Saudi Fund for Development, and
the Kuwait Fund for Prab Economic Development. Furthermore,
international companies, particularly consultants, were awarded
several contracts in these two sectors. Basically, one could
divide the projects in the sectors into two types including
consultancy management contracts, and work on the rehabilitation
and extension of the sectors with related consultancy contracts
for supervision on the projects. Below, we will take a closer
look at some of the projects in the two sectors.
Table 7: Water & Wastewater Sectors10°
Consul taricy
Contractor	 Country of	 1 Description	 Value Date Funding
______ ____________________________J Origin
1. Binnie & Partners	 U.K.	 Management S.1.U. 	 6.1	 1993	 E.U.
2. Lyonnaise des Eaux-Duiuez	 France	 Technical Assistance 	 2.5	 1993	 France
3. Sir Alexander Gibb & 	 U.K.	 Preparation of Programmes	 3.4	 1995
Partners
4. Howard Humpherys & Partners U.K.	 9.0	 1995	 WB
5. Nazeh Taleb	 Lebanon	 Supervision of Dbaye Project	 .155	 1992	 Italy
6. Montgomery Watson	 U.K.	 Study/Design of Drinking	 1.7	 1993	 Lebanon
Water Conveyer
7. Dar al Handasah	 Lebanon	 Sian Dam Project	 1.93	 1994	 Lebanon
Physical Rehabilitation & Development Projects
Contractor	 Country of
	
Description	 [Value Date Funding
Origin j _______ ______ __________
1. Kuk Dong	 S. Korea	 Fix Pumping Stations	 .	 12.3	 1994	 WB/EIB
2. Kuk Dong	 S. Korea	 Water Treatment Works	 3.8	 1994	 WB/EIB
3. Estephan	 Lebanon	 Work on Springs and Wells 	 2.8	 1994	 WB/EIB
4. Estephan	 Lebanon	 Transmission/Dist. Networks	 14.9	 1994	 WB/EIB
5. Unibuild/Polimer 	 Lebanon	 Work on Reservoirs	 11.3	 1994	 WB/EIB
6. Gico Costruzioni	 Italy	 Sewer Networks	 14.1	 1994	 W9/EIR
7. Emco Engineering	 Work on Pumping Stations	 .750	 1994	 WB/EIB
* The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
1.1.4.1 Consultancy Management
International consultants have provided institutional
100 The table was derived by the author from a number of
C.D.R. reports.
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support to the Ministry of Hydraulic & Electric Resources, and
other institutions associated with the water supply and
wastewater sectors. We will note two examples. To begin with, as
we explained in chapter four, a Sector Implementation Unit
staffed by the U.K. consultant Binnie & Partners was installed
in the Ministry of Hydraulic & Electric Resources (M.H.E.R.) to
assist with the implementation of the programme. 10' Some of the
main tasks of the S.I.U. included reviewing the reports and
tender documents submitted by consultants, reviewing the
progress reports from consultants and contractors, conducting a
follow-up on current contracts, and participating in tender
evaluation committees.' 02 Second, a three year management
contract was given to the French consultant Lyonnaise des Eaux-
Dumez in 1993. The consultant was responsible for assisting the
Directorate of Operations of the M.H.E.R. by training ministry
staff and offering technical and administrative management to
the various water boards.'°3
1.1.4.2 Work on the Rehabilitation and Extension of the Two
Sectors
The projects which have been, or are in the process of
being implemented, were basically divided into two kinds - the
first year programme and the second & third year programmes, and
an assortment of individual projects.
'°' The $6.1 million contract was financed by the E.U.
102 C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 39.
103 The three year contract, which was financed by the French
government, was worth $2.5 million. See C.D.R., Progress Report
- May 1994, 25; and ibid.
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1.1.4.2.1 The First Year Programme and the Second & Third Year
Programmes
The first phase, which has, for the most part, been
completed, consisted of 5 priority projects in the water supply
sector, and 2 priority projects in the wastewater sector. The
projects, which were all scheduled to have begun by April 1994,
were funded by the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and
the Lebanese government. Two of the projects in the water supply
sector were awarded to Kuk Dong of South Korea including a
$11.69 million contract (adjusted to $12.3 million) to fix
pumping stations and a $3.48 million contract (adjusted to $3.8
million) for water treatment works. 104 The other three contracts
in the sector were awarded to local companies, including the
contractor Estephan, which was awarded two contracts: one for
$1.97 million (adjusted to $2.8 million) for work on springs and
wells; and the second for $10.42 million (adjusted to $14.9
million) for work on transmission and distribution networks. The
third contract, valued at $8.68 million (adjusted to $11.3
million) went to Unibuild/Polimer, and involved work on
reservoirs.' 05
 The two wastewater contracts were .awarded to the
firms Gico Costruzioni, a $5.82 million (adjusted to $14.1
million) contract for sewer networks, and Emco Engineering,
which was given an approximately $750,000 contract for work on
pumping stations •b06
Numerous consultancy firms were contracted to supervise the
104 C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 25.
105 Ibid, and Progress Report - October 1996, 40.
106 C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 25; and Progress
Report - October 1996, 40.
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first year programme, including Hydea, E.N.B., Geti, Jouzi,
B.T.D., B.T.U.T.P., and Liban Consult. These contracts were
funded by the World Bank and the European Investment Bank.'°7
By the autumn of 1996, consultants were preparing the
programmes for the second and third phases. The main consultants
on the projects included a consortium of the U.K.'s Sir
Alexander Gibb & Partners with the local groups K.C.I.C. and
Khatib & Alamj, and a consortium of the U.K.'s Howard Humpherys
& Partners with E.N.B. of Greece and the local B.T.D. The
K.F.A.E.D. financed $3.4 million contract, led by Sir Alexander
Gibb & Partners, was for work on the Greater Beirut area, while
the other contract, financed by the World Bank and valued at
$9.8 million, was for work outside of the Greater Beirut area.'°8
1.1.4.2.2 Inthvidual Projects in the Sectors
A large number of other contracts also related to
consultancy and rehabilitation work were awarded in the two
sectors. We will cite several examples. In December 1992, the
contractors, E.M.I.T./S.E.L.C. were scheduled to have begun work
on the Dbaye treatment plant; the consultants Nazih Taleb were
awarded a contract to supervise the project.'° 9 In December 1993,
the TJ.K.'s Montgomery Watson, along with the local Engeco, were
to have begun work on a study/design of the Awali-Beirut
107 For precise details of the contracts, see C.D.R.,
Progress Report - May 1994, 25.
108 C.D.R., January 1995 - Progress Report, 13-14.
109 The main contract was valued at $5.72 million, and the
consultancy contract was valued at $155,000. The contract was to
be funded by Italy. C.D.R., May 1994 - Progress Report, 25.
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drinking water conveyor."0
 In the spring of 1994, Dar al
Handasah had begun consultancy work on the Bisri Dam project, a
crucial project aimed at meeting the future demand for drinking
water in the Beirut area." In March of 1996, the local al
Rachid Engineering began work on carrying out a geotechnical
study of the Bisri Dam project." 2 In November 1995, the local
company Geneco, owned by Hariri's brother, was awarded a
$368,000 twelve month contract to rehabilitate the Jamour
pumping station. The project was funded by the K.F.A.E.D."3
Finally, the Saudi Fund for Development funded consultancy
contracts for supervision of water supply works in the Akkar
region and in devastated villages in the Chouf region."4
1.1.5. The Solid Waste Sector
In chapter three of this paper, we explained that the waste
collection system in Lebanon had broken down completely. As a
result, solid waste was disposed of in open dumps virtually
everywhere. This was not only unsightly, but it raised concerns
over environmental damage, and the general health of the
"° The $1.7 million contract was funded through internal
sources. Ibid.
The contract, valued at $1.93 million, was financed by
the Lebanese government. C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 25.
12 The contract, valued at $804,000, was also funded by
internal sources. C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 26.
113 The K.F.A.E.D. backed at least two further projects
including a $3.4 million project for the rehabilitation of
Daichounieh & Hazmieh water treatment works, and a $3.2 million
project at the Kachkouch Spring encatcbment & conveyor. C.D.R.,
Progress Report - March 1996, 26.
" C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 26.
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population.
The solid waste sector accounted for 1.5% of the Horizon
2000 programme. Between 1 January 1992 and 30 September 1996,
the C.D.R. awarded a total of 22 contracts valued at $158.5
million."5 Basically, the contracts were awarded for four types
of projects, including: a range of consultancy contracts from
supervision to conducting studies on a series of issues;
repairing and maintaining garbage incinerators; providing
collection equipment; and street cleaning and collection of
garbage.
116Table 8: Solid Waste Sector
Consul tancy
Contractor	 Country e	 Deacription	 Value Date funding
Origin
1. Transtec Fichtner	 German/Bel.	 Management S.I.U.	 1.8	 1994	 E.U.
2. C.R.E.E.D.	 France	 Technical Assistance and	 1.5	 1993
Supervision
3. C.R.E.E.D./Liban Consult	 France!	 Study of Sector	 .192	 1994	 WB
Lebanon
4. Liban Consult	 Lebanon	 Environmental Impact Study 	 .150	 1994	 Japan
5	 D.G. Jones	 U.S.A.	 Supervision Work on Garbage	 .300
Collection
Physical Rehabilitation & Development Projects
Contractor	 Country o	 Description	 Value Date Funding
Origin
1. Sukkar Engineering	 Lebanon	 Rehab. and Oper. mroussieh	 1.3/	 1993
Incenerator	 year
2. O.T.V.	 France	 Rehab. Qarantina Compost	 4.5	 1993
Plant
3. Sukkar Engineering	 Lebanon	 Oper. Qarantina Compost	 1.3/	 1993
Plant	 year
4. Gallion/Arilamah	 U.S.A./	 Rehab. & Providing Compactor	 5.64	 1994	 WB
Lebanon	 Trucks
5. Oallah Albaraka/Bin	 Saudi Arabia	 Providing Garbage Containers 	 .910	 1994	 WB
Laden/Almabani
6. Sukkar Engineering	 Lebanon	 Garbage Collection and	 24	 1994
Street Cleaning (Beirut)
7. Terro	 Lebanon	 Garbage Collection (Chouf) 	 .690	 1995
* The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 45.
116 The table was derived by the author from a number of
C.D.R. reports.
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1.1.5.1 Consultancy Work
As we noted in chapter four, a sector implementation unit,
led by the U.K. consultant Transtec Fichtner, was installed in
the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the Ministry of the
Environment to help implement programmes from the Solid Waste
sector. Transtec Fichtner's $1.8 million E.E.C. funded contract
was for three years (1994-97) •h17 Several - other consultancy
contracts were awarded in the sector, of which we will note a
few. The French consultant, C.R.E.E.D., secured a $1.5 million
contract near the end of 1993 for assisting with designs for
landfill sites, preparation of tender documents, and the
supervision	 of	 construction	 work.118
	
A	 consortium	 of
C.R.E.E.D./Liban Consult were given a $192,000 World Bank backed
contract near the end of 1994 to conduct a study on a long term
strategy for the Solid Waste Sector. Finally, Liban Consult
secured a Japanese funded $150,000 contract to carry out an
environmental impact assessment h19
1.1.5.2 Repairing and Maintaining Garbage Incinerators
The C.D.R. awarded a few contracts for work on
rehabilitating and operating the Ixnroussieh incinerator and the
Qarantina Compost Plant. In the spring of 1993, the local
company Sukkar Engineering secured the contract to rehabilitate
and operate the Imroussieh incinerator. The contract was worth
$1.3 million per year of operation.' 2° In December 1993, the
117 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 27.
118 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 27; May 1994, 29.
119 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 18.
120 The contract was for five years, although it would
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French contractor O.T.V. secured a $3.95 million (adjusted to
$4.5 million) contract to rehabilitate the Qarantina Compost
Plant. The French firm, C.R.E.E.D., was the supervising
consultant on the World Bank funded project,' 21 while Sukkar
secured a $1.3 million a year contract to operate and maintain
the Qarantina plant.122
1.1.5.3 Contracts to Provide Collection Equipment
Several international companies, including Italy's Waste
Management Italia, France's Serrat, Japan's Hiro, the U.S.'s
Gallion Solid Waste and Heil, and Saudi Arabia's Dallah Albaraka
Group bid for two contracts ained at improving garbage
collection. One contract was for providing 2,800 garbage
containers, and the other contract was for rehabilitating 33
compactor trucks and providing 76 new ones.' 23 The latter
contract was awarded to a consortium of Gallion with local
partner Abilamah for $5.64 million. The other contract was
awarded to the Saudi consortium of Dallah Albaraka Group, Bin
Laden, and Almabani for $910,000. The contracts, which began in
January 1994, were funded by the World Bank.'24
1.1.5.4 Contracts for Garbage Collection and Street Cleaning
Sukkar Engineering was awarded the contracts for garbage
probably be extended. Also, additional work was added raising
the value of the contract. See C.D.R., Progress Report - 1994,
27; May 1994, 29, and October 1996, 48-49.
121 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 27; and March
1996, 30.
122 C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 29.
123 MEED (18 June 1993), 18.
124 C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 29.
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collection and street cleaning for the Greater Beirut area. The
two contracts went into effect in 1994, but were later
consolidated into a single contract, running until the year
2001, worth $24 million a year. The consultant D.G. Jones was
awarded a $300,000 contract per year for supervising the work.'25
D.G. Jones was also responsible for supervising work on garbage
collection in the Chouf area. That contract was given to the
local group Terro.'26
1.2 The Rehabilitation of the Social Infrastructure Sectors
As noted above, out of the approximately $3.3 billion worth
of contracts signed by the C.D.R., nearly $2.8 billion, or about
85% were for the rehabilitation of the country's physical
infrastructure. Only $251 million or 7.65% of the total spent by
the C.D.R. was for the rehabilitation of the country's social
infrastructure.' 27 This included the following sectors:
education, public health and social affairs, environment, and
housing & resettlement. Below we will take a closer look at the
projects implemented in these sectors.
1.2.1 The Education Sector
The 416 contracts signed by the C.D.R. from 1 January 1992
to 30 September 1996 for projects in the Education sector were
125 The nature and the value of the contracts continued to
change. See the following reports: C.D.R., Progress Report -
October 1996, 49; March 1996, 30-31; January 1995, 1; May 1994,
29; January 1994, 7.
126 Terro's contract, which began in January 1995, was worth
$690,000. C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 18.
127 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 5.
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by far the highest number of contracts in any of the sectors.
The value of the contracts, however, was comparatively very
small; the 416 contracts combined were only valued at $171.6
million.'28
 However, contracts valued at over $300 million, the
largest value after the road network, were scheduled to be
implemented during 1997_98.129
As we mentioned in chapter three, the education sector,
which accounted for 13% of the total Horizon programme, was
divided into three sub-sectors including: general education,
youth & sport; vocational & technical education; and culture &
higher education. We will give a brief examination of the
developments in each sub-sector.
Table 9: Education Sector'3°
Contractor	 Country of	 Description	 Value Date Funding
Origin
1. Over 150 Contractors	 Lebanon!	 Rehab. over 1,200 Public	 25	 1993	 Lebanon!I
Some - Italy	 Schools	 taly
2. Trafalgar House	 U.K.	 Build Sports Complex	 115	 1994	 Various
3. Several Local Firms	 Lebanon	 Rehab. of 23 Tech, and 	 7.4	 1993	 WE
Vocational Schools
4. (To be awarded)	 ---	 Construction of a new 	 200	 Various
Lebanese University Campus
* The numbers in the value column are in millions of U.S. dollars
1.2.1.1 General Education, Youth & Sport
This sub-sector was by far the largest of'the three sub-
sectors, representing 8.3% of the Horizon plan. Several
programmes were located in this sub-sector, including an
approximately $25 million project, which began in 1993, to
rehabilitate over 1,200 public schools (primary, intermediate,
128 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 5.
129 Ibid.
130 The table was derived by the author from a number of
C.D.R. reports.
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and secondary). The project involved at least 10 consultants and
over 150 individual contracts, most of which were awarded to
local firms, although some of the projects funded by the Italian
government were awarded to Italian firms.' 31
 Other projects
included the reconstruction of 7 destroyed schools, providing
equipment to schools, studies on improving the teacher training
colleges and regrouping schools, and the rehabilitation of the
ministry' s buildings P132
The most significant project in this sub-sector, however,
was the construction of a national sports city. The TJ.K.'s
Trafalgar House Corporation was awarded a $115.5 million
contract on 8 August 1994 for the construction of the sports
city in Beirut. The project was to be completed in two phases.
The first phase, which was valued at $49.5 million, included the
construction of a 48,000 seat Olympic Stadium, the refurbisbment
of a 3,300 seat multi-purpose sports hall, and the building of a
car park. The second phase, which was valued at $66 million,
included building a swimming centre, an administration building,
an open air tennis centre, and a turf club. The initial
completion date was for the summer of 1996, but was put back a
year to the summer of 1997.' The project was financed by grants
131 The Lebanese government funded most of the projects,
although the Italian government and the C.E.C. also contributed.
Italy provided funding for some of the contracts which called
for the supplying of equipment. For details of each project, see
C.D.R., Progress Report - May 1994, 39; January - 1995, 29;
October - 1996, 32.
132 For precise details, see ibid.
133 Two reason were given for the delay. First, the Israeli
invasion halted work on the project, and, second, promised
financial aid was slow in materialising.
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from the Arab Sports Federation and various Arab countries. To
date, $36.5 million was promised including $20 million from
Saudi Arabia, $6.5 million from Kuwait, and $5 million each from
the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.'34
1.2.1.2 Vocational & Technical Education
The main programme in this sub-sector consisted of the
rehabilitation of 23 technical and vocational schools. The World
Bank funded projects were split into 8 contracts valued
initially at $4.4 million, although later adjusted to $7.4
million. The projects were awarded to local firms, including
Estephan, Spectrum, Ghassen Chaccour, and Sleiman Haddad.'35
Another project in the sector included providing workshop and
laboratory equipment to the technical schools.
1.2.1.3 Culture & Higher Education
The most significant project in this sector was the
construction of a new Lebanese University campus in the Hadath
area of Beirut. The new university campus, estimated to cost
$200 million was to include 13 faculties, and other supporting
facilities. Financing for the project, which was still at the
prequalification stage during the period we are looking at, was
to come from Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Islamic Development Bank
and the Lebanese government.'36
134 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 32.
135 For precise details of the projects, see C.D.R., Progress
Report - May 1994, 39.
136 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 34.
227
1.2.2 Public Health and Social Affairs
The Public Health and the Social Affairs sectors accounted
for 5.4% of the total Horizon programme. As of 30 September
1996, the C.D.R. allocated 60 contracts valued at $71.8 million.
Two main problems existed in the public health and social
affairs sectors. The first problem consisted of institutional
weaknesses, primarily at the Ministry of Health. To help rectify
the situation, consultants were employed to conduct studies
aimed at offering solutions to institutional problems,' 37 and to
offer institutional support to the Ministry of Health to
implement the programmes. For example, the World Bank sponsored
a plan to set up a Project Coordination Unit and a Task Force
within the Ministry of Health.' 38 The second main problem was the
lack of access to medical and social facilities, particularly
for those people who lived outside of Beirut. To help rectify
the situation, the government planned to rehabilitate and build
hospitals and other related facilities in both Beirut and the
outlying regions of the country. During the first four years of
the programme, the construction of many new hospitals began,
while plans to develop other hospitals were in the final stages.
We will give several examples of projects which were started
during the period that we are looking at.
The main project was the construction of a new 360-bed
government university hospital in the Bir Hassan area of South
Beirut. The project, funded by the Saudi Fund For Development,
' Several studies, which examined the various ways the
Ministry of Health can improve health care, were produced.
138 For a summary of these contracts, see C.D.R., October
1996 - Progress Report, 26.
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the Saudi government, and the Islamic Development Bank, was
divided into two contracts consisting of the construction of the
main building and of an auxiliary building. The contract to
build the main building was awarded to a consortium of Saudi
Arabia's El-Self Contracting Engineering Establishment and the
local Alfred Matta for $44.7 million, while the other contract
was secured by Saudi Arabia's Hoshance for $8.7 million. The
consultant on the project was the local firm Spectrum. 139 Work
was expected to be completed in 1997.
Other hospitals under construction reflected government
attempts to provide health facilities to outlying regions of the
country. These included the construction of two new 70 bed
hospitals in Halba, which is in the deprived Akkar region in the
far North, and in Hermel, which is in the Biqa Valley.' 40 Other
hospitals under construction were in such regional towns as
Nabatiyeh, Tannourine, and Rachaya. Work on most of these new
hospitals was supposed to be completed by 1997.''
It may be of some interest to note that many of the
hospital and health centre projects which have been implemented,
or are in the process of being implemented, have not only been
funded by the Kuwaiti government, but have, in fact, been
awarded by the Kuwaiti Fund on behalf of the government of
Kuwait. This included work on the 40-bed hospitals at Tannourine
139 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 36.
140 The Lebanese firm ACE, which secured several consultancy
contracts in the health sector, was also the consultant on the
two contracts. The Halba and Hermel contracts were funded by the
S.F.D. and the OPEC fund for International Development. C.D.R.,
January 1994 - Progress Report, 36.
141 C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 23.
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& Rachaya, a 75-bed hospital at Nabatieh, and the construction
of 7 health centres.'42
Finally, the rehabilitation and extension of older
hospitals and the construction of new ones in Beirut, Tripoli,
Zahle, Sidon and other major centres was expected to take place
during 1996-97.'
1.2.3 The Environment Sector
As we noted elsewhere, many of the projects related to
environmental issues were dealt with in other sectors. As a
result, very few projects have come under the environment
sector. In fact, under the period of study, this included only
two projects worth $3.5 million, and a couple of other projects
which were still in the preparation stage. The projects, which
were funded by the U.N. and the World Bank, included planning
and policy studies, and the preparation of a national strategy
for the environment.'44
1.2.4 Housing & Resettlement
Throughout this study, we have explained the serious
problems facing Lebanon's hou.sing sector. In particular, we
noted the large portion of the population which was displaced as
a result of the war. However, in the time period that we are
looking at, only 15 projects in the sector, valued at $4.2
142 C.D.R., October 1996 - Progress Report, 27.
Many of them were at the design stage. Ibid.
144 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 65; January 1995,
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million, have been implemented by the C.D.R. Basically, the
projects included studies, funded by the E.U., to assess damage
to the sector, and credit programmes for house owners to repair
damage to their homes.'45
1.3 The Productive Sector
The productive sector consisted of several sectors
including agriculture, industry, oil & gas, and tourism.
Although the productive sector only represented a small portion
of the programmes in the Horizon 2000 Programme, it contained
some key programmes, most of which were located in the
agriculture sector. Below, we will give a brief review of some
of the important projects in the productive sector.
1.3.1 Agriculture & Irrigation
Basically, there were three major projects in the
agriculture sector, all of which received extensive support from
international organisations including the World Bank and the
United Nations.' 46 The principal project in the sector was for
the rehabilitation and modernisation of the irrigation system in
several parts of the country. The World Bank contributed
145 In the autumn of 1993, local consultants, supervised by
Hariri's company Oger International, were responsible for
conducting a physical survey of damage and collecting socio-
economic data for future planning. For a list of the consultants
dealing with the project, see C.D.R., Progress Report - Nay
1994, 47. In September 1994, ETI of France was awarded a
contract to conduct a legal and financial study of the sector.
See C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 24.
146 There were many other smaller projects. For details see,
C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 39-40; May 1994, 51;
January 1995, 32-33; March 1996, 33.
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approximately $57 million towards the project, and the Lebanese
government provided approximately $13 million. The programme
included supplying irrigation infrastructure for more than
27,000 ha of land, as well as providing technical assistance to
the relevant management bodies.' 47 As of October 1996, work had
started in parts of South Lebanon and in the North Biqa, while
other projects in the South Biqa, and in North Lebanon were at
the design stage.'48 A second project, which received
approximately $10 million from the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (I.F.A.D.) of the U.N., included
further work on irrigation projects, institutional support
concerning the management of water resources, and support
services to both farmers and to the development of women's
activities. 149 The third programme essentially consisted of U.N.
backed technical assistance programmes offered to the Ministry
of Agriculture for a number of projects including the
improvement of olive growing, the quality control of food
products, and the offer of training in new irrigation
techniques •150
147 Namely, the Irrigation Department of the Ministry of
Hydraulic & Electric Resources.
148 C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 33; October- 1996,
56. The contracts were awarded to Lebanese firms.
149 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 56; and March -
196, 33.
150 Ibid. For more information on the technical programmes,
see C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1994, 39-40.
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1.3.2 The Industrial, Oil & Gas Sectors
As we have explained throughout this study, there is a
serious lack of statistical information related to most aspects
of Lebanese society. The same holds true for information related
to industry. The main programme in this sector was a 1994-95
industrial census financed by the Germans for DM 500,000. The
census included a survey of approximately 24,000 companies. From
the information obtained, the government planned to draw up an
industrial strategy. Another project included a programme to
produce a uniform standard for the Lebanese construction
industry. That project, which was the responsibility of the
Ministry of Industry, was funded by the C.D.R. ($200,000), the
C.E.G.P.	 ($100,000),	 Solidere	 ($200,000),	 and the French
government ($400, 000). Other programmes included the
rehabilitation of the Industrial Research Institute, financed by
Belgium,' 51
 and a French funded study of Lebanon's oil refinery
industry.'52
1.3.3 Tourism153
We have already noted the former importance of the tourist
trade to Lebanon's economy. The tourist sector represented 1.6%
151 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 24; March 1996,
35; October 1996, 61.
152 C.D.R., Progress Report - January 1995, 24.
153 Interestingly, the tourism sector was not listed in any
of the C.D.R. progress reports even though it was supposed to
represent 1.6% of the Horizon Programme. One possible reason for
this is that the projects were implemented by agencies other
than the C.D.R., notably the Ministry of Tourism.
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of the Horizon Programme, with projects aimed at renovating and
reopening major tourist facilities including the Casino du
Liban, the Jeita caves, and the Istirahat rest houses in Sidon
and Tyre. Other programmes included opening new or improving
established national & international tourist offices, and the
development of a master plan for the tourist industry. We will
take a closer look at developments in the tourist industry in
chapter six.
1.4 Other Sectors
Two main areas concern us here. These include the
rehabilitation of government buildings, and programmes to help
manage and implement the reconstruction programme.
1.4.1 Government Buildings
Most government buildings suffered some sort of structural
damage as a result of the war. Just over 2% of the Horizon
programme was geared towards rehabilitating government
buildings, and constructing new ones. Between 1 January 1992 and
30 September 1996, 82 contracts valued at $88.6 million were
awarded by the C.D.R. Sixty eight contracts were let to firms,
essentially local companies, for rehabilitating government
buildings, 6 contracts were given to firms for the construction
of new government buildings, 6 contracts were awarded
(consultancy contracts only) for the development of
slaughterhouses, and 2 contracts were awarded to develop a
training centre for the Internal Security Forces. 154 The Saudi
154 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 66.
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government provided a grant of $60 million for work on urgent
projects. The Saudi Development Fund provided loans for other
projects. Grants were given by Qatar, the U.A.E., and other
sources for the rehabilitation of the Presidential Palace, while
the Lebanese government funded the remaining projects.155
1.4.2 Management & Implementation
As we explained in chapter four, various national and
international consultants were employed to assist the C.D.R. and
the various ministries and agencies with managing and
implementing Horizon 2000. These programmes, along with similar
ones, accounted for 1.3% of the entire Horizon programme. These
programmes, which we have listed throughout chapters four and
five were largely externally funded, with most of the funds
coming from the European Community.
2. An Analysis of the Horizon 2000 Programme
In this section, we will provide an analysis of the
progress of the Horizon 2000 programme with the intent of
answering two questions: first, we intend to find out the level
of international interest in the reconstruction programme; and
second, we intend to find out whether or not the programme has
succeeded in its goals with respect to improving the country's
infrastructure and facilitating economic growth.
155 Some of the local contractors who worked on the project
included Sleiman Haddad, Khatib and Alami, and Khoury
Contracting. For details, see C.D.R., Progress Report - March
1996, 36; January 1995, 35.
"mundane"
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2.1 International Interest in the Reconstruction Programme
In the course of evaluating the current economic and
political situation in Lebanon, one may tend to overlook the
fact that, only a few years ago, the country, was suffering from
a perpetual civil war and was considered to be one of the
premier pariah states. Few Westerners would travel to Lebanon
for fear of being kidnapped or killed, - further adding to
Lebanon's isolation from the rest of the world. Even as late as
1989, foreign governments seemed to be resigned to the fact that
Lebanon would remain unstable indefinitely, and were, therefore,
simply interested in preventing the conflict from escalating
beyond its borders.
Therefore, it is somewhat remarkable that only a few years
later, after the end of the war and the release of the last of
the Western hostages, we should be examining such
issues as the level of foreign participation
rehabilitation	 of	 Lebanon's	 road network,	 and other
infrastructure projects. In effect, however, looking at such
issues may go a long way towards demonstrating how far Lebanon
has returned to the international fold.
It is clear from the data we presented in section one that
international actors, including governments, businesses, and
organisations such as the World Bank, have played an active role
in the reconstruction of Lebanon. The only point that one may
contest is whether or not the level of international interest in
the recovery programme is really all that extensive.
When attempting to assess the real level of international
interest in the Lebanese reconstruction, one must take into
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consideration the violence of Lebanon's recent past, and a
constellation of other factors including: the cash flow problems
of Gulf Arab states, which would, naturally, affect their
abilities and willingness to provide funding; intense world
competition for Western aid, especially from East European
countries who are also trying to rebuild their economies; the
continuing Syrian dominance of Lebanon, which would tend to
frighten off expatriate Lebanese capital, not to mention other
investors; and the persistent instability in South Lebanon,
which would tend to adversely affect international interest for
obvious reasons. Given this admittedly problematic climate, we
are inclined to argue that the level of interest, which is
substantial, is relatively high -- although it should be pointed
out that it may not be quite as high as the Lebanese have
expected, and, perhaps, needed it to be.
The level of• international involvement in the
reconstruction programme can be observed on at least five levels
including: external funding (grants, loans, and "soft" loans)
for the recovery programme; the role of international companies
in the recovery programme; the reinstatement of coverage by
export credit agencies; the number of visits by Western
government and business delegations to Beirut; and international
investor interest in Lebanese government Eurobonds.
2.1.1 External Funding of the Reconstrucion Programme
As we explained in chapter three, the authors of Horizon
2000 expected external grants and loans to fund about 40% of the
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total programme. This was about the percentage of foreign aid
which was actually received by the Lebanese government during
the first four years of the programme. Out of the approximately
$3.3 billion worth of contracts signed by the C.D.R. between 1
January 1992 and 30 September 1996, $1.4 billion, or about 42%,
were funded through external grants and loans. However, due to
the time scaling built into the plan, this was far below the
amount of aid that the government had hoped to receive for these
years. Within the first three years of the programme foreign
funding was expected to cover a massive, and perhaps
unrealistic, 87% of the reconstruction programme, including 21%
through grants and 66% through loans. After the first few years,
it was hoped that the level of reliance on foreign funding would
be reduced as more domestic funding (primarily from projected
budget surpluses) would become available.'56
In fact, the Lebanese government had to push hard, due to
the cash flow problems and wariness of potential investors, to
solicit as much aid as it did.' 57
 Hariri, personally, made
numerous trips to the Arab Gulf states in an attempt to secure
aid for the prograirtine, sometimes without much success. For
example, in February 1993, after a visit to the Gulf, Hariri
declared, "The money has not come and no one is thinking of
supporting us.. .We have to rely on ourselves."' 58 Nonetheless,
156
"Horizon 2000 and Foreign Debt", The Lebanon Report
4, no.4 (April, 1993), 9.
' For an explaintation of why the aid was slow in coming,
see -----, "Modest Progress on Foreign Aid", The Lebanon Report
4, no.3 (March, 1993), 9.
158 Ibid, 9.
238
Hariri did have some success in obtaining aid during later trips
to the Gulf.
2.1.1.1 Origins of the External Funds
As the information provided in section one of this chapter
revealed, a number of countries, both Western and Arab, and
several international organisations, aid agencies, and
commercial banks, provided both grants and loans for the
recovery programme. In total. over 20 bodies pledged $3.1 billion
by 30 September 1996 for completed, current, and future
projects. Grants totalled $405 million or 13%, soft loans
accounted for $1.1 billion or 35%, and other loans accounted for
$1.6 billion or 52%.'
The World Bank contributed 17% of the total, the largest
amount of any foreign source. The other main donors included the
European Investment Bank 13%, the Arab Fund for Economic &
Social Development (A.F.E.S.D.) 12%, Italy 11%, France 9%, the
Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development (K.F.A.E.D.) 6%, and
Saudi Arabia and various commercial banks each accounted for 5%
of the total. 16° A number of other countries and institutions
also contributed including Japan and the audi Fund for
Development, each accounted for 4%, the Commission of European
Communities and the Islamic Development Bank, each
accounted for 3%, Kuwait 1%, and several other sources which
made up the remaining 7%161
159 C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 77.
160 Ibid, 76.
161 These included:
Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (A.D.F.D.)
Be 1 glum
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2.1.1.2 The Disbursements of the Grants and Loans
In giving an account of the projects in the various sectors
of the programme, we listed the main sources of funding for each
sector. In addition to reproducing a chart furnished by the
C.D.R. of the disbursements of external funds, we will briefly
reiterate where the main funds were allocated. 	 The sectors
which received the most external funding included: electricity,
water and wastewater, solid waste, transportation (particularly
the airport), public health and technical assistance programmes
to the institutions implementing the programmes.162
Germany
International Fund for Agricultural Development (I.F.A.D.)
OPEC Fund for International Development (O.F.I.D.)
Oman
Qatar
U.N.
See C.D.R., Progress Report - October 1996, 76.
162 The following table is taken from the C.D.R. Progress
Report from October 1996, p 78.
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The electricity sector accounted for 35% ($1.1 billion) of
all external funding. Funding originated from Italy ($258.5m),
the A.F.E.S.D. ($218.9m), the World Bank ($150.8m), Commercial
Banks	 ($148m),	 France	 ($100m),	 the E.I.B.	 ($76.2m),	 the
K.F.A.E.D.	 ($57.6m),	 Germany	 ($53.2m),	 and a few other
sources • 163
The water and wastewater sectors, and the solid waste
sector, received the second largest source of foreign funding,
amounting to $700 million. The World Bank provided the largest
amount of loans at $164.7 million, followed by the E.I.B. at
$157.5 million and Japan, which contributed $117.8 million.'64
The airport and the public health sector received grants
and loans totalling $191.4 million and $171.3 million
respectively. The E.I.B., the K.F.A.E.D., and France provided
the majority of funding for the airport projects, while funding
for the public health sector was pretty evenly divided among a
number of sources including the World Bank, the S.F.D., the
Saudi government and the Kuwaiti government.'65
Programmes which offered technical and other assistance to
the C.D.R. and the ministries were supposed to have received
$139.2 million worth of grants and loans. Funding for the
projects was derived from four sources including the World Bank
($40.4m), the Commission of European Communities ($38.2m), the
163 Ibid, 78.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
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Saudi government ($26.5m), and the A.F.E.S.D. ($2lin) 166
2.1.1.3 Reasons for Giving Foreign Aid
Critics have argued that foreign countries have only
provided funding for the reconstruction programme in exchange
for some tangible, usually economic, benefit. For example, it
has been asserted that some donor countries use the grants or
loans they have provided to the Lebanese government as leverage
to ensure that their national companies win the more lucrative
contracts in the recovery programme. In fact, this criticism
does seem somewhat valid with reference to several of the major
contracts, as well as many of the consultancy contracts. We will
look at some examples.
Clearly, the Italian government has used its aid programmes
vis-a-vis Lebanon as leverage in ensuring that Italian firms
secured many of the contracts in the Horizon 2000 programme. As
noted above, Italy was one of the leading sources of foreign
funding, accounting for 11% or $339 million of the total. The
Italian government was the first external actor to offer the
Lebanese government extensive financial assistance. In 1992, it
offered a financial protocol worth tens of millions of dollars,
consisting of grants, loans, and guaranteed credits, to finance
several projects in the physical infrastructure sectors. A
clause in the agreement stated that the financing would be
limited to projects involving Italian firms.'67
In at least two cases which dealt with lucrative contracts,
it appeared that political pressure from both the Italian and
166 Ibid.
167	 ED (4 December 1992), 36.
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Lebanese governments ensured that the C.D.R. awarded them to
Italian firms. One case dealt with repairs to the electricity
network, in which the Italian firm Ansaldo was apparently only
awarded the contract after P.M. Hariri and the Italian
Ambassador to Beirut, Giuseppe de Michelis di Slonghello,
personally intervened. As the Italian ambassador pointed out to
his Lebanese counterparts, "Italy was the first country to show
good faith in participating in the rehabilitation of Lebanese
state institutions and reconstruction.!Ti6B This case was the main
reason why the Minister of Electricity and Water Resources,
Georges Frem, who attempted to negotiate with another firm, in
order to get a lower price, was forced to leave his post.' 69 A
second case involved the substantial $534 million contract to
construct two 450 MW combined-cycle power stations, which was
given to a consortium of Ansaldo Energia of Italy and Siemens of
Germany. According to sources close to the project, generous
financing from the Italian governraent tilted the contract in
favour of Ansaldo/Siemens who were initially ranked second
behind John Brown Engineering of the U.K.'7°
168, "Electricity: Ansaldo to Rehabilitate Network",
The Lebanon Report 4, no.7 (July, 1993), 8.
169 Interview with Michael Young, editor of the Beirut based
journal The Lebanon Report, on 24 February 1997; "Hubayqah Takes
Over Electricity Ministry from Frem", The Lebanon Report 4, no.7
(July, 1993), 4.
170 The Lebanese government is funding the project primarily
through international loans. Most of the money will come from
Italian and German banks, who are backed by their respective
export credit agencies, SACE and HEBMES. The Italian government
offered approximately $240.6 million in concessionary loans to
finance the contracts. This is being provided in the form of a
loan from CREDIOP, Italy's leading medium & long-term bank. See
Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 83; and MEED (20 January
1995), 25.
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It can be clearly seen from the data presented in section
one, that Italian firms secured several other contracts in the
reconstruction programme. A good number of these may have been
connected to financing programmes from the Italian government,
and other sorts of political persuasion. 171 As one Italian banker
put it: "It is fundamental to have external finance. If we don't
give the aid, then we won't get the business." 172 Even the
Lebanese Parliament, which approved the 1992 protocol, publicly
acknowledged that Italian firms would be favoured in many of the
contracts, as long as their bids were "competitive".'73
French government financing, which accounted for 9% or $278
million of external funding, also played a role in ensuring
French companies many of the contracts in the reconstruction
programme.' 74 Several of the projects financed by the French
government were awarded to French firms. This included numerous
consultancy contracts secured by French firms, such as the
E.D.F., and contracts in the electricity sector, including the
one for the rehabilitation of the Jamour and Bsalim substations.
In addition, the French government provided grants to finance
'' As we will discuss below, Italian leaders, from both
government and business, made several visits to Beirut to secure
contracts, and other sorts of trade agreements. This included a
visit by the Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Coloinbo in January
1993. MEED (29 January 1993), 22.
172 MEED (8 July 1994), 28.
173 The Lebanon Report 3, no.12 (December, 1992), 10; and
MEED (4 December 1992), 36.
'' For a closer look at the French financial protocols, look
at the following MEED reports: (18 December 1992), 35; (26
February 1993), 26; (8 October 1993), 22; (3 March 1995), 22;
(19 July 1996), 20.
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French technical assistance in other areas of the Lebanese
economy including a $900,000 grant to revive the Beirut Stock
Exchange 175
The bidding for many of the projects funded by the Saudi
government, or Saudi backed agencies, was restricted to Saudi or
local companies. As a result, Saudi companies secured several
contracts. A prime example was the awarding of the Saudi funded
contract to build a 360-bed government university in South
Beirut to two Saudi firms, El-Seif Contracting Engineering
Establishment and Hoshance.176
2.1.2 The Participation of International Companies in the
Recovery Programme
In addition to the interest shown by foreign governments,
especially from Western Europe and the Gulf region, and
international agencies, such as the World Bank, the information
presented in section one revealed the remarkable interest shown
in the recovery programme by international firms. In short,
notable international companies, particularly from Western
Europe, have played a leading role in the recovery programme.
They were awarded most of the lucrative contracts to
rehabilitate the country's infrastructure, a significant portion
of the consultancy contracts related to supervising and managing
the individual projects, and nearly all of the consultancy
contracts which offered technical and organisational assistance
175 MEED (17 February 1995), 24, 25.
176 A prime example was the construction of the new 360 bed
government hospital in the Bir Hassan area of South Beirut. See
section one of this chapter for precise details.
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to the institutions responsible for implementing the recovery
programme. Below, we will provide a sample of the many
international companies which were involved in the recovery
programme.
2.1.2.1 The Main Projects
As noted above, an impressive list of prominent
international companies, most of which were from Western Europe,
secured the major contracts to rehabilitate Lebanon's
infrastructure. The list included: Siemen's of Germany secured
contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars in the
electricity and telecommunications sectors; Ericsson of Sweden
carried out work on the telecommunications network; Hyundai of
South Korea and Ansaldo Energia of Italy both worked on the
electricity network; Clemessy, Bouygues, and M.Elec, all of
France, also worked on the electricity network, as did European
Gas Turbines, an affiliate of the Ang1o/French company GEC
Aisthom; Alcatel of France worked on the telephone network;
France Telecom and Finnish Telecom were given the responsibility
of operating the mobile telephone network; Germany's Hochtief
worked on rehabilitating Beirut International Airport; Kuk Dong
of South Korea secured a couple of contracts in the water supply
and wastewater sectors; and Trafalgar House of the U.K. secured
a contract to build a sports city.
In addition to these companies, numerous other
international firms placed bids for the main contracts. Most of
the bids submitted must be considered serious, owing to the fact
that each tender document cost at least $3000. We will reiterate
two of the many examples listed in section one of this chapter.
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For the main electricity contracts, a myriad of companies
from a number of countries placed bids, including the U.K.'s
Balfour Beatty, NEI International and John Brown Engineering,
the Anglo-French company GEC Aisthoin, Japan's Mitsui & Company
and Toshiba Corporation, South Korea's Lucky Goldstar, several
French companies, as well as companies from Norway, Austria,
Finland, Switzerland, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
For the main contract to rehabilitate the airport, 23
companies and joint ventures prequalified. The list included
companies from the four major European countries - Germany,
France, Italy and Great Britain, but also included companies
from Spain, Brazil, Egypt, and Turkey.
2.1.2.2 Consultancy Contracts: Rehabilitation Projects
A sizeable number of the consultancy contracts for studies,
designs and supervision work linked to the various projects went
to numerous international firms, and in particular, to British
and French firms. Some of the British firms which secured
consultancy contracts included Posford Duvivier, for work on the
Beirut port, and Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, Howard Humpherys
and Partners, and Montgomery Watson, all of which worked in the
water supply and wastewater sectors. French companies awarded
consultancy contracts included Electricite Du France, which was
awarded numerous consultancy contracts in the electricity
sector, Deloitte & Touche for the telecommunications network,
Port Autonome de Marseille and Sogreah, both of which worked on
Beirut Port, Sofrerail for the rail network, Lyonnaise des Eaux-
Dumez on the watersupply and wastewater sectors, and C.R.E.E.D.,
who worked in the Solid Waste sector.
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2.1.2.3 Consultancy Contracts: Technical and Organisational
Assistance
Crucial consultancy contracts, which were aimed at giving
technical and organisational assistance to the institutions
responsible for implementing the recovery programme, were
secured by Western firms, and in particular, British firms. This
included the consultants KPMG Peat Marwick which operated the
Programme Management Unit at the C.D.R., Binnie & Partners,
which operated the Sector Implementation Unit at the Ministry of
Hydraulic & Electric Resources, and Transtec Fichtner, which
managed the S.I.U. at the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the
Ministry of the Environment. The Electricity Supply Board of
Ireland managed the other S.I.U., which.was at the Electricite
Du Liban, and the Dutch consultants NEDECO, assisted KPMG.
2.1.3 Support of Export-Credit Agencies
An important measurement of external confidence both in the
recovery programme specifically, and in the Lebanese political
and economic systems generally, was the return of coverage to
Lebanon by the export guarantee agencies of major Western
countries. By the end of 1994, the Italian, the French, the
German, the British, and even the American export guarantee
agencies were all active in Lebanon.177
In particular, the French, the Italian, and the German
credit agencies - COFACE, SACE, and HERMES respectively - have
177 The British agency is called the Export Credit Guarantee
Department E.C.G.D. and the American one is the Export-Import
Bank. For a look at the role of the Export-Import Bank of the
U.S., see Julius Kaplan, "A New Source of Financing for Lebanon:
The Export-Import Bank of the United States", Middle East
Insight 9 (March-April, 1995), 53-55.
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all played a leading role in backing the bids of their national
companies. As we explained elsewhere, for example, strong
financial backing by SACE and HERMES ensured the consortium of
Ansaldo/Siemens the lucrative contract to build two power
stations in the electricity sector.'78
2.1.4 Visits to Beirut by Foreign Government and Business
Delegations
Another measurement of the international interest in the
reconstruction programme specifically, and the Lebanese
government generally, was the relatively high number of visits
to Beirut by government and business delegations from numerous
countries including the U.K., France, Italy, Germany, Canada,
Russia, Romania, Spain, Australia, Brazil, and several Arab
countries. Hopes of securing economic opportunities in Lebanon
appear to have been the main reason behind the majority of the
visits to Beirut. Below, we will cite several examples.
In December of 1992, a Russian economic delegation visited
Beirut with hopes of increasing cooperation between Lebanese and
Russian industrialists; in January 1993, the Ita1ian F.M. Emilio
Coloinbo visited Beirut and pledged millions of dollars for the
recovery programme; in June 1993, the U.K. construction
minister, Sir George Young, led a trade mission to Beirut; in
October 1994, the British Foreign Office secretary, Douglas
Hogg, visited Beirut to encourage closer economic ties with the
U.K; in November 1994, the Italian F.M. visited Beirut with the
intention of encouraging closer economic cooperation; in
178 In a bid for the same contract, COFACE backed GEC
Alsthom. MEED (20 January 1995), 25.
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November 1995, the German Economic Minister, Gunter Rexredt,
headed a large business delegation to Beirut including bankers
and businessman, with the hopes of increasing German economic
opportunities; and in July 1995, the German F.M., Klaus Kinkel,
visited Beirut with a large delegation of businessman. 179 The
high level of foreign visits to Lebanon is also clear from the
fact that, in the first six months of 1996 alone, a total of 32
foreign delegations, many of which were economic delegations,
visited Lebanon from a large number of countries.'80
2.1.5 International Support for Lebanese Government Eurobonds
another indication of international support for the
Lebanese government and its recovery programme is the interest
shown in two Lebanese government Eurobonds. The first one, worth
$400 million was issued in September 1994, and the second one,
valued at 300 million, was issued in July 1995. A supplement to
the second Eurobond, valued at $100 million, was issued in March
1996.181 The $800 million raised by the government was to be used
to support infrastructure projects in the Beirut area. 182 Both
issues were oversubscribed, with investor interest from over 20
countries, although the majority of the buyers were Lebanese and
179 This information was taken from the chronology section of
The Lebanon Report.
180 For a list of the 32 foreign delegations, see -----
Business Lebanon no.1 (2nd Quarter 1996), 44.
181 Merrill Lynch was the lead manager for the first issue,
while Paribas managed both parts of the second Eurobond.
182 See -----, "Eurobonds Are Issued", The Lebanon Report 5
no.10-li (October-November, 1994), 8.
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Arab investors 183
2.2 The Progress of the Horizon 2000 Programme
Having established that there has been relatively strong
international interest in the recovery programme, we will now
attempt to assess the progress of its implementation to date,
and to address the question of whether or not the programme is
likely to succeed in its ultimate goals with respect to
improving the country's infrastructure and facilitating economic
growth. Obviously these are very controversial issues. Horizon
2000 was designed as a ten year programme, and after only five
years of implementation, there are bound to be a whole range of
unresolved questions and concerns. However, it certainly is
possible at this point to draw some general conclusions about
the results of the work that has been done, and to identify some
areas of concern which are likely to have a crucial impact on
the programme's final outcome.
2.2.1 Horizon 2000 To Date: Some General Conclusions
A general examination of the progress of the Horizon 2000
programme to date yields some very positive impressions. We
would argue that, above all else, there has been an improvement
in the country's infrastructure. To put it briefly, things have
moved forward in Lebanon. Electricity is now available to Beirut
residents for 24 hours a day, and to most other Lebanese for all
183 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon -
4th Quarter 1995, 19.
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but 2 hours a day. There has been a marked improvement in the
fixed telephone network and access to the cellular network is
widely available. A reasonably efficient system of garbage
collection is now in place in Beirut. In addition, as we have
shown in section one of this chapter, thousands of projects have
been completed, or are currently in progress. Even critics of
the programme cannot deny the importance of these infrastructure
projects. They have clearly improved the everyday lives of all
Lebanese, and they have served to provide at least the
beginnings of an adequate foundation for facilitating private
sector activity in Lebanon.'84
A second positive observation concerns the favourable
international attention that the reconstruction programme has
focused on Lebanon. At the beginning of the 1990s, Lebanon was a
pariah state, associated primarily with intractable confessional
and political conflict and terrorism. Now, largely as a result
of the recovery programme, Lebanon is once again viewed fairly
positively, in terms of its potential as an economic and
cultural centre. The programme has acted as a sort of magnet,
attracting all kinds of positive international attention.
Because of the recovery programme, and the opportunities it
offers, foreign governments are once again interacting
positively with the Lebanese government and other groups in
Lebanon, international businesses are making bids, winning
contracts, and generally bringing their expertise to bear on the
Lebanese economy, and the Western media is no longer depicting
184 See the relatively positive conclusion on the progress of
the programme in Said Hitti, Budgetary Politics in Lebanon, 20-
21.
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Lebanon in almost purely negative terms.
However, it would be grossly inaccurate to suggest that the
Horizon 2000 programme has been an unqualified success thus far,
or that its future is necessarily a bright one. A number of
problems, or potential problems, have become all too apparent
during the course of the last few years, and these raise serious
questions about the ultimate viability of at least some aspects
of the plan.
2.2.2 Some Areas of Critical Concern
2.2.2.1 Funding: The Debt Problem185
Perhaps the most serious problem facing the Lebanese
recovery programme, and the Lebanese economy as a whole, has
been the high debt burden associated with the perennial budget
deficits accumulated by the Lebanese government and the
increasingly high levels of foreign borrowing. The problem is so
serious that the World Bank revealed in the autumn of 1995 that
Lebanon is on its short-list of states that are a high risk for
bankruptcy.' 86 As of the end of July 1996, Lebanon's total debt
rose to $10.5 billion, which was nearly triple the debt figure
for 1993. Domestic debt accounted for $8.9 billion, or 85.4% of
185 For a look at the debt issue, see ibid.
186, " 6% Growth Conceals Difficulties", The Lebanon
Report no.3 (Fall, 1995), 14.
In fact, the World Bank opinion was reciteed in a paper
delivered by Alberta Musalem, the principal economist at the
World Bank, at the Financial Times sponsored conference on
reconstruction in Beirut in June 1995. See Albert Musalem, "An
Appraisal of Lebanon's Economic Prospects - Lebanese and
International Perspective".
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the total. 187 Total external debt increased from $327 million in
1993 to $1.53 billion in July 1996.188 The total gross debt
(before taking into account government revenues) to GDP ratio
increased from 49.5% in 1993 to 79% in 1995. In terms of total
net debt to GDP ratio, it increased from 38% in 1993 to 64% in
1995.189 In addition, both the 1996 and 1997 budgets have
recorded large deficits.
Obviously, if the Horizon 2000 plan is to succeed, it must
be sufficiently funded. As we noted previously, the government
expected to rely heavily on external sources of funding for the
first few years of the programme, and planned to balance this
with budget surpluses which were supposed to materialise
beginning in 1996. For a whole range of • reasons, perhaps
including the fact that the government was, as we noted
previously, unable to raise as much money from external sources
as it had hoped, these surpluses have not appeared. It is
unlikely that the government will even be able to control budget
deficits for the foreseeable future, let alone, record budget
surpluses. This has obviously had a negative effect on the
continuing implementation of the Horizon 2000 programme. In
short, lack of money has slowed the programme down.
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the
government has attempted to attract even more foreign funding
for the recovery programme, particularly grants and soft loans,
187 MEED (11 October 1996), 34.
188 Actually, the foreign debt component maybe much larger.
See Said Hitti, Budgetary Politics in Lebanon, 21, 25.
189 Ibid.
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as opposed to relying on domestic funding which tends to involve
high interest. To quote C.D.R. Vice President, Nahoud Baroudi,
"We initially forecast a limited role for grants and soft loans.
Now we are saying that of $5 billion we are seeking over the
next five years, 30% should be in grants and 70% in concessional
loans, which we define as carrying annual interest of less than
19O
In spite of this attempt to find alternative sources of
funding to continue the programme, it appears that the
government is resigned to the fact that the Horizon 2000
programme will have to be scaled down. P.M. Hariri has implied
that the programme may be cut in half to $7.7 billion.' 91 He may
have come to this decision under pressure from 'the World Bank. A
confidential 1995 World Bank report was highly critical of the
government's debt problems, and recommended that the government
cut its programme.' 92 The report stated: "the original Horizon
2000 in its entirety could not be undertaken by the government
alone without risking the failure of stabilisation under the
best of circumstances and strong fiscal adjustment efforts."'93
Moreover, as we noted above, the report stated that Lebanon's
debt burden had placed it on a shortlist of states threatened
190 Quoted in NEED (31 May 1996), 2-3.
191 For more details concerning this issue, see -----,
"Reconstruction Spending is Cut in Half", The Lebanon Report
nQ.2 (Summer, 1996), 24-25; and The Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 1996/1997, 11-12.
192 Ibid, 24.
See -----, "Reconstruction Spending is Cut in Half", 25.
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with bankruptcy.' 94	Hariri was unhappy with the report, and
apparently negotiated with the World Bank to moderate the
criticism.195
The funding shortage has been so serious that, in some
cases, the C.D.R. has already had great difficulty paying
contractors for their work. To cite one important example, the
C.D.R. has apparently failed to pay the joint venture Hochtief
of Germany and the C.C.C. for work on the rehabilitation of the
airport. Delays in payments prompted the heads of Hochtief
International and Asian Divisions to travel to Beirut to meet
with both Hariri and C.D.R. officials.'96
If the programme is to be cut, this obviously raises
serious questions concerning the priorities of Hariri, the
government and the C.D.R., who will be making the decisions
about which programmes are retained and which are indefinitely
postponed. Critics have raised the concern that the important
social infrastructure programmes, which were scheduled to
dominate the second half of the programme, will be cut in favour
of completing the leadership's "pet" physical infrastructure
programmes, such as the controversial expansion of the airport,
and the construction of the sports city. One may certainly
question whether all of the physical infrastructural works,
which have already been initiated or which are in the planning
stages, will ultimately be of particular benefit to the people
194 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Lebanon
- 1996/1997.
195 Ibid, 24.
196, "To Pay or Not to Pay?" The Lebanon Report, no.1
(Spring, 1997), 15.
257
of Lebanon if the public sector is not reformed, if the housing
problem is not addressed, and, generally, if the social
infrastructure of Lebanon is insufficiently improved to enable
the Lebanese to develop and utilise their human resource
potential.
2.2.2.2 The Institutional Arrangement
Throughout this paper, we have explained that the Lebanese
public sector has suffered from a great deal of corruption, and
inefficiency. In chapter four, we outlined the institutional
arrangement which was supposed to do away with these problems
and implement the programme as quickly and efficiently as
possible. Briefly, the recovery programme was placed in the
hands of the C.D.R., an organisation designed with technical
expertise and efficiency in mind. In contrast to the public
sector, it was staffed by technocrats hired on the basis of
merit and it was supported by highly qualified international
consultants. In addition, the C.D.R. was supposed to be
autonomous vis-a-vis the bureaucracy and the political process,
and, hence, not subject to the endemic conflict, compromise and
personal interest of the Lebanese political process, which would
very likely have dramatically altered the content of the
programme and significantly delayed its implementation.
2.2.2.2.1 The Functioning of the C. D . R.
Given the central significance of the C.D.R. in the
implementation of the recovery programme, it is critical to
determine whether or not it functions as it is intended to
function, and can really be characterised in terms of technical
258
expertise and efficiency.'97
There are certain variables which would tend to indicate
that the program has been operated in a relatively responsible
manner, but, it must be said, that none of these are
particularly conclusive. We will cite two examples.
First, the high level of international bids for many of the
major contracts is evidence that the international community has
faith in the management of the programme, and in the fair
awarding of contract bids. If this were not the case, we feel
that these international companies would not be willing to pay
the fee for a bidding document which averages between $2000 and
$l0 , 000 . 198
 Indeed, the bidding process is usually much more than
just the cost of the bidding document. The British company
Trafalgar House, for example, spent up to $350,000 just to bid
on the Sports City project.' 99 This point, about international
confidence in the C.D.R. is not, however, conclusive. Another
factor which promotes such confidence, perhaps a more
significant one, is that external procedures have been put in
place to ensure that projects will be allocated fairly. Aid
donors would usually have to okay the awarding of a contract
197 Many specialists in Lebanon have relayed to us the
difficulties of retrieving information on the C.D.R. For several
reasons the C.D.R. has remained incredibly guarded, including
its desire to keep information away from the ministries. This
information was based on interviews in Lebanon in the Winter of
1997 with several specialists.
198 The figures were given by Boutros Labaki in an interview
with The Lebanon Report 5, no.3 (March, 1994), 10.
199 In addition to paying for the tender documents, the cost
included bid bonding, performance bonding, advance payment
bonding, and retention bonding. Paul Hodge, "Contracting
Operations in Beirut", unpublished paper delivered at the
Financial Times sponsored conference Beirut on 8-9 June 1995, 2.
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which they have funded. The World Bank, for example, has
supervisory authority to insure that the loan T s guidelines are
properly respected, and to resolve any problems wrucfl may
arise. 200 What this simply means is that corruption is less
likely to occur in the projects which were externally funded, so
the levels of international involvement may or may not represent
a vote of confidence in the C.D.R.
A second indicator that the C.D.R. would tend to function
relatively effectively is that, below its top level, it is
staffed primarily with technocrats, who are, at least
theoretically apolitical, and who should be more accountable
than typical Lebanese public sector employees, in the sense that
they are hired on the basis of merit rather than on the basis of
patronage and confessional considerations, and can be more
easily dismissed for poor job performance or other shortcomings.
This point also is not conclusive. As will be recalled from
chapter four, the C.D.R. has suffered from a massive shortage of
qualified personnel. While more people have been hired, and
foreign consultants brought in to compensate, we cannot say with
certainty whether or not these measures have been effective.
Furthermore, it is not evident that the personnel who are
available have been organised in the most efficient manner. A
1995 study by the P.M.U.C. and Team International on the C.D.R.
organisational plan requested changes to the C.D.R.'s structure
in order to make the organisation more efficient. The major
change was to reorganise the C.D.R. into three divisions, from
200, "Behind the World Bank Loan 11 , The Lebanon Report
4, no.5 (May, 1993), 8.
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the original four, and to add two new staff units including an
Information Systems Unit, and a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit,
which was responsible for monitoring and evaluating the work of
the C.D.R. 20' However, as of this writing, the C.D.R. has yet to
institute these reforms, and the government does not seen to be
in any particular hurry to implement then in the near future.202
In fact, the decision to commission the study was basically in
response to political pressure from the opposition who were
worried about the C.D.R.'s lack of accountability.203
Aside from variables like these however, it is possible to
draw a reasonably favourable conclusion about the C.D.R. simply
based on the parts of plan that have been implemented to date.
As we detailed in section one of this chapter: thousands of
projects either have already been completed or are in the
process of being implemented; hundreds of contractors and
consultants have become involved; project types ranging from the
very simple to the very complex have been integrated into the
programme; and a diverse range of funding for the projects has
been attracted and administered. It is hard to imagine that the
reconstruction would have proceeded as it has if the C.D.R. had
not been conducting the programme in a relatively professional
and efficient manner.
2.2.2.2.2 The Autonomy of the C.D.R.
As we have indicated, the main strength of the
201 For precise details about the proposed reorganisation of
the C.D.R., see C.D.R., Progress Report - March 1996, 56-57.
202 Interview in Beirut in the winter of 1997.
203 Ibid.
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institutional arrangement to manage the Horizon 2000 programme
was that the C.D.R. was to be relatively autonomous from the
political process, thereby lessening the impact of political
interference, which would more than likely have retarded the
programme. However, it should be acknowledged that, almost
paradoxically, this autonomy would be fairly pointless, in
itself, if there were not a strong force, firmly grounded in the
political system, pushing for the implementation of the
programme in the first place. In short, the C.D.R. cannot be
completely autonomous. It needed, and continues to need, Hariri,
or someone very much like him, to give it the necessary
political authority to manage the programme. But Hariri has gone
beyond merely giving strong support to the Horizon programme and
the C.D.R. to iinmunise them from the fluctuations of the
political process. As we have noted many times in the course of
this study, for motives which are not entirely clear, he has
actually attempted to take personal control of the recovery
process by allocating the top posts in the C.D.R. to close
associates. While this has meant that the C.D.R. has
increasingly been able to utilise his personal authority to
assist it in pushing the reconstruction forward, it also has
meant that the C.D.R. is subject to the same limitations vis-a-
vis autonomy from the political process as he is subject to. In
short, Hariri, who effectively controls the C.D.R., has had to
operate in a political environment in which he is not completely
dominant, and the C.D.R. has had no choice but to endorse the
compromises that he has been forced to make, irrespective of the
impact that these might have on the programme.
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In order to maintain his position and get his programmes
through, Hariri has had to bargain with his political rivals. In
effect, in order to prevent his political opponents from
crippling the programme, he has been forced to give them access
to some of the projects, where they have been allowed to pursue
their own interests in terms of financial gain or the allocation
of patronage. The result has been that the major political
factions have split many of the projects in the Horizon 2000
programme amongst themselves. Political interference left a
situation where many of the contracts in the programme have been
awarded on the basis of political connections rather than on the
basis of competitive bidding. We will cite several examples.
A prime example was the project to rehabilitate Lebanon's
famous tourist attraction, the Jeita caves, a project which was
the responsibility of the Ministry of Tourism. In brief, the
Minister of Tourism, Nicolas Fattouh, awarded the contract both
to rehabilitate and to manage the caves to a company owned by
one of his friends. Apparently, the company lacked the
geological and technical expertise to rehabilitate the caves.
Critics argued that the company did not properly rehabilitate
the caves, and that in the long run, damage to the caves would
occur 
• 204
A second example was the very controversial contract to
build a coastal road from Beirut to the South. The contract was
awarded to the local company Ittihad Contracting, which is owned
204 For details of the affair, see -----, "A special deal for
Friends", The Lebanon Report no.4 (Winter, 1995), 21; and
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 4th
Quarter 1995, 18.
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by Nabih Birri's wife Randa, a Syrian company Qassioun, which
the Khaddam family has had some stake in, and the local company
Geneco, which is owned by Rafiq Hariri's brother, Shafiq. The
contract sparked a controversy in parliament where opposition
figures claimed that the companies charged an extraordinary sum,
and that, furthermore, there was no competitive bid for the
projects. Because of the controversy, the companies agreed to
cut their price by 20%, but observers noted that they would
still make a huge profit on the deal. 205 Other examples
included a $67 million contract awarded to Geneco for work on
the Sidon corniche, a $206 million contract awarded to Syria's
Mount Qassioun Company to build a road between the Southern
towns of Zahrani and Qena, 206 and the awarding of the two
contracts, noted in section one, to operate the cellular
telephone network. In the latter case, the project was divided,
at least partly because one group was backed by interests close
to the defense minister Mohsen Dalloul, and the other group was
backed by Kuwaiti interests.207
Of course, Hariri has also gained a great deal from the
recovery programme through his connections with the C.D.R. As
the most powerful domestic actor, has been able to secure the
most lucrative contracts for his allies, thereby strengthening
his own political patronage network.
In addition to the numerous other examples which could be
205 See the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report:
Lebanon - 3rd Quarter 1996, 20.
206 NEED (9 February 1996), 19.
207 Interview in Beirut in the winter of 1997.
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easily cited, there are some which are much more difficult to
identify. As we noted at the beginning of section one, most of
the contracts awarded to international firms have been sub-
contracted to local firms, usually for significantly less than
the international companies had bid for them. It is quite
conceivable that these contracts have been sub-contracted to
firms which had political connections to either 1-lariri, or other
groups 208
Obviously this level of political interference has an
adverse effect on the recovery process as a whole, and on the
bidding process in particular. Although the programme has not
been crippled, modified and delayed to the extent that it might
have been, had it been fully exposed to the political process,
even the limited interference that has taken place has
jeopardised its ultimate success by driving up costs.
2.2.2.2.3 Future Institutional Problems
We would like to conclude this chapter by raising an
interesting question regarding the future of the prograrnrrte once
it has been completed. Few would argue , that Lebanon does not
need a modern infrastructure. Still, we would question the
benefit of spending billions of dollars on this kind of
development without a corresponding comprehensive reform of the
public sector. If the kinds of corruption, inefficiency, and the
lack of technical expertise, that, in part, necessitated the
creation of the C.D.R., continue to persist after it has
fulfilled its role, there is a very real danger that a multi-
208 This information was based on interviews conducted by the
author in February 1997.
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billion dollar investment will effectively go to waste.
We will give just four examples of many which could be
found to illustrate our point. First, a telling example of the
sorry state of the Lebanese public sector and its inability to
either implement the projects or manage them after their
completion was strongly in evidence when the Post and
Telecommunications Minister, Moharned al Ghazairi, requested in
February 1995 that the C.D.R. relieve his ministry from the task
of supervising the rehabilitation of the telecommunications
network. 209 This situation could also apply to the EDL, which
lacks the technical expertise to run and maintain the new and
rehabilitated electrical facilities. 210 A third example concerns
the government's plan to buy buses to improve the public
transportation network in the Beirut area. A 1994 study of the
public transportation system by Team International indicated
that investing in the transportation system would be a "clear
waste of money" unless there was a complete restructuring of the
agency responsible for operating the buses. 21' A final example
concerns the management of Beirut Port, where corruption, theft,
and bribery are rampant, at present. Companies which have
refused to pay bribes, have found great difficulty getting their
goods through the port. Things are so bad, that insurance
209 Philip Khoury, "Reconstruction: Implementing Horizon
2000", The Lebanon Report 6, no.4 (April, 1995), 8.
210
,"End to Rationing in 18 Months", The Lebanon Report
4, no.11 (November, 1993), 8.
211 The operating agency is the O.C.F.L.T.C. Quoted in Marwan
Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 186.
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companies have refused liability during this period.212
Thus far, Hariri has not had the necessary political
support or resources to really deal with the problem of
institutional reform, and he has been limited to "reforming" the
public sector, by putting his own men at the top of the
bureaucratic institutions to streamline the decision making
process. However, this has not been a particularly effective
policy due to the fact that, while it allows him to exercise
authority over top level bureaucrats, it does not give him
effective control of the ministries because the chain of command
breaks down at the middle management level. As the economist,
Philip Khoury explained, "In the clientist nature of Lebanese
politics, middle managers remain under the control of
politicians and the chain or responsibility has fallen apart at
this level. The chief victim has been the government's
reconstruction programme. ,,213
3. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State?
The need for a strong state, a state which is pre-eminent
relative to other political or societal forces, and hence has
the capability to formulate coherent development policies and
carry them out, is one key feature of Johnson's model of a
capitalist developmental state. Another feature is the presence
of an elite economic bureaucracy which must be autonomous from
the political process in order to focus on purely economic
212 For a damning look at port practices, see -----, "A Den
of Theives?" The Lebanon Report no.4 (Winter, 1995), 19.
213 Philip Khoury, "Not Banking on the Future", The Lebanon
Report 6, no.3 (March, 1995), 5.
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imperatives. As we have seen in section two of this chapter, the
Lebanese case does not conform to this model in either of these
two respects. The Lebanese state is not particularly strong. The
political process is structured in such a way that elite
solidarity, primarily sustained through a broad distribution of
access to patronage, is a key priority, a pre-condition for the
effective management of sectarian conflicts. Thus, bargaining
and compromise is an inherent part of politics in Lebanon, a
part which even the most powerful domestic political actors
cannot escape from. As we have seen, Hariri has attempted to
provide Lebanon's version of the elite economic bureaucracy, the
C.D.R., with the necessary autonomy from the bargaining process
by taking personal control of the organisation and using his
influence to push through its initiatives. However, in practice,
this has meant that the C.D.R. is only as autonomous as Hariri
himself, and, for reasons which we will return to in chapter
seven, and which are mostly related to Syria's penetration of
the Lebanese political system, Hariri has been fairly heavily
engaged in the bargaining process.
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CHAPTER SIX: PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE ECONOMIC
RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON
In the previous chapter, we presented a survey of the
progress of the govermnent's Horizon 2000 plan. As we noted, we
feel that several conclusions can be reached. 2bove all, it is
clear that, largely as a result of the institutional framework
established during Hariri's period in government, the
reconstruction of the country is progressing: this is
particularly true in respect to the rehabilitation of the
important infrastructure projects. However, because of a
shortage of funds, the programme has slowed down, and it is
doubtful that the government will have the financial resources
to implement the remainder of the plan. Second, the C.D.R. has,
to some extent, executed the plan in a reasonably professional
manner. Third, the government's reconstruction programme has
received international attention. International firms have
played a leading role in the recovery programme, and many of the
projects were funded through loans or grants from foreign
governments or international organisations.
As we explained in chapter three, as crucial as the
government's Horizon 2000 programme is in helping to restore the
economy, the success of Lebanon's economic recovery is
ultimately dependent upon the performance of the private sector.
To put it a different way, the government's hopes of returning
Lebanon to its former role as the commercial and financial
capital of the Middle East very much hinge on the level of
private sector investment in the country.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a survey of
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private sector investment in numerous areas of the Lebanese
economy, with a view to establishing several conclusions:
first, we hope to provide the reader with a general idea of what
has happened, and is happening, in the Lebanese economy, and
show that things in Lebanon are at least moving forward, even if
it is not possible at this time to draw any definitive
conclusions concerning the success of the economic recovery;
second, we hope to identify both the personalities and
companies, Lebanese and otherwise, which have invested their
resources in Lebanon; third, we can gain a relatively accurate
impression of private sector confidence both in the Hariri
government, and in the political system as a whole; and fourth.,
the survey may also provide some insight into the future
stability of the Lebanese state. For example, if it can be
shown that important Saudi businessmen, and/or major Western
businesses have developed a presence in the country, then it
follows that they, and their respective governments, would have
a greater interest in ensuring the stability of Lebanon.
This chapter is divided into two sections. In section one,
we will look at the various ways the Hariri government has
attempted to attract private sector investment into the country.
In part two, we will give a survey of private sector investment
in Lebanon.
1. Government Assistance to the Private Sector
In section one, we will take a brief look at the various
ways the government has attempted to attract private sector
investment into Lebanon.	 Briefly, these have included: the
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establishment of private companies (and one public agency) to
redevelop large sections of Beirut and other urban areas; the
encouragement of Build-Operate-Transfer (B.O.T.) projects; the
lowering of personal and corporate tax rates; the establishment
of a government agency - directly linked to the prime minister's
office - to advise foreign companies on investing in Lebanon;
the establishment of a development bank to assist entrepreneurs;
and the passage of several specific laws aimed at particular
sectors of the economy.
1.1 Government-Established Private Companies
On 7 December 1991, nearly one year before Hariri took the
reins of power, the Lebanese government established Law 117,
which stated that the C.D.R. had the legal right to set up one
or more real estate companies, which would then proceed to take
over and rebuild areas destroyed during the civil war.' The
owners of the private property affected by the takeover would be
given shares in the new property companies. The rationale behind
the law was that a private company backed by the government
would be able to manage the redevelopment of large areas of
urban Lebanon much more quickly and efficiently than individual
property owners.
Hariri was a major supporter of Law 117. In fact, it may
' For precise details on the law, see Solidere, Law No. 91-
117 of 7th December 1991 4th Edition (Beirut: Solidere, May
1995), 3-14. For a critical examination of the law, see Paul
Mourani, "Decision Making in Reconstruction: The Consequences of
Monopoly-Type Solutions", in Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salam, and Jad
Tabet (eds.) Beyrouth: Construire L'Avenir Reconstruire Le
Passe?, 115-144.
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have been his idea to establish a private real estate company,
which came to be known as Solidere, to redevelop the Beirut
Central District (B.C.D.) . As we will see below, Hariri's
government zealously supported the Solidere project, and
employed Law 117 to create more privately-owned real estate
companies to develop areas in other parts of Lebanon. These
controversial projects will be discussed in section two.
1.2 Government-Sponsored B.O.T. Projects
The Hariri government has also enthusiastically supported
the use of B.O.T. projects. As we explained in Chapter 5,
several of the projects in the Horizon 2000 plan were awarded on
a Build Operate Transfer (B.O.T.) basis, or on similar concepts
including Build Operate Own (B.O.O.), and Design Build Operate
Transfer (D.B.O.T.) projects. Enterprises originally intended to
be based along these lines included the mobile telephone
network, the Arab highway linking Beirut and Damascus, the
southern section of the Beirut ring road, free zones at Beirut,
Riyak, and Quleaat airports, and the country T s postal service.2
The reasoning behind encouraging these types of projects was
simple: They invited investment into the country, at little or
no cost to the government. The government also encouraged the
development of several purely private sector (i.e., outside the
Horizon 2000 plan) B.O.T. projects, including the development of
commercial complexes. 3
 These projects will be discussed in
2 Of course, some of these projects did not go ahead. For
instance, we have commented in chapter five that the Beirut-
Damascus toll road had to be abandoned for a number of reasons.
It should be noted, however, that the mobile telephone
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section two.
1.3 Tax Incentives
One of the Hariri government's most ambitious attempts to
attract domestic and foreign investment into Lebanon was the
establisbment of a new tax law, passed by Parliament on 14
December 1993, which significantly lowered the personal tax rate
to between 2 and 10%, and the corporate tax to a flat rate of
10%. Previously, the top rate for personal tax had been 43% and
for corporate tax had been 35%•4 The new corporate rate is the
lowest in the region. The government had hoped that with a 10%
corporate tax rate, foreign companies might be encouraged to
establish their regional bases in Beirut. As the Central Bank
governor, Riad Salameh, explained, "[a corporate income tax of
10%] cannot be matched by any country in the region." 5 The low
corporate tax, combined with no capital gains tax, should prove
to be attractive to foreign investors.6
1.4 The Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (I.D.A.L.)
In an attempt to both attract and facilitate foreign
network was also not included in the Horizon 2000 programme.
See the following: NEED (18 December 1993), 26; -----
,"Government Preparing New Tax Laws", The Lebanon Report 4, no.6
(June, 1993), 8; -----, "Cabinet Approves Reduced Tax Rates",
The Lebanon Report 4, no.7 (July, 1993), 9.
NEED (3 December 1993), 15.
6 In addition to hoping to attract domestic and foreign
investment, the government hoped that the low tax rates would
lower tax evasion.
For a brief review of some of the criticisms levied against
the new tax law, see -----, "Cabinet Approves Reduced Tax
Rates", The Lebanon Report, 9.
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investment the government established a special investment
promotion agency, called the Investment Development Authority of
Lebanon (I.D.A.L.). This 'agency, which was established in
December of 1994, is attached to the prime minister's office,
and is currently headed by Youseff Choucoir, who has been a
senior advisor to Hariri on reconstruction and economic affairs.7
As of January 1997, it consisted of approximately 15
professionals and a total staff of about 40, although the
organisation was hoping to increase its staff.8
The I.D.A.L. is responsible for helping to facilitate
foreign (as well as domestic) investment by identifying projects
which need investment, marketing these projects to foreign
investors, and providing recommendations to relevant state
bodies. 9
 Choucoir stressed the need for such an agency,
commenting: "We have had a lot of requests and interest from
prospective foreign investors but we were not able to deal with
them in a formal way until the new authority was set up." 1° Since
its establishment, numerous foreign business delegations have
visited the I.D.A.L. to find out about investment opportunities
' Dr. Choucair was a former World Bank economist, and was
involved in the first World Bank loan to Lebanon.
8 Interview with Adib Salem, senior economist at the I.D.A.L,
in Beirut on 4 February 1997.
For a succinct look at the activities of the I.D.A.L, see
Nicholas Blanford, "Let the Free Trade Begin", Business Lebanon
no.1 (3rd Quarter 1996), 20-22. In addition, see the
information package distributed by the organisation. I.D.A.L.,
Lebanon: The Will to Reconstruct, The Opportunity to Invest.
10 MEED (2 December 1994), 2-3, 33.
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in Lebanon.1'
One project which the agency has promoted, although
apparently they have failed to draw significant interest, was
the development of free trade zones at various airports and
ports.'2 The I.D.A.L. is also responsible for Lebanon's existing
and future industrial zones.' 3 The ability of this organisation
to promote Lebanon to foreign investors, may however, be
somewhat limited due to a lack of financial resources.'4
In addition to its stated role of promoting investment in
Lebanon, the I.D.A.L. has also assisted foreign investors in
dealing with red tape. As one senior economist at the I.D.A.L.
put it, "if an investor is caught in a bureaucratic nightmare,
we will make the necessary phone calls to facilitate the
process.
1.5 Government-Sponsored Development Bank
To help encourage private sector investment in two key
sectors of the Lebanese economy, the tourist and industry
sectors, the Hariri government created the National Bank for the
Development of Industry & Tourism. The bank, which was
established on 25 October 1994, was entrusted with the task of
" The delegations have probably heard about the I.D.A.L.
through their embassies.
Interview with Adib Salem in Beirut on 4 February 1997.
12 Ibid.
13 Nicholas Blanford, "Let the Free Trade Begin"r 20-22.
' The organisation is, however, on the internet.
Interview with Adib Salem in Beirut on 4 February 1997.
15 Ibid.
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financing industrial and touristic projects, as well as
encouraging the investment of domestic and foreign capital. The
government was to contribute 20% of the bank's capital, while
the remaining 80% was to come from private investment.'6
1.6 Additional Laws
The government has also passed several laws, dealing with
more specific aspects of the Lebanese economy, which were
intended to help foster private sector growth by reestablishing
the stock market, and by strengthening the banking system, the
tourist sector, and the industrial sector. In section two, we
will take a closer look at these government laws.
2. Private Sector Investment in Lebanon
In section two, we will give a detailed survey of private
sector investment in Lebanon. In sub-sections one and two, we
will look at unique private sector projects which are
essentially sponsored by the government, with sub-section one
concentrating on the largest private sector project, the
reconstruction of the Beirut Central District, and the second
sub-section on similar but smaller scale projects. In sub-
section three, we will look at the B.O.T. projects which have
been, or are currently being, developed. In sub-section four, we
will look at major projects, mostly consisting of
commercial/residential enterprises developed solely by private
interests. In sub-section five, we will look at the health of
16 Middle East Economic Survey XXXVIII no.5 (31 October
1994); Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon -
1st Quarter 1995, 19.
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the real estate sector. In sub-section six, we will look at the
health of the banking sector. In sub-section seven, we will look
at developments in the stock market. In sub-section eight, we
will look at the tourism sector. In sub-section nine, we will
look at investments in the industrial sector. And finally, in
sub-section ten, we will look at private sector investment in
various other sectors of the economy.
2.1 Government Assisted Private Sector Projects: Solidere &
the Reconstruction of the Beirut Central District
2.1.1 The Importance of the City Centre
The Beirut Central District (B.C.D.) is the most prized
piece of property in Lebanon. During modern Lebanon's prosperous
years (1950s-1975) the city centre was not only the heart of the
country's economic, cultural, and bureaucratic establishment,
but it was also the financial and commercial centre of the
Middle East. One might even argue that the centre's prosperity
confirmed Lebanon's success as a country. The city centre,
however, was completely destroyed during Lebanon's civil war
(from 1975 to 1990) and it became merely a desolate physical
barrier between Christian dominated East Beirut and Muslim
dominated West Beirut. The B.C.D. was replaced by other economic
and cultural centres, most of which were parochial, such as the
Maronite dominated city of Jounieh. With the end of the war, the
reconstruction of Beirut's city centre had become a project of
paramount importance. From a symbolic standpoint, rebuilding a
centre accessible to persons of all faiths would help to signify
an end to the divisions in Lebanese society. From a practical
277
standpoint, Beirut's centre is the natural location for
Lebanon's financial and commercial core.
In this sub-section, we will look at the reconstruction of
the Beirut Central District. There is a belief among many
observers of the Lebanese scene that those who dominate the city
centre will also dominate the rest of the country.' 7 In many
ways, therefore, looking at the reconstruction of the city
centre provides an interesting avenue to understanding the
forces, both governmental and private, which are involved in
driving through the reconstruction of Lebanon. Moreover, given
the importance that the government, and particularly Prime
Minister Hariri, has placed on the city centre project, its
success or failure can be regarded as an indicator of the
progress, or lack thereof, of the economic reconstruction of
Lebanon and also of support for the government.
2.1.2 The Development of Plans to Renovate the City Centre
Since the initial destruction of the city centre during the
first rounds of fighting in 1975, at least three major attempts
have been made to renovate the area: the master plan of 1977-78
which dealt exclusively with the renovation of the city centre;
the master plan of 1983 which covered the entire Metropolitan
Beirut area; and the 1991 plan, which once again covered only
the Beirut city centre.' 8 As we mentioned elsewhere, Hariri was
' It is therefore not very surprising, as we will
demonstrate below, that the plan to rebuild the city centre was
met with opposition from numerous groups and individuals.
18 For an analysis of all three plans, including a damning
critique of the 1991 plan, see Nabil Beyhum, "The Crisis of
Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans For Beirut," The
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considered to be the main player behind the 1991 plan, designed
by the consultants Dar al Handasah and Bechtel, to rebuild
Beirut city centre. The C.D.R. initially commissioned the plan,
but it was financed by one of Hariri's companies, which also had
considerable input into the plan.' 9 To reiterate our earlier
argument, when the $3 billion plan was severely criticised by
both private and public figures, Hariri decided to put himself
forward to accept an executive position in order to push forward
the reconstruction of the Beirut city centre.
As noted elsewhere, the plan called for the establishment
of a private real estate company, which was later named
Solidere, to take over and manage the reconstruction of the 130
hectare city centre. As Angus Gavin, Dar al Handasah's project
manager for planning, and a former employee for the London
Docklands Development Corporation, explained, "the company will
operate like a British development corporation. It will have to
build infrastructure on a large scale, refurbish the retained
buildings, and market the land approved for development."20
The owners and the tenants of the property, who were not
consulted or even given a right to opt out of the plan, were
entitled to 50% of the shares in the company, while the other
Beirut Review no.4 (Fall, 1992), 43-62.
In addition, see chapter two for details on Hariri's
involvement in these, and other plans.
19 Ibid, 49; Interview with Paul Mourani on 14 February 1997.
20 Quoted in Graham Ridout, "Rebuilding Beirut", Building 2
(July, 1993), 32.
For an insider's view on the plan to develop the
reconstruction of B.C.D., see Angus Gavin, Beirut Reborn: The
Restoration and Development of the Central District, (London:
Academy Editions, 1996).
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50% would be made up of cash from investors. As critics have
strongly pointed out, the expropriation of private property was
highly illegal. 2' The proponents of the plan, however, justified
the takeover of the property on two grounds. First, they argued
that the owners would be unable to properly finance the
reconstruction. 22
 Second, some of the individual properties were
jointly owned, or the legitimate ownership was unclear. Such
conditions clearly presented obstacles to reconstruction with
regard to decision-making and the management of the process. It
seemed unlikely that all owners (or claimants) would agree on
appropriate plans to rebuild, presenting the prospect that the
process would be tied up in the courts for a very long time,
further frustrating reconstruction efforts. As Gavin explained,
"There are estimated to be in excess of 40,000 individual
owners. The idea of a property development company was conceived
because no major reconstruction could take place under these
circumstances." 23 Critics of the plan strongly dispute the logic
of this argument. They have argued that this management problem
has existed in all parts of Beirut, but it has not prevented
development in those parts of the capital.24
2.1.3 Solidere: Its Structure and the Personalities Who Manage
it
21 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997;
Interview with Paul Mourani in Beirut on 14 February 1997.
22 Critics, on the other hand, argued that this is unfounded.
Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
23 Quoted in Graham Ridout, "Rebuilding Beirut", 32.
24 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
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On 23 December 1992, the C.D.R. established a Board of
Founders which would be responsible for taking the necessary
steps to form the company Solidere. The Board of Founders
consisted of 12 men, including a member of the C.D.R., and
representatives of both the owners and tenants of properties in
the B.C.D., and prospective investors in Solidere. 25 The Board
of Founders included prominent businessmen from Saudi Arabia
including Mohamad Saad Yamini of the Dallah Albaraka Group,
Yahia Binladin of the Binladin Group, and Pbdullah Ba Hamdan of
the National Commercial Bank. 26 The high level of Saudi
involvement in Solidere indicates, at least to some extent, the
degree to which Arab interests have supported the reconstruction
process in Lebanon.
On 5 May 1994, Solidere was incorporated at a general
assembly of shareholders in Beirut. 27 At the same meeting, an 11
member board of directors was elected for a three year period.
The board included, and currently includes, both prominent
members of Lebanon's business community and businessmen from
other parts of the Arab world. Nasser Chamma, an associate of
Hariri, and a representative of the Hariri Group, was elected
Chairman. 28
 Nabil Boustani, a member of Parliament from the
wealthy Boustani clan and one of the largest investors in
25	 Solidere, Information Memorandum (Beirut: Solidere,
November 1993), 7.
26 For a list of the members of the board of founders, see
Solidere, Information Memorandum, 37.
27 Sixty-four percent of the shareholders were represented.
MEED (20 May 1994), 22-23.
28 Nasser Chainma worked formerly for I.T.T. and Hariri's
company, Oger. See NEED (16 June 1995), 11-19, and 25-26.
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Solidere, was elected Vice Chairman along with Maher Beydoun,
who is the president and general manager of several commercial
companies. Other members included Raphael Sabbagha, president
and general manager of Ashada engineering and several real
estate companies, Joseph Asseily, and Maher Daouk, both real
estate developers, Fouad al Khazen, businessman, Chairman of the
Lebanese Contractors Syndicate and President of Industry and
Labor Bank, Basile Yared and Sami Nahas, who are both attorneys,
and Sarkis Demerdjian, who is the general manager of Demco
steel. Yehia Binladin represented Arab interests on the board.
And finally, the Posts and Telecommunications Minister, Mohamed
Ghazairi, was appointed as the 12th member of the board.29
As of 1994, Solidere employed a core of 156 professionals
and support staff to plan and implement the B.C.D.
reconstruction project. As we will demonstrate below, the staff
at Solidere have used a number of consultants to assist them
with all aspects of implementing the plan.3°
2.1.4 Ownership and Investor Interest in the Project
There are two types of shares in Solidere: "A" shares,
which are reserved for property owners and distributed as
compensation for the expropriation of B.C.D. properties by
Solidere; and "B" shares which can be purchased by investors.
With respect to the A shares, seven government appointed
appraisal committees and a higher appraisal committee ruled, on
29 For details on each board member, see Solidere, Annual
Report 1994 (Beirut: Solidere, 1994), 52.
30 Ibid, 7.
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25 February 1993, that the worth of the B.C.D. properties
(essentially the worth of Solidere) was just over $1.17
billion. 3' Seven judicial distribution committees have been
responsible for distributing shares in the company to the
property owners of the appraised land. A maximum of just over
11.7 million A shares, valued at $100 each was to be issued.
The process of distribution has not been completed, as the
courts have yet to settle ownership of numerous properties
claimed by several owners. As of April 1995, just over 2.6
million shares have been allocated.32
In addition to the A shares distributed to property owners,
the company offered investors a cash subscription of 6.5 million
shares at $100 each, worth a total of $650 million. The share
offering was made between 1 November 1993 and 10 January 1994.
The cash shares were offered only to Lebanese and Arab
investors, with priority going to existing landowners and
tenants followed by Lebanese residents, government institutions,
Lebanese expatriates, and citizens of Arab countries. In order
to prevent a single shareholder from dominating the company, the
law stated that a shareholder is allowed a maximum. of 10% of the
cash B shares. 33 The shares were marketed by local, regional,
and international banks including Banque Paribas, Saudi 1merican
31 The findings cannot be appealed. ibid, 16;
"Downtown Property", The Lebanon Report 4, no.3 (March, 1993),
10.
32 Ibid, 18.
MEED (5 November 1993), 2-3, 28. For a interesting
critique of this law, see Paul Mourani, "Decision Making in
Reconstrucion: The Consequences of Monopoly-Type Solutions", in
Nabil Beyhuiu, Assem Salam, & Jad Tabet (eds.), Beyrouth:
Construire L'Avenir, Reconstruire Le Passe?, 115-144.
283
Bank, and over 20 local banks. 34 The cash raised by the share
issue was to be used for financing the first stage of
infrastructure proj ects.
In a powerful show of investor confidence in the Solidere
project specifically, and the reconstruction of the country in
general, the cash share offering was 42% oversubscribed. 35 Out
of the $926 million total subscribed, $600 million originated
from Lebanese investors. According to Central Bank governor
Riad Salameh, 90% of the Lebanese investment came from accounts
held in banks abroad. In particular, Lebanese based in the Gulf
were actively involved. Some of the investors included Hariri
himself, who bought $125 million worth of shares accounting for
about 7% of the total, 36 and Nabil Boustani, who subscribed to
approximately $50 million worth of shares.	 Other Lebanese
businessmen who have bought shares have apparently decided to
remain anonymous. 37 Critics have pointed out, however, that
although 19,000 people may have shares, in effect, only a few,
led by Hariri and his associates, but also Boustani and one of
the leading Lebanese construction firms, the C.C.C., dominate
the company. In fact, many of the initial subscribers may have
sold their shares to Hariri and his close associates, further
increasing their control of the company. 38 Moreover, liquid share
Ibid.
Solidere Annual Report 1994, 18; MEED (21 January 1994),
21.
36 MEED (21 January 1994), 21.
MEED (26 November 1993), 29.
38 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
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holders dominate the company because most of the other shares
are still up for grabs in the courts.39
2.1.5 The Master Plan4°
At the time of writing, the B.C.D. constituted
approximately 8% of the total Beirut area. It included a 1.2
million square metre area which is projected to rise to 1.8
million square metres after land reclamation work is completed.
The project has touched on every aspect of urban development,
including land reclamation, the building of infrastructure such
as roads, utilities and public space, the restoration of
historic buildings and areas such as the traditional Beirut
souks, and the construction of commercial and residential units.
Of the total area of 1.8 million square metres, 853,000
square metres was to consist of public space -- including roads,
public squares and gardens, about 863,000 square metres was to
consist of development blocks, and approximately 83,000 square
metres are to be owned by religious or state authorities. The
master plan allocated the amount of floor space to the types of
building as follows: 1,582,000 square metres of floor space was
reserved for offices, 1,959,000 for residential buildings,
563,000 for commercial buildings, 386,000 square metres for
cultural facilities and government offices, and 200,000 square
metres for hotels.4'
Ibid.
40 As we will note below, the original plan was later changed
to account for more land reclamation from the sea, creating more
built up area.
' Solidere, Annual Report 1994, 21.
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The plan is supposed to be executed in two phases. Phase
one, which is: to be completed between 1994 and 1999 includes
both infrastructure and construction work. Infrastructure
projects include archaeological excavations, demolition, road
construction, seafront protection and marinas, and landfill
treatment and additional land reclamation. Construction
projects designed to be implemented during this phase include
the restoration of retained buildings, the redevelopment of the
souks, and the construction of office, residential, and public
buildings, as well as the construction of hotels. Many of the
construction projects, particularly those related to the
development of office, residential and hotel construction have
been, or are in the process of being, constructed by other
developers. Phase two, which is scheduled to begin in the year
2000, includes major development projects on the reclaimed
land.42
2.1.6 Execution of the Plan
2.1.6.1 Infrastructure Projects
As we explained above, Solidere was responsible for the
redevelopment of the Beirut Central District T s infrastructure.
The company estimated the cost of infrastructure projects at
$129 million, and the cost of reclaiming the landfill zone at
$346 million. 43 In return for building the infrastructure of the
area, the company was to be compensated by the Lebanese
government. Given the weak financial position of the government,
42 Ibid, 22.
MEED (2 September 1994), 2-3, 27.
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it decided to repay Solidere by allowing the company to reclaim
even more land from the sea, thereby increasing the surface from
105,000 to 608,000 square metres. 44 Critics point out that such a
move was a windfall for Solidere. They claim that Solidere would
earn billions of dollars once the land is built-up.45
At least two groups of international consultants and
engineers have assisted Solidere in several aspects of the
infrastructure projects. Maunsell Consultancy Services of the
U.K. has been the general project engineer, helping Solidere
with a range of issues from tender evaluation to construction
supervision. A partnership of the U.K.'s Christiani & Nielsen
and Denmark's C.O.W./consult has been the general construction
managers.46
To date, infrastructure projects can be broken into four
areas, including the first stage of infrastructure projects, the
second stage of infrastructure projects, the construction of
marine defences, and the reconstruction of Beirut's historic
souks.
The contract for the first stage of infrastructure projects
was awarded in November 1994 to a consortium of the local Khlat
& Moawad and Italy's Consorzio Cooperative Costruzion for $63.7
million, a cost that even critics of the project concede was
-----, "Green Acres: The Turning of Land into Political
Influence", The Lebanon Report 5, no.9 (September, 1994), 3.
A prime critic of the government move was Henri Edde. See
, "No Solidarity Downtown", The Lebanon Report 5, no.9
(September, 1994), 8.
46 JED (3 November 1995), 18.
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competitive. 47 The contract stipulated that the work was due to
be completed in four years, but that a 20% bonus would be
awarded to the contractors if the work was completed in three
years. The work included a diverse range of infrastructure
projects including roads, sewerage, water and draining pipes,
power distribution, and lighting.48
Four other contracts related to the first phase of
infrastructure works were awarded. Buro Happold Consulting
Engineers of the U.K. was awarded a contract to carry out cost
controls on the project. 49 Dar al Handasah has been the
supervisor on the contract, and France's Pilotage has been the
construction manager. And a subcontract worth $442,000 to
provide 20km of water distribution pipework was awarded to
Biwater of the U.K.5°
Several projects are part of the second phase of
infrastructure repairs, including the construction of a power
substation, major landscaping work, and the inclusion of street
furniture. 5' Contracts have yet to be awarded.
The contract to build the critical marine defences for the
B.C.D. was awarded in June 1996 to Bouygues & Bouygues Offshore,
both of France, for $230 million. The work, which is designed
to protect the 1 km long seafront of the reclaimed zone, is
Interview with Paul Mourani in Beirut on 14 February 1997.
48 MEED (16 June 1995), 11-19, 25-26. 	 Solidere, Annual
Report 1994, 24; Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 56-57.
" MEED (28 July 1995), 15.
° MEED (10 March 1995), 16.
51 MEED (12 May 1995), 27; (5 January 1996), 27.
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expected to be completed in 30 months. Other companies involved
in the project included Sogreah of France, which designed the
project, 52 Maunsell Consultancy Services, which was appointed as
project engineer, and a partnership of Christiani & Nielsen &
C.O.W/consult, which are joint construction managers. 53 Unlike
the infrastructure contract, critics have claimed that the price
of the marine contract was too high. They have further claimed
that the involved companies and political groups took
commissions, while the contract was subcontracted to a local
firm for considerably less than the initial contract.54
A master plan for the reconstruction of Beirut's
traditional souks was prepared in March 1995 by a group of local
and international firms. 55
 Construction on the refurbishment of
the souks was due to begin in early 1997.56 To date, a number of
international and local architects were awarded contracts to
carry out designs for various aspects of the project, which, in
addition to renovating the souks, will also include a multi-
media cinema, an underground car park, an office building and a
department store. Paris based Jad Tabet, has been responsible
for supervising overall designs, and the local Samir Khairallah
52 For an explanation of the designs, see Solidere, Annual
Report 1994, 28.
MEED (26 July 1996), 32; (21 June 1996), 19, 36-37, 41;
(16 February 1996), 24.
Interview with the author in the winter of 1997.
The team included the local Samir Khairallah & Partners, a
group of local architects, Paris based Jad Tabet and Larry
Smith, and U.S. consultant Benjamin Thompson. MEED (16 June
1995), 11-19, and 25-26; Solidere, Annual Report 1994728.
56 MEED (26 July 1996), 32.
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& Partners is carrying out detailed designs. Other firms
responsible for designs, or which are assisting with designs,
include the U.K.'s Kevin Dash and Buro Happold, Valode & Pistre
of France, Rafael Moreo of Spain, and the local Nabil Tabbarah.57
2.1.6.2 Projects Developed by Solidere
Several projects have been, or are in the process of being,
developed by Solidere. In addition to the construction of a new
corporate headquarters, 58 and the establishment of a permanent
exhibition centre in Martyrs Square to display models of the new
B.C.D., 59 Solidere has been working on a number of new
residential projects in the Saifi and Wadi Abu Jamil areas of
the B.C.D. 6° In addition, it has been working on the construction
of a new headquarters for the U.N.'s Economic & Social
Commission for West Asia, 61 and it has been carrying out an
estimated $50 million refurbishment of the one time Beirut
Samir Khairallah & Partners with the assistance of Buro
Happold were responsible for designing an underground car park.
Belgium's Tractebel was appointed project manager on the scheme.
Kevin Dash was responsible for designing an office building and
jewellery souks. Nabil Tabbara was responsible for designing a
department store. Rafail Moreo was responsible for designing
various souks. And Valode & Pistre were responsible for
designing a multi-media cinema. MEED (11 October 1996), 34; (21
June 1996), 41; (12 April 1996), 21.
58 The local architect Pierre Khoury designed Solidere's new
corporate headquarters. MEED (16 June 1995), 11-19, 25-26.
E Buro Happold Consulting Engineers helped with the
establishment of the exhibition centre. MEED (28 July 1995), 15.
60 MEED (21 June 1996), 37.
61 The local company, Arabian Construction Company is working
on the estimated $25 million project. MEED (11 October 1996),
34.
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landmark, the Murr Tower, which is to become the new Beirut
Trade Centre. When completed, the Beirut Trade Centre is
supposed to become a "flagship business complex and a symbol of
Beirut's return to financial eminence." 62 A consortium of the
local company, Almabani General Contractors, and the Binladin
group of Saudi Arabia were awarded the contract to refurbish the
trade centre, and the U.K.'s Wimpey Construction Management is
acting as construction advisor to Solidere on the project.63
2.1.7 Solidere's Raison D'Etre: To Earn Profits
Solidere's raison d'etre is to develop the B.C.D., and to
earn a profit for its shareholders. So far, it has generally
succeeded on both fronts. From the very beginning of the
company's operations, it has been able to earn a profit, largely
through the sale of land. In 1995, the price per square metre of
built-up land was fixed at $950. According to Beirut financial
analysts, the cost to the company of each square metre of built-
up land was nearly half that price at about $500. At the end of
1994, after eight months of operation, the company announced
profits of 18.1 million. 64 In 1995, it recorded a net profit of
$32.3 million. 65 A further $164 million of revenues was due to
be booked into the company's 1996 account from land sales in
62 The Ministry of Economy and Trade, Business Lebanon, 8.
63 The new building was designed by Canadian architects Webb
Zerefer Menkes Housden. MEED (27 September 1996), 19; (23 August
1996), 23; (5 June 1996), 31.
64 The profits came from interest on cash reserves. MEED (7
July 1995), 5, 27.
65 MEED (24 May 1996), 17.
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1995 alone. Eventually, Solidere will develop over 46 million
square metres of real estate space with sales expecting to earn
the company billions of dollars. As noted, the company would
receive further profits from rents and franchise agreements, and
interest on its cash reserves.66
2.1.8 Private Purchases of Land in the B.C.D.
As noted, a substantial proportion of the company's profits
have stemmed, and will in the future, stem from the sale of land
and receipts from rental properties in the B.C.D. The company
has had some considerable success both in selling and in renting
property in the B.C.D. According to Dr. Marwan Ghandour of the
investment house Lebanon Invest, there seem to be at least three
factors which would point to investor interest in the Beirut
Central District. First, many investors, especially from the
Gulf, believe in the resurgence of Beirut as a regional economic
power. Second, the investors also believe that, at present,
they could get the best plots of land at the best prices. And
third, Lebanese expatriates who have built empires elsewhere
have decided to establish their headquarters in Beirut to "hoist
their flag of success at home."67
According to Solidere Chairman, Chaxnma, Solidere sold
250,000 square metres of built up land, including 11 plots of
land, for an estimated $250 million during 1995.68 That number
66 MEED (21 June 1996), 36.
67 Marwan Ghandour, "Investing in Lebanon's Growth & Revival:
Investment Opportunities & Challenge", Financial Times
Conference (Beirut: 5 June 1995)
68 MEED (5 January 1996), 27.
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was expected to rise substantially as Solidere expected 40 land
sales in 1996.69
The list of local groups which have bought land, or are in
negotiations to purchase property in the B.C.D., is impressive.
The list of those which have bought land in the B.C.D. includes
Banque Audi, which is one of Lebanon's largest banks, al Nahar,
which is the country's most prestigious daily newspaper, and the
C.C.C., which is the Arab World's leading construction firm.
Banque Audi has planned to build its new headquarters in the
B.C.D. Kevin Dash of the U.K. is the main architect. 7° The
C.C.C. has planned to build a residential block overlooking the
marina. 7' Other buyers include Lebanon & Gulf Bank, the Republic
National Bank, the Idriss retail group, the Diab Group, the
Beirut Stock Exchange, which will be based in the B.C.D., and
the development company Prime Estate, which is owned by the
politically prominent North Lebanon based Muawwad and Fares
families. Prime Estate has planned to build an office complex,
which is designed by the architecture firm Terry Furell &
Company of the U.K.72
The number of non-Lebanese interests which have bought land
in the B.C.D., or have shown some sort of interest in investing
in the area, is also extensive. Included among them is the
69 NEED (21 June 1996), 36-37.
70 NEED (21 June 1996), 37.
71 NEED (21 June 1996), 36-37; "Stampede to Buy Land in
Solidere", Lebanon Opportunities Preview Issue (Beirut: 1996),
18.
72 NEED (5 January 1996), 27; Lebanon Opportunities, Preview
Issue, 18.
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company Kingdom Establishment, which is owned by Prince Aiwaleed
bin Talah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia. In the autumn of 1996,
the company was negotiating with Solidere for the purchase of a
site for the construction a Four Seasons hotel. The hotel is
expected to cost approximately $75 million. 73 Another private
project, backed by Saudi Arabian based M.D.'s Mustafa Ghandour
and Fayes Takieddine, is an estimated $20 million plan to build
a medical clinic. The local E.R.G.A. group was awarded the
contract to design the clinic, which is to be modelled after a
consultancy clinic in Riyadh, also owned by Ghandour and
Takieddine. Also involved in the project is the Mayo Clinic of
the U.S., which is responsible for supervising the designs for
the clinic, and Arthur D. Little, also of the U.S., which
carried out feasibility studies for the project. Construction on
the project is to begin in mid-1997.74
Solidere has also had considerable success in attracting
tenants for the B.C.D. rental properties. By the end of
September 1995, 600 former tenants, companies and institutions,
have registered their intent to return to the B.C.D.75
2.1.9 Additional Financing: Attempts to Attract Foreign
Investors
In November of 1996, Solidere opened its shares to
international investors for the first time when it launched a
MEED (4 October 1996), 28; Lebanon Opportunities, Preview
Issue, 18.
MEED (11 October 1996), 34; (14 June 1996), 17.
Solidere, Solidere: The Quarterly (Beirut: Solidere, July-
September 1995), 3.
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global depository receipt for an estimated $80 million. Merill
Lynch was lead manager of the issue, with the U.K.'s Robert
Flemings and other institutions playing a subsidiary role. The
launch of the G.D.R. was the first of its kind taken by a
Lebanese company since the end of the civil war.76
2.1.10 Criticism of Solidere
The Hariri government has been generally pleased with the
progress of the programme to redevelop the Beirut Central
District. In fact, the programme has received some praise from
international circles. For example, Dr. Hannes Swoboda,
Vienna's Executive City Councillor for Urban Development,
believed that the Solidere model should be used for the
reconstruction of Sarajevo. According to Dr. Swoboda, "Beirut
is the best example in the world in this area because the
reconstruction process is moving along quickly and in a credible
way." 77 Also, at a U.N.D.P. conference in Dubai in 1996, Solidere
was declared the best example of "urban planning and
reconstruction of a war-torn city centre".78
Although progress on the development of the B.C.D. has
proceeded relatively smoothly, opposition to the project has
existed from the very beginning. As we explained in chapter two,
opponents of the plan came from several circles. Some groups
76 MEED (27 September 1996), 15; (11 October 1996), 17;
-, "Solidere Issues GDRs", The Lebanon Report no.4 (Winter,
1996), 14-15; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report:
Lebanon - 1st Quarter 1997, 27.
The Ministry of Economy & Trade, Business Lebanon no.1
(3rd quarter 1996), 9.
78 Ibid.
295
were worried about the fate of squatters who resided in the
area. Many groups and individuals were concerned that Solidere
was created with the basic intention of earning vast profits,
even at the risk of destroying the historical and social
importance of the city centre. 79 For example, one prominent
critic argued that 80% of the buildings demolished by Solidere
could have been preserved. As he put it, the claim made by
Solidere that they had to knock them down was "rubbish". 8° They
were demolished because it was cheaper than renovating them, and
because it allowed for a greater density of building, which
would greatly increase Soliderevs profits. 8' Also, many
specialists opposed certain technical aspects of the plan as
well as the general secrecy surrounding it. 82 Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, the property owners of the downtown
property opposed the heavy-handed takeover of the area, and
Many people were concerned that the plan would segregate
Beirut, and create a "ghetto of prosperity" surrounded by poor
suburbs. Proponents of this line of argument included Fouad
Awada of the Institute for Planning and Urbanisia of Ile-de-
France (I.A.U.R.I.F.), Michael Davie from the Center for Urban
Studies in the Arab World (U.R.B.A.M.A.), and Nabil Beyhum, who
was a sociologist. See -----, "C.D.R. Plan Debated in Paris",
The Lebanon Report 4, no.3 (March, 1993), 5; Nabil Beyhum, "The
Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans for
Beirut", The Beirut Review, 43-62.
80 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
81 Ibid.
82 Included in this group was Henri Edde, the author of the
original Dar al Handasah plan. On 22 October 1993, he gave a
press conference to warn that a "secret" plan existed to
redevelop the B.C.D., which was to replace the officially
propagated one by Solidere. His main criticism focuses on the
parts of the plan which call for a greater built up area, an
obvious attempt by the plans promoters to increase the
profitability of the venture. See -----, "Secret Plan for Old
City Center", The Lebanon Report 4, no.11 (November, 1993), 8.
296
believed that the worth of their land was extremely undervalued.
By the middle of 1996, Solidere had succeeded in dealing
the with the thorny issue of removing the squatters living in
the B.C.D. by paying $245 million to the government agency
established for settling displaced persons. This agency is
widely seen as a vehicle of patronage for political factions,
particularly those representing the Shiite community.83
Solidere has also taken pains to deal with technical
concerns, and concerns about the secrecy surrounding certain
aspects of the project. In particular, Solidere has attempted to
dispel the popular notion that it is prepared to ignore Lebanese
sensitivities concerning the history, tradition, property
rights, etc., of Beirut, for the sake of profit. As one critic
of the project put it: "Beirut is not a Wahabi city." 84 For
example, Solidere has attempted to soften its image by financing
much of the archaeological fieldwork in the area. In addition,
due to a public outcry, controversial aspects of the plan,
including the development of certain office and residential
complexes, were dropped because of the popular perception that
they were included in the plan solely to generate enormous
profits for the people behind the plan (i.e., Hariri and his
close associates. 85
The criticism levelled against the Solidere project by the
83 NEED (21 June 1996), 35.
84 Nabil Beyhum, "Beirut's Three Reconstruction Plans", 54-
55.
85 Ibid, 51-52.
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former property holders, particularly concerning the relatively
low level of financial compensation for the properties
appropriated by the company, seems to be warranted. In fact, as
one major critic of the plan put it, "the squatters had more
rights than the land owners. They were paid to leave. The owners
received no such benefits." 86 There are over 200 libel suits
against Solidere which are still before the courts. 87 However, as
noted above, given the complexity of the issues of ownership and
decision-making, it is difficult to imagine how the
reconstruction of the B.C.D. could have proceeded without some
of the drastic measures that were taken. The Economy and Trade
Minister, Yassine Jaber, offered a balanced view. "The important
issue with Solidere is how well it is managed. The owners may
indeed have lost out, but what was the alternative?" 88 Taking
the long view, if Solidere does succeed in attracting developers
and tenants to the area, which it appears to be doing, then the
project can be largely vindicated.
2.2 Government Assisted Projects
Pleased with the progress of the Solidere project, the
Hariri government decided to create three more property
companies to develop land or to rebuild damaged areas, one in
Sidon, and the other two in the northern and southern suburbs of
Beirut. The first two, the companies Sidon and Linord are
private companies, while the one created to develop the southern
86 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
87 Ibid.
88 MEED (16 June 1995), 11-19, 25-26.
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suburbs of the city, called Elysser, is a public agency. We will
take a closer look at each of these three projects.
2.2.1 Property Company - Sidon
In the autumn of 1995, the government created the property
company Sidon to develop land in the southern Lebanese city of
Sidon, Hariri's birthplace. The value of the land taken over by
the company, and therefore the worth of the company is between
$100-150 million. The project included considerable land
reclamation from the sea, and called for the development of a
new port.
The project had its roots in 1994, when it was decided to
rehabilitate and expand Sidon port. 89 In 1995, apparently through
the offices of P.M. Hariri, the Lebanese owned shipping company
Compagnie Maritime d'Affretement, one of the largest shipping
companies in the world, indicated that it was willing to develop
the port and to turn it into a regional transhipment centre.
As noted, the scheme is similar to the Solidere project.
In fact, it was authorised by Law 117 of 1991, the law which
created Solidere. Subscriptions to the capital would only be
open to Lebanese and Arab citizens, and no investor would be
allowed to hold more than 10% of the company's total capital. As
with Solidere, the company will pay some of the costs of the
infrastructure work, but will be allowed to sell, or lease land
for commercial or residential development.
Criticism of this plan centres around Hariri's involvement
89 This was probably Hariri's idea.
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in the project. In particular, it has been feared that Hariri
will use his control of the project to strengthen his own
political and economic weight in Sidon. 9° Moreover, Law 117 was
designed to redevelop land that was badly damaged by the
conflict, which is not the case here. The Sidon project was
mostly intended to develop virgin land. 91 As a result, critics
see the project as an attempt by its supporters, namely Hariri
and associates, to earn a great deal of profit.
2.2.2 Property Company - Linord
In the sunimer of 1996, the government began the process of
forming a private company called Linord, based on guidelines
similar to Solidere, to develop a two million square metre
coastal zone from the Beirut River (north of Beirut) to the Metn
Coast. As with other similar schemes, the project has entailed
considerable land reclamation from the sea. Linord is worth
$200 million. The company was expected to divide the land into
four zones, and was to build commercial, industrial, touristic,
and residential schemes, as well as a free trade zone. It is
also expected to sell or lease land for commercial or
residential ventures. Two U.S. firms, Arthur Anderson and Arthur
D. Little, and the Lebanese firm Associated - Construction &
Engineering (A.C.E.) have carried out pre-feasibility and
financial studies •92
90 For a look at the criticisms of the plan, see -----, "A
Monster in Sidon", The Lebanon Report no.3 (Fall, 1996), 14.
91 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
92	 Linord has an 11 member board of founders which is
overseeing the studies. MEED (26 July 1996), 32; (21 June 1996),
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As one critic pointed out, this project is "even worse than
Solidere." 93 As with Sidon, the rational behind the project
appears to be the development of prime virgin land along the
coast, which would earn substantial profits for its backers.94
Its promoters, namely Hariri and associates, have used state
instruments, and state land, to promote private sector projects.
2.2.3 Property Company (Public Agency) - Elysser
In the summer of 1995, the government established the real
estate company, Elysser, for the redevelopment of Beirut's
southern suburbs (near the airport). This project very much
differed from the B.C.D., Linord, and Sidon projects, in that
Elysser was a public agency, rather than a private company. The
public agency was charged with the task of developing the
southern suburbs - a poor, densely populated area politically
dominated by Hizb Allah - taking into consideration the immense
social and economic problems in the area.
Elysser was the product of three years of negotiations
between the government, Shiite interests, and the ultimate
arbiter in the discussions, the Syrians. Initial government
plans to redevelop the area, including one based on the Solidere
model, were vetoed by both Hizb Allah, and 2ma1, backed up by
41; (16 February 1996), 24; (10 November 1995), 24.
For a brief summary of the project, see -----, "There goes
the Metn Coast", The Lebanon Report no.4 (Winter, 1995), 21.
Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
For some of the criticisms, see -----"There goes the Metn
Coast".
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the Syrians. 95 A compromise agreement between the government and
the Shiite leadership (both Hizb Allah and Amal), which
consisted of giving the two Shiite groups a major say in the
development company, brought about the establishment of Elysser.
By controlling the company, both groups were trying to secure
(increase) their patronage network in the region. 96 In return for
giving the Shiite groups a stake in the project, Hariri received
their backing on other issues. For example, Birri supported the
revisions of the B.C.D. plan in parliament.97
Elysser is headed by a seven member board including the
chairman, Joseph Helou, and Saad Khaled, Ali al Khalil, Najif
Karim, Antoine Andreos, and Eli Sahnini. The board included one
representative from Hizb Allah, and one representative from
Amal. 98 Critics of the project point out that I½mal and Hizb
Allah, through their influence on the board, have used projects
on the scheme to increase their influence on the constituents.99
The Elysser project, to be divided into two phases,
consists of infrastructural works, and the construction of
housing units; The first phase consists of building 1,150 homes,
and is to be completed by the middle of 1997, and a second phase
consists of additional housing units to be completed in early
For example, in 1994, a Hariri plan to create a Solidere
style development company failed because of Shiite opposition.
96
, !Vfl Acres: The Turning of Land into Political
Influence", The Lebanon Report 5, no.9 (September, 1994), 3.
Ibid.
98, "Elissar and the Southern Suburbs", The Lebanon
Report no.3 (Fall, 1995), 17-18.
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 2nd
Quarter 1996, 16.
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1998. Dar al Handasah is providing the planning and designs for
the project, which will be financed from the two Eurobonds
issued between 1994_1995.b00
2.3 B.O.T. & B.O.O. Projects
As we explained in part one of the chapter, Hariri has
encouraged the use of Build-Operate-Transfer (B.O.T.) projects
because it was seen as a good way to generate income without
tapping into government revenue.' 0' We have already discussed
several of the B.O.T. projects in the context of the Horizon
2000 programme. This type of system has also been encouraged for
some of the commercial/sports projects including the development
of a Beirut Cultural/Conference Centre, a commercial complex in
the Bir Hassan area of Beirut, and the development of a Beirut
Sports City. We will look at each of these projects.
2.3.1 Beirut Cultural/Conference Centre: Palais de Congres
After making several changes to the original design, the
C.D.R. decided in the autumn of 1995b02 to create a Lebanese
company to carry out an estimated $350 million project to build
a cultural/conference centre on a design-build-operate-transfer
basis (D.B.O..T.) in the al Manara district of West Beirut.103
100 MEED (21 June 1996), 22; (9 February 1996) 25 ; (18
August 1995), 22.
101 MEED (6 January 1995), 31.
102 The Council of Ministers approved the revised version of
the project on 6 December 1995.
103 The changes were recommended by the Investment
303
The project, named the Palais de Congres, is to be built on
51,628 square metres of state owned land along the waterfront.
It will include a conference centre, a theatre, two hotels, a
library, a cormnercial centre, a cinema, and a parking area.
Before the aforementioned changes were made, three companies -
Bouygues of France, Almabani General Contractors of Saudi
Arabia, and the Binladin Group, also of Saudi Arabia - were in
contention for the contract.'° 4 The contractor will be required
to raise at least half of the cost of the project.105
2.3.2 Commercial Complex in Bir Hassan, Beirut
In December of 1995, the Lebanese firm, Engineering
Development Company (Endeco), which is owned by the local Hijaz
Group, was awarded a contract to build an estimated $150 million
corrtmercial complex in Bir Hassan. The project, which is being
carried out on a B.O.T. basis, is scheduled to be completed by
1998. The investment house, Lebanon Invest, is the financial
advisor to the project. Financing for the project is expected to
come from the sale of equity in the complex, which is to be
listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange.106
2.3.3 Beirut Sports City
In the autumn of 1995, the firm Endeco was also awarded a
contract to build a Beirut Sports City commercial and leisure
Development Authority of Lebanon.
104 NEED (20 January 1995), 25.
105 MEED (22 December 1995), 2-3 and 26-27.
106 NEED (31 May 1996), 17; (21 June 1996), 40.
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complex estimated to cost between $200-250 million. The project
is to be carried out on a B.O.T. basis and is to be completed in
two and a half years. The concession is for 45 years before
ownership of the complex transfers to the government. Lebanon
Invest is also the financial advisor to this project, which is
to be listed on the B.S.E.'°7
2.4 Major Projects
In this section, we will look at numerous major projects
which have been, or are in the process of being developed
completely independent of the government. The projects are
backed both by Lebanon's private sector and by Arab businessmen
from the Gulf. Prominent businessmen from the Gulf states have
invested heavily in Lebanon. We have already indicated, for
example, the extensive Saudi interest in the Solidere project.
Entrepreneurs from the Gulf have also chosen to invest in
substantial commercial/residential schemes. Some of the projects
are joint ventures between these two groups.
2.4.1 Trirnacor Backed Project
An estimated $80 million project to develop a residential
and commercial centre in the Delhaniya area south of Beirut is
being carried out by the company Trimacor, which is headed by
Rashad al Shara. The company, which is registered in the British
Virgin Islands, and is mainly owned by Saudi, and to a lesser
extent, Kuwaiti and U.A.E. interests, includes on its board a
number of prominent Saudis and Kuwaitis. Switzerland's Royal
107 MEED (15 December 1995), 15.
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Trust Bank is sponsoring the project. The bank has raised funds
for the project in Saudi Arabia, and it is providing finance for
Trimacor's Lebanese affiliate, which will own the land. The
project, which will include the construction of villas, is being
designed by Saudi architects.'°8
2.4.2 New City Venture
In the summer of 1995, a group of Arab and local investors
announced plans to develop a $100 million residential/commercial
project in the Hazmieh district of Beirut. The preliminary
master plan called for 122,000 square metres of residential
space and 52,000 square metres of commercial and office space.
The development is also to include leisure facilities,
recreational areas such as public parks, and a car park.
The project is backed by prominent investors, and its board
includes some of the major players in the Arab world's business
and financial world including U.K. based businessmen Wafic Said,
Banque Audi chairman Raymond Audi, Fransabank chairman Adrian
Kassar, George Asseily of J. Henry Schroder & Company, Credit
Commercial du Moyen Orient (C.C.M.0) chairman George Ashi, and
Gefinor Investment Management Company chairman Khaled al-
Ossaimi, who heads the board. The founding investors in the
project put up 70% of the $100 million needed for the project
and have offered shares worth $30 million to Lebanese and Arab
investors. The sale of the shares, which involves 300,000 shares
priced at $100 each, is being managed by J. Henry Schroder &
Company and Gefinor Investment Management Company. Credit
108 NEED, (7 October 1994), 25-26.
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Commercial du Moyen Orient, Banque Audi, and Fransabank have
acted as placing agents for the shares.'°9
2.4.3 Twin Towers Project
Financial details for an approximately $80 million project
to build two 40 storey buildings offering condo style apartments
were to be completed by the end of 1995. The twin towers are to
be situated on the Beirut waterfront between the A.U.B. campus
and the Beirut Central District. The project is sponsored by
Ziad Abdelnour, who is one of the managing partners with the
N.Y. based investment and merchant bank Continuum Capital.'1°
2.4.4 The Golden Cedar Club
Ayboub Farid Saab & Fadi Saab, who head the Cyprus based
The Federal Bank of the Middle East, are behind a scheme to
build a luxury residence and coimnercial complex, in the
foothills of the Shouf mountains, 2 km from the coast at
Mechref-Daraiya, and 17 km from Beirut International Airport.
The project, named the Golden Cedar Club, will include 417
villas, 37 apartments, a five star hotel, and conference and
exhibition facilities. The estimated $73 million first phase of
the project, was to be completed by 1996. The entire project was
estimated to cost $500 million. The master plan for the project
was drawn up by Cyprus-based Integrom Resources and studies were
carried out by the U.K.'s Howath & Howath consulting.
109 MEED (28 April 1995), 28; MEED (7 July 1995), 5 and 27;
Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 46.
110 NEED (26 May 1995), 22-23.
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The Saab family will own a good portion of the project, but
have also offered shares to Lebanese, Saudis, and other Gulf
Arabs. A real estate company was formed to sell the shares.
Saudi Arabia's Consulting Center for Finance & Investment
(C.C.F.I.) is the placement manager for the offering."
2.4.5 St. Charles City Centre
Societe St. Charles, the owner of the 500 room Holiday Inn
which is located in the B.C.D., is planning to renovate the
hotel as part of larger complex, named the Saint Charles City
Centre, which will include offices, furnished apartments, a
mall, a cinema, a 12,000 square metre exhibition centre, and
parking facilities. The largest shareholder in Societe St.
Charles is Kuwaiti P.M. Crown Prince Saad al bdulla al Sabah.
The project is expected to be completed in 1998.112
2.4.6 Beirut Agora Shopping Complex
An estimated $150 million commercial complex, named the
Agora complex, in the Furn el-Chebbak area of Beirut, is being
developed by the local contracting firm, the Karam Group, and
one of the leading local architects, Samir Khairallah. The
TJ.K.'s Healey & Barker is the consultant on the project,
advising the developers with both the design of the project, and
the approach to tenancy agreements. London-based Schroder
" MEED (22 April 1994), 29-30; Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese
Economy 1995, 46.
112 The hotel will no longer be managed by the Holiday Inn.
The Ministry of Tourism, Visitor (2nd Quarter, 1996), 58; and
MEED (9 February 1996), 20; (22 March 1996), 39.
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Asseily is the financial advisor on the project.
Several international firms, as well as regional and local
ones, have shown interest in leasing out space in the complex,
including a French hypermarket operator, a number of U.S. firms
interested in setting up multiplex sports facilities, Lebanese
department store operators, and Gulf retail firms."3
2.4.7 The Mechref Project
An estimated $80 million project to develop luxury
residential villas on 2.3 million square metres of land in the
hills overlooking Beirut was begun in 1995 by the Dallah al
Baraka group of Saudi Arabia. The project was scheduled to be
completed in seven years.'14
2.4.8 Developments Constructed by the Murr Group
The Murr group, which is headed by the wealthy interior
minister, Michel Murr, began the construction of two luxury
apartment complexes in 1995, called Les Toits de Beyrouth and
Cap sur Ville. In addition, the construction of a planned
country club will be connected to the projects.'15
2.4.9 Other Major Projects
Several other large residential/commercial complexes have
been developed, or are under construction. The Freeway project,
MEED (22 March 1996), 25; Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese
Economy 1995, 50.
114 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 46.
115 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 46.
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a large commercial center developed by Copri and Credit
Bancaire, consists of retail and office space, as well as
entertainment facilities such as a restaurants, cinemas, and
health clubs. It is located in Sin-El-Fil. The Dunes project,
developed by the Rayess and Tabbara Group and located near
Verdun street, is a huge mixed development project consisting of
two 19 story residential towers, and a third building housing a
four star hotel as well as commercial, office and leisure
facilities."6
2.5 The Real Estate Market
During modern Lebanon's prosperous years (1950s-1975),
entrepreneurs invested heavily in the real estate market,
particularly in the Beirut area. Property speculation, combined
with no capital gains tax, earned fortunes for many involved in
the real estate market. The purpose of this section is to look
at developments in the real estate market. Three areas will be
of particular interest to us. First, we will examine growth in
the market. Second, we will discuss who is involved in
developing the market. Finally, we will look at some of the
negative ramifications of what has happened in the real estate
market.
2.5.1 Growth in the Real Estate Market
Between the years 1992 and 1995, property development in
Lebanon was booming." 7
 According to figures released by the
116 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 47,49.
117, "Property Development is Booming", The Lebanon
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Beirut and Tripoli Order of Engineers, building permits were
awarded for areas covering 15,052,825 square metres in 1993,
increasing to 21,541,471 square metres in 1994, and reaching a
high of 34,031,586 square metres in 1995.118 In 1995 alone,
investment in the real estate market topped $3 billion. 119
 Partly
as a result of the boom in property development in 1995,
however, the market suffered a setback in 1996 as significantly
fewer building permits were awarded.' 2° In 1996, the
construction industry slowed considerably, falling by 60% from
1995 figures.12'
As we will explain in sub-section six, billions of dollars
have returned to Lebanon. Most of the money has been deposited
in Lebanese banks by investors who wish to take advantage of
generous interest rates. However, a significant portion of the
money has also gone into the real estate market.
In sub-sections one through four, we have already discussed
several of the huge property development projects which have
occurred in Lebanon since 1992. In addition to these projects,
property investors have built a myriad of apartment buildings,
and commercial and retail offices throughout Lebanon, and, in
Report 5, no.4 (April, 1994), 8.
118 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 38; Banqi.ie Audi,
Lebanon: Facts and Figures 1993 - 1995. One method used for
measuring growth in the industry is to look at cement sales. For
a monthly record, see Banque du Liban, Monthly Bulletin.
119 Lebanon Opportunities, Preview Issue, 6.
120 For 1996 numbers see Banque Audi, Quarterly Economic
Report (4th Quarter 1996), 1; and Banque du Liban, Quarterly
Bulletin no.70 (3rd Quarter, 1996), 7.
121 Economist Intelligence Unit, Lebanon: Country Report -
2nd Quarter 1997, 19.
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particular, in the Beirut area.' 22 We will cite numerous
examples.
The Saudi/local Inmaa group, with the assistance of the
U.K.'s Buro Happold Consultancy Engineers, completed a 13 story
apartment block in the Ramlet al Baidasame area of Beirut in
1995.123 A group of investors from the U.A.E., led by the al
Habtour Group of Dubai, launched a $30 million project to build
luxury houses in the Jamour area overlooking Beirut.' 24 A Saudi
group was to begin work on a $80 million project to build villas
and commercial and touristic sites in the hills overlooking
Beirut.'25 The Lebanese contracting firms, Ramco Trading &
Contracting, which spent the war years operating in Saudi Arabia
and Spain, built an apartment complex in the Ramlet al Baida
area of Beirut, as well as several other projects. Banque Credit
Libanais competed work on a 12 storey, highly sophisticated
commercial complex, named Liberty Tower, in the Hamra district
of Beirut. The I.D.A.L. offices are located in the building.
The Soubra family, completed work on a 16 storey office,
commercial, and residential complex in the Raouche area of
Beirut. The Zakhem Group constructed a seven story office
complex, called the Allied Business Center, in the Achrafieh
area of Beirut.	 The main tenant in the building is Allied
122 MEED (25 June 1993), 11; Marwan Ghandour, "Investing in
Lebanon's Growth & Renewal: Investment Opportunities &
Challenges", Financial Times Conference ( 8-9 June 1995).
123 MEED (23 June 1995), 15.
124, "Private Foreign Investment Picking tip", The
Lebanon Report 4, no.10 (October, 1993), 8.
125 Ibid, 8.
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Business Bank. Ashada Enterprises 126 developed a 10 storey office
building, called the Ashada Center, in the Achrafieh area. The
owners had hoped to lease the property to banking, insurance, or
tourist firms.127
Other office and retail complexes that were completed and
operational, or were under construction, between 1995-1997
included: the Hamra Square building; the Mirage Plaza, which is
a luxury complex of over 20 floors of commercial, office and
residential units located in the Sanayeh area of Beirut; the
Palm Center, an 11 storey office complex located in the eastern
part of Beirut; the Pag building, a 10 storey complex for office
and retail space, located in Achrafieh and to be completed in
1997; the Fauchon building, nine floors of office and retail
space, located in Achrafieh;' 28 developer Jamil Ibrahim, a
wealthy Shiite emigre from Africa, connected to the Imal
movement, has constructed several buildings including a large
project, called Sodeco Square, which is to include several
cinemas, a shopping mall, and further commercial space, as well
as residential space;' 29 developer Nadim Qineir is also developing
a mixed residential/commercial project to be completed by 1998.
In addition, some of the many luxury residential towers
constructed included the 20 storey Weavers Tower developed by
126 As noted, a leading member of this group sits on the
Solidere Board.
127 The Ashada Group also began construction on a residential
complex called Jardin de Tabaris.
For information concerning the projects, see Marwan
Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 45-53.
128 The ABN bank has many offices in this building.
129 Lebanon Opportunites, Preview Issue, 6.
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Hassan Smadi, the 11 storey Jaffal Center located in the Rainlet
el-Bayda area of Beirut, and the 11 storey Terra-Blanca
building, also located in Ramlet el-Bayda, developed by the
Saudi al Fadl group and the local Sameer Haddad firm.130
2.5.2 Investors in the Real Estate Market
In sub-sections one through four of this chapter, we have
given a detailed listing of the major players involved in
property development. As Assem Salain, President of the Beirut
and Tripoli Order of Engineers, explained, there is no single
group involved in property development in Lebanon.' 3' To
reiterate briefly, developers included representatives from
Lebanon's traditional business elite, such as the Boustani clan,
some of Lebanon's new business elite, mostly consisting of
Hariri and his associates, members of Lebanon's expatriate
community, particularly from those who live in the Gulf region
and Shiites from Africa, many of Lebanon's contracting firms,
including those who moved their bases of operations to
neighbouring countries, and Gulf Arab interests 132
 In fact, P.M.
Hariri has encouraged Gulf Arabs to invest in such projects. In
the sumner of 1993, Hariri hosted a convention of 200 Saudi and
130 This project is estimated to cost about $44 million. For
more information concerning these projects see Marwan Iskandar,
Lebanese Economy 1995, 45-53.
For nwnerous other examples, see Lebanon Opportunities,
Preview Issue, 6-9.
131 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
132 For a brief look at Arab interests in the real estate
market, see "Arabs Buy More Real Estate", The Lebanon Report 4,
no.8 (August, 1993), 10.
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Arab Gulf investors at Beirut T s five star Sunmierland hotel.' 33 As
for Hariri himself, in addition to his involvement in the
property schemes noted above, he has apparently bought extensive
tracts of land throughout Lebanon.134
2.5.3 Negative Aspects of Growth in the Real Estate Market
Growth in the real estate market, particularly as it
relates to the construction of apartment buildings, has caused
serious distortions in the demand/supply aspect of the market.
Most of the apartment buildings which have been constructed, or
are currently being constructed, have been targeted at the
upscale market. As a consequence, the market is saturated, and
many apartments (or even whole apartment buildings) remain
vacant. Estate agents estimated in 1994 that 30,000 premium
apartments, priced from $300,000 upwards, were empty in Beirut.
The prices of these apartments, however, are unlikely to go
down, because the developers have self-financed the projects
from their own savings, rather than borrowing from the banks.
Thus, many developers are in a position in which they can afford
to hold onto their properties until a buyer is found who is
willing to pay the asking price. 135 While there is a considerable
amount of surplus property in the upscale market, however, there
is a serious shortage of more affordable housing in Lebanon,
especially in the Beirut area.
133, "Private Foreign Investment Picking Up", The
Lebanon Report, 8.
134 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
135 James Whittington, "Beirut Property Prices Soar to Sky-
High Limits", Financial Times (22 November 1994)
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There have also been some serious questions related to the
market viability of the hundreds of commercial/office properties
being developed by Solidere and other private contractors. In
particular, it may appropriate to ask whether or not there will
be enough demand for the rental of these facilities.
It is highly likely that Beirut Central District, for
several reasons, will take tenants and other businesses away
from various other parts of Beirut. To begin with, many
businesses would prefer to be based in the B.C.D. because it is
centrally located. In fact, many of the roads being constructed
in Beirut are intended to make it easier to travel to the
centre. 136 Second, there is a feeling in Beirut that the city
centre is the "place to be". Third, given the political and
economic weight of Solidere's backers, it is likely that they
should be able to easily induce businesses to relocate.'37
2.6 The Banking Sector
As we have stated throughout the thesis, a major goal of
the Hariri government is to return Beirut to its former role as
the financial centre of the Middle East. Beirut's previous
success as a financial centre rested largely on the strength of
its banking sector. As Louis Hobeika explained: "The commercial
banking sector [is the] main centrepiece of the nation's
136 Interview with Assem Salam in Beirut on 22 February 1997.
137 In fact, people working on behalf of Solidere (or maybe
on behalf of Hariri) went around the various business
establisbments in Beirut, such as accounting firms, to find out
whether or not they had any interest in relocating to the city
centre. Interview with Riad Mansour, area manager for KPMG, in
Beirut on 14 February 1997.
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financial environment." 138 The purpose of this section is to look
at developments in the banking sector.' 39 In addition to looking
at both the health of the banking sector and the role that it
has played in the economic recovery of the country, we wish to
examine whether or not the sector has the capability to help
Beirut regain its role as a regional financial centre. Having
examined the available literature, we feel that four conclusions
can be reached. First, we intend to show that the banking sector
is healthy. The major banks have enjoyed massive profits over
the last few years. Second, Lebanon's banks have made an effort,
to at least some extent, to expand their resources in order to
play a role in the reconstruction of the country by extending
loans to Lebanese businesses and to home buyers. Third, several
new investment banks (houses) have been established in Beirut in
the last few years. The investment houses, which are owned by
both local and international concerns, have played a key role as
financial advisors for projects developed by the private sector
in Lebanon. Finally, Beirut has made some progress, albeit
limited at this point, towards regaining its role as the banking
138 Louis Hobeika, "Banking on Beirut: What Lebanon Needs to
Become the Region's Financial Centre." Middle East Insight
(March-April, 1994), 53.
' A few succinct articles have been written on the state of
the Lebanese banking system. See, James Whittington, "Beirut,
City of Surprises", Financial Times (Thursday 15 December 1994),
36; Louis Hobeika, "Banking on Beirut: What Lebanon Needs to
Become the Region's Financial Center"; Roula Khalaf, "Facing the
New Order", Financial Times (Tuesday 6 June 1995), 2; Chafic
Nebme, "Lebanon's Banking Potential", Middle East Executive
Reports 18, no.1 (January, 1995), 8; Nasser Saidi, "Lebanon -
Financing Reconstruction: Issues and Opportunities Part II:
Banking and the Financial Market, Prospects for Beirut as
Financial Center", Middle East Executive Reports 19, no.4
(1996), 9.
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centre of the region. A number of international banking firms
have opened or reopened offices in the city, and some
international banks have established their regional offices
there. However, as we will discuss in the final chapter, due
both to competition from other regional cities (i.e., Dubai and
Bahrain), and to the changing nature of international banking,
Beirut is unlikely to regain the predominant regional role that
it once held.
2.6.1 The Health of the Corrunercial Banking Sector
Thanks largely to the fact that billions of dollars have
been deposited in Lebanon's banks by Lebanese expatriates, the
banking sector has prospered greatly. Much of this money either
was taken out of Lebanon during the 1980s or it was made outside
of the country. The principal inducement for depositing money
into Lebanese bank accounts has been, simply, the high interest
rates, which have, at times, reached over 20%. The amount of
money which has been deposited into Lebanese banks since Hariri
took office is staggering. According to Raymond Audi, President
of the Lebanese Bankers' Association, "billions of dollars are
being repatriated thanks to growing confidence in Hariri's
government." 40 Central Bank governor, Riad Salameh, noted that
some $1 billion returned to the country within a month of Hariri
taking over as prime minister.' 41 In November of 1994, Audi said
the banking system had recovered 90% of the funds sent abroad
140 Quoted in MEED (28 January 1994), 29. For a look at
Hariri's influence on the money markets, see -----, "The Hariri
Factor", The Lebanon Report, 13-14.
141 MEED (3 December 1993), 15.
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over the past 8 years. 142	Some 15 months into Hariri's
administration, net transfers from abroad totalled $6.5
billion.' 43 At the end of 1993, total deposits in Lebanon's
commercial banks were $8.5 billion.' 44 By May of 1996, deposits
had grown to $16.3 billion. 145 The vast majority of the deposits
have been in dollars, as opposed to Lebanese pounds.
One of the largest banks, Banque du Liban & d'Outre-Mer
(B.L.O.M.) recorded a $4 million profit in 1992, up from $1.2
million the previous year. In subsequent years, the bank's
profits skyrocketed: $8.9 million in 1993, $14.1 million in
1994, and reaching a total of $18 million in 1995. The growth of
the bank's assets was equally impressive. In 1992, the bank
recorded assets of $693 million, growing steadily in subsequent
years and reaching a total of $1.9 billion in 1995.
Banque de la Mediterrannee, in which, incidentally, Hariri
has a controlling interest, overtook B.L.O.M. in 1996 to become
the largest Lebanese bank. The bank recorded a profit of $19.2
million in 1995, compared with a profit of just $1.6 million in
1993. Bank de la Mediterrannee's assets grew from $521 million
in 1992 to an impressive $2 billion in 1995.
142 MEED (11 November 1994), 17.
143 MEED (28 January 1994), 29.
144 MEED (3 December 1993), 15. For a detailed look at the
balance sheets of commercial banks, see the Monthly Bulletin
projected by the Department of statistics and Economic Research
at the Banque du Liban. The Monthly Bulletin can also be found
on the world wide web: (http://www.bdl.gov.lb/) . For quarterly
summaries, see Banque du Liban, Quarterly Bulletin.
145 MEED (16 August 1996), 26. For details about the health
of the banking sector in 1996, see Economist Intelligence Unit,
Lebanon: Country Report - 2nd Quarter 1997, 23.
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Banque Audi's profits rose from $2.6 million in 1993 to $13
million in 1995. Its assets rose from $375 million in 1992 to
$986 million in 1994.
Finally, Byblos bank's profits reached approximately $15
million in 1995, while its assets grew from $309 million in 1992
to just over one billion in 1995.146
2.6.2 The Role of the Banking Sector in the Reconstruction
Lebanon's banking sector has been the subject of extensive
criticisn. In particular, critics of the banking system have
pointed to the lack of financing available to the private
sector. To at least some extent, this criticisn is appropriate.
With the exception of the local arm of the Imman based Arab
Bank, which is backed by extensive resources outside of
Lebanon,'47
 the nature of the Lebanese banking system is such
146 The numbers were taken from several sources including
numerous MEED editions: (14 January 1994), 17-18; (29 April
1994), 34; (17 June 1994), 7-17, 24; (1 September 1995), 16; (4
August 1995), 24; (14 July 1995), 22-23; (7 July 1995), 5, 27;
(24 February 1995), 33; (28 April 1995), 28; (5 May 1995), 25;
(19 May 1995), 17-18; (26 May 1995), 22-23; (16 June 1995), 11-
19, 25-26; (14 June 1996), 17; (19 July 1996), 22; (26 July
1996), 14; 12 July 1996), 18-19; (28 June 1996), 16; (1 March
1996), 19; (23 February 1996), 25; (16 Febraury 1996), 25; (9
February 1996) 19; (9 August 1996), 31; Economist Intelligence
Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 4th Quarter 1996, 24; Economist
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 3rd Quarter 1996,
24; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 2nd
Quarter 1996, 19-20; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Report: Lebanon - 2nd Quarter 1995, 18; Lebanon Opportunities,
Preview Issue, 49; Banque Audi, Quarterly Economic Reports.
147 The Arab bank is backed by prominent Palestinian
families, including the founders of C.C.C., and by Rafiq Hariri,
who is represented on the board by his son Bahaa. The bank is
financing the construction of the Commodore hotel in Beirut and
is also playing a role in the financing of 4 small contracts by
the company European Gas Turbine. MEED (16 June 1995), 11-19,
25-2 6.
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that the banks are not in any real position to finance the
recovery programme or to provide medium or long-term loans to
the private sector. There are two main reasons for this. First,
most of the deposits are short-term. For example, the general
manager of B.L.O.M. bank, Fadi Osserian, stated that "the
effective maturity of its deposits is about one month."48
Second, the government has required banks to keep 40% of their
deposits in treasury bills (T-bills), 10% in non-interest
bearing deposits with the Central Bank, and 3% in special bonds
yielding 6% interest. Consequently, government borrowing (t-
bills) has crowded out private sector borrowing.'49 The banks,
however, have been generally pleased with this profitable
arrangement, as t-bills yield a robust return, with one year t-
bills having reached a high of 40%.'° The sector has received a
return on equity of 31.4% versus 11.38% for the world's first
100 banks. 15' The downside for the banking sector is that this
arrangement puts them, effectively, at the mercy of government
economic policy.'52
It should be stressed, however, that both the government
and the banks themselves have made an effort to reorganise the
banking sector in order to allow banks to play a greater role in
148 JED (11 November 1994), 17.
MEED (21 June 1996), 33.
150 NEED (8 March 1996), 21.
'' Roula Khalaf, "Facing the New Order", 2.
152 For a brief look at the role of T-bills in financing
government spending, see -----, "Retrospective on the
Government's T-Bill Plan", The Lebanon Report 4, no.2 (February,
1993), 9.
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providing the private sector with credit. The reasoning behind
the banks expansion was summed up by a local banker: "Banks two
years ago saw no need to expand into capital markets or
investment banking. But, with reconstruction, some banks are
realising there is a need to expand, otherwise foreign banks
will get all the business."53
2.6.2.1 Changes in Central Bank Regulations and Covernment Law
The Central Bank and the government have introduced a
number of changes to existing regulations and laws which were
intended to encourage the banking sector to advance loans to the
private sector. To begin with, the Central Bank reduced the
percentage of deposits which banks were required to keep in t-
bills from 60% to 40%. In fact, in mid-1997, the government was
considering legislation which would have eliminated all bank
requirements to keep t-bills.' 54
 Second, the Central Bank
allowed commercial banks to reduce their statutory reserves by
the equivalent amount of their medium term lending to the
productive sector.' 55
 Third, the Central Bank allowed banks to
increase dollar loans from 60% to 65%.156 Fourth, investment
banks have previously had an advantage over commercial banks in
acquiring t-bills because they have no reserve requirements.
According to a new law they are only allowed to purchase t-bills
amounting to an equivalent of their loans to the private
153 Quoted in ibid.
154 MEED (16 September 1994), 26.
MEED (21 June 1996), 33.
156 Approximately 90% of bank lending has been in dollars.
NEED (22 September 1995), 34.
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sector.' 57 Fifth, banks are now required to increase their
available capital to a minimum of $7 million.' 58 Finally, in a
move aimed at increasing the banking sector's available capital,
the government has authorised banks, which are mostly controlled
by families, to trade up to 30% of their shares on the stock
market.'59
2.6.2.2 The Banks' Response
There is ample evidence to suggest that many of the larger
commercial banks have made an attempt to increase their
resources in order to place themselves in a stronger position to
offer financing to the private sector. Their efforts have
consisted primarily of raising capital by selling short and
medium term debt and equity issues on the international market.
In addition the banks have raised some capital by securing loans
from the International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the
World Bank. Finally, some Lebanese banks, and Fransabank in
particular, have joined forces with foreign banks in order to
provide additional financing to the private sector.16°
157 MEED (21 June 1996), 33.
158 NEED (31 May 1996), 17.
The law was passed in May of 1996. NEED (20 September
1996), 32; -----,"Eurobond Mania", The Lebanon Report no.4
(Winter, 1996), 16.
By mid-June 1997, a few banks have already issued shares on
the Beirut Stock Exchange, while others were in the process of
doing so. For examples, see Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Report: Lebanon - 2nd Quarter 1997, 24.
160 In addition, several of the larger banks have attempted
to modernise their banking practices, and to improve the skills
of their workforce. For a brief look at some of the practices
employed by the banks, see Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy
1995, 27-30.
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2.6.2.2.1 Capital Raised on the Local and International161Markets
The largest of Beirut's commercial banks, Banque de la
Mediterrannee, planned to launch a $300 million certificate of
deposit in the autumn of 1996. This was to be done in two
stages. The bank launched a two year first tranche worth $100
million in the autumn of 1996. The certificate of deposit was
priced at 265 basis points over U.S. treasury bills. The issue
was managed by Merill Lynch and the Mediterrannee Investment
Bank, a subsidiary of Banque de la Mediterrannee. Apparently,
the bank has planned to use the money to play a more active role
in project finance.'62
Banque Audi raised its capital thrOugh a $34 million global
depository receipt (G.D.R.) which was issued in October 1995.
The issue, which was managed by the U.K.'s Robert Flemings, was
100% oversubscribed. Most of the buyers were from outside the
Middle East. Forty-five percent of the funds were raised in the
U.K., 25% elsewhere in Europe, 15% in the U.S., 10% in the Far
East, and 5% in the Middle East.' 63 Flemings was particularly
pleased with the Pmerican interest, given the rluctance of U.S.
investors to invest in Lebanon.
In October of 1996, Banque Audi also launched the first
tranche, worth $100 million, of its $200 million Eurobond. The
161 For a brief look at developments in this area during
1995, see ibid, 26.
162 See MEED (4 October 1996), 28; -----, "Eut'obond Mani",
14; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon -
1st Quarter 1997, 25; Banque du Liban, Monthly Bulletin no.30
(November, 1996), 7 & (October, 1996), 7-8.
163 MEED (20 September 1996), 32.
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first tranche was for five years and was priced at 315 basis
points over U.S. treasuries. The Eurobond is particularly
noteworthy as it was the largest amount achieved by a local
borrower. The issue, which was managed by Merrill Lynch, was
heavily oversubscribed. .Pmerican investors accounted for 40% of
the total, Europeans accounted for another 40%, while the
remaining 20% went to Arab investors.164
Byblos Bank went twice to the international market to raise
capital. In June 1995, the bank raised $11.6 million in equity
through an international equity placement managed by Japan's
Nomura Securities, and the local investment house, Lebanon
Invest. The equity placement was one and a half times
oversubscribed, and it was supported by a range of international
investors mainly from the Gulf.165
In September 1996, the bank launched a three year Euronote
worth $50 million. The Euronote, which was managed by the U.K.'s
S.B.C. Warburg and Lebanon Invest, was priced at 285 basis
points over comparable U.S. treasuries. It was sold out in 30
minutes, and was three times oversubscribed. The bank is to use
the capital to increase its personnel and lending facilities.166
Credit Libanais, which is 97% owned by the Central Bank,
164 The Eurobond was quoted on the London Stock Exchange.
NEED (25 October 1996), 27; -----"Eurobond Mania", 15; The
Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 1st
Quarter 1997, 25; Banque du Liban, Monthly Bulletin, no.30
(November, 1996), 7.
165 NEED (20 September 1996), 32; Economist Intelligence
Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 4th Quarter 1995, 19.
166 NEED (20 September 1996), 15; -----, "Eurobond Mania",
16; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 1st
Quarter 1997, 25; Banque du Liban, Monthly Bulletin, no.28
(September, 1996), 8.
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also increased its capital by tapping the Eurobond market. In
June of 1996, the bank launched, with the assistance of Merrill
Lynch, a $60 million Eurobond priced at 320 basis points over
three year U.S. treasuries. The bank intended to use the capital
to strengthen its medium-term financing facilities.167
Banque Beyrouth Pour Le Commerce increased its capital in
October 1996 by issuing a one-year certificate of deposit worth
$12 million, and based at 200 basis points over U.S. treasuries.
The issue was launched by Lebanon Invest.168
Banque Libanaise Pour le Commerce announced plans in the
autumn of 1996 to issue a global depository receipt, which is to
be listed on the Luxembourg and Beirut Stock Exchanges. Beirut
finance house, Middle East Group, was to manage the local issue,
while Nomura International was to manage the international
issue. Assuming this goes as planned, Banque Libanais Pour le
Commerce will be the first bank to list its share on the B.S.E
since the government changes noted above.'69
Some of these banks and other Lebanese banks have also
raised money on the international markets during the first half
of 1997.
2.6.2.2.2 I.F.C. Loans
Lebanon's commercial banks have also increased their
167 MEED (20 September 1996), 32; (18 July 1996), 22; (14
June 1996), 17; -----, "Eurobond Mania", 16; Economist
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 4th Quarter 1996,
24; Lebanon Opportunities, Preview Issue, 52; Banque du Liban,
Monthly Bulletin, no.2 (June, 1996) 7-8.
168 NEED (18 October 1996), 15; Banque du Liban, Monthly
Bulletin, no.29 (October, 1996), 8.
169 MEED (25 October 1996), 27.
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capital by securing millions of dollars in loans from the
International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.), an affiliate of the
World Bank. The I.F.C. has advanced local banks three loans
since 1993, amounting to a total of $190 million. The I.F.C.
project was intended to help increase the capability of the
banks to offer loans to small businesses and homeowners. 17° As
Lebanese Bank Association Chairman, Raymond Audi, explained,
"the loan(s) are an important source of finance for the private
sector, as commercial banks on their own are unable to meet this
kind of demand." 7' The importance of the loans to the recovery
process was stated by the I.F.C. investment officer in charge of
the loans, Michel Ayoub: "The I.F.C.'s project in Lebanon will
help the Lebanese play an effective role in the reconstruction
of the country by providing much needed loans to the private
sector. ,,172
The first I.F.C. loan was initiated on 24 June 1993, when
the I.F.C. signed a $45 million loan with 5 local banks,
including Banque Audi, Byblos Bank, Fransabank, Bank of Beirut &
the Arab Countries, and Banque du Liban & d'Outre Mer.'73 The
intent of the loan was to provide the Lebanese banks with
capital to back projects which are too small for direct I.F.C.
involvement. 174
 The credit line was distributed to the following
170 NEED (19 July 1996), 22.
' NEED (1 July 1994), 22-23.
172 NEED (4 June 1993), 26.
173 For loan conditions see, "IFC Extends Credit Line to Five
Lebanese Banks", The Lebanon Report 4, no.10 (October, 1993), 9.
174 The I.F.C. set a loan minimum of 300,000 and a maximum of
$1.5 million for each borrower. -----, "The I.F.C. Extends
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sectors of the economy: industrial projects (50%), tourism
projects (14%), hospitals (13%), agricultural projects (9%), and
other projects (14%)
On 21 June 1994, The I.F.C. signed a $45 million loan with
four local banks, providing the banks with funds to lend to
small and medium borrowers.' 76
 A limit of $1.5 million was
placed on the size of any loan.' 77 The banks involved included
Fransabank, Banque Libano Pour le Commerce, Banque Libano
Francaise, and Societe Generale Libano-Europenne de Banque.' 78 On
5 July 1996, the I.F.C. signed a $100 million loan with 6 local
banks aimed at providing long term housing loans. The banks
involved included Fransabank, Banque Audi, Byblos bank, Banque
Libano-Francaise, Societe Generale Libano-Europenne de Banque,
and the Bank of Beirut & the Arab Countries. The banks have
provided loans to homeowners covering a minimum of 60% of house
prices ranging from $40,000 to $200,000.' According to I.F.C.
regional director, Andre Hovaguimian, "The credit lines
alleviate a social crisis by enabling about 3,000 middle-income
Credit Line to Five Lebanese Banks", 9.
In March 1993, the I.F.C. was directly involved in a $6
million loan to a ceramics project. MEED (4 June 1993), 26.
175, " IFC Provides $45 million for Private Sector", The
Lebanon Report 5, no.7 (July, 1994), 9.
176 NEED (1 July 1994), 22-23.
-----, "IFC Provides $45 million for Private Sector", 9.
178 Ibid.
179 
NEED (19 July 1996), 22; Lebanon Opportunities Preview
Issue, 46.
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families to afford the purchase of their primary residence."18°
2.6.2.2.3 Additional Project Financing: Lebanese Banks in
Association with Foreign Banks
In addition to raising capital on the local and
international markets, and through loans from the I.F.C., some
Lebanese banks have also entered into joint ventures with
foreign banks for the purpose of providing credit for the
private sector.
A group of banks, led by Fransabank, have formed a leasing
company, named the Lebanese Leasing Company, in order to provide
local contractors and industry access to long-tern financing for
their equipment. The company, which is capitalised at $5
million, is majority owned by Fransabank, with Credit Agricole
of France, the I.F.C. and various local business people holding
a share.181
Also, the German government-owned development bank, D.E.G.,
acquired a 5% stake in Fransabank in 1995.182 D.E.G. chairman
Rainer Von Otergraven said that "the move is aimed at boosting
project finance capabilities in Lebanon and encouraging German
investment in the region." 183 As part of the package, the D.E.G.
has agreed to provide Fransabank with a $6.7 million credit
line, which would allow Fransabank to play a greater role in
providing medium and long term financing for domestic
180 Quoted in Lebanon Opportunities, Preview Issue, 46.
181 MEED (16 September 1994), 26; Economist Intelligence
Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 1st Quarter 1995, 19.
182 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 26.
183 MEED (29 September 1995), 21-22.
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borrowers 184
2.6.2.3 Meeting the Financial Needs of Post-War Lebanon:
Investment Banks and Finance Houses
While the commercial banks have admittedly played a
somewhat limited role in the economic recovery process, the same
can hardly be said of Lebanon's finance and investment banking
sector. In fact, since 1992, several new investment banks and
finance houses have been established in Beirut in order to
compensate for perceived shortcomings in this aspect of the
banking system. The financial houses and investment banks have
acted as financial advisors on several private sector projects,
and, in some cases, on projects listed in the Horizon 2000 plan.
In addition, some of the investment banks, particularly Lebanon
Invest, have played a regional role, thereby helping to validate
Beirut's claim as a regional banking and financial centre. It
may also be of particular interest to note that the new
investment banks and finance houses are sponsored by prominent
individuals and institutions from local, regional, and
international circles. This suggests not only that international
financial players have confidence in the Lebanese recovery
process, but also that they are prepared to seriously consider
at least the possibility of Beirut's resurgence as the regional
financial centre.
2.6.2.3.1 Lebanon Invest
The most active of the finance and investment houses, by
far, has been Lebanon Invest, an investment bank which was
founded in 1994 by Banque Audi, Luxembourg-based Capital Trust
184 Ibid.
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and Lebanese investor Marwan Ghandour, with a capital base of
$26 million.'85 It is based in Beirut partly because of the
country's favourable tax rate.'86 Lebanon Invest (Holding) is the
main enterprise, but the operational activities are carried out
by its subsidiary, Lebanon Invest (S.A.L.). Lebanon Invest
claims to be the largest investment and financial services group
based in Beirut. The investment bank has offered an array of
financial advisory services to investors wishing to invest in
the Levant region, including Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The
bank's services have also included the management of client
funds and investments. In particular, the bank has been
interested in income generating projects such as hotels and
other touristic facilities.'87
Lebanon Invest is backed by prominent Lebanese, Middle
Eastern, and international shareholders, both institutional and
individual. The international array of shareholders is
impressive. There are 21 institutional and corporate
shareholders originating from the following countries: 5 from
Kuwait, 4 from Lebanon, 3 from Saudi Arabia, 2 each from
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, and one each from the U.K., the
U.S., the Netherlands, Bahrain, and Liberia.' 88 This includes the
U.S. Brokerage & Finance house Donaldson, Lufkin & Jennette, and
185 From 1990-1993, he was a Vice Governor of the Central
Bank of Lebanon.
186 MEED (15 July 1994), 20-21.
187 Marwan Ghandour, "Investing in Lebanon's Growth &
Renewal: Investment Opportunities & Challenges: A Practitioner's
View"; Roula Khalaf, "Facing the New Order", 2.
188 Lebanon Invest, Lebanon Invest Group (Information
Pamphlet).
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the Luxembourg based Kredietbank Luxembourgeosis. 189 In addition,
there are 38 individual shareholders originating from the
following countries: 18 from Saudi Arabia, 12 from Lebanon, 3
from Kuwait, 2 from Jordan, and one each from the U.S., U.A.E.,
and Syria.' 90 The internationally visible Saudi businessman,
Prince Aiwaleed bin Talal, is also a major shareholder.'91
The board of directors for Lebanon Invest (Holdings)
includes an impressive group of international businessmen and
financiers. The chairman is Saudi Arabian businessman, lthduallah
al Hobayh, and the vice-chairman is Raymond Audi. Other members
include Waleed Hassan al Saggaf of Saudi Arabia, Sayer al Sayer,
who is representing the al Sayer Group of Kuwait, Ibdusalam al
Awadi of Kuwait, Au Ghandour of Lebanon, Nuhad Basha, who is
representing J.J. Lebanon, John Chalsty, who is representing
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jennette of the U.S., Faisal Kudsi, who is
representing Capital Trust, Odeh .Zthurdene of the U.S. who is
associated with Capital Trust, and Sami Khoury, who is
representing Questridge Corporation of the Netherlands.'92
The board of directors for Lebanon Invest (S.A.L.) consists
of 10 men, including Nuhad Basha, who is the chairman, Faisal
Kudsi, who is the representative for Lebanon Invest (Holding),
and Antoine Elias Maroun, who represents the management of
Lebanon Invest (S.A.L). Others board members include Mabmoud
189 MEED (1 July 1994), 22-23.
190 Lebanon Invest, Lebanon Invest Group. 	 -
191 See the report on him in Nicholas Blanford, "Saudi Prince
Takes Stake in LI TT , The Daily Star (Beirut: 31 January 1997), 9.
.192 Lebanon Invest, Lebanon Invest Group.
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Zuhdi Malhas of Saudi Arabia, who is also chairman of the Coca-
Cola bottling company of Jordan, bdulkade Abmad Askalan of
Jordan, who is the general manager and a member of the board at
the Oman Arab Bank, Samir Nicolas Hanna, who is the General
Manager of Banque Audi (S.A.L.), Bernard Barecqe, who represents
the Kredietbank Luxernbourgeoise, Au Selim Hobballah, who is the
General Director of Societe Generale de Papetrie au Senegal,
George Zeini, who represents the Arab Reinsurance Company, and
mad Mansour, who is the representative on the board for First
National (Holding) S.A.L.'93
The high calibre of people who work at the bank is a strong
indicator of the professionalism of Lebanon Invest. The top
professionals at the bank have earned M.A., M.B.A., or Ph.D.
degrees from American or Western European universities. The
professionals were recruited by Lebanon Invest from major
regional and international banking or financial institutions.'94
From the available evidence, Lebanon Invest appears to have
been a success. In its first full year of operations (1995), it
declared a net profit of almost one million dollars. Its assets
grew to $33.2 million including $12.8 million in Lebanese
treasury bills. 195 It should be clear from the information we
have already given in this chapter, that Lebanon Invest has been
intimately involved in a number of important projects in
193 Ibid.
194 See Ibid for details.
195 MEED (14 June 1996), 17.
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Lebanon.196
2.6.2.3.2 Other Investment and Finance Houses
Two other important investment and finance houses were
established in 1996. In January of 1996, Banque de la
Mediterrannee established a subsidiary investment bank named The
Mediterrannee Investment Bank. It was established with a start
up capital of $6.4 million and assets of over $220 million.'97
Also, in March of 1996, the I.F.C. approved plans to launch a
regional and investment bank with its Middle East office based
in Beirut, called Middle East Capital Group.' 98 The project is a
joint venture between I.F.C. and Saudi Arabia's National
Commercial Bank & B.Z.W., which is the investment arm of
Barclays Bank of the U.K. Other shareholders include Saudi
Arabia's bin Mahfouz family, and Khaled al Turki, founding
shareholder of Saudi .Pmerican Bank and chairman of ABC
International Bank, and Abmed al Badi of the Abu Dhabi-based
Belbadi group.' 99 The new bank will concentrate on promoting and
developing a secondary market for corporate and government
securities, underwriting equity and bond issues and making
private equity investment in private companies going public.
196 For a look at a couple of financial projects undertaken
by the investment house, see Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 1st Quarter 1997, 26.
The Central Bank has encouraged banks to establish
subsidiaries to deal in investment banking. See Roula Khalaf,
"Facing the New Order", 2; NEED (12 July 1996), 18-19; Lebanon
Opportunities, Preview Issue, 49.
198 Officially, the bank is based in the Channel Islands.
199 See NEED (2 February 1996), 22; Economist Intelligence
Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 3rd Quarter 1996, 24; Lebanon
Opportunities, Preview Issue, 46.
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Initially, the bank will focus on developing business in the
Levant including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Gaza.20°
Another investment bank actively involved in Lebanon is J.
Henry Schroder & Company. The bank, which has a London based
sister company called Schroder Asseily & Company, is 65% owned
by the U.K.'s Schroder and 35% by the Asseily family. The bank
has offered the typical range of investment banking services,
but, it has also attempted to fill a void by offering project
finance. As Tony Asseily put it, "The local banks are just not
equipped for major project finance". 201 J. Henry Schroder &
Company has been involved in several projects including: raising
$50 million to finance the expansion of the local cement
company, Cimenterie Nationale; raising millions of dollars of
capital to develop the New City commercial and residential
complex in Beirut; and helping to restructure the local Banque
du Credit Populaire.202
2.6.2.4 Beirut As A Magnet For International Banking and
Finance Firms
By this point, we hope that we have demonstrated that the
international financial community has evinced a strong interest
in the Lebanese recovery, and in the future of Beirut as a
regional financial centre. International interests have shown a
high level of confidence in Beirut T s financial sector by
200 MEED (3 November 1993), 6; Lebanon Opportunities, Preview
Issue, 46.
201 The finance house raised capital on the international
market for the Societe Hoteliere de Tourisme, which are the
owners of the al-Bustan hotel. MEED (16 June 1995), 11-19, 25-
26.
202 MEED (23 February 1996), 25; Lebanon Opportunities,
Preview Issue, 49.
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investing in the commercial banks through the purchase of
international bonds and certificates of deposit. The
international community has also become directly involved by
participating in the sponsorship of investment banks and finance
houses. Finally, international institutions such as the I.F.C.
have shown confidence in the Lebanese financial sector by
furnishing Lebanese banks with substantial loans. Now, we will
also show that elements of the international business community
have responded to Beirut's attempts to
encourage them to establish bases of operation in the city.203
Several international banking firms from the U.K., Germany,
France, the Netherlands, the U.S., and the Gulf region have
established a presence in Beirut, with many of them using the
Lebanese capital as a regional base. As John Manser, chairman of
the U.K.'s merchant bank Robert Flemings & Company explained:
"The Middle East does not have a clear, dominant financial
centre. Tradition is on Beirut's side, it needs building up."204
Manser led a U.K. delegation to Beirut on 23-25 October 1994,
which included representatives from the London Stock Exchange,
Schroder Asseily, Coopers & Lybrand, Samuel Montagu and Morgan
Grenfell, to promote British financial services.205
Three international banks established a presence in Beirut
in 1994. In mid-1994, the Dutch bank, Internationale Nederlanden
203 Counted among them was Edmond Safra, the leading
internatinal Lebanese banker, who controls the Republic National
Bank of New York. He showed interest in reactivating the bank's
Beirut subsidiary, Banque National de Credit. See Narwan
Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 23.
204 Quoted in MEED (11 November 1994)
205 MEED (4 November 1994), 30.
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Bank (I.N.G. - Bank) set up a fully-fledged branch in Beirut,
the first foreign bank branch to be established in 25 years.
Bank officials say the aim is to use the Beirut branch to cover
the entire Middle East. 206 In November of that year, Robert
Flemings & Company decided to set up a representative office in
Beirut to serve a number of countries including Lebanon, Syria,
the Palestinian territories, Turkey, Egypt, and Cyprus. The
Beirut office will concentrate on raising funds for capital
market investments in the region, and it also plans to help
banks and corporations develop long range strategies to deal
with their currency exposures. 207 London based U.B.A.F. bank also
established a representative office in Beirut in 1994.208
Several international banks either established a presence
in Beirut in 1995 or were planning to do so. Germany's
Cominerzbank reactivated its representative office, which was
closed because of the civil war, 209
 while Citibank of the U.S.
decided to open a full branch. 21° J.P. Morgan & Company of the
U.S. reactivated its representative office licence, 21' both the
206 NEED (22 July 1994), 25; (20 January 1995), 25; Economist
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 2nd Quarter 1996,
20.
207 MEED (11 November 1994) 17.
208 NEED (20 January 1995), 25; Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 2nd Quarter 1995, 19.
209 NEED (20 January 1995), 25; Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 2nd Quarter 1995, 19; Marwan Iskandar,
Lebanese Economy 1995, 24-25.
210 NEED (23 February 1996), 25; Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese
Economy 1995, 24-25.
211 NEED (20 January 1995), 25, Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese
Economy 1995, 24-25.
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Scotia Bank of Canada and the Bank of Tokyo opened a
representative office, 212 and Malaysia's largest bank, Malayan
Bank was considering establishing an office. 213 The Bahrain
based Gulf International Bank (G.I.B.) decided to open an office
in Beirut to study investment opportunities. 214 G.I.B. general
manager Ghazi .bdul Jawal said the office "will study and
identify investment opportunities, cement existing ties or set
up new links with Lebanese banks and also take part in financing
development projects. ,,215
In 1996, the German bank, Berliner Bank, opened a
representative office in Lebanon. It aims to play a role in the
growing economic relationship between • Germany and Lebanon.216
Toqueville Middle East, part of the French-american investment
firm, opened up a branch office in Beirut to handle its Middle
Eastern operations. 217 Finally, in 1997, Merrill Lynch announced
plans to expand its Beirut office. 218
 In addition to
established banks and financial institutions which have set up
bases of operation in Beirut, a consortium of local and foreign
212 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 24-25.
213 MEED (24 November 1995), 14.
214 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon -
2nd Quarter 1995, 19; Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy, 25; and
Arab Press Service, Diplomat 4 Recorder Covering (7/14 January
1995), 43.
215 NEED (20 January 1995), 25.
216 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanon Opportunities, Preview Issue,
49.
217 Ibid, 46.
218 Nicholas Blanford, "Merrill Lynch Set to Expand Beirut
Office", The Daily Star (Beirut: Thursday 27 February 1997), 7.
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individuals and institutions have created a new bank called the
First National Bank, which opened in 1996. The bank, which
started with a paid up capital of $5 million, is backed by
investors from Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the U.A.E.219
2.7 The Stock Market
As we have demonstrated above, investors have invested
capital in Lebanon, both in the real estate market and in the
banking system. In effect, these are really the only two sectors
that investors feel comfortable investing in. In this section,
we will discuss the Hariri government's plans to revive the
Beirut Stock Exchange (B.S.E.) in the hope of using it to
attract foreign and expatriate capital. We will argue that
although some progress has been made in attracting capital to
the stock market, its role will nevertheless, remain limited.
2.7.1 The Purpose of the Beirut Stock Exchange
The Beirut Stock Exchange (B.S.E.) was reactivated in 1995
after an absence of more than 10 years. The Hariri government
has introduced several new features aimed at modernising the
stock exchange. These included the establisbxnent of an
independent regulatory body, 22° the passage of laws establishing
219 Investors in the bank include Khaled .bdallah Sakr and
Suad al Sabah, both of Kuwait; Khalaf and Mohammed al Habtour of
the U.A.E.; Mutlaq al Mutlaq of Saudi Arabia; Lebanese Minister
Marwan Hamadeh and former Minister Mikhail Daher, and several
others. See Marwan Iskandar, The Lebanese Economy 1995, Lebanon
Opportunities, Preview Issue, 49; NEED (5 June 1996), 13.
220 The B.S.E. is regulated by a committee headed by the
Banque du Liban. The committee also included the finance,
justice, and economy ministers, a member from Societe Financiere
Libanaise, 33 intermediaries from 30 banks and 3 finance
339
the rules for trading, 22' and the introduction of laws aimed at
protecting the investor. 222 To qualify for a listing on the
B.S.E., a company has to be in existence for at least three
years, and meet stringent requirements.
The B.S.E. was to perform several functions. To begin
with, there would, of course, be the usual listing of blue chip
companies, of which Solidere would be the most prominent.
Second, the exchange was to attract mutual funds and act as a
market for treasury bills and Eurobonds. Third, government owned
organisations which are likely to be privatised were also to be
listed on the exchange. Fourth, banks were to trade a portion of
their shares on the B.S.E. Such a move would give the banks'
access to greater capital, which would presumably, in turn, give
them greater resources to extend loans to the private sector.
Fifth, the B.S.E. was to serve as a regional exchange rather
than a local one. The idea was to attract regional companies who
would agree to be listed on the B.S.E. As the head of the stock
market committee, Gabriel Sehnaoui, explained, "the aim is to
create a regional, rather than a local market." 223 For example,
representatives from the B.S.E. have held discussions with
leaders in Dahrain and Tunisia about cross-listing.224
companies, Solidere chairman Nasser Chamuma, and representatives
of the public.
221 For example, to prevent speculation, the price of a given
stock will not be allowed to rise or fall by more than 5% a day.
MEED (1 July 1994), 22-23.
222 See NEED (4 November 1994), 30.
223 NEED (1 July 1994), 22-23.
224 NEED (24 February 1995), 33.
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As noted, the aim of the stock exchange was to attract
funds from foreign sources, and particularly Lebanese
expatriates. As a leading proponent of the stock market pointed
out, "We want above all to create vehicles for Lebanese abroad
to invest, without physically coming to the country."225
2.7.2. The Stock Market: Strengthening Beirut's Role as a
Financial Centre
There has been considerable debate concerning the role that
the stock market may play in Lebanon's economic recovery.
Advocates of the stock market paint a rosy picture of its
potential effectiveness, both in drawing funds for the economic
recovery of the country, and in playing -a major role in
strengthening Beirut's status as a financial centre. Support has
come from the Central Bank, the government, the I.M.F. and the
World Bank. Perhaps the most outspoken supporter of the stock
market is Central Bank Vice Governor, Nasser Saidi, who has
published several works on the subject. 226 It was hoped that
approximately 45 blue chip companies would be listed on the
225 The quote was attributed to Yassine Jaber, a meniber of
the stock exchange committee. NEED (24 February 1995), 33.
226 They include: N. Saidi, and S. Nasr (eds.), The
Development of Lebanon's Capital Markets, (Beirut: 1995); N.
Saidi, "The Development of Lebanon's Capital Markets" Economic,
Legal and Organisational Issues", in N. Saidi and S. Nasr
(eds.), The Development of Lebanon's Capital Markets; N. Saidi,
"Financing Reconstruction: Issues and Opportunities", Financial
Times Conference - Lebanon Toward 2000: Opportunities for
Finance and Investment in a Re-emerging Market (8-9 June 1995);
N. Saidi, "The Economic Reconstruction of Lebanon: War, Peace,
and Modernisation", in Deirdre Collings (ed.), Peace for
Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction (London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1994), 195-212.
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stock exchange within the first year. 227 Furthermore, it was
hoped that the market capitalisation of the B.S.E. would reach
$30 billion by the year 2000.228 There has also been qualified
support concerning the capabilities of the stock market from the
Western press, including The Financial Times, and from journals
which specialise in the Middle East, including the Middle East
Economic Digest •229
However, the views expressed by proponents of the stock
market have been severely criticised as being overly
optimistic. 23° To cite one example of this, the B.S.E. was not
able to attract nearly as many blue chip companies in its first
year as had been hoped (45 or so, as noted above). In fact,
only, perhaps, half a dozen companies were listed.
2.7.3 The Beirut Stock Exchange: Attracting Investor Capital?
Lebanon has several advantages, which may prove valuable in
attracting investor capital to the Beirut Stock Exchange.
Unlike other countries in the region, Lebanon has had a
tradition of being friendly to foreign investors. The country
has a liberal financial system, a low tax structure, and no
capital gains tax. In addition, Beirut has the skilled manpower
to run a stock market. Furthermore, a clearing and settlement
227 NEED (7 July 1995), 5, 27.
228 NEED (7 July 1995), 5, 27.
229 For a generally balanced article, however, see Julian
Ozanne, "Symptom of Change", Financial Time Survey - Lebanon
(Tuesday 6 June 1995), 2.
230 For a critique, see Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud Leenders,
"Lebanon: The Emerging Regional Financial Center? 2-\msterdam
Middle East Papers no.6 (August, 1996), 1-23.
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system, operated by Midclear, is already in place. Midclear is
75% owned by the Central Bank with the remaining stake owned by
local and international banks and brokerage houses. 23' The
company will be responsible for ensuring the settlement of
transactions within a period of three days, and will also be
responsible for setting up a system which will register all
transactions electronically without the necessity of handing
over documentation to shareholders.232
2.7.4 Constraints to a Successful Stock Market
As we noted, the optimistic view regarding the potential of
the stock market to channel funds into Lebanon has not escaped
criticism. 233 In fact, critics point to several characteristics
of the Lebanese economy which may make potential investors wary
about investing in the B.S.E. In addition, a lack of reliable
information regarding macroeconomic developments and information
about the companies themselves, political instability, and
increased competition from regional stock markets, may also
hinder investor appetite for B.S.E. stock.
2.7.4.1 Characteristics of the Lebanese Economy
There are at least three characteristics of the Lebanese
231 Midclear was established in 1994 following the
recommendation of an international study completed in mid-1994.
MEED (7 July 1995), 5, 27.
232 Ibid.
233 In particular, see Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud Leenders,
"The Lebanese Economy: Exaggerated Prospects", Middle East
International (4 October 1996), 19. A more extensive version of
their argument can be found in Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud
Leenders, "Lebanon: The Emerging Regional Financial Center?", 1-
23.
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economy which may hinder the establishment of a successful stock
market.
Foremost among these is that most Lebanese businesses,
especially the largest ones, are family owned. As Marwan Khair
al Din, a member of the stock market committee, pointed out,
vv there is a saying that the Lebanese economy is made up of 100
families."234 These families are very reluctant to list their
companies on the stock market for fear of losing control of
their respective companies. In an attempt to alleviate some of
these concerns, some international investment houses operating
in Beirut, including Robert Flemings, have attempted to convince
these companies of the advantages of being listed on the stock
market, while still keeping majority control over the company.235
A second problem relates to the concept of joint-stock
companies and the nature of management in such companies. As we
noted above, a major rationale behind creating a stock market in
Lebanon was to attract investors, who had previously been
limited, for the most part, to investing in either the real
estate market or to simply depositing their money in bank
accounts, in the course of investing in Lebanon. However, one
could seriously question whether or not Lebanese or other Middle
Eastern joint-stock companies would be attractive investments.236
234 Quoted in Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud Leenders, "The
Lebanese Economy: Exaggerated Prospects", 19.
235 Interview with Dominic Herbert, Robert Flemings
representative at the Beirut office, on 21 Febri.iary 1997.
236 This point was made by Paul Mourani in an interview with
the author on 14 February 1997. For a look at this problem, see
Paul Mourani, "Decision Making in Reconstruction: The
Consequences of Monopoly-Type Solutions", 118.
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There is always the danger in joint-stock companies, in which
there is a separation between ownership and management, that the
chances for corruption amongst the management is high. In
developed economies, strict rules governing management behaviour
exist to help alleviate, although by no means completely
eliminate, this problem. In Lebanon, and other Middle Eastern
states, strict rules governing management behaviour are
practically non-existent. Therefore, the potential for
management corruption is high. For, example, joint-stock
companies with dispersed ownership in Lebanon have been plagued
by mismanagement and corruption, including such companies as
Intra and M.E.A. 237 Given this situation, it may be doubtful that
investors would retrieve optimal returns on their investments.
A third factor which may be seen as a constraint to the
stock market, is that there are very few companies in Lebanon
which would be considered suitable to be listed on the stock
market. Lebanon is simply too small a market, and the majority
of Lebanese firms are too small to offer investors a substantial
return on their investments. 238
 Of the companies listed on the
market before it closed in 1983, only seven survived the war.
2.7.4.2 Other Constraints
As we noted above, there are other constraints which would
indicate to us that a stock market would probably not be a major
source for the attraction of investment into the country. To
237 Interview with Paul Mourani in Beirut on 14 February
1997; Paul Mourani, "Decision Making in Reconstruction: The
Consequences of Monopoly-Type Solutions", 118.
238 Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud Leenders, "Lebanon: The
Emerging Regional Financial Center?", 7-8.
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begin with, potential investors need to know as much information
as possible about the company, and about macro-economic
developments in a general. On both points, information is
relatively hard to come by in Lebanon. We have explained
elsewhere that the Lebanese government cannot even measure GNP,
let alone provide detailed information about other aspects of
the Lebanese economy. As for Lebanese companies, unlike those
in Western countries, they do not tend to keep a meticulous
account of their records. As one Lebanese banker explained:
"People here are just not accustomed to write financial
statements."239 Given the lack of accurate information about a
company, or even regarding macroeconomic figures, potential
investors would find it difficult to make a rational choice
about investing in the Beirut Stock Exchange.
Another potential constraint is that the Beirut Stock
Exchange is likely to find stiff competition in attracting
foreign investors from other regional stock markets, including
the Egyptian and Jordanian ones. In fact, the Egyptian stock
market, not the Beirut Stock Exchange, is seen by Western
financial houses as being the most "exciting" prospect for
investors in the region. 24° For example, Egyptian investors
abroad have directed considerable amounts of capital back into
Egypt.24'
Finally, many investors, both Western, and Lebanese
239 Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud Leenders; "The Lebanese
Economy: Exaggerated Prospects", 20.
240 Interview with a Western banker operating out of Beirut.
241 Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud Leenders, "Lebanon: The
Emerging Regional Financial Center?", 8.
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expatriates, are still quite reluctant to invest in Lebanon due
to the legacy of war, the continued problems in the south, which
may expand into a larger conflict, and the continued instability
of the political system. In particular, every time Hariri has
resigned, or threatened to resign, Lebanon's macroeconomic
instability becomes evident.
2.8 The Tourism Sector
Prior to the civil war, tourism was a major industry in
Lebanon, with revenue from the tourist trade accounting for as
much as 20% of the country's GNP. 242 For this reason, rebuilding
the tourist industry has been one of the Lebanese government's
high priorities. The purpose of this section is to look at
developments in the tourist sector.
2.8.1 Government Attempts to Improve the Tourist Industry
The government's direct efforts to reconstruct the tourist
industry have extended into four areas. To begin with, since
Hariri's appointment as Prime Minister, the government has
overhauled the Ministry of Tourism. The ministry's system of
record-keeping has been computerised, allowing the ministry to
keep meticulous statistics related to all aspects of the tourist
trade, including counting the number of tourists who visit
Lebanon, the sites they visit while staying in the country, and
the number of hotel reservations. Second, the Ministry of
Tourism, in conjunction with the United Nations Development
Program and the international tourism organisation (ONT),
242	
-, Visitor no.2 (2nd quarter 1996), 10.
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developed a master plan for the tourist industry. The ministry
also received assistance in the development of a tourism
strategy from a French team supported by the French
government. 243 Third, the government made it a priority to
renovate and reopen major tourist attractions, including the
Casino du Liban, 244 the Jeita caves, and the Istirahat rest
houses in Sidon and Tyre. In 1996, the Ministry of Tourism
illuminated many of the historical buildings and fortresses
around the country and has begun work on the ruins in Tyre,
Tibnin, and Sidon. There are also plans to revive Lebanon's
famous Baalbek festival, and plans to create a national park in
Dahr al Baydar and a national exhibition centre in Jounieh.245
Finally, the government has attempted to market Lebanon as a
tourist attraction to the rest of the world. The Ministry of
Tourism reopened its offices throughout Lebanon, and in major
regional and international cities including Cairo, Jeddah, and
London. The ministry also participated in international tourist
exhibitions in Paris, Milaii, •I½msterdam, Gothenburg, Geneva,
Cairo, and Dubai. Its advertising and public relations personnel
have updated the ministry's brochures and guides covering 11
major tourist sites, and have published guides covering hotels,
restaurants, and ski resorts. In addition, the ministry has
produced a film called Lebanon Today in English, French and
243 Michael Karam, "A Centre for Selective Tourism", Visitor
(2nd Quarter 1996), 10.
244 For details, see -----, "The Casino du Liban is to
Reopen", The Lebanon Report no.3 (Fall, 1995), 20; Economist
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 1st Quarter 1997,
24.
245 Michael Karam, "A Centre for Selective Tourism", 10.
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Arabic 246
Indirectly, the Hariri government has also encouraged the
redevelopment of the tourist sector by offering incentives,
including customs exemptions, to the private sector to develop,
or to cater to, the tourist industry. These efforts have been
targeted particularly at those operating in the hotel industry.
Some of these incentives might be interpreted as being more
negative than positive. For example, in a move to encourage
owners of damaged hotels in Beirut to start with renovating
them, the government passed a law in October 1995 that
renovation of the hotels must begin by the end of 1996, or else
their assets would be taken over by property companies set up
according to law 117.247
2.8.2 Private Sector Interest in the Tourist Sector: The
Hotels
One way to assess the level of private sector confidence in
the Lebanese economy in general, and in the tourist trade in
particular, is to look at developments , in the hotel trade. At
the beginning of 1996, Lebanon had 6,500 rooms in 218 hotels,
compared to 14,000 rooms in 569 hotels in 1974. The government
estimated that 18,000 rooms would be required by the year
2002 248
The hotel industry has seen impressive growth over the past
246 Ibid.
247	 (10 November 1995), 24.
248 Visitor (2nd Quarter 1996), 56. For a look at
developments in the sector, see -----, "Hotel Reconstruction and
the Tourism Sector", The Lebanon Report, no.3 (Fall, 1995), 21.
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few years, particularly with the building or reconstruction of
several five star hotels. 249 Between 1994 and mid-1996 the
Ministry of Tourism issued 59 permits to construct new hotels.25°
Many international chains have established or reestablished a
base in Lebanon, including the Mariott, the Intercontinental,
and the Sheraton, all from the U.S., and Hilton International of
the U.K. In addition, Arab businessman, such as Saudi Adnan
Khashoggi, have also planned to develop hotels.251
The new five star Beirut Mariott Hotel, located in the Jnah
district of southwest Beirut, opened on 1 May 1996. It was the
first hotel managed by an international chain to be opened in
Lebanon since the war. The hotel is owned by Ziad Fakhry's Jnah
Development Company, an affiliate of the local development
company Safeco. 252 The owners of the hotel secured a $2 million
loan from a local bank to furnish the hotel with U.S.
manufactured goods. 253
 The loan was guaranteed by the U.S.'s
249 Derek Kelly of the British Bank of the Middle East
criticised the trend toward building five star hotels. He argues
that the money would be better spent on marketing. See Derek
Kelly, "Lebanon as a Gateway to the Middle East and Europe",
Financial Times Conference (Beirut: 8 June 1995); 16-17.
For a brief look at some of the hotel projects, see Marwan
Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 40-45.
250 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon -
4th Quarter 1996, 23.
251 For Khashoggi's role in this sector in specific, and
growth in the sector in general, see Lebanon Opportunities,
Preview Issue, 51.
252 It has 174 guest rooms including 42 executive rooms and a
presidential suite, a shopping mall, four cinemas, several
restaurants, a fitness centre, and a business centre.-----
Visitor no.2 (2nd Quarter, 1996), 58.
253 The agreement was with Banque Beyrouth Pour le Commerce.
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Import-Export	 bank	 (ExiInbank),	 which	 is	 particularly
significant, as it was the first loan guaranteed by Exirnbank in
Lebanon in twenty years.254
In autumn of 1995, Hilton International of the U.K. stated
its desire to return to Beirut to manage an approximately 600
room five star hotel located in the Beirut Central District. The
hotel, which is owned by the local/Saudi Societe Mediterrane des
Grands Hotels, was originally completed in 1975 but was later
damaged during the war. The refurbisbment of the hotel is
scheduled to be completed in late 1998.255
Beirut's once famous Phoenicia Hotel, to be managed by the
Intercontinental Hotel Corporation, is also being redeveloped.
The hotel will have approximately 600 rooms including 50 suites,
and the usual facilities one would expect from a five star
hotel. Redevelopment of the hotel is to begin in early 1997.
Several international construction firms have bid for the
contract to rebuild the hotel, including a consortium of
Trafalgar House and John Laing, both of the U.K., Philipp
Holzmann of Germany, Besix of Belgium, a consortium of the
U.K.'s Costain International with the local Almabani General
Contractors, and a consortium of Sweden's Skanska and the local
C.A.T. 256
 The Athens based contracting firm, C.C.C., is
254 See MEED (5 April 1996), 16; Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 3rd Quarter 1996, 22; Lebanon
Opportunities, Preview Issues, 51.
255 The hotel will be one of the largest in Beirut and will
include five restaurants, a coffee shop, a night club, a
conference room, and a ballroom. See Visitor no.2 (2nd Quarter
1996), 57; -----, "Hilton Leads Hotel Comeback", The Lebanon
Report 4, no.10 (October, 1993), 9.
256 NEED (19 July 1996), 21.
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construction manager. 257
 The owners of the Phoenicia, Societe
des Grands Hotels du Liban, secured financing for the $80
million project in June 1996. Lebanon Invest and Capital Trust
managed a share placement worth approximately $31 million in
Societe des Grands Hotels du Liban, with buyers from both the
Arab world and the West. Additional financing will come from a
$45 million loan from Fransabank, of which $10 million will be
underwritten by D.E.G. of Germany.258
The Societe des Grands Hotels du Liban has also been
renovating the Vendome Hotel, which will also come under the
management of the Intercontinental chain. The Vendome is a small
five star hotel, with 96 rooms.259
The renovation of Beirut's Meridien hotel is another
colossal hotel project. When completed in the summer of 1997,
the hotel will include 340 rooms, 12 restaurants, a nightclub,
and a major health and fitness club which will be one of the
largest in the Middle East. In addition, the hotel will have a
marina with a capacity to accommodate approximately 180 boats.26°
Several other hotels have been, or are in the process of
being, built or renovated in Beirut. These include a new
Sheraton hotel, which is to be built in the Ramlet al-Baida
area, the expansion of the five star al Bustan hotel, which is
257 NEED (26 July 1996), 32.
258 The remainder of the financing will come from
shareholders and local banks. See NEED (7 June 1996), 26;
Etonomist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Lebanon - 4th
Quarter 1996, 23; Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 40-41.
259 The hotel is located near the once famous St. Georges
hotel. Visitor (2nd Quarter 1996).
260 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 41.
352
located in the resort town of Beit Men north of Beirut, 26 ' the
renovation of the Cadmos hotel, and the construction of several
quality hotels in the Jounieh vicinity including the $40 million
Regency Palace Hotel (located in Adma), and the PortEmilio hotel
(located in Kaslik) 262 In addition, Al! .lthdulla Jarnrnal, head of
the local Jaxnmal Trust, is planning to build a new $100 million
five star hotel, in the Raouche district of Beirut.263
Many hotels are also being constructed as part of larger
conimercial or residential complexes, including one at the Golden
Cedar Club complex, two hotels at the Palais de Congres
enterprise, one at the St. Charles City Centre project, and one
at a tourist resort at the Jeita caves in Kesrouan.
Finally, hotels are also planned for Beirut International
Airport (B.I.A.) and the Casino du Liban. The hotel at the
airport is to built on a B.O.T. basis. 264 The cost of the hotel
at Casino du Liban is estimated at $35 million, and will include
approximately 200 rooms.265
261 The local investment house, Middle East Capital Group,
will assist the owners of the hotel with financing the
expansion. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: .
 Lebanon
- 4th Quarter 1996, 23.
262 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 44.
263 The newly renovated Cadmos hotel opened on 11 January
1996. The renovation cost $5 million and took two years to
complete. See Visitor no.2 (2nd Quarter, 1996), 58-59.
For details about the new hotel being planned by Jainmal,
see MEED (26 July 1996), 32; Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Lebanon - 4th Quarter 1996, 23; Lebanon
Opportunities, Preview Issue, 51.
264 MEED (26 July 1996), 32.
265 MEED (16 December 1994), 13-14.
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2.8.3 Other Private Sector Initiatives in the Tourist Sector
In addition to the development of hotels to accommodate
tourists, the private sector has also developed a number of
tourist resorts, including ones located at the Jeita Caves, at a
site north of Tyre, and one in al Mansourieh. A tourist resort
at the Jeita caves in the Kesrouan district of Mount Lebanon is
being developed by local and Arab investors. The plan is to
build a hotel and a number of chalets on a 7,000 square metre
site at an estimated cost of $71 million. 266 Au Abdallah Jammal
is planning to build a tourist village at al Qasimjya, north of
the southern city of Tyre. It is estimated that the project
will cost $200 million. 267
 Finally, a Lebanese-U.S. consortium
operating under the name "Recreational Management" are planning
to build a water sport amusement park in al Mansourieh in early
1998. The project, estimated to cost $8 million, will include
amusement parks, golf courses, water sports, as well as
restaurants, movie theatres and sports centers. The two U.S.
firms involved in the project are called "Putt Putt" and "Water
Technology" 268
2.8.4 The Number of Tourists Arriving in Lebanon
So far, we have shown that both the government and the
private sector have invested significant resources in the
tourist industry. The question that arises is whether or not
266 NEED (4 June 1993), 26.
267 NEED (17 May 1996), 13.
268 Banque Audi, The Weekly Local Economic Report week 6
(3rd-9th February 1997), 4.
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tourists have decided to return to Lebanon. 269 In 1994 alone,
850,000 people visited the country. Out of that total, 322,000
foreign tourists stayed at 41 hotels between May of 1994 and
December 1994.270 Between 1992 and 1995, there was a 130%
increase in tourists to Lebanon. The highest number have tended
to come from the E.IJ., followed by Arab nationals.27'
2.9 The Industrial Sector
The purpose of this sub-section is to see what has occurred
since 1992 in Lebanon's industrial sector, which accounts for
about 20% of the GNP. 272 We will look at three areas related to
developments in this sector. First, we will look at government
industrial policy. Second, we will look at the support given to
Lebanon's industrial sector by national and international
financial institutions. Finally, we will look at growth in the
industrial sector.
2.9.1 Government Policies Toward the Industrial Sector
As we have mentioned several times previously, one of the
Hariri government's top priorities was to pursue policies aimed
at	 strengthening	 Lebanon's	 financial	 and	 commercial
capabilities. It is unclear, however, to what extent the Hariri
269 The central bank keeps a monthly record of the number of
people who arrive in Lebanon via Beirut International Airport.
See Banque du Liban, Monthly Bulletin.
270, "Hotel Reconstruction and the Tourism Sector", The
Lebanon Report no.3 (Fall, 1995), 21.
271, "Foreign Visitors Keep Coming", The Lebanon Report
no.3 (Fall, 1996), 16-17.
272 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 93.
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government has made growth in the industrial sector a major
priority. According to one of Lebanon's leading economists,
however, the industrial sector lacked adequate support from the
government. 273
 The government has, however, taken some limited
steps to assist the sector. In 1996, the government signed a
contract with Arthur D. Little of the U.S. to carry out a
comprehensive study of the industrial sector and to offer
prospects for its development. Furthermore, the government has
taken a few steps to help encourage growth. To begin with, as we
explained in section one of the chapter, the government
established a Bank for the Development of Industry and Tourism.
To reiterate, the law establishing the bank stated "that the
bank is entrusted with financing industrial and touristic
projects, and that it is to encourage the investment of domestic
and foreign capital into such projects." 274
 Second, in the
summer of 1996, the government-backed Investment Development
Authority of Lebanon began a series of studies to determine the
viability of a pilot project, a light industrial park north of
Sidon. The government planned to buy the land, build the
infrastructure and lease the property to the private sector.275
Finally, the government has employed tariffs to protect some
industries, such as the domestic furniture sector, while
decreasing tariffs on imported raw materials necessary for
273 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 94.
274 Quoted in Middle East Economic Survey XXXVIII no.5, (31
October 1994).
275 MEED (23 August 1996), 22.
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Lebanese industry. 276
 Having said this, however, in the summer
of 1993, the government had planned to reduce custom duties by
50%, a process that industrialists claim would hurt the Lebanese
industry sector. As the president of the Industrialists'
Association, Jacques Sarraf, explained, the "government had
opted for an anti-industrial policy.277
2.9.2 Support From National and International Financial
Institutions
Private sector industry has also received assistance from
national and international financial institutions, although
access to credit is still difficult to obtain.. 278 The local
financial institution, Lebanon Invest, has played a role in
assisting industrialists, especially those involved in the
smaller enterprises. For example, Lebanon Invest has raised
nearly $6 million in order to provide small and medium sized
loans to local industries. The loans were to be between $500,000
and $2 million to help industries prepare for flotation on the
stock market. 279 At the international level, the I.F.C. has been
particularly helpful in assisting industrialists. As the
regional director for the I.F.C. in the Middle East, North
276 In 1995, 2% decreases in tariffs were decided on 185 raw
materials used in such sectors as electricity, telephone cables,
soft drinks, and car batteries, while tariff increases ranged
from 15 to 20% on textiles, and 30% on imported bottle water.
For more details, see Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995,
97-98.
277 Quoted in -----, "Industrialists Unhappy", The Lebanon
Report 4, no.7 (July, 1993), 8.
278 Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 94.
279 MEED (3 September 1995), 22.
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Africa, and Central Asia, Andre Hovaguimian, explained: "The
I.F.C. could play a major role in Lebanon's rehabilitation by
supporting its private sector."28° As we have noted in sub-
section five of this chapter, the I.F.C. has either provided
loans to Lebanese industry directly, or it has provided loans
via Lebanese banks.
2.9.3 Growth in the Industrial Sector
Growth in the industry sector has occurred during the
period under study. 28' We will site a few figures. According to
figures released by the General Directorate of Industry,
investment in light industry increased substantially between
1991 and 1992. In 1992 a total of 462 licences to build
factories was issued accounting for $30 million of investment.
In addition, $67 million of machinery was imported for the
factories from such countries as Italy, Germany and the TJ.K.282
In the first half of 1993, machinery imports increased to $300
million. Many companies, particularly in the light industrial
sector, including textiles, printing and food, have built new
plants or expanded existing ones, and have updated their
technological capabilities. 283 In 1995, 431 firms valued at $60
million and employing 3,451 workers were set-up. These new firms
were most heavily concentrated in producing food and beverages,
280 MEED (2 April 1993), 30.
281 For a monthly record of the number of ftew registrations
of industrial firms and their associated jobs, see Banque du
Liban, Monthly Bulletin.
282 NEED (12 February 1993), 26.
283 NEED (25 June 1993), 11.
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followed by metal products, and furniture and wood. 284 In 1996,
459 new industrial enterprises were founded, employing 3,414
people.285
2.9.3.1 Growth in the Cement Industry
Lebanon's cement industry has enjoyed impressive growth
thanks to strong demand from the construction industry. The
country's three cement companies, the Sibline Cement Company,
Cimenterie Nationale, and Societe des Ciments Libanais, have all
enjoyed healthy profits, and have planned major expansions to
meet increased demand for their products.286
In May of 1995, the largest of Lebanon's cement companies,
Societe des Ciments Libanais, announced plans for an estimated
$150 million expansion project. Krupp Polysius of France was
awarded the contract. The cement company, which is majority
owned by Switzerland's Holderbank, raised funds for the project
by tapping the local and international bond markets including
the issue of a $50 million Eurobond in January 1996. The
Eurobond issue, which was managed by S.B.C. Warburg and priced
at 350 basis points above U.S. treasurie.s, was oversubscribed at
its launch. In an indication of support for the Lebanese
economy, 40% of the Eurobond was sold to institutional European
284 See Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 98; Lebanon
Opportunities, Preview Issues, 69.
285 Banque Audi, Quarterly Economic Report (4th Quarter
1996), 2.
286 For a brief study of Lebanon's cement industry, see
Flemings Research, Emerging Opportunities: Cement Review -
Eastern Mediterranean (Flemings Research: November 1996), 40-50.
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investors 287
Lebanon's second largest cement company, Cimenterie
Nationale, 288 expanded its Chekka plant in 1996 in order to
double its production capacity. Equipment for the approximately
$85 million expansion was supplied by Germany's Kloeckner
Huniboldf Deutz. In March of 1995, the cement company signed an 8
year $50 million loan with a number of international
institutions including the I.F.C., the Banque Nationale de
Paris, and the Netherlands Development Finance Company. The
finance house, George Asseily and Company is financial advisor
to the cement company. The significance of the loan was
commented on by the I.F.C. regional director, Andre Hovaguimian:
"the loan was a mark of confidence in Lebanese
reconstruction. ,,289
The Sibline cement company signed a $100 million contract
on 15 October 1995 with France's Technip to expand its Sidon
plant. Civil works for the project were carried out by the
C.C.C. Sibline raised funds for the project on the local and
international bond market. An interesting group of powerful
businessmen/politicians own the Sibline plant. P.M. Hariri owns
26% of the company, the Druse leader, and sometime political
287 NEED (26 January 1996), 20; (1 December 1995), 15-16; (2
June 1995), 4-5, 17; (12 May 1995), 27. For a brief history of
the company, see Flemings Research, Emerging Opportunities:
Cement Review - Eastern Mediterranean, 46-48.
288 It has 28 shareholders, although it is dominated by the
Doument and Asseily families. Flemings Research, Emerging
Opportunities: Cement Review - Eastern Mediterranean, 49.
289 NEED (14 April 1995), 34. For a brief history of the
company, see Flemings Research, Emerging Opportunities: Cement
Review - Eastern Mediterranean, 49.
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critic of Hariri, Walid Juinblatt owns 28%, businessman Iskander
Bourn owns 10%, and the brothers Adnan and Adel Kasser, the
major shareholders in Fransabank, own 10%.290 This fusion of
political/economic interests raises interesting questions
concerning both government economic policies and alliances
between politicians and businessmen. We will cite one example
concerning government policy toward the cement industry. In
November 1995, the Lebanese parliamentary finance and budget
committee recommended that the government lower duties on cement
imports and provide special incentives for new cement projects
as a means to break the monopoly of the three cement producers.
As of this writing, we do not have information concerning the
government's response to this important recommendation.
Obviously, if the government chose to ignore it, it would raise
further questions about certain ministers placing their own
economic interests ahead of the general interest.29'
In spite of the increased production of local producers,
imported cement is still needed to meet demand. In 1993, the
Bourn trading group established a cement importing company
called Seament.292
290 MEED (1 December 1995), 16; (27 October 1995), 2-3, 33;
(29 September 1995), 21-22; Flemings Research, Emerging
Opportunities: Cement Review - Eastern Mediterranean, 49.
291 In April of 1993, the price of cement rapidly increased
from $67 a ton to $120 a ton, prompting a public outcry.
However, a close observer of the scene, Mr. Marcos, blamed
factors beyond the control of the cement companies for the
crisis.	 For a succinct analyses of the problem, see -----,
"Crisis in the Cement Market", The Lebanon Report 4, no.6 (June,
1993), 9.
292 See MEED (16 June 1995), 11-19 and 25-26; Flemings
Research, Emerging Opportunities: Cement Review - Eastern
Mediterranean, 41.
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2.9.3.2 Examples of Growth in Other Industries
In 1993, a local ceramic floor tiles manufacturer,
Uniceramic, received a $6 million loan from the I.F.C. to expand
its ceramics plant. Uniceramic, which is headed by Joseph
Ghoara, was the first company in Lebanon to receive a loan from
the I.F.C. since 1978.293
In 1994, a new factory, which produces a variety of pipes,
including glass reinforced plastic pipes, was built in the Akkar
region of Lebanon by the local company Future Pipe Industries.294
The company will use a process licensed by the Pmerican company
Owens Corning Corporation, through its subsidiary Neroc
Technology of Norway. Other technological capabilities were
supplied by Wauin of the Netherlands. The pipes are being
manufactured for water supply and irrigation projects in both
Lebanon and Syria. The project has cost over $35 million, and
was expected to create 700 jobs.295
In 1994, another Dubai based pipe manufacturer, Gulf
Eternit, in a joint venture with the U.K.'s Johnston Pipes,
planned to build a new plant to design similar pipes in the
northern Lebanese city of Chekka. The project has an estimated
cost of about $8 million.296
293	 ED (2 April 1993), 30.
294 The company was set-up by Lebanese owned Future
Management Services.
295 A local contractor was to build the plant. See MEED (4
March 1994), 26-27; (5 November 1993), 2-3, 28; (8 October
1993), 22.
296 Eternit has a plant in Chekka which designs concrete
pipe plants. MEED (4 March 1994), 26-27.
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2.9.4 Problems Facing the Industrial Sector
As noted above, however, the Industrial sector faces many
obstacles to continued growth. Economist Marwan Iskandar listed
several constraints. The most prominent was the lack of an
effective government strategy in the industrial sector. Second,
the sector lacked the proper institutional support. Institutions
overseeing the sector, including the Ministry of Oil and
Industry, and the Institute of Industrial Research lack
qualified personnel and financial resources to properly assist
the sector.297
2.10 Foreign Investment/Interest in Lebanon
Throughout chapters five and six, we have clearly
demonstrated the high level of foreign business activity in
Lebanon. Foreign companies have figured prominently in most of
the projects in the Horizon 2000 plan, and they have also played
a leading role in many of the projects which have been, or are
in the process of being, developed by private interests. We have
also demonstrated the high level of direct foreign investment in
Lebanon, some of which has been quite substantial. These
investments have included, in particular, B.O.T. projects or
enterprises of a similar nature.
In this sub-section we wish to look at additional examples
of foreign investment in Lebanon which have not been discussed
elsewhere.	 We also wish to discuss the increased level of
foreign interest in Lebanon, including companies which have set
297 For a look at some of the problems facing the industrial
sector, see Marwan Iskandar, Lebanese Economy 1995, 106-111.
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up offices in Lebanon, or have established some sort of
relationship with a Lebanese representative.
2.10.1 Direct Foreign Investment
Foreign companies have invested in Lebanon in a number of
different ways. In addition to the types of investments listed
above, these have included the following: operating directly in
Lebanon; buying a Lebanese company; taking a stake in a local
company; operating a joint venture with a local company; or
having a local company represent a foreign company's interest.
Both Gulf Arab companies and Western European ones have
invested directly in Lebanon. We will ,
 cite three examples. In
the summer of 1995, Saudi Arabia's Corral Petroleum Holdings and
the Dubai based Gulf Interstate Oil Company acquired the Fortune
Holding Company for approximately $50 million. The Fortune
Holding Company operated 2 petrol distribution subsidiaries and
146 petrol stations throughout Lebanon. 298 One of the largest
insurance firms in the Arab world, Bahrain based Arab Insurance
Group announced, in 1996, plans to expand to Lebanon. 299 And in
1995, a new company dealing in the liquor trade, International
Distillers & Vintners Lebanon, was launched by a joint venture
of International Distillers & Vintners (I.D.V.), which is the
drinks sector of the U.K.'s Grand Metropolitan, and the local
company Amlevco Trading. The company was to be responsible for
marketing and distributing I.D.V. spirits and Wines in
298 MEED (14 July 1995), 22-23.
299 NEED (10 May 1996), 17.
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Lebanon.300
While the presence of Arab and Western European. companies
in Lebanon is not surprising, it will be of particular interest
to note that several TJ.S. companies have also invested in
Lebanon.	 This has occurred in spite of the U.S. government
travel ban on U.S. citizens to Lebanon. We will cite four
examples of direct investment in Lebanon by leading 1merican
companies. In 1995, a new computer company was launched in
Lebanon, Quantech, to represent the giant U.S. computer company
I.B.M. Quantech is owned by both I.B.M. and local interests.30'
The U.S. company Owens Corning Corporation took an equity stake
in a local firm which produces glass fibre pipes. 302 The
Pmerican firm M.C.I. International has operated a satellite
international telephone service in Beirut since 1993 according
to an agreement with the government. 303 Finally, the giant U.S.
automaker, Ford, decided to return to Lebanon in 1994 after a 30
year absence. The local Boustany-Dandah automobiles will be its
Beirut representative •304
2.10.2 Foreign Interest in Lebanon
In addition to investing directly in Lebanon, numerous
foreign companies have either established an office in Beirut or
they are represented by local agents. During the years 1992 and
300 NEED (21 July 1995), 13.
301 NEED (21 July 1995), 13.
302 NEED (8 October 1993), 22.
303 NEED (17 December 1993), 26.
304 NEED (11 November 1994), 17.
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1995, a number of foreign companies have established a presence
in Lebanon, including such well known brand names as Pepsi Cola
and Adidas. 305 We have already mentioned the number of banks
which have done so. In addition, many Western based construction
firms have also established a presence in Beirut. Moreover,
these offices have often been established as regional bases for
the companies. For example, the U.K.'s Trafalgar House
established a regional office in Beirut in 1995 with the intent
of targeting the "Fertile Cresent" as a place to do business in
the future. 306 In addition, some prominent international
advertising agencies, including the U.K.'s Saatchi and Saatchi,
and B.B.D.O., one of the largest advertising agencies in the
country, have set-up offices in Lebanon. 307 Moreover, some
international media sources, including Reuters, have decided to
open offices in Lebanon, to cover the entire region. This would
help strengthen Beirut's claim to be a headquarters for
multinational firms interested in the region as a whole.
Figures on the number of foreign companies which have
established a presence in Beirut either directly or through a
local representative during the first half of 1996 are
staggering. Within the first half of 1996, 18 foreign companies
have opened offices in Lebanon, with a further 76 foreign
305 For numerous examples of international companies which
established a presence in Lebanon, see Lebanon Opportunities,
Preview Issue, 56.
306 Paul Hood, "Contracting Operations in Beirut", Financial
Times Conference (Beirut: 8-9 June 1995).
307 Giles Trendle, "Flaunting It: Lebanon's Thriving
Advertising Industry", The Lebanon Report 4, no.7 (July, 1993),
7.
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companies represented by Lebanese agents.
companies included:308
Company	 Date of Registration
Origin
Citibank
Malaysian Airlines
Smithkline Beechain
ETDE
Christiani & Nielson
Shenfu Real Estate Development Co.
Ansaldo-Energia SPA
Engineering Business Development Inc.
Berliner Bank Aktiengessllschaft
Saudi Co. for Research and Publishing
CAT Intl. Ltd.
Mothercat Ltd.
Kuwaiti Center for Industrial Metals
SIF Bachy
Kiockner Steel Middle East FZE
Reuters Ltd.
ABB Management Ltd.
Club Flipper
The 18 foreign
Country of
U.S.
Malaysia
U.K.
France
U.K.
China
Italy
U.S.
Germany
S .A.
Chan. Isles
Chan. isles
Kuwait
France
U.A.E.
U.K.
Swiss.
Turkey
6 Jan.
31 Jan.
30 Jan.
24 Jan.
26 Jan.
29 Jan.
6 Feb.
14 Feb.
15 Feb.
15 Feb.
19 Feb.
19 Feb.
11 March
26 March
11 April
9 May
10 May
13 May
The 76 Foreign
Include 309
Companies Represented By Lebanese Agents
Company	 Date of Registration
Fijian Hitachi T.V. Co.
	 3 Jan.
Apparel Ventures Inc. 	 6 Jan.
Tseng-Wang Intl.	 16 Jan.
Sinequanone	 17 Jan.
Acm Hightech Ltd.	 17 Jan.
Office Automation M.E. Ltd.
	
23 Jan.
Heinrich Frings GrnbH & Co. KG 26 Jan.
EMI Music Intl. Services	 3 Feb.
Kali Und Salz GnibH 	 5 Feb.
Shiseido Co. Ltd.	 7 Feb.
NGK Sparkplug Co. Ltd. 	 10 Feb.
Osram GrnbH	 12 Feb.
Telecom Trading SRL
	
15 Feb.
Beam Industries	 15 Feb.
Hard Rock Cafe Ltd.	 24 Feb.
McAipine & Co. Ltd. 	 26 Feb.
Lumen SRL	 27 Feb.
Siemens	 27 Feb.
Leolux Mobefabrik	 4 March
Silca SPA	 4 March
Mirato Nuovo SPA 	 4 March
Country Of Origin
China
U.S.
Taiwan
France
Greece
Chan. Isles
Germany
U.K.
Germany
Japan
Japan
Germany
Italy
U.S.
Canada
U.K.
Italy
Germany
Germany
Italy
Italy
308 The Ministry of Economy and Trade, Business Lebanon, 39.
309 Ibid.
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Mirato Nuovo SPA
LPC Hellas
Snap-On-Tools Intl. Ltd.
Giem Gas SPA
Sciclone Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
D.M.T. Corp.
Compania Roca Radiodores SA
Cellogique
Sumitomo Rubber Industries Ltd
Industrial Parts Distribution
Arc luce
Niba SRL
C&G Carandini SA
Ferraz
Le Livre de Paris et de Quil.
General Electric Co.
Biogenex Laboratories Inc.
GMB Corp.
Thompson Consumer Marketing
Christian Dior
Vapco Vet. & Agric. Products
Van Den Berg Seeds SL
Blanc Pain SA
Ferrari
Big Star Holding AG
P.T. First National Glassware
Kali TJnd Salz GrnbH
Gulf Oil Intl. M.E. Ltd.
Bayex
Rum Metal Manufacturing Co.
Apotex Inc.
Handelmaatschappijvan Rijn
Toshibi Corp.
Galassi Sementi SNC
Importations Ricci Intl. Ltd.
BPT SPA
Sumanthi Newspapers (PVT) Ltd
Kedaung Subur md. Ltd.
Kedaung Medan md. Ltd.
Kedaung md. Ltd.
Kedaung Oriental Porcelain
Kedaung Surya md. Ltd.
Supreme Indo-.Pmerican Indust.
Kanigara Gelas md. Ltd.
Elite Models Fashion Sari.
Anglofranchise Ltd.
Theratronics Intl. Ltd.
Shiseido America Inc.
Alpargatas Santista Textile SA
GTR Group SPA
Elefanten-Schuh GinbH
Gewiss SPA
Prenatal
E-arrs
Haag Streit AG
Black & Decker (Overseas) AG
4 March
7 March
7 March
7 March
7 March
7 March
7 March
7 March
9 March
12 March
12 March
12 March
12 March
12 March
19 March
21 March
27 March
18 April
17 April
19 April
23 April
27 April
7 May
9May
9 May
9 May
9 May
14 May
14 May
14 May
14 May
16 May
16 May
17 May
20 May
22 May
22 May
23 May
23 May
23 May
23 May
23 May
23 May
23 May
25 May
31 May
3 June
7 June
7 June
7 June
15 June
15 June
17 June
17 June
21 June
22 June
Italy
Greece
U.S.
Italy
H.K.
U.S.
Spain
U.S.
Japan
Germany
Italy
Italy
Spain
France
France
U.S.
U.S.
Japan
France
France
Jordan
Spain
Swiss.
Italy
Swiss.
Indonesia
Germany
U.S.
Canada
Jordan
Canada
Netherlands
Japan
Italy
Canada
Italy
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
France
U.K.
Canada
U.S.
Brazil
Italy
Germany
Italy
France
U.S.
Swiss.
U.S. (Dubai)
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Nordyne Intl.	 22 June	 U.S.
Terry of Redditch
	 22 June	 U.K.
International business confidence in Lebanon during the
beginning of 1997 continued to remain strong. For example, the
British owned supermarket chain, Spinneys, has decided to return
to Beirut after an absence of 22 years. As John Bartley, the
executive director of the company explained, "the resumption of
the company's operations in Lebanon is due to the country's
stability and rising confidence in it." 31° The company has
decided to open several branches in Lebanon.311
As one can see from the data which we have presented in
this sub-section,	 Lebanon has succeeded in attracting
international firms to the country. To cite one more impressive
figure, over 80 British companies are presently active in
Lebanon.312
3. The Hariri Government: A Capitalist Developmental State?
A defining feature of Johnson's capitalist developmental
state is substantial government direction of, or assistance to,
the private sector. As we have noted, Hariri'. government has
not been particularly active in this area, preferring to allow
private sector involvement in the recovery process to evolve in
a laissez faire fashion. The exception to this was a number of
government assisted private sector projects to develop vast
areas of land such as the Solidere project in Beirut, and the
310 Quoted in Bassem Ajami, "Spinneys back in Beirut", The
Daily Star (Beirut: Friday 31 January 1997), 9.
311 Ibid.
312 Source: British Embassy in Beirut.
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Linord and Sidon projects. However, government assistance as it
relates to the capitalist developmental state usually refers to
productive sectors, such as industry or agriculture, not to the
development of land or infrastructure. The government assisted
land development projects in Lebanon are not a long term growth
priority. Once the land is developed, and particularly given
Lebanon's small size, the short term construction boon will come
to a conclusion. As with all infrastructure development, long
term benefits in terms of revenue, economic growth, the
generation of new employment, etc., may be derived from the
improvements, but probably not to nearly the same extent that
benefits would be derived if the government were to target a
growth industry and focus investment on it.
4. Summary
As we explained in chapter three, as crucial as the
government's Horizon 2000 programme is in helping to restore the
economy, the success of Lebanon's economic recovery is
ultimately dependent upon the performance of the private sector.
To put it a different way, the government's hopes of returning
Lebanon to its former role as the commercial and financial
capital of the Middle East very much hinge on the level of
private sector investment in the country.
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a survey of
private sector investment in numerous areas of the Lebanese
economy, with a view to establishing several conclusions.
First, we have demonstrated that things in Lebanon have moved
forward, even if it is not possible at this time to draw any
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definitive conclusions concerning the success of the economic
recovery. Second, we have identified both the personalities and
companies, Lebanese and otherwise, which have invested their
resources in Lebanon. Numerous business interests have invested
in Lebanon, including, of course, Hariri and associates, but
also a considerable number of other business interests --
Lebanese, Arab, and to a lesser extent, Western. Two sectors of
the economy, the real estate sector and the banking sector,
received the bulk of the investment. In the real estate sector,
the investments included several government backed private
sector projects such as the reconstruction of the Beirut Central
District, and the Linord and Sidon projects, but also included
some large projects launched by various Lebanese and Arab
interests. We feel that the level of investment in Lebanon that
we have demonstrated throughout this chapter is a relatively
accurate reflection of considerable private sector confidence
both in the Hariri government, and in the Lebanese political
system as a whole. Finally, we also feel that the relatively
high level of international investment in Lebanon, particularly
from prominent Saudi investors, may bode well for the continuing
stability of the Lebanese state, as it follows that they, and
their respective governments, would have a greater interest in
helping to ensure the future stability of Lebanon.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AS A CONSTRAINING FACTOR TO
LEBANON'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY
In chapters five and six of this paper, we have
demonstrated that things have moved forward in Lebanon. The
country's infrastructure network has been greatly improved, and
the private sector has been very active. We have further
demonstrated that international actors, including governments,
organisations, and businesses have taken a relatively strong
interest in both the recovery programme, and in the Lebanese
economy in general. In the latter case, prominent international
investors, particularly from the Arab world, from the Lebanese
expatriate community, and to a lesser extent, from Europe, have
invested extensively in the Lebanese economy, especially in the
real estate, banking, and tourist sectors. This fact may bode
well both for the health of the economy, and for the stability
of the Lebanese state. For example, Arab investors, especially
from Saudi Arabia, have developed a stake in the Lebanese
system, and it follows that they may use their influence with
the Saudi government to ensure that it does all it can to
support continued stability in Lebanon.
Furthermore, macroeconomic indicators under the Hariri
government have stabilised. To begin with, inflation has been
checked. For example, it was reduced from 131% in 1992 to 12%
in 1994.' Second, the Lebanese pound has stabilised at around
1,500 to one-U.S. dollar. Third, the Lebanese economy showed
strong signs of growth between 1993 and 1995 with 13% growth in
1 Bassam Fattouh and Reinoud Leenders, "The Lebanese Economy:
Exaggerated Prospects", 20.
r
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In spite of these relatively positive conclusions, the
Hariri government has continued to face numerous problems,
which, if not rectified, may jeopardise the country's economic
recovery, and, potentially, the stability of the political
system. In fact, as we noted elsewhere, both the recovery
programme and the economy have already slowed down. The problems
faced by the Hariri government included: the large deficit,
which as we have shown elsewhere, was a major factor in causing
a slowdown both in the recovery programme and in the economy;
the growing rift between the rich and poor, which may incline
poorer elements within Lebanese society to be co-opted by groups
unhappy with the present political order, thereby destabilising
that order; the inability to reform the pablic sector, which
accentuates waste and corruption, and turns away potential
investors; the inability to incorporate the Maronite community
within the political system, which has, amongst other things,
kept a good part of the Lebanese Christian expatriate community
from investing in or returning to the country; and the regional
conflict which continues to be played out in South Lebanon, with
all the negative ramifications it entails.
As we explained in chapter two, the Syrians acquiesced, in
spite of earlier misgivings, to a constellation of interests
inside and outside Lebanon, and allowed Rafiq Hariri to become
Lebanon's prime minister, primarily because he was widely seen
as the only figure capable of reviving the Lebanese economy,
and, thus, the fortunes of the post-Ta T
 if system. In addition to
the qualified support of Syria, Hariri had the support of the
majority of Lebanese, and, therefore, to at least some extent, a
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popular mandate to govern. 5 These two factors gave him the basic
support to push through his economic plans for the country.
Once in office, Hariri strengthened his position by
building up an impressive political network to help him carry
out his economic programmes. He managed to bring several of his
associates into the cabinet with him, and also to install
associates at the head of the key economic institutions running
the country, including the C.D.R. and the Central Bank. In
addition, through political appointments, he established a large
class of men whose political careers are dependent upon him.
However, Hariri's great personal wealth, international
connections, mandate to govern, and impressive political power
base, all of which have combined to give him an effective
monopoly over Lebanese economic policy making, have not
necessarily given him the sort of authority he would need to be
the "saviour" that many in Lebanon may have been hoping for. As
Michael Young, the editor of The Lebanon Report put it, "men of
providence come and go - Mr. Hariri being only the latest in an
illustrious line - but they never seem able to reform the
political system they have come to save." 6 .nd the fact is,
Hariri has not been able to reform the Lebanese political
system. On the contrary, he has faced, and continues to face, a
number of serious political constraints in implementing his
economic and political policies. As we will demonstrate below,
A poll taken a couple months after he canie to power showed
that he had a 75% approval rating. -----, "Reflections on
Independence Day", The Lebanon Report 3, no.12 (December, 1992),
3.
6 Michael Young, "Hariri or Chaos", The Lebanon Report 6,
no.1 (January, 1995), 2.
375
he has been so frustrated by these constraints periodically that
he has threatened to resign on several occasions.
In this chapter, we will discuss these political
constraints. In essence, there are two of these: an "internal"
constraint, which consists of Hariri's problematic relations
with the other two key leaders within the institutional set-up
of the Lebanese political process (i.e., the president and the
speaker of the house); and, an "external" constraint, in the
form of Syria's massive and continuing influence over virtually
every aspect of the Lebanese political system. These two
constraints are strongly related. Whereas there might be strong
divisions amongst the three principal institutional leaders in
Lebanon irrespective of any external interference, Syria has
played a very interesting role, exacerbating the problem by
playing the three off against each other (mostly Hariri against
the other two), but also regulating the conflict to ensure that
the system does not break down entirely.
1. The "Internal Constraint": The Troika
As we explained in chapter one, the post-1943 political
order was a confessionally-based patron-client system. Political
leaders would use their positions of power to distribute
patronage to their followers in return for political support.
Essentially, the political leaders of the various sects, through
the use of informal compromises, divided the patronage amongst
themselves. Obviously, those with the most political power, such
as the President of Lebanon, would have access to the greatest
amount of patronage. Moreover, political leaders were also
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likely to use their positions of power to gain financially.
As we explained in chapter two, the Ta'if Accord did not
change the basic foundations of this system, but simply made
some adjustments which lessened Maronite power in favour of the
Sunni and Shiite communities. In fact, the Ta'if Accord made the
necessity for compromise amongst the top leaders even more
essential for the system to function. Although compromising was
important in the pre-Ta'if system, the president was usually
powerful enough that his views prevailed. In the post-Ta'if
political system, the architects of the accord made the
divisions of power between the president, the prime minister,
and the speaker of the house intentionally ambiguous, on the
understanding that the three leaders, as representatives of the
three most powerful communities in Lebanon, would have to
compromise in order to successfully govern the country. The
post-Ta'if political system, has been ruled by what is often
termed the "leadership troika". As one keen observer of the
Lebanese political system explained, "the term [leadership
troika], widely accepted and used, came to legitimise what could
more accurately be called a confusion of powers.'7
Since November of 1992, the governing troika has included
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who is a Sunni, President Elias
Hrawi, who is a Maronite, and the Speaker of the House, Nabih
Birri, who is a Shiite.
Obviously, Hariri, a relatively independent leader backed
by enormous personal wealth and vast international connections,
' Joseph Bahout, "Lebanese Parliamentarism: Shadow Plays and
the Death of Politics", The Lebanon Report, no.1 (Spring, 1996),
28.
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is, by some considerable margin, the most powerful of the three,
and he has certainly been the most crucial player in the
programmes aimed at facilitating the economic recovery of
Lebanon. He is also the only member of the three who had a
developed political and economic programme. (Indeed, it is
actually quite unusual in Lebanese politics for any politician,
or even any political party for that matter, to have a stated
set of political or economic policy goals.) Furthermore, while
the other two members of the troika are traditional leaders who
have, arguably, tended to use the system to advance their own
personal status, sometimes to the detriment of the economic
recovery programme, Hariri's role in government has generally
been seen as a necessity to the health of the Lebanese economy.8
The other two troika members have, however, been a major check
on Hariri's ability to implement his policies.
The speaker of the house, Nabih Birri, has been the second
most powerful man in the governing troika, and is probably
Hariri ! s greatest political nemesis within Lebanon. As noted,
the Ta'if Accord gave the speaker of the house increased powers.
To begin with, his term in office was extended from one to four
years. Second, the speaker was given immense control over
parliament, an institution which must pass all government
legislation including legislation connected to the economic
recovery programme, through his right to decide the timing of
the examination of draft laws in parliament. 9	Finally, the
8 Of course, Hariri has also personally benefitted from his
political position, both through increased political power and
through economic gain.
Joseph Eahout, "Lebanon, Fin de Regne" The Hariri
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speaker of the house, as Joseph Bahout put it, "under the guise
of participating in the 'national destiny', was accorded quasi-
executive powers with the president and the prime minister."10
Through tough bargaining with the prime minister, Birri,
who has the backing of Syria, has been able to gain access to
all sorts of state programmes, which further has increased his
ability to distribute patronage. For example, Birri took control
of the Council of the South, an organisation which received
public funds, and which has, historically, been used by Shiite
leaders to extend their patronage network. As one scholar noted,
the Council of the South acted "as a sort of super-ministry of
Southern affairs and carries out a wide range of activities"."
For example, the Council of the South has had a great influence
over many of the infrastructure projects throughout the south of
the country. Furthermore, as we noted in chapter five, Birri has
been able to gain access to some of the other recovery
programmes. As we recall, this included the awarding of a
contract, to build a major coastal road, to a company owned by
his wife.
The president of Lebanon, Elias Hrawi, has been the weakest
meitber of the troika. However, in his capacity as president,
which means that all legislation must be signed by him, as an
ally of Syria, and as the only Christian member of the troika,
Resignation and the Post-Ta'if System", The Lebanon Report 6,
no.1 (January, 1995), 3.
10 Joseph Bahout, "Lebanese Parliamentarism: Shadow Plays and
the Death of Politics", 28.
" See Adib Ne'meh, "Slipping Through the Crack: Social
Safety Nets in Lebanon", The Lebanon Report, no.2 (Summer,
1996), 49.
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Hrawi has also been able to bargain with Hariri to extract some
concessions to secure for himself the right to distribute
patronage in a number of areas.
In addition to opposition from the other two members of the
troika, Hariri has faced opposition from members of his own
cabinet, and from members of the Lebanese parliament. However,
as we shall see, this opposition is, to a considerable degree,
an extension of the his continuing problems with the other
members of the troika, and of course, with Syria.
As we explained in chapter two, although Hariri was allowed
to place many of his associates in the cabinet, he was forced to
include several pro-Syrian figures, as well as men close to
Birri. As with the members of the troika, these men have also
used their positions in government to secure access to
patronage, and to further their personal economic status. As we
will explain shortly, some of these men have been highly
critical of Hariri, and as a result, he has threatened to resign
on several occasions, demanding that he be allowed (by Syria) to
reshuffle his cabinet.
As noted elsewhere, parliament T s power was greatly enhanced
by the Ta'if Accord. In fact, parliament has been able to
successfully oppose Hariri on several occasions. In February
1993, it refused to grant the government special powers to rule
by decree, as Hariri had wanted. He was also forced to
compromise with parliament on a number of issues including the
1995 budget. 12 Parliament was also highly critical of Hariri's
12, "Legislative Privilege", The Lebanon Report 5,
no.12 (December, 1994), 7.
For a chronology of the major highlights of parliament from
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economic programmes. Criticism of the programmes came from
several figures within the parliament including such independent
and respected politicians as the former prime minister, Salim
Hoss. Basically, they were concerned that the Horizon 2000
programme would plunge Lebanon into a bottomless debt situation.
However, it should be recognised that it was the Speaker of
the House, Birri, who mostly benefitted from parliament's
increased power. Since parliament had the power to delay
executive decrees, a situation arose where, as Bahout put it,
"the prime minister is forced to bargain with the speaker to
insure that draft laws are placed within a reasonable amount of
time on the agenda of the relevant parliamentary committees."'3
Although theoretically, the changes introduced by Ta'if would
have given parliament much greater power, as Bahout further
explained, "these powers were largely confiscated by the speaker
of parliament, who was able to put them to use for strictly
communal ends."4
In the course of the 1996 parliamentary elections, Hariri
and Birri were able to secure the election of a number of their
supporters to parliament, thereby increasing their own influence
within the institution. Hariri had the support of between 30 and
40 members while Birri had the support of a block of
approximately 20 and 25 members. Very few independent
1992-1996, see -----, "Highlights of Parliament, 1992-1996", The
Lebanon Report, no.1 (Spring, 1996), 37-39.
13 Joseph Bahout, "Lebanese Parliamentarism: Shadow Plays and
the Death of Politics", 28.
14 Ibid.
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parliamentarians remained.' 5 As a result, parliament will
continue to be used, to a great extent, simply as a bargaining
chip between elements in the troika to gain access to more
patronage or concessions.
Essentially, therefore, the principal internal constraint
on Hariri's ability to carry out his programmes, is that he has
had to bargain with the other two leaders of the troika
concerning almost all aspects of government business. For
example, they bargained over civil service appointments, over
the establisbment of a nedia law, and over economic policy. This
policy of bargaining between the three members of the troika has
been described, accurately in our view, by one observer of the
Lebanese system as "the splitting up of the Lebanese pie". We
will cite but one of many examples which could be found.
In the autumn of 1996, the Lebanese government passed,
after years of debate, a controversial media law, which limited
the number of private T.V. stations in the country to four, and
the number of private radio stations to eight (this did not
include the government television or radio station). The major
political figures secured the rights to broadcast T.V. and radio
stations. The four T.V. licenses were awarded to Future
Television, which is owned by Rafiq Hariri, the National
Broadcasting Network (NBN), a station which had yet to be
established, which is to be owned by Nabih Birri, Murr
Television (MTV), owned by the brother of the interior minister
Nichel Murr, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation
15 For election details, see the fall 1996 issue of The
Lebanon Report.
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International (LBCI), once the mouthpiece of the Lebanese Forces
militia, but now owned by a number of independent shareholders
including the billionaire and parliamentary deputy, Isam Fares,
and the parliamentary deputy Sulayrnan Franjiyyeh. The situation
was similar in the awarding of radio station licenses, where the,
owners included Hariri and Birri.' 6 The media law was criticised
on several grounds including: that it attempted to monopolise
access to the media; and that it was designed to reap huge
financial gains for the owners.' 7 Indeed, this case is a perfect
example of an obvious conflict between the public and private
interests of the government leaders, a conflict that has been
reflective of a very large proportion of government business.
The almost total lack of any attempt by Lebanon's political
leaders to acknowledge a distinction, or form a separation,
between government and personal interest has not been lost on
the Lebanese population. For example, on 9 December 1994, after
several more scandals in government were revealed, including the
alleged role of some political leaders in the drug trade,
fifty-five intellectuals released a statement condemning the
high levels of corruption in the country.'8
There is no democracy without transparency.
The present controversy is not, as such,
unhealthy; on the contrary, it appears
necessary to get to the bottom of things.
The major problem lies not so much in the
opening of dossiers than in what these
dossiers reveal of the mafia-type relations
-----, "Switching off the Competitioi", The Lebanon
Report, no.3 (Fall, 1996), 8.
" ibid.
18 For a version of the anti-corruption text, see The Lebanon
Report 6, no.1 (January, 1995), 6.
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between those who stand accused and those
who are manipulating accusations. Are not
those who are denouncing scandals today the
same who covered them in the past?
However, the process of splitting up the pie has not been
an easy one. Problems in relations between members of the troika
started immediately after Hariri took power, and centred around
appointments to various political positions. For example, Birri
was unhappy over not being properly consulted over the make-up
of Hariri's cabinet. In particular, he was upset over Hariri's
decision to take over the finance portfolio, a position which
had in recent years, gone to a Shiite. In January 1993, tensions
among the troika (as well as influential ministers) arose over
numerous high level government appointments, which were only
agreed on, after much political bickering, several months later.
The most widespread criticism of the appointments was that they
resulted from political horse-trading among the troika and
influential ministers."' 9 To cite one example, Birri secured the
allocation of the position of director general at the ministry
of emigrant affairs to Haythain Jom'a, who headed ]L\mal's
executive committee. Such a move was unpopular with Lebanon's
emigrant community, which is mostly Christian. 20 Even
ambassadorial appointments were controversial, and were only
agreed on after Syrian intervention.2'
Frustrated both at the inability to get some of his
19, "Appointments Controversy: Government Fills Grade-
One Positions", The Lebanon Report 4, no.6 (June, 1993), 4.
20 Ibid, 4.
21, "Cabinet Appoints Ambassadors", The Lebanon Report
5, no.2 (February, 1994), 7.
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policies through, and at being criticised by certain cabinet
ministers, Hariri either threatened to resign, or did in fact
resign, only to return to work after Syrian intervention. Hariri
first threatened to resign in August 1993, after ministers in
the cabinet criticised him for attempting to rnonopolise power.22
Hariri was reported to have said that he can no longer govern in
an atmosphere of insurrection within his cabinet. 23 The crisis
was defused after Syrian Vice President Khaddam, and the Syrian
head of intelligence in Lebanon, General Ghazi Kanaan,
intervened. 24 In May 1994, Hariri boycotted cabinet meetings in
protest, after his attempt to reshuffle the cabinet to make it
more inclusive by adding more Christian ministers, was opposed
by both Hrawi, who wanted his own Christian allies in cabinet,
and Birri, who demanded a greater Shiite role in the cabinet,
particularly at the finance ministry. Again, Hariri returned to
work under Syrian pressure.25
In December 1995, Hariri actually announced his
resignation, but recanted after Syrian intervention. Two reasons
lay behind his attempt to resign. First, he was outraged over
the constant accusations of corruption directed against him. For
example, Najah Wakim, the outspoken independent parliamentarian
from Beirut charged that Hariri had bribed 30 MPs to vote in
22 Arab Press Service, Diplomat 10, (21/28 August 1993), sp
135.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Arab Press Service, Diplomat 21 (7/14 May 1994), SP 392.
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favour of the creation of Solidere. 26 Hariri was also accused of
planning to profit from a proposed sale, to the Saint Georges
Hotel company, of land apparently reclaimed illegally and worth
$50 million, of which Hariri acquired 70% for a relatively small
amount of money. This accusation was raised at a cabinet meeting
by several ministers including the Minister of Housing and Co-
operatives, Mahmoud Abu Hamdan, who was the unofficial
representative of the Amal movement in cabinet and was close to
Birri. 27 Second, the Parliament refused to pass the 1995 budget
submitted by Hariri because it also contained the entire budget
for the Horizon 2000 Plan. Critics, which included Birri, argued
that the plan should have been submitted and debated separately
from the 1995 budget, as it dealt with expenditures until the
year 2002. Hariri stated that he was resigning to protect
reconstruction projects for Beirut's city centre:28
For two years our efforts have stumbled more
than once against obstacles aimed at
hampering them, provoking doubts and
preventing them from succeeding - as if
Lebanon was condemned to political decay and
under-development. For two years we have
tried to promote the reconstruction poject,
and for two years people have put up walls
in front of us. That is why we have made our
latest decision, a decision we won't go back
on, with the sole aim of defending the
reconstruction project for Lebanon.
As we have noted elsewhere, Hariri's ultimate weapon in
26 Even President Hrawi criticised Hariri for adopting a
"hegemonistic style". Ibid.	 -
27 The issue was also raised by the Minister of Tourism,
Nicholas Fattouh, and Sulayman Tony Franjiyyeh. See Arab Press
Service Diplomat 24 (26 November13 December 1994), SP474.
28 Quoted in Arab Press Service Diplomat 24, (26 November13
December 1994), SP 474.
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securing his policies was to threaten to resign. While
threatening to resign may serve Hariri in attempting to break
through political deadlock, although not always with the desired
results, it tends to have adverse effects on the economy, and in
particular, on the exchange rate. For example, the central bank
was forced to intervene to stabilise the currency, spending an
estimated $342 million of its reserves. 29 Thus, in many ways, the
stability of the economy was dependent on the whims of one man,
a factor which would surely be considered by any potential
investors in Lebanon.
In this case, a compromise deal was hammered out by the
Syrians, in which only some of Hariri's demands were met.
Although the Horizon 2000 plan was to be delinked from the 1995
budget, that draft legislation of some of the most important
projects worth over $2 billion were to be passed by the
parliament. Furthermore, other parts of the plan were to be
dealt with in the first half of l995.° Hariri's attempt to
reshuffle his cabinet, in order to get rid of some pro-Birri
ministries who were opposed to his policies was blocked by the
Syrians. 3' A more homogenous cabinet, however, was realised in
May of 1995, two and a half years after the first cabinet was
formed, as a result of a Syrian brokered deal between Hariri and
Birri.	 Hariri was able to exclude some pro-Syrian members
29 Joseph Bahout, "The Hariri Resignation and the Post-Ta T if
System", 3.
30 For details, see Philip Khoury, "Reconstruction:
Implementing Horizon 2000", The Lebanon Report 6, no.4 (April,
1995), 8.
' Arab Press Service Diplomat 25 (3/10 December 1994), SP
497.
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including the former minister of rural affairs, Sulayman
Franjiyyeh and the former information minister Michel Samaha. As
well he brought into the cabinet his associates Fadl Chalak, who
headed the C.D.R., and Farid Mecari, who was a former president
of Saudi-Oger. Hariri also kept the finance ministry, opposing
Birri's demand that the post be given to one of his allies.32
Tensions among the troika greatly increased after the
parliamentary elections of 1996. It took a couple of weeks for
the troika and Syria to agree on a cabinet. The new cabinet,
32 The new cabinet included the following:, see Arab Press
Service Diplomat (20/27 May 1995), SP 415.
Premeir & Finance Minister	 Rafiq Hariri
Deputy Premeir & Interior Minister . Michel Murr
Foreign Affairs Minister	 Fares Buwayz
Defence Minister	 Mushin Dalloul
Economy Minister	 Yassin Jaber (new)
Petroleum & Industry Minister	 Shahe Barsumian (new)
Information Minister	 Farid Mecari (new)
Justice Minister	 Bahige Tabbara
Health Minister	 Marwan Hamadeh
Education Minister	 Robert Ghanem(new)
Social Affairs Minister	 Stephen Douweihy(new)
PTT Minister	 Fadl Chalek(new)
Public Works Minister	 All Harajli (new)
Emigrant Affairs Minister 	 Ali Khalil (new)
Displaced Persons Minister	 Walid Jumblatt
Agriculture Minister	 . Shawki Fakhury(new)
Labour Minister	 Assad Hardan (new)
Water & Electric Resources Minister Elie Hubayqah
Cultural Affairs & Higher Edu. Mi	 Michel Edde
Tourism Minister 	 Nicolas Fattouh
Public Transport Minister	 Omar Meskawi
Housing & Cooperatives Minister 	 Mabmud .Pbu Hamden
Rural Affairs Minister	 Hagop Demerdjian (new)
Environment Minister	 *Joseph Mughayzel (new)
Vocational & Technical Edu. Mi	 bdel Rahim Mrad (new)
State Minister for Finance 	 Fuad Seniora
State Minister without Portfolio	 Nadem Salem(new)
State Mm. for Administrative Reform 1nwar Khalil
State Minister without Portfolio	 Kabalan Khoury(new)
State Minister	 Fayez Shukr(new)
* He had passed away shortly after coming into cabinet.
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Hariri's third since taking power in 1992, was slightly less
homogenous than his previous cabinet and included such
noteworthy critics as Sulayman Franjiyyeh, and Talal Arsian.
Furthermore, depending on which way the political wind was
blowing, Juniblatt can also be seen as a partial critic of
Hariri.
In fact, relations among the troika leaders effectively
broke down between the autumn of 1996 and the first half of
1997. Birri, in particular, with Syrian encouragement, was
increasingly critical and hostile towards both Hariri and Hrawi,
accusing the other two leaders of pursing policies which were
aimed at lessening his power. Moreo yer, all three leaders
attacked each other over a host of issues, including corruption.
For example, all three leaders accused each other of aiding
corruption at the finance ministry. Apparently, senior
politicians connected to all three members of the troika where
linked to a situation where employees at the finance ministry
sold counterfeit fiscal stamps for profits worth millions of
dollars.33
Under such conditions, it is likely that Birri, and his
external allies, and other political leaders would try to
frustrate any programmes or policies, including economic ones,
set out by Hariri. Relations among the troika had worsened to
such a degree, that Birri, in the winter of 1997, declared the
troika system dead. 34 All three leaders were in constant touch
-----, "The Troika Divided", The Lebanon Report, no.4
(Winter, 1996), 5.
-----, "2n Unruly Threesome", The Lebanon Report, no.1
(Spring, 1997), 4.
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with Syrian leaders to ensure their support. Whether or not
Syria mediates an end to the conflict very much hinges on Syrian
interests. As we will explain below, by the early part of 1997,
Syria was interested in lessening Hariri's power, however, not
to an extent that would seriously destabilise the Lebanese
S ys ten.
2. The "External" Constraint: Syria
As we explained in chapter two, Syria has been, and is, the
dominant political and military power in Lebanon. Both the
Syrian army and the Syrian secret police have penetrated nearly
all facets of Lebanese society, making any form of opposition to
either Syria, or the Syrian sponsored political order in
Lebanon, extremely difficult. Furthermore, Syria has cultivated
an impressive group of political dependents. For example, to a
considerable extent, both Hrawi and Birri owe their power to
Syria. In addition, several ministers, and numerous members of
parliament also owe their positions primarily to Syrian
influence. Very few political decisions are made without first
consulting Damascus. Lebanese politicians, including all three
members of the troika, regularly travel to Syria to consider
Syria's opinion before proceeding with a policy. In addition,
Syrian leaders such as Khaddam regularly visit Beirut, while
Syrian leaders based in Lebanon, such as the head of Syrian
military intelligence, General Kaanan, are in constant contact
with Lebanese politicians to ensure that Syrian interests are
given adequate consideration. Given this deep level of Syrian
Lnvolvement in Lebanese politics, it is hardly surprising that
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Syria has also played a major role in shaping relations among
the nembers of the troika.
Syria's primary interest in Lebanon has been to ensure the
presence of a stable pro-Syrian government which is prepared to
defer to Syria in dealings with regional and international
powers, especially those dealings which relate to Israel. Syrian
interests are also increasingly linked to the Lebanese economy.
The Syrian economy has become increasingly tied to the Lebanese
economy primarily through Syrian migrant labourers working in
the country. Estimates of the number of Syrian workers vary from
approximately 500,000 to a million, contributing a sum of around
$1 billion to the Syrian economy. 35 It is not surprising
therefore, that Syrian leaders signed a Labour Accord with
Lebanese leaders in the autumn of 1994 regulating, or, to put it
more accurately, legitimising, the presence of Syrian workers in
Lebanon. In addition, several Syrian leaders have developed
substantial business interests in Lebanon.
Having said all of this however, we would argue that it
should be recognised that the relationship between the Syrian
and Lebanese leaders is considerably more complex than is widely
recognised. Although Syria clearly is dominant, a few Lebanese
leaders at least, have considerable influence with Syria's
leaders, and are occasionally able to gain Syrian support for
their initiatives in Lebanon. We have already noted that Syria
sometimes supports the personal interests of important political
The respected daily, al Nahar, put the total number of
Syrian migrant workers at 650,000, most of whom were employed in
construction and agriculture. Arab Press Service Diplomat 18,
Recorder Covering (15/22 October 1994).
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allies such as Hrawi and Birri. Indeed, one might argue that men
with these kinds of ties to Syria are unlikely to be in a hurry
to see Syrian power in Lebanon decrease. If it were to decrease,
or if Syria were to withdraw its military and security services
from Lebanon, it is unclear to these leaders whether or not they
would survive politically. 36 In addition, one must understand
that many of the Lebanese leaders, and businessmen including
Hariri, the interior minister Michel Murr, and the deputy Isain
Fares are extremely wealthy people, and it is probably standard
practice for them to buy influence with the Syrian leadership.
To put it a different way, if they want something done, they
offer the Syrians financial incentives to facilitate the
process. As one observer of the Lebanese scene explained: "it's
like a mafia relationship.' 37 Some of the prominent Lebanese
politicians and businessmen seem to have personal allies within
the Syrian leadership. For example, Hariri and Khaddam, the
chief Syrian official vis-a-vis Lebanon, have some sort of
relationship which extends into the business world, and some
people feel that Khaddam occasionally advocates Hariri's point
of view in Damascus.38
As noted, Syria allowed Hariri to take power primarily so
that he could improve the economy, thereby stabilising the pro-
Syrian political order. However, Syria has been intent on
limiting Hariri's power base strictly to the economic domain,
36 Interview with Michael Young on 24 February 1997 in
Beirut.
Interview in Beirut 1997.
38 Interview with Michael Young 24 February 1997 in Beirut.
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while continuing, itself, to exercise effective control over
Lebanese foreign policy, and domestic security issues.
Syria's approach to the troika leadership is indicative of
its approach to the Lebanese political situation in general. In
short, Syria plays a game of divide and rule with the troika,
thereby securing its role as the ultimate arbiter among the
three leaders. Syria has skilfully played the three leaders off
against one another, ensuring that no one leader (particularly
Hariri) dominates, and that all three remain dependent on Syrian
goodwill. As noted, Syria has great influence over Birri and
Hrawi, both of whom are essentially dependent on Syria for their
continuing political survival. Syria often expresses its policy
preferences through them, and at the same time, perhaps to
encourage their continuing loyalty, tends to be sympathetic to
issues which are of personal concern to them (status, access to
sources of patronage, etc.) However, while Syria has generally
tended to limit Hariri's room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis the other
two members of the troika (and its other political allies in
cabinet) it has been careful not to antagonise him to too great
an extent, for fear that he would resign, causing a crisis in
the economy, and thus risking the pro-Syrian political order.
Syria's policy of divide and rule also extended to the
relations between the Lebanese government and the Lebanese
people. The general idea was to prevent any leader, Hariri
particularly, in this case, from gaining too broad a base of
support among the population -- especially among those parts of
the population which are opposed to Syria's dominance of
Lebanon. Such a base of support would obviously increase a
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politician's popular legitimacy, lessening Syrian control over
him. We will cite the example of Syrian policy towards Lebanon's
Christian community. Syria has been concerned to prevent an
alliance between Hariri and the Christians who, for the most
part, remain strongly anti-Syrian.
As we have explained elsewhere, Lebanon's Christians,
particularly the Maronites, who have been effectively leaderless
for some time, were marginalised in the post-Ta'if political
system. 39 The most popular politicians within the community, such
as General Michel Aoun, were in exile, and in spite of attempts
by the various exiled leaders to organise a political movement
which would form an opposition party to the government, they
have been mostly ineffective in influencing political
developments in Lebanon. 4° In the meantime, Hariri has generally
been seen as the most legitimate leader in Lebanon, the one who
is doing the most to promote the general welfare by pushing
through the reconstruction programme. In short, the Christian
community has been in a position where they might potentially be
co-opted by Hariri.
Perhaps because it does not wish to see this happen, Syria
has attempted to further marginalise the Christians. One example
Within Lebanon itself, the Cardinal Sfeir, had become the
defacto leader of the Maronite community.
40 On 21 November 1996, it was announced that several
prominent exiled Christian leaders have established an
oppositional organisation called the Lebanese National Grouping.
It was to include General Aoun, the former President, 1min
Gemayel, and Dory Chamoun, the son of the former president
Camille Chamoun. However, this group is unlikely to make any
impact on the political scene in Lebanon in the foreseeable
future. Even their traditional ally, France, is supportive of
the government, and has called on Christians to participate in
government.
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of this concerns Syria's insistence on the imprisonment of the
former Lebanese Forces militia leader, Samir Geagea. He is
currently serving a life sentence in prison for crimes very
similar to those which have likely been committed by many of the
people currently in the government. While few Christians
sympathised with Geagea during the war years, many view his
punisbment as idiomatic of the Christian position in post-War
Lebanon 41
An example, which more clearly illustrates Syria's concern
about the possibility of a political accommodation between
Hariri and the Christians, has to do with Hariri's attempt in
1994 to broaden Christian support for his government by
including more independent Christians in cabinet. The move was
vetoed by Birri, which one would expect, but also by the
Christian president, Hrawi. As we have noted previously, Hrawi's
base of support among Lebanese Christians is tenuous,
essentially because of his relationship with Syria. He, and, no
doubt, his Syrian sponsors, were apparently unwilling to allow
potentially more popular Christians into the cabinet.
The main point that we wish to make is that elements within
Lebanon's Christian community, especially those within the
expatriate community, were unwilling to invest vast resources
into the Lebanese economy, as long as Syria remained the
dominant power in Lebanon.
Hariri's lack of control over foreign policy and security
issues also had an adverse affect on the Lebanese economy. This
included Syria's continued support for Hizb Allah activities
41 Interview in Beirut in the winter of 1997.
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against Israel in the south, which many in the Lebanese
government would like to stop, but are powerless to do anything
about. The continued conflict in the south led to two 'widescale
Israeli military operations against Lebanon, one in 1993, and
the other in 1996. The conflicts caused enormous damage both to
Lebanon's infrastructure, and to Lebanon's economy. According to
one of Lebanon's leading economists, Marwan Iskandar, Israel's
16 day military operation in April 1996, which was dubbed Grapes
of Wrath, cost Lebanon some $500 million. The conflict may have
cost Lebanon's tourist industry alone approximately $150
million. We will cite two concrete examples concerning the
effects of the conflict on the hotel trade. First, a group of
Japanese tourists cancelled their booking (which was for
September 1996) at a leading Beirut hotel, and second, Beirut's
Cavalier hotel lost about 100 European businessmen and
tourists 42
The damage to the Lebanese economy arising from the
continued instability in the south is very difficult to
estimate. However, it is highly likely that many potential
investors,, both Lebanese and foreign, and potential tourists,
would be wary about investing in or travelling to Lebanon as
long as the problems in the south continue.43
An independent Lebanese foreign policy, which may include a
wish to end the conflict in the south as quickly as possible, is
unlikely in the face of determined Syrian opposition. Hariri's
42, "What did Grapes of Wrath Cost?nI, The Lebanon
Report, no.2 (Summer, 1996), 26.
-----, "The April Understanding", The Lebanon Report, no.2
(Summer, 1996), 10.
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efforts to seek even a very limited independent Lebanese foreign
policy have been met with extreme concern by Syria, which has
responded, in each case, by attempting to weaken his position.
We will cite a couple of examples. Syria was opposed to Hariri's
visit to Washington during the Friends of Lebanon conference in
Washington in December 1996, in which Hariri was trying to
secure aid that was promised in compensation for Israel's Grapes
of Wrath operation. In particular, Syria was worried that
Washington and Hariri would form closer ties, thereby lessening
Syrian power in Lebanon. The second example centred around
Hariri's visit to Paris in mid-February 1997. During the
meeting, it was hinted that France might play a role in south
Lebanon. Syria worried that this meant that Lebanon might come
to a separate agreement with Israel, or, at the very least, it
would mean that France would cut into Syrian power in Lebanon.
Aware of Syrian sensitivities, Hariri convinced President Chirac
to telephone Asad to ease his mind about the fact that the two
of them would not make any unilateral moves in the south. 44 It
was partially because of Syrian displeasure with Hariri, that
Syria gave the "green light" for its allies (Hrawi and
particularly Birri) to be more critical of Hariri, which, as we
have noted, led to the escalating tensions that led to a
functional breakdown of the troika following the parliamentary
elections of 1996.
3. The Hariri Government: A Developmental Capitalist State?
As we have noted previously, the existence of a strong
44	 -	 'VAn Unruly Threesome", 5.
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state, a state capable of developing and implementing coherent
growth-oriented economic policies, is central to Johnson's
conception of the capitalist developmental state. At the end of
chapter five, we explained that Lebanon does not conform to this
aspect of the model due to the system of bargaining and
compromise which is an inbuilt characteristic of the Lebanese
political process rooted in the sectarian character of Lebanese
society. Throughout the course of this chapter, we have shown
how Hariri has been forced, by domestic political imperatives
and, particularly, by Syrian penetration of the Lebanese
political process, to engage in this system of bargaining and
compromise. This has obviously affected the coherence of
economic policy to the detriment of the recovery programme.
Beyond this, the current political process in Lebanon has
seriously endangered the recovery process by distorting the
government's priorities. In Johnson's conception of the
capitalist developmental state, the state's primary policy
objective is to foster economic growth. Theoretically, this
policy focus far from conflicting with the government's natural
interest in retaining power, would almost always tend to serve
it, because a healthy economy disrupts the ability of rival
elements to effectively challenge the status quo. In Lebanon the
situation is complicated by the fact that the elite elements in
each of the major sects need patronage to secure their political
positions. If the patronage is not fairly widely distributed
across the sects, the system breaks down. There is no over-
arching mechanism for ensuring that this balance is maintained,
which is why the system of bargaining and compromise is so
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important. However, the fierce competition among politicians for
sources of patronage, which entails a considerable level of
"under the table" dealing and corruption, often escalates to the
level where it becomes an end in itself irrespective of larger
political and economic concerns. With respect to the recovery
process, this tendency has been manifest in the distribution of
contracts for political reasons instead of on the basis of
competitive bidding, in the large "commissions" claimed by
politicians for their involvement in virtually every aspect of
the recovery process, in the distribution of bureaucratic
appointments on the basis of patronage considerations rather
than on the basis of merit, etc. Personal interest has becone
such a feature of the politics surrounding the recovery process
that one must question whether the economic well-being of
Lebanon remains as the government's top priority. Given that
relations among menibers of the troika have become increasingly
strained, it may be no exaggeration to claim that survival has
become the top priority of the government.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
The general purpose of this study was to look at the post-
war economic reconstruction of Lebanon. More specifically, our
primary aim was to examine, within the context of development
theory, the institutional arrangement for implementing the
various reconstruction programmes. In order to address these
points, we examined several important areas: We looked at how
the economic leadership of post-war Lebanon developed, we
identified the institutions providing economic leadership, we
explained the plans for Lebanon's reconstruction programme, we
identified the groups which have participated in the
reconstruction, and we looked at the principal obstacles to the
economic recovery of the country.
In this chapter, we will restate briefly the major
conclusions reached in this study. In section one, we will
identify the forces behind the reconstruction programme, and the
economic recovery in general. In section two, we will comment on
the validity of the Horizon 2000 programme and other government
programmes aimed at rehabilitating the Lebanese economy. And in
section three, we will address the primary issue in this study,
namely, the appropriateness of the institutional arrangement
used to implement the recovery programmes. In addition to
stating the major conclusions reached in the study, we will end
this chapter by including a brief postscript on the potential
for future political instability.
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1. Conclusions About The Forces Behind the Reconstruction
Programme, and the Economic Recovery of Lebanon
1.1 The Importance of Rafiq Hariri to the Economic Recovery
Programme
The first major conclusion reached in this study is that
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and his personal network have been
the crucial forces in pushing through the economic
reconstruction of Lebanon. lthove all else, he rejuvenated and
stabilised a very unpopular and precarious post-Ta'if political
system. One must bear in mind that the two previous post-war
governments failed miserably, not only in their attempts to push
through similar economic programmes, but even in their efforts
to halt the decline of the Lebanese economy. As we have seen,
Hariri has had considerable success, both in pushing through the
reconstruction programme and in stabilising the Lebanese economy
-- particularly with respect to improving certain macroeconomic
indicators such as currency valuation and rate of inflation.
We have argued that P.M. Hariri's success in taking control
of the recovery programme can be explained in terms of three
factors.
First, his massive personal wealth, his considerable array
of connections to Saudi and Western business interests, and the
widespread feeling that he was personally indispensable to the
reconstruction of the Lebanese economy, have given him great
leverage in dictating the terms of the reconstruction. Hariri's
importance to the recovery programme, and to the Lebanese
economy in general, has been demonstrated by the fact that when
he has threatened to resign, Lebanon's economy has shown signs
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of entering a sharp decline.
Second, to a great extent, Hariri has made the
reconstruction programme the centre-piece of his administration,
and has taken personal charge of it. He has appointed men loyal
to him to leadership positions in the major economic
institutions of the country, including the Central Bank, to the
key institution managing and implementing the reconstruction,
the Council for Development and Reconstruction (C.D.R.), as well
as to vital ministerial portfolios.
And third, by giving extensive powers to institutions such
as the C.D.R., which are loyal to him, and yet somewhat
autonomous from the political system, he has been able to remove
the programme, to at least some extent, from the political
process, in which it would, more than likely, have been delayed
or effectively crippled by frequent political disputes.
However, at the same time as they have contributed to the
success that Hariri has enjoyed to date, these three factors
have also undermined Hariri's personal credibility to some
extent. For example, the extremely high level of personal
involvement which has enabled Hariri to accomplish so many of
his goals, has also left him open to frequent accusations that
he is primarily concerned about his own personal stake in the
Horizon programme, and other projects, and the benefits that he
may eventually derive from them. Hariri stands to derive
enormous profit particularly from his stake in the development
of the Beirut Central District, and from other property
development projects such as the Linord and Sidon projects.
In addition, in spite of Hariri's dominance over the key
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economic institutions, he has not been able to completely remove
the recovery prograrrune from the political process. He has
certainly succeeded to the extent that he has been able to
bypass the time consuming debates and modifications that would
surely have impeded the programme if it had gone through the
normal political channels. He has been able to use the C.D.R. as
a sort of parallel public sector to implement substantial
elements of the progranune. However, he has faced, and continues
to face, a number of serious political constraints in executing
his economic and political policies. In essence, Hariri's power
has been checked by the other key members of the institutional
set-up of the Lebanese political process, including the
president and the speaker of the house, and, by the key power
broker in the country, Syria. As a consequence, Hariri has had
to negotiate with the other two members of the troika, and with
Syria, in order to push through the recovery programme. Part of
the bargaining process included allowing politicians, or
political forces, access to some of the reconstruction projects,
which they have used as sources of wealth and patronage. As a
result, in many cases, decisions about such matters as the
awarding of contracts have been based on political rather than
economic considerations. As one observer of developments in
Lebanon put it, "Lebanon's reconstruction program has become a
fountainhead of influence and wealth, from which the political
class, many deputies included, have benefited". 1 Given the
extremely serious problems that the government has encountered
1 Michael Young, "The Price of Politics", The Lebanon Report,
no.3 (Fall, 1996), 22.
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with respect to funding the recovery programme, Hariri's
inability to iinmunise it from this aspect of the political
process is potentially very serious.
1.2 The Dominance of the Wealthy Classes
A second major conclusion reached in this study is that
Lebanon's wealthy classes, irrespective of their sectarian
affiliations, and including numerous expatriates who made their
fortunes outside of Lebanon, have been heavily involved in the
rebuilding of Lebanon, even if only through the reinvestment of
some of their resources into the country. Most of the
investments were in the real estate market, including numerous
large real estate development projects. Others have simply
invested some of their enormous fortunes in the Lebanese banking
system, significantly contributing to the country's balance of
payment surpluses.
One might also argue that Lebanese businessmen, most of
whom made their fortunes outside of Lebanon, have represented a
new political elite, and have become the doininaht domestic force
in post-Ta'if Lebanon. Hariri and his associates are the most
obvious example of this. However, many other wealthy Lebanese
businessmen have entered politics vis-a-vis the 1996
parliamentary elections, including the billionaire Isain Fares.
Given this situation, it is not surprising that the post-
Ta'if political and economic order has heavily favoured
Lebanon's rich and super-rich. Many of the Hariri government's
initiatives have tended to create advantages for this class. For
example, corporate and personal taxes were reduced to 10% or
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less, and the government ensured that there would be no capital
gains tax on such things as land sales. As one critic of the
government noted, "it is a crime that a rich man like Hariri
does not pay any taxes.!!2 The government's initiatives appear to
reflect a general belief in the trickle down school of economic
growth, an economic policy tried by the Reagan administration in
the U.S. during the 1980s. The main losers in this system have
been the poorer elements in society.
1.3 The Participation of International Actors in the Recovery
Programme and in the Economy in General
The third major conclusion reached in this study is that
the international' community, including international
organisations, such as the World Bank, foreign governments, such
as Italy, and important international companies, such as Siemens
of Germany, have all been actively involved in the recovery
programme. Aid for the recovery programme has come from several
foreign governments, numerous international aid agencies
(particularly those connected to the Gulf arab states) and
international organisations. The international business
community, especially from Western Europe, has been awarded the
most crucial contracts in the recovery programme, some of which
were worth tens of millions of dollars. In addition,
international consultancy firms, again, particularly from
Western Europe, were awarded many of the consültancy contracts,
including the main ones to assist the institutions managing the
2 Interview in Beirut in the winter of 1997.
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recovery programme.
In addition to participating in the recovery programme, we
have also demonstrated that the international business
community, especially from the Gulf Arab countrie.s, has made
significant investments in Lebanon. Most of the investments,
however, have gone into real estate and tourist developments,
including some of the vast development projects such as
Solidere.
Given the level of international economic involvement in
Lebanon, one might further argue that the international
community as a whole has a vested interest in maintaining the
stability of the Lebanese system, a possibility that bodes well
for Lebanon's future. However, it is important to note that,
although the most of the prominent players in the international
community have participated in Lebanon's reconstruction, the
United States has been a notable exception.
2. Conclusions about the Horizon 2000 Prograrrime, (and Other
Programmes Including the Development of the B.C.D.)
In this section, we will explain briefly the major
conclusions reached concerning the Horizon 2000 programme. As we
noted in this study, the Horizon 2000 Programme is a public
expenditure programme aimed at rehabilitating Lebanon's
devastated physical and social infrastructure network. 3
 We have
argued that the plan was a necessary component of Lebanon's
Kamal Shehadi, for example, prefers to see it more as a
aggregation of individual projects in the various sectors,
rather than a plan.
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recovery, not only in the sense of providing a proper
environment for attracting business confidence, but also in
terms of alleviating the hardships of all Lebanese. However, we
feel that although the plan, or something along very similar
lines, was necessary, one may raise questions concerning
specific aspects of it, and, generally, concerning the extent of
infrastructure development which was really necessary. The
Horizon 2000 Plan is exceedingly expensive as written, and may
leave Lebanon a legacy of overwhelming public debt instead of
the surpluses and prosperity which were its stated aims.
Naturally, one way to decrease the cost of the plan, would be to
determine which projects are strictly ' necessary to Lebanon's
present well-being, and which are luxuries which Lebanon cannot
afford. Critics, however, have questioned whether or not the
present government's priorities reflect this kind of
consideration.
For example, the government has attempted to build an
infrastructure that would reflect its goal of making Beirut the
financial and commercial capital of the Middle ast. Thus, plans
included the construction of an enormous airport, and the
construction of numerous roads, although it is unclear whether
or not Lebanon really needs such an airport, or a road network
of that magnitude. Other government initiatives, including the
government-backed private sector projects such as the immense
Soliclere project to develop the Beirut Cential District, are
being constructed on the understanding, or hope, that Beirut can
regain its role as a financial centre.
A number of economists and other observers of the Lebanese
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scene, however, have seriously questioned the validity of the
government's plans of trying to return Beirut to its traditional
role as the financial capital of the Middle East. 4 Even the
assertion that Beirut ever was a real financial centre has been
questioned. As the economist P. Khoury put it, "Lebanon was
never much of a financial center, just an intermediary between
Arab money and Western banks and markets." 5 Besides, the critics
would argue that many of the factors which made Beirut a
financial centre are no longer valid. For example, with the Suez
canal having reopened, Beirut will no longer be needed as a
transshipment point. Second, the Gulf states, no longer need to
use Beirut as a banking intermediary. Since 1975, they have
developed sophisticated infrastructure of their own, and have
increasingly tended to deal directly with Western bankers.6
Finally, with the advent of the information age, one could
question the need for a regional financial centre at all.
Certainly, as we concluded in chapter five, the Lebanese
government does not have the financial capability to proceed
with many of the projects. In fact, the gov&cnment is having
great difficulty paying for many of the programmes which are in
the process of being implemented. As we have noted, the focus of
the plan, during the first few years, was to rehabilitate the
physical infrastructure. It is possible that, having proceeded
For a succinct look at this line of argument, see P.
Khoury, "Servicing Lebanon: The Government's Economic Vision",
The Lebanon Report 5, no.2 (February, 1994), 5.
Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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with this, the government may choose to abandon many of the
social programmes which were to be implemented in the latter
years of the Horizon 2000 programme. Although the rehabilitation
of physical infrastructure was definitely a priority, one may
question whether the reconstruction, and particularly some of
the projected improvements, in this area, are all that useful in
the long term if social problems, such as education and
affordable housing for the hundreds of thousands of poor
citizens and people displaced by the war, are not also
adequately addressed.
Having said this, however, we feel that critics of the
Hariri government's plan(s) have failed- to offer sound
alternatives. Let us look at just one example. One option which
is frequently advanced by critics is that the government should
concentrate on building up the industrial and agricultural
sectors of the economy, rather than on trying to re-establish
Beirut's role as a regional financial centre. According to the
critics, the advantage to this is that the industrial and
agricultural sectors would employ more people, and would,
therefore, be more practical. However, this may not itself be a
particularly practicable option, for many reasons, including the
fact that Lebanon lacks a disciplined labour force. In addition
to requiring the bulk of the physical infrastructure work, it
would also require, perhaps to an even greater extent,
substantial investments in the social infrastructure which are
not forthcoming.
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3. Conclusions About the Institutional Framework Established
to Implement the Horizon 2000 Plan
As we have explained elsewhere, the primary purpose of this
study was to examine, within the context of development theory,
the institutional arrangement for implementing the various
reconstruction programmes. In chapter one of this study, we
introduced several theoretical models of development that
examined linkages between economic growth and specific
institutional arrangements in several East Asian countries.
These included works by Olsen, Haggard, Wade, and Johnson. All
of them shared a common central argument in their studies of
East Asian development; they argued that a • strong government,
autonomous from societal actors, strategically intervened in the
economy to achieve impressive economic growth. Although all of
these models are similar, we used Johnson's model to test the
Lebanese case, since it is, perhaps, the only one to give a
detailed description of a developmental state. In particular, we
looked at some of the key aspects of the model including the
concept of strategic intervention in the economy, and of the
autonomy, and power of the economic bureaucracy. We noted that a
preliminary survey of the situation in Lebanon suggested that a
number of the key characteristics of successful institutional
arrangements, particularly Johnson's model of the capitalist
developmental state, may apply. In the course of the study, we
attempted to determine whether the Lebanese state actually does
possess the basic characteristics Johnson establishes for the
capitalist developmental state. We have argued in this study
that the Lebanese state does not possess the basic
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characteristics of either Johnson's model, or other similar
development models, and cannot, therefore, be considered a
developmental state. Furthermore, we have argued that the
Lebanese model itself is not an appropriate or effective one for
implementing the recovery programme. In fact, the institutional
arrangement may jeopardise the recovery programme. Below, we
will note some of the main conclusions reached concerning the
institutional arrangement used to implement the recovery
programme.
3.1 The Lebanese Model: A Strong and Autonomous State?
As we have indicated, Lebanon clearly •does not possess a
particularly strong or autonomous state in spite of Hariri's
mandate to rebuild the economy, his considerable personal
influence, or Syria's acquiescence to his priorities in the
economic sphere. Hariri's government has been quite strong in
relation to the other two post-Ta'if governments, but it does
not approach the standard that the theoretical model of a
capitalist developmental state would seem to require. The system
of bargaining and compromise which is rooted in the sectarian
character of Lebanese society, and which is therefore an in
built characteristic of the Lebanese political process, has
obviously affected the coherence of economic policy to the
detriment of the recovery programme. We have shown how Hariri
has been forced, by domestic political imperatives and,
particularly, by Syrian penetration of the Lebanese political
process, to become increasingly engaged in this system of
bargaining and compromise, and we have also seen how the
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corruption and excessive competition engendered by the system
have threatened the ultimate success of the economic recovery
programme.
3.2 The Lebanese Model: A Development Oriented State?
While it would probably be fairly accurate to say that
economic development has been the principal priority of the
Hariri government, and even its raison d'etre, we have concluded
that this must be qualified by an acknowledgement of the extent
to which personal interest and the imperatives of political
infighting have obscured this priority and interfered with the
government's ability to effectively run the economy, and
particularly the recovery programme.
3.3 The Lebanese Model: Strategic Government Intervention in
the Economy?
A defining feature of Johnson's capitalist developmental
state is substantial government direction of, or assistance to,
the private sector. As we have noted,. Hariri's government has
not been particularly active in this area, preferring to allow
private sector involvement in the recovery process to evolve in
a laissez faire fashion. The exception to this was a number of
government assisted private sector projects to develop vast
areas of land such as the Solidere project in Beirut, and the
Linord and Sidon projects. However, government assistance as it
relates to the capitalist developmental state usually refers to
productive sectors, such as industry or agriculture, not to the
development of land or infrastructure. The government assisted
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land development projects in Lebanon are not a long term growth
priority. Once the land is developed, and particularly given
Lebanon's small size, the short term construction boom will come
to a conclusion.
3.4 The Lebanese Model: An Autonomous and Effective Econoxn.ic
Bureaucracy?
We have given a great deal of attention to the C.D.R.,
which, as we noted, was supposed to serve as an autonomous elite
economic bureaucracy, to do away with the inefficiencies of the
public sector and implement the programme as quickly and
efficiently as possible. In terms of its organisation, the
C.D.R. was designed with technical expertise and efficiency in
mind. In contrast to the public sector, it was staffed by
technocrats hired on the basis of merit and it was supported by
highly qualified international consultants. In addition, the
C.D.R. was supposed to be autonomous vis-a-vis the bureaucracy
and the political process, and, hence, not subject to its
endemic conflict, compromise and personal interest, which would
very likely have dramatically altered the content of the
programme and significantly delayed its implementation.
We have argued that the C.D.R. has done reasonably well in
managing and implementing the recovery programme. above all
else, it has been able to achieve a great deal, particularly
relating to the rehabilitation of Lebanon's physical
infrastructure, including the electricity sector, the
telecommunications sector, and the solid waste sector. In
addition, the C.D.R. must be commended for its ability to manage
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such a large project. For example, thousands of projects either
have already been completed or are in the process of being
implemented; hundreds of contractors and consultants have become
involved; project types ranging from the very simple to the very
complex have been integrated into the programme; and a diverse
range of funding for the projects has been attracted and
administered.
As we have argued throughout the study, however, the Hariri
government was unable to remove completely the programme from
the political arena. Because Hariri effectively controls the
C.D.R., and because it has relied on Hariri's personal influence
to push through its initiatives, it is, in effect, only as
autonomous from the political process as Hariri is. As Hariri
has become increasingly engaged in the political process, the
whole programme has been opened to the bargaining, compromise
and corruption that are inherent parts of that process.
3.5 The Lebanese Model: A Developmental State?
As is clear from this study, Lebanon does not really
conform to Johnson's model to any significant degree, and,
indeed, it clearly does not conform to any rapid development
model that stresses the need for a strong state. Lebanon also
does not conform to the neoclassical school, which does not
stipulate the need for a strong state, but which requires the
supremacy of the free market. The functioning of the free market
in Lebanon is constrained by the high level of state
involvement, in the sense of personal interest, competition for
patronage, etc., and also by Syrian political imperatives. Given
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development models, and given other problems that we have
raised, such as the debt issue, and relatively unique problems
such as the sectarian divide and the Syrian occupation, it seems
appropriate to raise questions regarding the future prospects of
the recovery programme and of the economy as a whole. Few would
argue that Lebanon does not need a modern infrastructure. Still,
we are inclined to question the benefit of spending billions of
dollars on this kind of development without a corresponding
comprehensive reform of the public sector. If the kinds of
corruption, inefficiency, and lack of technical expertise, that,
in part, necessitated the creation of the C.D.R., continue to
persist after it has fulfilled its role, there is a very real
danger that a multi-billion dollar investment will effectively
go to waste.
4. Postscript: The Potential for Future Political Instability
Before concluding this study, we wish to raise the issue of
the potential for future political instability in Lebanon. As
any student of Middle Eastern politics will be aware,
personalities, ratther than institutions dominate the political
systems of most Arab countries. The list of contemporary
examples is very extensive indeed. Muainmar al Qaddafi
essentially personifies power in modern Libya. Saddam Hussein
has continued to exercise almost exclusive personal control over
the Iraqi state in spite of continued attempts by domestic and
foreign actors to overthrow him. King Hussein of Jordan
symbolises the Jordanian state. Hafez al Asad has been the
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symbolises the Jordanian state. Hafez al Asad has been the
undisputed dominant figure in Syrian politics for almost three
decades. To some extent, this level of importance, if not this
level of control, could also be said to apply to Rafiq Hariri in
Lebanon.7
Hariri's personal dominance over the Lebanese economy, and
the continuing belief that he is indispensable to the recovery
process, raise some interesting, and, perhaps, worrying
questions about the ultimate prospects of the reconstruction,
and of the current regime. To begin with, it may be appropriate
to raise an issue that is often raised with reference to regimes
dominated by one man: what if he passes away? For that matter,
what if the economic situation or the political system becomes
so intolerable, that Hariri resigns? In the context of the
Lebanese political system and the economy, is there an
alternative leadership candidate who can fill Hariri's shoes in
terms of domestic and international connections, popularity, the
credibility that he has brought to the recovery progranime, etc.?
By extension, acknowledging that Syria is the true dominant
force in Lebanon, one must consider the impact of potential
political instability in Syria. Given President Asad's age and
apparent ill-health, it is conceivable that Syria may soon
suffer a leadership crisis. Even the most seasoned observers of
the Syrian scene do not know how the post-Asad succession will
' Both Hariri and Syria were so concerned about maintaining
the stability of the troika, that they chose to override
Lebanese constitutional considerations, in order to ensure the
extension of Hrawi's presidential term. This exemplifies that
personalities, rather than institutions, have become predominant
in Lebanon.
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resolve itself, and it is even more difficult to speculate about
the impact that such a development will have on Lebanon.8
8 One possible scenario is that Syrian iorces would be
inclined to return to Syria to help settle the leadership issue,
thereby leaving a power vacuum, which Hariri and the Lebanese
army will attempt to fill, either as competitors or as partners.
This kind of situation night present an opportunity for the
Maronite community and other disaffected groups to assert
themselves.
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